Preserving the ABM Treaty

1. Preserving the ABM Treaty Written By: Sidney D. Drell; Philip J. Farley; David Holloway International Security, Vol. 9, No. 2. (Autumn, 1984), pp. 51-91 A Presentation By: Judy Wang, pp. 51-78

2. The Case against Missile Defense: • Futile: Offensive missiles would prevail in a competition • Costly: Maintain deterrent threat • Destabilizing: Speed up arms race • -compete to build defensive system • -come to build offensive missiles to overcome opponent’s defensive system • -pressure to strike first (fear other side’s defensive capabilities)

3. Preventing War and Reaching a Common Goal: • Other Measures besides ABM Treaty: • 1971 agreement on “hotline” –reduce risk of accidental war by allowing leaders to communicate during crises • 1973 agreement to prevent nuclear war and to act to avoid a nuclear war during crises • Agreed to ABM Treaty in 1972: to avoid nuclear war and its “devastating consequences for all mankind” • -accepts deterrence as a necessary condition instead of as a threat • Self-deterrence: suicidal for any country to start a nuclear war • Does self-deterrence still apply today? Does it apply to rogue states? If self deterrence works, why fear a nuclear threat at all?

4. About the ABM Treaty and Reagan: • Article V.1: “each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. • Vague: on purpose so as not to rule out other devices that can be developed in the future. As long as treaty is amended, these devices are not exempt. • Reagan, March 23, 1984: Wants to build a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) • Escape from reliance on mutual deterrence, but interim goal is to enhance deterrence • 1985-1989: a cost of 26 billion dollars • Says it is consistent with ABM….for now

5. The Soviet Perspective • Late 1960’s, Soviets began to doubt effectiveness of ABM systems. • Increased confidence in deterrence, realized that both sides vulnerable to a devastating retaliatory strike if it attacked first. • Desired ABM Treaty b/c without it… • Upset the nuclear balance • Lead to an unconstrained race in ABM systems and the further deployment of offensive forces • Not effective vs. offensive missiles

6. View U.S. weapons program as a way to gain strategic superiority. • Criticized Reagan’s speech as a way for the U.S. to undermine its commitment of making progress in limiting and reducing offensive weapons • Serious Threat and Rejection of ABM Treaty • Soviets would respond by building their own

7. Soviet Activities • Soviets still focus on how to wage a war and defeat the enemy • Soviet Activities in ABM technologies: • Upgrading the Moscow ABM system, fully operational since 1970 or 1971 • Replace Galosh interceptor missiles with SH-04 and SH-08 nuclear-armed missiles (allows them to use atmospheric sorting to differentiate between real vehicles and ecoys) • New phased-array radars to complement missile detection

8. Soviet Activities (cont) • SH-04 and SH-08 could be used to create a nationwide defense • Building a radar that fills a gap in the Soviet early warning system, claim the radar is designed for space tracking and thus, consistent with the Treaty • Surface-to air missiles (SAMs) improved capability to deal with smaller radar cross sections and shorten reaction times • SA-12reported to have been tested vs. ballistic missile reentry vehicles, a violation of Article VI.a of the ABM Treaty. • No concrete evidence that Soviets will pull out of ABM Treaty

9. Missile Defenses • Space-Based Chemical Lasers: • Can travel the speed of light in space above the atmosphere • Complex, expensive, vulnerable to attack, effective countermeasures, must function above atmosphere. • Complexity of defense system: page 68. • Three Layer Defense system, if 90% effective, would allow only 8 out of 8,000 to arrive on target • Other weaknesses: • Vulnerable to direct enemy attack with space mines • Countermeasures such as disruption of operations, like sensors and communication links, would render it inoperable. • Decoys

10. Pop-up systems • X-ray lasers, driven by nuclear explosives and mounted onto a missile that can be launched rapidly. • Idea is to mount this system on a rocket to be boosted into space upon detection of a missile attack • Most important conflict is if the system can be deployed rapidly enough to attempt a boost-phase intercept • Must be based near Soviet territory due to the shape of the Earth • Countermeasures: • High-thrust “hot” missiles that burn below the top of the atmosphere • Alter trajectory of launch

11. Hybrid System • Ground-based lasers whose beams are aimed up to a small number of large relay mirrors that then direct the beams to mission mirrors, which then redirect the beams onto their targets. • Fewer parts in orbit that space-based system, avoids time constraint of pop-up • Unavoidable technical and operational problems • Vulnerable to attack

12. Mid-Course Intercept and Battle Management • Target the post-boost vehicles, then target the individual warheads. • Generally harder to target: smaller • Warheads are smaller and harder still and more numerous—can also dispense light decoys, which follow the same path • Can confuse sensors with anti-simulation (making warheads look like decoys) • No real viable defense

13. Terminal Defense • No prospect for defending the nation against a massive attack • Easier to do b/c of recent technological advances, and b/c the goal is to destroy enough warheads to cause the attacker to expend more of his force than he destroys