REVIEW OF SENEGAL PDNA Process

1. REVIEW OF SENEGAL PDNA Process Lessons Learned and Key Reflections United Nations Development Programme

2. OVERVIEW OF PDNA Disaster Context • Severe flooding in Aug. 09 affecting Dakar and rural areas • Low-lying peri-urban areas were most affected: 2/3 of the population of Dakar was underwater • National Emergency Organization (ORSEC) plan was triggered Aug. 26. • Govt. committed US$4 M to support implementation of ORSEC plan allowing rapid use of all public and private relief available • Aug. 27 the Govt. requested urgent assistance to donors and partners to alleviate impact of flooding and reduce risks of future flooding. • UN and NGOs distributed essential goods and initiated a UN/Govt. humanitarian needs assessment • Govt. did not request UNDAC mission; no cluster system, no flash appeal.

3. OVERVIEW OF PDNA PDNA timeframe 10 September: Govt. request for a PDNA 15 October: Acceptance from UNHC for PDNA; request from UNHC to BCPR for support 16 October: TOR for PDNA drafted by WB; submitted to UNDP in Senegal 17 October: BCPR shares the TOR with WB and EC for further discussion 22 October: TOR finalizedamong BCPR, EC, WB 23 October: First UNCT Coordination meeting on PDNA in Dakar 27 October: Arrival of BCPR coordinator to Dakar 28 October: Official launch of PDNA by Min. of Interior, WB Director, UNHC

4. OVERVIEW OF PDNA PDNA timeframe Cont. 28-29 October 2009: PDSNA orientation course 30 October : constitution of PDNA coordination team in Dakar 30 October- 6 November: data collection 6 -16 November: sectoral reports 6 November: presentation of the preliminary findings to the Government 30 November: Final report

5. OVERVIEW OF PDNA Key Stakeholders – Participants in PDNA Team • 1 ECLAC expert, 5 World Bank consultants and 2 World Bank staff • I BCPR staff, I BCPR consultant, 1 UNICEF local staff, 1 UNHABITAT local staff, 1 WFP local staff. 1 expert from City Alliance • Representatives of Govt. line ministries Training on PDNA • Training on DaLa methodology by ECLAC • Introduction to early recovery/HRNA approach and PDNA procedures by BCPR staff • More than 60 participants from Govt. and UN agencies over two days

6. Overview of PDNA cont. Recovery Framework Final report included: • A recovery framework focused on immediate sectoral recovery/reconstruction needs for 12 month period prepared by BCPR staff • A vision for longer term reconstruction of major infrastructure prepared by WB • A long-term strategy for disaster risk reduction prepared by the WB

7. Overview of PDNAProcess • Government Role: Govt. was heavily represented during the data collection phase; ministry reps and local authorities provided valuable information to the PDNA team. • UN, WB, EC, civil society: WB role exceeded UN. WB office in Dakar provided both leadership and logistical support to PDNA process and PDNA coordination team. • Most UN agencies were absent except UNICEF and UNHABITAT • UNDP Dakar totally disengaged from the process, provided no leadership and guidance to the PDNA process. • UNDP Dakar relied on BCPR for the conduct of the PDNA; raises issue of sustainability of PDNA process and implementation given limited duration of BCPR presence in country.

8. Overview of PDNAProcess cont. Resource Mobilization: There was no resource mobilization strategy from the UN side and no proactive attempt from UNDP to approach donor community

9. Lessons Learned What worked? • Main positive impact of PDNA is bringing together all international actors in one exercise to avoid duplications and proliferation of individual agency assessments. • Represents significant effort to elaborate one coordinated assessment, saving time, energy and costs and provides more reliable assessment of the impact of the disaster. • Joint effort helps avoid confusion and presents a credible evidenced-based resource mobilization strategy for the government. • There was willingness and commitment between the World Bank and UNDP to conduct the assessment jointly; i.e. UNDP’s comments in the TOR , prepared by the Bank, were fully incorporated.

10. Lessons Learned cont. What didn’t work? • Integration of the two methodological approaches did not take place. UN needs to better define HNRA approach, and determine clear sectoral indicators and outcomes that better match the DaLa. • Training materials for HNRA do not exist. An appropriate training module that fits into a 2 day joint HRNA/ DaLa should be developed. • A new final report outline is needed to reflect both HRNA and DaLa; final report focuses predominantly on findings of DaLa, not HRNA. • The two methodologies need to agree on common basic concepts such as recovery and reconstruction; current definitions don’t match. • Final report contains two disconnected sections reflecting differing institutional mandates of the UN and WB: 1) immediate recovery activities; and, 2) longer term reconstruction vision. No mechanisms exist for smooth transition between early recovery activities and longer term reconstruction.

11. Lessons Learned cont. What needs to be improved? • Positioning the UN for leadership in longer term recovery: the UN system lagged behind WB and failed to take leadership. The UN system needs to establish conceptual frameworks, planning tools and clear strategic vision for longer term recovery as opposed to humanitarian response. • Improving management of the PDNA process is not only technical issue for BCPR; senior UN management needs to take leadership and provide high level support of PDNA process. • Similar gap for UNDP: despite progress in the area of early recovery planning and programming, UNDP still lacks systems which allow seamless transition from early recovery to longer term recovery. Without such systems, UNDP COs will never be able to take a lead position in the national PDNA process. • PDNA cannot be viewed in a vacuum, but needs to be integrated into a corporate long term recovery vision and strategy.