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The mass psychology of disasters and emergency evacuations: Implications for the emergency services

The mass psychology of disasters and emergency evacuations: Implications for the emergency services . Presentation for the BPS annual conference, Dublin 2/4/2008 Chris Cocking, John Drury & Steve Reicher : London Metropolitan University, University of Sussex & University of St. Andrews

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The mass psychology of disasters and emergency evacuations: Implications for the emergency services

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  1. The mass psychology of disasters and emergency evacuations: Implications for the emergency services Presentation for the BPS annual conference, Dublin 2/4/2008 Chris Cocking, John Drury & Steve Reicher: London Metropolitan University, University of Sussex & University of St. Andrews Funded by ESRC (Ref no: RES-000-23-0446) c.cocking@londonmet.ac.uk

  2. Outline of Presentation • Background and aims of research • Data from interview studies • Implications for emergency planners

  3. Development of crowd behaviour theories over time • 19th Century- The irrationalist approach (Le Bon, 1895) • 1960s - 70s more rationalist approaches Emergent Norm Theory (Turner R., 1974) • From 1980s to present- The Social Identity Model (Reicher, 2001)

  4. The ‘Panic’ model • Part of the irrationalist tradition in crowd psychology • a) Threat causesemotion to overwhelm reason • b) Collective identity breaks down • c) Selfish behaviours - pushing, trampling • d) Contagion - these behaviours spread to crowd as a whole • This has implications for emergency planning

  5. Iroquois fire 1903 • ‘most of the dead were trampled or smothered, though many jumped or fell to the floor of the foyer. In places on the stairways, particularly where a turn caused a jam, bodies were piled 7 or 8 feet deep. Fireman and Police confronted a sickening task in disentangling them.[ ] The heel prints on the dead faces mutely testified to the cruel fact that human animals stricken by terror are as mad and ruthless as stampeding cattle’ (in Latané & Darley 1970p. 53)

  6. Under-reaction rather than over-reaction ‘When people die in fires, it’s not because of panic, it’s more likely to be the lack of panic’ p.73 Neil Townsend, Divisional Officer, London Fire Rescue Service (in Kemp, 2003) Supported by evidence of behaviour in fires that people are often unwilling to deviate from familiar activity, leading them to continue with existing behaviours or evacuate along known routes, even in the face of danger (Canter, 1990)

  7. Social attachment model(Mawson, 2005) • In emergencies, people seek out attachment figures: social norms rarely break down • But, such ties can have fatal consequences- people escape (or die) in groups • Improves on panic model, and supported by evidence from behaviour during fatal fires (Cornwell, 2001) but problems remain: • a) Implies that panic in a crowd of strangers is more likely • b) Why do strangers co-operate in emergencies?

  8. The self-categorisation approach (Turner et al., 1987) • Disasters create a common identity or sense of ‘we-ness’- Clarke (2002) • This can result in orderly, altruistic behaviour as people escape common threat • Increased threat can enhance common identity

  9. Interview studies • 21 survivors of 11 different emergencies • 12 survivors of 7/7/2005 • Open–ended interviews • Tape-recorded and transcribed • Analysed using Content Analysis and IPA

  10. Results from interviews • Common identity quickly emerges • Co-operative rather than selfish behaviour predominates • If selfish behaviour happens, it is usually isolated and rarely spreads

  11. Hillsborough survivor • I don’t think people did lose control of their emotions [ ] they were clearly in control of their own emotions and their own physical insecurity, I mean [] you’re being crushed, you’re beginning to fear for your own personal safety, and yet they were [ ] controlling or tempering their emotions to help try and remedy the situation and help others who were clearly struggling

  12. Research into 7/7/2005 • Data from Press reports and web-logs • Web based questionnaire study for eye-witnesses of bombings • Interviews with 12 survivors

  13. Response to 7/7 • Individual fear and distress, but no mass panic • Evacuations characterised by orderly, calm behaviour • Many reports of altruism, co-operation, and collective spirit of Londoners/ UK as a whole

  14. Panic? • There was no real panic - just an overwhelming sense to get out of the station quickly • Almost straight away our packed carriage started to fill with smoke, and people panicked immediately. Thankfully there were some level-headed people on the carriage who managed to calm everyone down

  15. Unity • One of the things which struck me about this experience is that one minute you are standing around strangers and the next minute they become the closest and most important people in your life. That feeling was quite extraordinary

  16. The myth of Panic • Many accounts of ‘panic’ in emergencies • But what actually is panic, and what is logical flight behaviour? • Need to look at what people actually do, and decide if it is indeed ‘panic’ • More than just semantics, as it could affect emergency evacuation planning

  17. Implications for emergency services • More info rather than less can improve evacuation time and efficiency (Proulx & Sime, 1991) • Source of info and whether it’s trusted matters • Appeal to crowd’s co-operative nature - don’t assume they will behave selfishly or panic • Practice evacuations- don’t assume it won’t happen to you!

  18. Crowds can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem People may delay own escape to help others Appeal to the crowd’s common humanity- ‘We’re in this together’ Don’t address commuters as atomised ‘customers’ Influential leader figures may emerge from crowd, who can help rescue effort

  19. Summary • Crowds in emergencies behave in ways that are consistent with their identities and governed by the social norms of the situation • The ‘panic model’ is largely a myth • http://www.sussex.ac.uk/affiliates/panic/applications.html

  20. References: • Blake et al. (2004). Proceedings of Third International Symposium on Human Behaviour in Fire • Canter, D. (ed.) (1990) Fires and human behaviour (pp. 15-30). London: David Fulton • Cornwell, B. (2001). The Sociological Quarterly, 44, 617-638 • Kemp R (2003) Homeland Security: best practices for local government.http://www.icma.org • Le Bon, G. (1968)The crowd: A study of the popular mind. (Originally published 1895) • Mawson, A.R. (2005) Psychiatry, 68, (2) 95-113. • Proulx, G. & Sime, J.D. (1991). Fire Safety Science: Proceedings of the Third International Symposium, 843-852 • Reicher, S. (2001). The psychology of crowd dynamics. In M.A. Hogg and R.S. Tindale (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Group processes (pp. 182-208). Oxford, UK: Blackwell • Turner J et al (1987) Rediscovering the social group • Turner, R.H. (1974). Collective behavior. In R.E.L. Faris (ed.), Handbook of Modern Sociology. Chicago: Rand McNally.

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