REVIEW OF Burkina Faso PDNA Process

1. REVIEW OF Burkina Faso PDNA Process Lessons Learned and Key Reflections United Nations Development Programme

2. OVERVIEW OF PDNA Disaster context: date of crisis, overview of affected sectors, extent of damages • September 1st Heavy rains (263 mm in 12 hours) affected capital Ouagadougou anda11 regions out of 13 in Burkina Faso. • More than 150,000 people wereaffected; halfwerechildren. The damages to social and physical infrastructure werevery important - Housing, schools, health and livelihoodmostaffected PDNA timeframe: activities from initial request to final product • The government of Burkina Faso requested technical and financial assistance from WB and UN on a PDNA from October 19 to November 6, 2009 • November 5th 2010: presentation of the preliminary results to the GoBF • End of November report support submission of the PDNA report to the Government of BF • 14 of April 2010 presentation and validation of the PDNA report by the GoBF

3. OVERVIEW OF PDNA, Continued Description of key stakeholders: relationships between govt., World Bank, HC/RC, UN agencies and EC The GoBF took the lead and demonstrated strong leadership at the level of the PM. But our FP institution for the PDNA exercise was the Ministry of Economy and Finance - junior staff appointed for coordination. Key UN agencies: WHO, UNICEF, UN-Habitat, FAO, and WFP. The RC provided a strong leadership in terms of coordination and BCPR supported with the deployment of a Surge advisor in addition to the allocation of emergency grant for coordination and assessment. Regular coordination meeting stillorganized by RC; resourcesmobilizedthrough CERF and BCPR to support coordination and assessments. The local EC office neverinvolved but both the WB and UN consultedthem on a regular basis

4. OVERVIEW OF PDNA, Continued Training on PDNA: content, management, timing, participation, frequency, partnerships • Workshop well attended • WB good presentation based on the ECLAC. • UN unprepared - complete improvisation. BCPR on ER and the integration of ER and Recovery related issues into both the assessment and the final report - amateur compare to WB. • Time allocated for UN system limited. In a 2 days workshop participants received a huge amount of information to digest. Recovery framework: final output, recovery projects, monitoring system • A consultant was hired and deployed by BCPR for 3 months to prepare the ER and Recovery framework.

5. Overview of PDNA Process Role of Government: level of govt. leadership, communication between govt. and UN system, World Bank, EC, civil society, etc. • Ministry of interior was leading the humanitarian phase; wanted the Humanitarian phase to be limited in time and quickly move to recovery and reconstruction. • Strong overall coordination by PM - excellent relationship with UN, WB and civil society. • But - direct counterpart Min Economy and Finance - minimum capacities, lacked basic information to link with humanitarian phase because not involved in humanitarian action. Role and nature of involvement of UN system, World Bank, EC, civil society, other actors. • UN role critical from the beginning - UNDAC team’s results used in the humanitarian appeal • Humanitarian agencies played critical role during humanitarian phase – but not recovery phase – until PDNA • Strong leadership/interest from the RC • Surge advisor, ER expert, worked closely with RC, CO and WB to prepare PDNA process. Identified entry points for ER - used later for development of ER and RF. • Good relationship between the WB and UN; the EC involvement was limited on the ground

6. Overview of PDNA Process, Cont. Relationship between DaLa/ECLAC and UN HRNA approaches; process to develop consensus • ECLAC DALA methodology used by WB • Methodologies developed by UN agencies also used to assess the human recovery needs and initiate planning for early/ medium term recovery • ER guiding questions distributed to sectors/leads and explained in detail. • UN agreed with WB to separate the macro-economic and livelihood related issues in PDNA report. Language was a challenge in BF and most of the document had to be translated into French in a very short period of time How were corporate agreements operationalized in the field; level/adequacy of support between HQ and field? • For the WB, UN and EU side the corporate agreements were completely unknown at the field level and much time spent explaining them

7. Overview of PDNAProcess cont. Resource Mobilization • For the PDNA process most of the resources came from the UNDP and the EU funds. • Expect WB based on the PDNA will fund most of the affected sector (health , infrastructure, etc) • Recovery programme not yet finalized but momentum is maybe lost with the long delay in the finalisation of the report…Challenging to talk about ER 7 or 8 months after the crisis and get resources from donors. Issues related to finalization of PDNA products • Difficulties to get feedback from UN agencies. • Lack of capacities of the government. • challenge to mainstream ER and Recovery in the final report. • Finally the time taken by the Government to review the report.

8. Lessons Learned What worked? • Strong leadership form UN RC, excellent relation with the WB and GoBF locally, good involvement of UN agencies. The Google space was a great idea but more space needed to upload all key document • Surge was a very useful tools although some the consultant were not the best in the market. • Surge Advisor an extremely productive - able to start process and build the necessary link with WB and Gov at local level; also was instrumental in bringing the UN on board from the beginning. What didn’t work? • Lack of information of local actors on the PDNA process, • lack of good preparedness before starting the exercise. We were just running after the WB from 1 country to another one without a clear vision and strategy from our side. • The training for the non ER-Recovery needs. • Dealing with UNDP operations for assessment activities. The recruitment of national staff, the payment of DSA for national,….every single interactions was quite difficult and illustrated the limitation of UNDP in terms of response in during crisis • Logistics is the weakest part of this process. Two parallel logistic process (WB and UN).

9. More Reflections What should change? • Training should be provided systematically to all high risk countries. • GIS, maps and Satellite images should be made available for all crisis. • More advocacy and training on the PDNA process will be critical Guidance provided by headquarters? • Some cases useful. When you are in the middle of the response what is most needed is additional hands and brains who can anticipated on the needs… How much did invested in the PDNA? • BCPR provided key funding through the emergency grants and the deployments of 4 experts to support the processes PDNA (financial, technical, logistical, resources)? How much did counterparts invest in the PDNA? • WB around 200K provided by EU

10. Relationship of PDNA and therecovery process Utility of the recovery framework? • This is powerful tool but should be developed immediately and presented to donors. Don’t need a sophisticated tool at the beginning. The human recovery dimension is sometimes lost in the PDNA process. The delays in this process are affecting the value added of the RF. Ability to monitor the recovery framework? • Extremely limited What recovery strategies have been undertaken since the crisis? • A draft plan developed but no follow-up since. Too much time dedicated to finalize the PDNA report and momentum lost for recovery. How much has been invested in recovery? • Almost nothing yet except the recovery done by people themselves with their own limited means Nature of relationship between assessments undertaken/PDNA recovery framework developed and actual strategies and investments? • Can not report yet since PDNA just finalised and recovery plan under development Documentation of recovery activities: existence/effectiveness of monitoring system? • No system put in place