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Context of Situation

Palestinians in Jordan: Using Game Theory to Analyze the Potential for Palestinian and Jordanian Integration. Context of Situation.

amaya-hartman
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Context of Situation

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  1. Palestinians in Jordan:Using Game Theory to Analyze the Potential for Palestinian and Jordanian Integration

  2. Context of Situation The relationship of Palestinians with Transjordanians within is a side-effect of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 and poses a serious issue to the population of Jordan. This study attempts to capture the interactions between the two ethnicities through a game theoretic analysis. The emergence of a prisoner’s dilemma and consideration of the future reveals that ethnic integration is not very probably within Jordan.

  3. Thesis Payoff structures identifying the interactions as prisoner’s dilemmas emerge through an examination of each group’s participation in the parliament, the educational sector as well as passport/residency status. Extending the interactions into the future develops the model of an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (IRPD), in which a discount factor will display why the two groups may continue to remain distinct rather than fully integrating.

  4. UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

  5. Palestinian Undergraduate Payoff Ranking

  6. Jordanian University/Government Payoff

  7. The Game After Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies

  8. Parliamentary Elections

  9. Palestinian Voter Payoff Rankings

  10. Jordanian Gov’t Payoff Rankings

  11. The Game

  12. Residency

  13. Palestinian Immigrant Payoff Rankings

  14. Jordanian Government Payoff Rankings

  15. The Game

  16. General Interactions

  17. Palestinian Payoff Rankings

  18. Transjordanian Payoff Rankings

  19. The Game

  20. Finding A Discount Factor Strategy: Trigger strategy (Tr) Expected payoffs under cooperation and defection given Trigger strategy: EP(C|Tr) = R + R + 2R + 3R + … = R + R*(1/(1-)) EP(D|Tr) = P + P + 2P + 3P + … = P + P*(1/(1-)) Solving for equilibrium discount factor: R + R*(1/(1-) = P + P*(1/(1-)) * = (T-R/T-P) Discount Factor of Education: Undergraduates: 5-4/5-3 = ｽ Jordanian Gov’t: 3-2/3-1 = ｽ Discount Factor of Parliament Elections: Palestinian Voter: 4-3/4-2 = ｽ Jordanian Gov’t: 4-3/4-2 = ｽ Discount Factor of Residency: Palestinian Immigrant: 4-3/4-2 = ｽ Jordanian Government: 4-3/4-2 = ｽ Discount Factor of General Interactions: Palestinian Jordanians: 3-2/3-1 = ｽ Transjordanians: 3-2/3-1 = ｽ

  21. The Private Economic Sector

  22. Potential for Deadlock

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