Thoughts on the Next Force Planning Construct

1. Thoughts on the Next Force Planning Construct

2. Overview • Force planning constructs since the end of the Cold War • The Quadrennial Defense Review: what’s next? • Opportunity to create new Service visions • What is a Force Planning Construct? • Guidance on the size (capacity) and shape (mix of capabilities) of U.S. Armed Forces needed for a range of planning scenarios • Includes assumptions on the nature of the operating environment, frequency and concurrency of contingency operations, steady-state and surge requirements, force availability, etc.

3. 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR)Force Structure Building-Block Approach POST-CONFLICT PERIOD ENGAGED IN ONE MRC SHIFTING TO TWO MRCS ENGAGED IN SECOND MRC SITUATION: PEACETIME WIN MRC #2 MRC #2 WIN MRC #1 MRC #1 RESERVE FORCES OVERSEAS PRESENCE STABILITY OPS POST-CONFLICT STABILITY OPS RESERVE FORCES PEACEKEEPING RESERVE FORCES DEMOCRACY OVERSEAS PRES. OVERSEAS PRES. OVERSEAS PRES. PEACEKEEPING DEMOCRACY PEACEKEEPING FORCES ENGAGED HA/DR OVERSEAS PRES. HA/DR HA/DR STRAT LIFT STRAT LIFT STRAT LIFT STRAT LIFT STRAT LIFT NUKE DETER. NUKE DETER. NUKE DETER. NUKE DETER. NUKE DETER. ACTIVE FORCES STRAT LIFT ACTIVE FORCES STRAT LIFT ACTIVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES ACTIVE FORCES ACTIVE FORCES FORCES AVAILABLE RESERVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES RESERVE FORCES • Assumed a force that was properly sized for 2 major regional contingencies (MRCs) could also support smaller-scale conventional operations (“lesser included cases”)

4. 1997 QDR Construct“Bottom-Up Review Light” • Major QDR Objectives • Preserve the Bottom-Up Review force planning approach, create a rationale for cuts to force structure and personnel • Address requirements to support multiple, concurrent smaller-scale contingencies • Continue capability enhancements to support operations to halt invasions (e.g., improved surveillance and precision strike) Most significant cuts

5. 2001 QDR Construct“1-4-2-1” • Major Objectives • Size for homeland defenseand smaller-scale contingencies • Accept risk in the second of 2 major theater wars • Deter forward to prevent conflicts, rather than respond to crises • Shift from optimizing for conflicts on the Korean and Arabian Peninsulas to a broader range of scenarios 1-4-2-1 1 • Defend the United States; • Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions; 4 • Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving the option for decisive victory in one of those conflicts – including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and 2 • Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations 1

6. 2006 QDR Refined Wartime Force Planning Construct “Michelin Man” • Support wartime requirements • Change the capabilities mix, forces sized about right • Prioritize capabilities for 4 focus areas • Build partner capacity Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping Homeland Defense Global Deterrence Consequence Management Interdiction Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping Stability Operations War on Terror Irregular Warfare Train & Equip Transnational Deterrence Information Operations Foreign Internal Defense Counterinsurgency Active Partnering & Tailored Shaping Information Operations Conventional Campaign(s) Stability Ops Reconstruction Consequence Mgmt. Forward Presence Major Combat Operations WMD Elimination Regional Deterrence

7. 2010 QDR Force Planning / Sizing Construct • Multiple scenario cases for near-term (next 5 to 7 years) and mid- to long-term (years 7 to 20) planning • Preserved 2 war planning requirement, prioritized capabilities that can rapidly “swing” between theaters • Project power in anti-access/area-denial environments Mid- to Long-Term Scenario Case Scenario Case Scenario Case or or

8. 2011-2012 Comprehensive Strategic Review Update • No longer size for large-scale, long-duration stability operations • Asia-Pacific rebalancing • Another nuclear forces cut may be possible Surge (Illustrative) Steady-State • Support continuing counter-terrorism operations • Sustain other “steady-state” mission demands • Maintaining a stabilizing global presence • Nuclear deterrence • Homeland defense, defense support to civil authorities • Lesser contingencies

9. Visualizing Steady-State and Surge Demand over Time STEADY-STATE OPTEMPO SURGE OPERATIONS PHASE 4/5 OPERATIONS Theater #2 Deny Objectives / Impose Unacceptable Costs on Opportunistic Aggressor Theater #1 Combined Arms Campaign to Defeat Aggression COCOM Force Requirements Defeat Homeland Defense Support to Civil Authorities / Consequence Management Presence Steady State: Nuclear Deterrence, Support to Counter-Terrorism Operations Air Force Rotation Goal Active 1:3 (1:4 desired) Rotation Policy Reserve 1:5 (AF 1:10 volunteerism) Component Full Mobilization No force rotation Rotation Policy 1:2 Active 1:5 Reserve

10. Different Elements of the Force are Sized to Support Different Requirements • Rotational • Post-surge rotational • Examples • Examples • Air superiority fighters, bombers • Low-density, high-demand • Strategic mobility • Majority of the fighter force • Theater mobility

11. What’s Next?

12. One Approach Increase timing between major warfights Change surge scenarios to enable force structure/end strength cuts (e.g., adopt new operational concepts that emphasize global surveillance and strike, cyber, SOF, “swing” forces, undersea warfare, etc. vice deploying forces to engage in major ground operations) Decrease steady-state and long-term rotational requirements In other words, “do less with less”

13. Impact? • These changes could have profound implications for the Air Force’s AC/RC mix • Post Surge Rotation 1:2 Active 1:5 Reserve

14. Another Approach: An FPC That Better Focuses the Services’ Unique Capabilities Predominately Air and Naval Capabilities Predominately Ground and Expeditionary Capabilities • Expeditionary Crisis Responses • Building Partner Capacity • Sustained Counter-Terrorism Operations • AirSea Battle in the Western Pacific • Global Swing Forces • Hybrid Major Contingency • WMD Elimination Operations • Joint Theater Entry Operations Capability Requirements Expeditionary Combat Support, Force Enablers, Force Generation Capabilities, etc. Range of Defense Planning Scenarios

15. Create New Service Strategic Concepts Hand-in-Hand with the Next FPC “The fundamental element of a military service is its purpose or role in implementing military policy … the strategic concept of the service…a description of how, when, and where the military service expects to protect the nation against some threat to its security.” “Changes in the principal threats to the security of any given nation … must be met by shifts in national policy and corresponding changes in service strategic concepts” — Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, 1954 • Operational domains that are increasingly contested • Asia-Pacific rebalancing • Growing need for systems that are survivable, persistent, multi-mission capable, and can operate from access-insensitive areas • New visions should consider:

16. Emerging Threats and New Scenarios Should Drive a Different Force Mix Future Gulf? Future Pacific? UK Bases Aviano AB 2,355 nm 22x greater than Iraq’s landmass 1,850 nm Denied Areas Taiwan Strait Tehran Andersen AFB 1,500 nm Denied Areas 1,000 nm Key Considerations Denied Areas Sea Base • Increased depth of the battlespace • Close-in bases at risk • Average range to possible target areas > 1,200 nautical miles • Campaigns may be protracted 2,400 nm Potential target sets much greater in size, more time-sensitive, more mobile, better concealed, better hardened, deeply buried 2,200 nm DiegoGarcia Northern RAAF Bases

17. Future Air Force: Creating an Effective Density of Surveillance & Strike Capabilities at Range • A future force capable of attacking the full range of targets in contested environments • Greater focus on preparing for potential Asia-Pacific operations • America’s “swing force” that can rapidly deploy to a 2nd theater to deter or spoil opportunistic acts of aggression • A force that takes full advantage of new technologies (unmanned, DE, other) to maintain freedom of action in the air, space, and EM spectrum • Balancing mix of short-and long-range • Fully harnessing the robotic revolution • Dominating the EM spectrum • Creating resilient forward postures

18. Future Navy: Creating a Force Mix that Maximizes Striking Power from the Sea • Improve the ability of aircraft carriers to project power ashore and into contested areas • Take advantage of manned and unmanned undersea capabilities that can operate in denied areas • Take advantage of new technologies that could create cost/exchange ratios favorable to the United States • Prepare for operations that may be of long duration • Getting the future carrier air wing right • Harnessing the potential of cyber & DE • Expanding payloads of the submarine fleet • Developing the right • PGM magazine

19. Harnessing the Power of Combinations in the Pacific Space Assets More Dispersed, Resilient Basing Posture Air-Breathing, Long-Endurance Communications Relays Aerial Refueling Standoff Strike Platforms Undersea Land-Attack Capacity Penetrating Munitions Standoff Strike Platforms Electronic Warfare Expendables Penetrating Bombers Next Generation Jammers Carriers with Longer Range Air Wing Capabilities Penetrating, Carrier-based Multi-Mission UCAV

20. Future Marine Corps: Leveraging Expeditionary Capabilities • Focus on rapid crisis responses • Not a second land army • Distributed operations in the Pacific and Middle East • Work with allies and partners to establish forward expeditionary operating locations • Joint theater entry ops (different than traditional “forcible entries) • Right-sizing expeditionary lift • Modernizing the • STOVL force • Supporting capabilities for distributed ops • Fielding next generation EW capabilities

21. Future Army: Preparing for the Post-Invasion Era • New approaches and capabilities for imposing costs in the Pacific and Persian Gulf • Focus on preparing for hybrid and counter-WMD operations • Land-based sea control Land-based long-range strike Air and missile defense Leveraging the indirect approach: SFA, BPC Land-based sea denial

22. Summary • Early 1990s: End of Cold War >> shift to conventional theater • contingency scenarios • 2001: 9/11 >> address homeland defense requirements • 2002-2013: Iraq, Afghanistan >> major expansion of SOF, CT, unmanned aircraft, building partner capacity, etc. • Today • End of 12 years of war >> no large-scale stability ops • Pacific rebalancing, A2/AD challenges, WMD proliferation, hybrid conflicts >> time for a new FPC rather than an “update” that sustains the status quo

23. The Proof Will Be In The Budgetit may be time to finally break the “golden rule” • 1993 BUR • Today Air Force Navy & Marine Corps Army Defense-Wide • Service Shares of the Base Defense Budget Does not include funding for overseas contingency operations

24. Questions

25. Defense Budget? Baseline:No Additional Cuts FY14 President’s Budget Scenario B: Half Sequester Scenario A: Full Sequester (In FY14 Dollars)

26. CSBA Strategic Choices Exercise Reshape for Future Challenges Example exercise results for a full sequester scenario • Accelerated next bomber procurement • Funded new stealthy, multi-mission remotely piloted aircraft • Added precision-guided munitions to help offset force cuts • Invested in airborne directed energy weapons $150 B $100 B $50 B $0 B -$50 B -$100 B -$150 B -$200 B -$250 B -$300 B -$350 B Air Strategic Sea Personnel Readiness S&T Logistics, Basing Missile Defense Special Operations Land, Expeditionary Space, Cyber, Comms

27. CSBA Strategic Choices Exercise Reshape for Future Challenges Example exercise results for a full sequester scenario • Traded military and civilian personnel, contractors, to support modernization • Reduced near-term readiness FY14-18, fully restored readiness for FY19-23 $150 B $100 B $50 B $0 B • Traded DoD TACAIR for long-rangecapabilities • Kept Air Force above 1,000 combat-coded fighters • Traded non-survivable RPAs for a new generation of stealthy, multi-mission unmanned vehicles • Reduced strategic and tactical airlift -$50 B -$100 B -$150 B -$200 B -$250 B -$300 B -$350 B Air Strategic Sea Personnel Readiness S&T Logistics, Basing Missile Defense Special Operations Land, Expeditionary Space, Cyber, Comms