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Identity Header Field and PASSporT Requirements for Enterprise Outgoing Calls

This document outlines the requirements for the content and semantics of the Identity header field and PASSporT generated by the Enterprise for outgoing calls, as well as the requirements for the content and semantics of the Identity header field/PASSporT added by the Originating SP to the incoming SIP INVITE.

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Identity Header Field and PASSporT Requirements for Enterprise Outgoing Calls

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  1. IPNNI SHAKEN Enterprise Models: LEMON TWIST March 18, 2019 Mary Barnes, iconectiv Industry Solutions Email: mbarnes@iconectiv.com

  2. Terms, Principles and Problem statement TN Provider is the SP who has been assigned the TNs that the Enterprise (aka TN Customer) is using to make outgoing calls Originating SP is the service provider that handles the outgoing calls (aka Connected SP) at the point at which they are entering the PLMN Need to decide requirements for content and semantics of Identity header field and PASSporT (including RCD) generated by the Enterprise at call origination. Need to determine requirements for Originating SP for content and semantics of Identity header field/PASSPorT added to the incoming SIP INVITE.

  3. Requirements • The Originating SP should always authenticate and add an Identity header field: • Depending upon level of trust in the TN provider, the Originating SP sets the Attestation to A or B. • The calling party identity of the TN customer must be authenticated and authorized by the Originating SP through some means – direct or indirect

  4. Scenarios and related requirements (1) • Originating SP is the TN Provider. • Originating SP should sign with an attestation of “A” if it has a trust relationship with the TN Customer. • Originating SP may allow a TN Customer provide an Identity header field with an RCD PASSport. • Originating SP is not the TN Provider • The calling party identity must be authenticated and authorized by the Originating SP through some means – direct or indirect • If the originating SP has a trust relationship with the TN customer, it may not require an Identity header field in the INVITE from the TN customer • If the originating SP does not have a trust relationship, it should expect an incoming INVITE to contain a SIP Identity header field. • If not authenticated then the originating SP should set the attestation to ‘B’ • Originating SP may allow a TN Customer provide an Identity header field with an RCD PASSport.

  5. Scenarios and related requirements (2) 3. Originating SP is not the TN Provider & Originating SP has no relationship with the TN Customer. SIP INVITE may have passed through one or more intermediaries prior to reaching the Originating SP. • The calling party identity must be authenticated and authorized by the Originating SP • Should the originating SP expect an incoming INVITE to contain a SIP Identity header field added by the TN customer? • If not, then attestation should be set to ‘B’. • If there is an Identity header field, the originating SP can authenticate the TN customer’s identity 4. Others?

  6. Solution Options TN-PoP 2.0 Lemon-Twist (LEveragingMOdels for Enterprise dialiNg - TNauthlist With an enterprise Identity Secured Token)

  7. TN PoP 2.0 Model Focus remains scenario 2? Utilizes delegated certificates as described in RFC 8226 and draft-peterson-: • Adds cross certificates to the model based on RFC 5280: • SP hosts a CA delegated by one of the STI-CAs: • Enterprise requests certificate from SP CA • Key advantages: • Removes the ACME proxy from TN-PoP solution • Uses standard PKI functions for delegation • Disadvantages: • Increases complexity: • Additional fields in certificates • Additional criteria to be considered and established by the CP/CPS (currently states no cross certificates) • More complex certificate path validation at the STI-VS • Increases # certificate chains to manage • More complex traceback and debugging • SP now manages a PKI instance

  8. LEveragingMOdels for Enterprise dialiNg (Lemon) - TNs With an enterprise Identity Secured Token (TWIST) (1) • The Trust Anchor may be supported in the STI-PA or by another entity with which the SP has an equivalent trust relationship • for managing SP specific accounts and numbering • Based on Trust Authority model developed for STI-PA: • Introduces a Trust Anchor (TA) logical function for supporting SPs Enterprise customers • Trust Anchor provides a subset of functionality provided by the STI-PA • TA supports API for Authority Token Acquisition • A unique identifier is assigned by the SP for the TN Customer: • Concatenation of SPC with an additional identifier assigned by the SP • SP configures account with the TA with the identifiers • SP provides the Enterprise with credentials to obtain an SPC token from the TA, removing SP/TN Provider from any subsequent interactions • Input to token generation includes SPC+id and TNs

  9. LEveragingMOdels for Enterprise dialiNg (Lemon) – TNs With an enterprise Identity Secured Token (TWIST) (2) • Defines a new type of attestation: • A’: Implies Full attestation – originating SP has verified the identity that has been authenticated and authorized by another SP in the SHAKEN ecosystem • Provides the terminating provider with more comprehensive information about the call, possibly including a unique ‘verstat’ value • Originating SP does not need to verify the SIP Identity header field added by the enterprise: • Passes the SIP Identity header field as received from the enterprise • Originating SP can add an additional SIP Identity header field with attestation ‘A’ depending upon relationship with Enterprise

  10. SHAKEN LEMoN TWIST Interfaces Trust Anchor/STI-PA STI Certification Authority Protocol/API Human I/F DataBase I/F SPC Token Cert CRL Authority Token Authority Token Enterprise CRL URL List of CAs Credentials for Authority Token API & URLs for List of STI-CAs Enterprise Account with TNs for each SPC+id Service Provider

  11. Summary –LEMoN TWIST • Model is consistent with core SHAKEN: • Trust is based on secure token provided by the entity that has been given authority over the TNs • Gives enterprises flexibility in choosing an STI-CA • Reduces burden on SP’s role in certificate acquisition • Doesn’t require more complex certificate delegation model • Reduces processing burden on originating SP • TN Customer directly interfaces with an STI-CA • More transparent – terminating SP recognizes call as being from an authorized user of SP-x’s TNs – consistent with the “What do we know and how do we know it model” • Enterprise isn’t relegated behind the SP in the SHAKEN ecosystem • No new PKI requirements (no new IETF dependency) • Hosting in the STI-PA simplifies SP account management

  12. Overall Comparison: TN-PoP 2.0 and Lemon Twist

  13. Functional Impacts: TN-PoP’ and Lemon Twist * https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-peterson-stir-cert-delegation-00.txt ** https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/stir/YVRfILEUu0yZaHMIMc3hIcEQPug: “This can be a bit messy when delegating from SPC to TN ranges, but that messiness probably isn’t avoidable.”

  14. Questions ???

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