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LOCAL PERSPECTIVE Government Relocation Strategies: To nearby rural areas:
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LOCAL PERSPECTIVE Government Relocation Strategies: To nearby rural areas: Located to areas with much less fertile land, majority of which were located on extremely steep slopes, making it nearly impossible to grow sufficient crops to sustain themselves; resulting in a drastic decline in income. To nearby urban areas: They generally moved in with family or friends, and are pushed into the industrial sector to seek employment. There was high competition for resources, making it very difficult for the migrants to create a sustainable lifestyle. Many felt that with living in such an environment felt they have lost traditional skills and the social and business networks they once had, and therefore found it very difficult to adapt to the new settings. Far away, to neighbouring provinces: A response to the dissatisfaction of the previous two strategies. However, the people were very hesitant to move so far away as they felt they would become completely disconnected from their places of origin. Adapting to a new environment was very difficult for the migrants, as they were forced to learn how to cultivate new and unfamiliar varieties of crops. Not only was there a drastic decrease in their incomes, there was a loss of social and cultural values and traditions. In addition, the residents of the host communities were very hesitant on welcoming the migrants, with whom they were to share their own land with. The local people voiced their opinions through protests in Beijing, but the government failed to listen. The government had also made promises to compensate those who were relocated, however a great deal of the people never received it, and if so it was much less than what was promised. Rather, the government officials tended to keep a great deal of the funding for their own use rather than supporting the displaced locals. 三峡大坝 • FACT SHEET • Started in 1994, completed in 2008 • Located on the Yangtze River, which flows for 6,418 km • 101 meters tall, 2309 meters long • Capacity of 18,200 MW of electricity • Storage capacity of the reservoir is 22 cubic kilometers • Total costs estimated to be $88 billion American dollars “submerged 13 cities, 140 towns, and 1,350 villages, and displaced 1.3 million people” “the world's largest relocation project” Forced Migration Three Gorges Dam “12% of the resettlement budget has been embezzled” WCD KEY DECISION POINTS WORLD DAM REPORT The World Commission on Dams was established in May 1998 in response to the escalating local and international controversies over large dams. The commission was to research the environmental, social and economic impacts of the development of large dams globally, funded by the World Bank and the World Conservation Union. The final product of the WCD was launched in 2000 and established a comprehensive set of guidelines for dam building to date and issued seven strategic priorities and five key decision points, illustrated in the figure on the right. GOVERNMENT PERSEPECTIVE The high capacity of the reservoir will drastically reduce the frequency of major downstream flooding from once every ten years to once every 100 years. The dam will also provide clean energy to the local residents, and will increase river shipping from 10 million to 100 million tones annually, cutting transportation costs by 37%. The State Planning Commission held an evaluation meeting of 350 representatives from concerned ministries and commissions in 1983, and also had a cost-benefit analysis proposal done. There were many expert and inspection groups involved in the process. Chinese government promised to keep the financial support to the local people during the relocation process and for another 20 years. By March 2006, the Migration Found had raised 51 billion RMB, and built 42 million square meters of housing. This Migration Found is part of the money earned by the hydro-electricity generated by the dam. NGO PERSPECTIVE Environmental NGOs in China address a wide range of environmental challenges, including the ones concerning large scale dams and hydropower projects. These have also engaged a number of Chinese NGOs both in Beijing and in the regions where the dams are slated for construction. Over time, there has been a “radicalization” of the rhetoric of NGOs engaged in dam protests, possibly due to the support of international NGOs such as International Rivers Network, so that Chinese NGOs now talk extensively about social justice and displaced peoples rather than focus exclusively on consequences for the environment or ancient cultural sites. Other NGOs, focusing solely on human rights have been involved in the 3 Gorges dam since the Chinese government decided upon building the dam, such as Human Right Watch. 拆迁移民 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE The World Bank and the US Export-Import Bank were stung by vicious critiques of other hydro projects that it sponsored, so therefore decided not to fund the project in China. The export credit agencies of Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, France and the UK all promised support for potential suppliers from their countries. Canada also offered long-term commercial loans to China. Closer to home, Japan decided positively on the building of the dam, and they offered long-term commercial loans as well, after initial hesitation. The Three Gorges Dam project acts as a guideline to current and future dam projects around the world, demonstrating both positive and negative processes and outcomes. • Sources: • International Waters (2009). China’s Three Gorges Dam: A model of the Past • Heming, L., Waley, P. & Rees, P (2001). Reservoir Resettlement in China: Past experience and the Three Gorges Dam. The Geographical Journal, 167(3), p. 195-212. • Three Gorges Dam Hydroelectric Power Plant, China (2011). Retrieved from http://www.power-technology.com/projects/gorges/ • Allin, S. (2004). An Examination of China’s Three Gorges Dam Project. Retrieved from http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-12142004-125131/unrestricted/SAllin_010304.pdf • Report of the World Commission on Dams (2000). Dams and Development. Earthscan Publications Ltd. • Environmental Groups and Activists in China (2011). Retrieved from http://factsanddetails.com/china.php?itemid=388&catid=10&subcatid=66 • Economy, E.C. (2011). China’s Environmental Movement. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-environmental-movement/p7770 Created By: Rebekah McLeod, Tabitha Maat, Ru Wan, Marco Becking