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Waltz’s Neorealism. N E O R E A L I S M, S T R U C T U R A L T H E O R I E S. Russia. Balance of Power as a Reaction to a Threat: Napoleon, 1802-1815. Major Powers: FRA , UK, RUS , PRUS , AUS. After French Revolution (1789), Napoleon Bonaparte rises to power. -- Consul (1802)
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N E O R E A L I S M, S T R U C T U R A L T H E O R I E S Russia Balance of Power as a Reaction to a Threat: Napoleon, 1802-1815 Major Powers: FRA, UK, RUS, PRUS, AUS After French Revolution (1789), Napoleon Bonaparte rises to power. -- Consul (1802) -- Emperor of France (1804) Continues military campaigns to build empire and feed war machine. -- Poses major threat to Europe UK, RUS, PRUS, AUS form “coalitions” against FRA -- Napoleon defeated (1814) -- Congress of Vienna (1814) -- Napoleon returns (1815) -- Waterloo (1815)
N E O R E A L I S M, S T R U C T U R A L T H E O R I E S Russia BoP as a Peaceful Equilibrium: Concert of Europe, 1815-1848 After Napoleonic Wars, Congress of Vienna continues (1815) Defeated France let back into “club” Quadruple Alliance: Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia Congresses held to attempt to resolve issues. Buffer states/territory traded.
N E O R E A L I S M, S T R U C T U R A L T H E O R I E S Bipolarity vs Multipolarity 1792 1815 1854 1866 1870 1914 1939 WW I WW II Napoleonic Wars Crimean War Franco-Prussian War (“peaceful”) Concert of Europe Austro-Prussian War Multipolar loose, shifting alliances, Britain as balancer four or five Great Powers 1945 1990 Cold War—or “Long Peace” ? Bipolar (two Great Powers, tight blocs)
N E O R E A L I S M, S T R U C T U R A L T H E O R I E S Bipolarity vs Multipolarity • Internal balancing is more reliable • External balancing can give rise to miscalculations that lead to general war • Large influence of small allies • Deterrence fails because there is an incentive to defect from commitments • As numbers grow, strategic complexity grows geometrically • Uncertainty is the leading cause of war
Allied Powers Central Powers • France • Austria-Hungary • Great Britain • Germany • Russia Structural Theories: WWI Multipolar System • Abandoning an ally invites one’s own destruction • In a moment of crisis, the weaker or more adventurous party (Austria) is likely to determine its side’s policy • Its partners (Germany) can afford neither to let the weaker member be defeated nor to advertise their disunity by failing to back a venture even while deploring its risks
Allied Powers Central Powers • France • Austria-Hungary • Great Britain • Germany • Russia Structural Theories: WWI Balance of Power • The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance were approximately balanced • The defeat of any great power would give the opposing coalition a decisive advantage in the overall European balance of power • Britain entered the war to prevent Germany from upsetting the balance of power on the continent
Allied Powers Central Powers • France • Austria-Hungary • Great Britain • Germany • Russia Structural Theories: WWI Alliance System • The establishment of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance divided the European powers into two camps • While seen as a form of self-protection, the alliances also had the potential to escalate small crises into major wars • When Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, this brought Serbia’s ally Russia into the war, which brought Germany, France, and Britain into the war
Strengths of Structural Realism • Parsimony • Focus on systemic effects • Power is defined as capabilities (non-tautological) • Explanatory power is in the constraints, not in the preferences • Collective action • Probabilistic predictions