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Fiscal aspects of health systems

Fiscal aspects of health systems. William Jack Georgetown University Motivated by “The fiscal sustainability of health care in Canada” Gregory Marchildon, Tom McIntosh, and Pierre-Gerlier Forest. Total health spending in Canada. Is spending sustainable?. 1990-2002: ~constant, 9-10% of GDP

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Fiscal aspects of health systems

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  1. Fiscal aspects of health systems William Jack Georgetown University Motivated by “The fiscal sustainability of health care in Canada” Gregory Marchildon, Tom McIntosh, and Pierre-Gerlier Forest

  2. Total health spending in Canada

  3. Is spending sustainable? • 1990-2002: ~constant, 9-10% of GDP • But pressures lurk on the supply side: • New technologies • Prescription drugs …..and the demand side: • Ageing • How should additional costs be financed?

  4. Outline of comments • Basic principles • Mixed systems • Some tax policy issues

  5. Basic principles

  6. Basic principles: I. Efficiency • Raise money with minimal distortions • Tax system design • Maybe link taxes to benefits • Spend money on the right things • There is such a thing as too much health care • Provide insurance • …..without diluting incentives

  7. Basic principles: II. Equity • Redistribute from rich to poor • Use the income tax system • Generally, don’t use differential commodity taxation, or the health system • Redistribute from healthy to sick • This is insurance • Redistribute from low risks to high risks • Risk adjustment mechanisms?

  8. Generating funds with mixed systems

  9. Public-private mixes • Canada: separate by service type • Public insurance for physician and hospital services • Private (some public) insurance for drugs, dental, vision, long-term care • An alternative: separate by service quality • Public insurance for basic care (of all kinds) • Private insurance for higher quality care

  10. Quality differentiated systems • Chile: public-private • Public health care: general tax finance • ISAPREs: risk-based premiums • Colombia: public-public • Basic “subsidized regime”: general tax finance • Higher quality “contributory regime”: payroll tax finance

  11. Dual public-private systems • “Relieve the burden on the public system” • Assumes taxes on those who opt out remain in place • Allowing people to opt out with their taxes will not help budget position • Paying them to opt out could reduce net revenues • Compare with public-private education policies • Should governments subsidize private schools?

  12. Insurance market competition • Can competition help us “spend the money well”? • Need to define the package – uniform or differentiated by risk? • Adverse selection – the good risks drop out • Affordability – package could be too expensive for bad risks and/or the poor • Administrative/marketing costs

  13. Dual public-public systems • Price discrimination • Over-finance the higher quality public system • Use extra funds to expand lower quality system • Is this better than general taxation? • efficiency, equity, political feasibility? • Should the government get into other businesses to raise money for the poor?

  14. Tax policy

  15. User fees • Raising money or spending it well? • Is health care an efficient and/or equitable tax base? • or are user fees “taxes on the sick”? • “Distortionary” effects of user fees should in fact be positive • The impact on risk exposure and equity might not be

  16. What is our model of demand? • Do user fees deter only the use of “unnecessary” care? • If not, then • (a) some people who need care are making bad choices, and • (b) some who don’t need care are being conned • Suggests the need for supply-side cost-sharing

  17. Tax-subsidies to health insurance • Effects of tax-subsidy – too much private insurance • moral hazard? • or too little support for public insurance? • Is a tax-subsidy regressive? • (a) Effective MTRs can be high on the near-poor • (b) Optimally designed tax system might include deductibility of health

  18. Tax treatment of out-of-pocket spending • Medical savings accounts • Use pre-tax income to pay OOP costs • Can this reduce moral hazard problems? • Nominal cost-sharing rate could increase • Include insured expenses in taxable income • Effect is to increase cost sharing • But nominal cost-sharing rate could fall • Is it efficient for different people to face different prices?

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