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Making Electricity Markets Work:. The Ontario Industrial Perspective presented to CAMPUT Annual Conference 2005 Mike Kuriychuk Chair, Board of Directors Association of Major Power Consumers in Ontario (AMPCO) May 3, 2005. Who is AMPCO?.
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Making Electricity Markets Work: The Ontario Industrial Perspective presented to CAMPUT Annual Conference 2005 Mike Kuriychuk Chair, Board of Directors Association of Major Power Consumers in Ontario (AMPCO) May 3, 2005
Who is AMPCO? • The collective voice of large industrial electricity consumers • Over 60 member companies with total load over 3000 MW • size range: 5 MW to over 250 MW each • wide range of industrial sectors • Fundamental goal: to preserve and enhance industrial competitiveness through appropriate electricity policy in Ontario • Activities: • provide policy advice to Ontario politicians on electricity issues • provide technical and regulatory advice to the Ministries and electricity organizations such as IESO, OEB, OPA, OPG, Hydro One • provide a clearing house for technical and strategic information among members
Outline • Attitude of large industry: market vs. regulatory solution • Ontario electricity history from an industrial viewpoint • Elements that create short-term risk in the hybrid market • What should be the ultimate end-state of the system • What mechanism can be used to get there
What industry is seeking • The lowest practical delivered price of electricity, consistent with reliability, power quality, and environmental sustainability • The effects go beyond just an industrial consumer’s bottom line: Electricity cost escalation in Ontario is adversely affecting profitability, as well as industrial competitiveness, economic diversity, employment, the balance of trade, and the provincial standard of living
Drivers towards a market solution • Experience with markets for manufactured products and production inputs • Preference for minimum intervention and the freedom to creatively solve problems • Belief in the economic efficiency of competition and choice • Skepticism in the ability of government and its agencies to solve problems • Distrust of political interventions • Memory of excesses under the previous, regulated Ontario system
Drivers towards a regulated solution • Realization that market dominance in generation has not been resolved and probably will not be, in the short term • Realization that electricity markets have some characteristics that preclude pure competition • Evidence from other jurisdictions that market solutions for generation capacity do not work • Evidence from other jurisdictions that open market regimes do not necessarily result in lower prices • Positive prior experience leveraging industrial capabilities in the regulated Ontario environment, for example, various interruptible rates
Outcome of this balance of opposing forces • Industry favours open market solutions as the preferred choice, but tempered by practical considerations: Market solutions where possible, with minimum regulation where necessary
Electricity history in Ontario through industrial eyes (1) • Relentless cost escalation under former Ontario Hydro regime: went from second-lowest price jurisdiction in Canada to second highest over 15 years • Provincial utility had co-opted its shareholder and its regulator and was effectively out of control • With this history, the breakup of Ontario Hydro and creation of an open market was seen as a welcome change • But there were concerns over: • opening the retail market – would unduly complicate the transition • decision not to break up OPG into competing companies at the outset – seen as a compromise and ultimately a problem • opening market during a supply shortage – a timing issue
Electricity history in Ontario through industrial eyes (2) • The market opening process went very well • planning, technology, and processes were almost flawless • Short-term price predictability was an operational issue • pre-dispatch vs. dispatch prices • items hidden in “uplift” (surcharges) • Lack of generation transparency • But companies were learning to live with the situation: • MPMA/BPPR provided an inherent hedge • forward products were available, even though market was thin • prices had moderated somewhat in the second year; more supply was coming on stream from refurbished nukes • many companies learned to mitigate risks of the new market
Electricity history in Ontario through industrial eyes (3) • Intent to further decontrol OPG (the basis of the MPMA) was abandoned, first informally by the PCs, then officially by the Liberals with the creation of the “hybrid” market • Cost overruns on OPG Nuclear are a continuing problem • The issue of inadequate new supply needed to be addressed due to the age of existing generation asset base • However, too many decisions are now being driven by ideology: • “coal is bad; natural gas is the answer” • “conservation/smart metering/windmills will save the day” • insufficient cost/benefit scrutiny of programs, development processes, renewables technologies
Risks in the present situation • Coal phase-out will come at the cost of significant price escalation: expect to see additional 20-30% price increase • Classical rent-seeking behavior among prospective generators • apparent lack of appreciation of the impact of fuel on the margin --it’s not just an issue of percentage of generation • cost escalation may make removal of fixed prices/revenue caps politically difficult • Some moves have been made to limit OPG rate of return, but upward cost pressure in that organization still needs to be better controlled • Tendency within government and its agencies to adopt solutions with inadequate cost/benefit scrutiny
Risks in the present situation (cont) • Risk transfer from producers to consumers, through the Net Revenue Requirement with lack of transparency: NRR will be aggregated with other items in the Global Adjustment • Apparent execution issues with the generation RFPs: • delays, lack of major players, local opposition • some projects don’t fit criteria; additional processes will be needed • Realization in government that socioeconomic disruptions from electricity policy are occurring; uncertainty about what to do about it • Need to address longer term supply-side issues, e.g. next generation nuclear, clean coal, natural gas depletion • “Sovereign risk” (political/regulatory) in Ontario electricity industry is still high by international standards, inhibiting investment
Desired end-state: principles to follow • A balanced generation portfolio • by technology, geography, plant size, ownership, useful life • Market liquidity on both the purchaser and seller side • still room for more aggregation on the purchaser side • long-term contracts need to play a larger role • Avoidance of risk transfer • generation investment and operational risks need to stay with the generator’s investors • Stable policy environment • essential for sound investment planning on both the generator and large consumer sides • Balance of supply-side and demand-side solutions • expanded role for industrial Demand Response
Desired end-state: principles to follow (cont) • Attention to cost causality • avoidance of cross-subsidies between producers and consumers; between different classes of consumers, etc. • Transparency • clear and unambiguous rules • disclosure of reasoning for decisions reached • opportunity for meaningful input • derivation of cost components identified
Some mechanisms to get there • Reconsider the off-coal decision • why create additional crises? • Maintain and enhance the life of existing generation assets • generally less expensive to maintain than replace • will minimize NIMBY and BANANA • Adjust the generation procurement process to include opportunities that did not fit into the previous RFPs • examples: industrial cogeneration, district heating • establish an “evergreen” or open season process for projects • maintain environmental standards and verify proponent credibility on all proposals • avoid arbitrary or ad-hoc solutions
Some mechanisms to get there (cont) • Monitor and control market power to avoid supra-normal profit levels • Maintain effective regulation of natural monopoly elements • Provide minimum levels of incentives for new generation • Assess the cost implications of fuel choices, technologies, and other concepts and ideas • Adopt the experience and best practices of others
Conclusions • Original intention to deregulate Ontario electricity market was the right move for its time • Some execution problems got us into the present “hybrid” state • Long-term goal should still be as much competition as possible, tempered by practicality • In the short term, cost escalation is still a major concern and must be controlled by addressing all components • Attention to fundamental principles will help us manage our way through this transition state
Contact Information: Mike Kuriychuk, Chairman, Association of Major Power Consumers in Ontario 162 Cumberland Street, Suite 305 Toronto, ON M5R 3N5 Web Site: www.ampco.org Direct Line: (807) 475-2432 E-mail: kuriychukm@bowater.com