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International Studies Association Conference, San Francisco April 3, 2013. The Hunt for Joseph Kony and Members of the Lords Resistance Army. Lessons and Observations. James J.F. Forest, Ph.D. Professor and Director, Security Studies, UMass Lowell
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International Studies Association Conference, San Francisco April 3, 2013 The Hunt for Joseph Kony and Members of the Lords Resistance Army Lessons and Observations James J.F. Forest, Ph.D. Professor and Director, Security Studies, UMass Lowell Senior Fellow, Joint Special Operations University
Background • Who is Kony and the LRA • History, 1980s rebellion • Source of “recruits” • Periods of state sponsorship (Sudan) • 25 years of terrorizing villages in northern Uganda and surrounding region • Several efforts to solve this problem • 2002-05 Operation Iron Fist • 2006-08 Juba Talks • 2007-08 Operation Lightning Thunder
Source: Conciliation Resources, 2012. http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/LRA-africa.jpg
Background 2011: The US deploys 100+ SOF to the region • Political dimensions • Invisible Children • Kony2012 • Enough Project • Sentinel Project • AMISOM (Somalia) • Military dimensions • AFRICOM • ACCE (base in Entebbe) • “Light Footprint” Model for the future
Lessons and Observations 4 “P”s • Preparations and Logistics • Perceptions and Expectations Management • Partnerships and Relationship Management • Policy and Politics • Data Sources = Field research, interviews in Uganda, Washington DC, AFRICOM headquarters; Documents
Lessons Learned #1Preparations and Logistics • Figure out how things get done in the local context • NGO, Other countries’ forces, etc. • Technology may be of limited use • Minimize the amount of “stuff” you need (pack judiciously), yet be self-sufficient • Landing strips • Neighbors • Cash/currency • Health/medical
Lessons Learned #2Perceptions and Expectations Management • Manage your own expectations (what you can achieve, tyranny of distance and time, what “should” be) • Local militaries’ NCOs, officers, etc. • Manage your partner nation’s expectations (what you can do, authorizations, false perceptions of capabilities) • Publicvisibility • ‘Owning’victory
Lessons Learned #3Partnerships and Relationship Management • Many kinds: Partner nations, NGOs, Mboro herders, etc. • Choose the right people for this mission; the wrong person can do far more damage than the right person can repair • Plan to invest time • Trust is themost important currency • Sharing hardships (vs. LOGCAP) • Development projects
Lessons Learned #4Politics and Policy • Political Sensitivities • Legacy of colonization; honor, pride • Regional dynamics (DRC, CAR, Sudan/S. Sudan) – especially since this is where we are now tracking LRA • Local Politics • Centralization of authority • Informal power • Some corruption • U.S. domestic politics forpremature departure?
Conclusion • Brief sample of a much larger study • Overall objective: Inform pre-deployment training of SOF teams to sub-Saharan Africa • There will be deployments like this in our future • Final report (unclassified) will be available August 2013 on JSOU website (https://jsou.socom.mil/Pages/Publications.aspx)