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Minimizing Losses from Zero Days – A New Layer of Defense (SCIT)

Minimizing Losses from Zero Days – A New Layer of Defense (SCIT). Game-Change Concepts: Moving Target + Exposure Management. Next Generation Server Security Technology. Arun Sood Ph. D. Dept of Computer Science & International Cyber Center, SCIT Labs Inc http://cs.gmu.edu/~asood/scit

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Minimizing Losses from Zero Days – A New Layer of Defense (SCIT)

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  1. Minimizing Losses from Zero Days – A New Layer of Defense (SCIT) Game-Change Concepts: Moving Target + Exposure Management Next Generation Server Security Technology Arun Sood Ph. D. Dept of Computer Science & International Cyber Center, SCIT Labs Inc http://cs.gmu.edu/~asood/scit http://www.scitlabs.com +1703.347.4494

  2. Multi-National Security Breach • http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7118452.stm • “A huge campaign to poison web searches and trick people into visiting malicious websites has been thwarted.” • If a user searched Google for terms such as • "hospice", "cotton gin and its effect on slavery", "infinity" and many more • The first result pointed to a website from which malicious software was downloaded and embedded on user system. • Criminals in country A created domains that were mostly bought by companies in country B and hosted in country C. Tens of thousands of domains were used. • These domains tricked the indexing strategy of Google to believe that these web pages were good and reliable source of information. Our focus: targeted and organized attacks.

  3. Anatomy of an Hack Identify Target Install Malicious Code Hack Other Machines Take over Domain Controller Foot print analysis Who is NSLookup Search Engines Enumeration Scanning Machines Ports Applications Exploitation Buffer Overflow Spoofing Password DOS Manual Approach Analyze publicly available info. Set scope of attack and identify key targets Damage “Owning” IP Theft, Blackmail, Graffiti, Espoinage Destruction Check for vulnerabilities on each target Attack targets using library of tools and techniques Foot print analysis Who is NSLookup Search Engines Enumeration Automated Scanning Machines Ports Applications Deliver Payload Custom Trojan Rootkit Damage “Owning” IP Theft, Blackmail, Graffiti, Espoinage Destruction Automated Approach Attack targets using installed software Richard Stiennon, May 2006, http://blogs.zdnet.com/threatchaos/?p=330

  4. Attacking a Multi-tier ArchitectureWeb-App-DB-Domain Controller Step 1: Identify Target Network address ranges Host names Exposed hosts Applications exposed on those hosts Operating system and application version information Patch state of both the host and of the applications Structure of the applications and back-end severs Step 2: Initial Compromise Web pages are always exposed – opportunity for ingress Step 3: Elevate Privileges Become a privilege user – like internal user on the target system Step 4: Hacking Other Machines Own the network. Step 5: Take over Domain Controller Jesper Johansson and Steve Riley , Protect Your Windows Network: From Perimeter to Data, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2005.

  5. The Problem • Verizon Business (DBIR2009): 285 M records compromised for 90 sites. Customized malware hard to detect. Intrusion persists for days, weeks, months. • Network Solutions, Wyndham Hotels. • Symantec produced 920,000 malicious signatures in 2009. • 50% of all vulnerabilities in web apps. • Half of disclosed vulnerabilities had no fixes. • Recovery from a breach is costly: $6.3M [Ponemon Inst] • Focus on targeted and organized attacks. Current reactive approaches are inadequate. We introduce intrusion tolerance – a new paradigm.

  6. Verizon (DBIR2010): Time Frame

  7. The SCIT Solution Enterprise Server Firewall Hacker (Actual Photo) SCIT Virtual Partition SCIT Virtual Server SCIT provides Intrusion Tolerance for servers… …using virtualization to restore the OS and application to a pristine state after attack! Every minute SCIT software cleans and restores the virtual server to its pristine state 8/30/2014 7

  8. Cross Sector Cyber Threats Strategy Multi layered Approach to Security: Best if layers operate independently Firewalls depend on inspection of incoming packets IDS/IPS depend on inspection of incoming and outgoing packets With increasing bandwidth and more matching requirements, the cycles devoted to packet inspection will keep increasing Threat independent approaches are needed for protection against zero-days Other approaches should be included in the mix, including approaches that do not rely on packet inspection and have potential for threat independent performance: White list of software Time-dependent recovery-based intrusion tolerance Defense in Depth Approach to Security

  9. Cross Sector Cyber Threats Strategy The SCIT Solution • Static Servers Converted to Dynamic Environment • Facilitates Incorporation of Diversity • Threat Independent • Rapid Recovery: Work Through an Attack • Mission Resilience • Emphasize Temporal Dimension • Virtualization as a New Framework for Server Security

  10. How Does SCIT Provide Additional Security? • SCIT servers • Regularly restored to a known state and remove malicious software installed by attackers. • Provide protection while manufacturer is developing a patch, i.e. SCIT servers are protected in the time period between vulnerability detection and patch distribution.  • Gives data center managers an additional level of freedom in developing a systematic plan for patch management. • SCIT DNS servers • Domain name / IP address mapping is protected from malicious alteration, thus avoiding improper redirection of the traffic. • SCIT Web servers • Protect the corporate crown jewels, front ends for sensitive information, e.g. customer or employee data sets, IP, and informational web sites.   • Regularly restores the sites to known states, and makes it difficult for intruders to undertake harmful acts such as deleting files. • Avoid long term defacements. • Reduces the risk of large scale data ex-filtration.

  11. Key Intrusion Tolerance Approaches See IEEE Security and Privacy paper for details

  12. Comparison of IDS, IPS, SCIT 8/30/2014 12

  13. Server RotationsExample: 5 online and 3offline servers • Servers • -Virtual • Physical Server Rotation Online servers; potentially compromised Offline servers; in self-cleansing 8/30/2014 13

  14. Server RotationsExample: 5 online and 3offline servers • Servers • -Virtual • Physical Server Rotation Online servers; potentially compromised Offline servers; in self-cleansing 8/30/2014 14

  15. Server RotationsExample: 5 online and 3offline servers • Servers • -Virtual • Physical Server Rotation Online servers; potentially compromised Offline servers; in self-cleansing 8/30/2014 15

  16. Server State Transitions Current Additional States Planned for Analysis and Archiving 8/30/2014 16

  17. SCIT Supports Session Persistence • SCIT does not require changing the application server or application code • SCIT servers support session persistence but do not migrate state • Session data is stored in shared memory or shared by multicasting among the virtual servers • Session info is data and not executable 8/30/2014 17

  18. Cost T SCIT - Intrusion Tolerance Approach • Increase security by reducing exposure window • Exposure window is the time a server is online between rotations • Optimizes application-specific exposure windows to servers • Decreasing available time for intrusion, reduces potential losses • No packet inspection; No signatures; No detection • SCIT does not eliminate vulnerabilities or prevent intrusions, but makes it difficult to exploit the vulnerability • Additional layer of defense • Integrated system: prevention, detection, tolerance • Reduce managed services cost • Adaptive SCIT • Increase availability – reduce down time for upgrades – fewer reboots T 8/30/2014 18

  19. Transaction Length in Multi-tier Architecture

  20. Exposure Time Reductions In the following slides we show that: Reducing Exposure Time Significantly Reduces Expected Loss

  21. Security Risk Assessment Follows SecurityFocus.com (Symantec), Microsoft

  22. Risk Shaping by Exposure Time

  23. Multi Tier Example

  24. SCIT vs Traditional Cumm Single Loss Expectancy Multi Tier Architecture Web server DNS server Content Manager Database server SCIT Exposure Time Reducing Exposure Time Significantly Reduces Expected Loss

  25. Avoidance is Better Than Cleaning You cannot clean a compromised system by patching it. removing the back doors. using some vulnerability remover. using a virus scanner. reinstalling the operating system over the existing installation. You cannot trust any data copied from a compromised system. the event logs on a compromised system. your latest backup. The only proper way to clean a compromised system is to flatten and rebuild. CLEANING COMPROMISED SYSTEMS IS DIFFICULT. IT IS BETTER TO AVOID HACKING.

  26. Case Study: Payment Card Industry Cost per exposed accounts (legal and professional fees, customer contact, post event clean up and improvements) More than 1M accounts compromised: $50 per account Few (1500) accounts compromised: $1500 per account Cost for protecting data – 100,000 customers Bottom Line: Cost of exposed accounts >> Cost of protection Reducing Exposure Time provides additional layer of defense - makes it more difficult to exploit vulnerabilities and steal data. Source: Rapid 7 – Vulnerability Management Trends. Also Gartner Group

  27. Sample Requirements Met by SCIT Servers Web site should not be defaced longer than 1 minute DNS tables should be restored within 1 minute System should reduce data ex-filtration – when combined with IDS the volume of data that can be maliciously retrieved can be computed To ensure clean servers, remove malware every minute Change the face of the website every minute

  28. Randomized Defensive Strategies Current servers are static and overexposed -almost sitting ducks Randomly change the exposed face of the target Hide, obscure, alter, move target Develop approaches that are effective in server farms and at the point of the spear Issues to address: Impact on system administration Scalability

  29. Comparing 4 Architectures IDS SCIT NIDS + HIDS NIDS + SCIT

  30. Results of Simulation Parameters used in the simulation Results of the simulation

  31. Target Applications • E-Commerce payments – long session of multiple short transactions • Streaming media • Web servers • DNS services • Single Sign On • Firewalls • Authentication (LDAP) • Transaction Processors Transaction Length Long Short • VPN • Complex Database Queries • Back end processing • File Transfer (size dependent) Low High Value for Exposure Window Management

  32. Collaboration with Systems Integrators • Lockheed Martin • Testing and validation of SCIT servers. • Funded SCIT research • Northrop Grumman • Testing and validation of SCIT servers. • Matching partner – Virginia CTRF project • Raytheon • Collaborated on SBIR proposal 8/30/2014 32

  33. Testing by Northrop Grumman • Overall • The SCIT platform does reduce exposure time and confuses attacker efforts. • There is a slight performance degradation as exposure time is reduced.

  34. Lockheed Testing • The overall security features of the SCIT system performed as advertised. This tool is very effective in ensuring application availability and the integrity of the web server itself. It provides a stable platform on which an enterprise can host web applications. • “…The evaluators found that the first step, port scanning, was successfully accomplished. However, the Nessus software just hung when establishing sessions with the open ports it found. This was probably because the rotation of the servers deleted the session information that Nessus left on the servers. “ • Recovery from DoS attack • Verify that the system will automatically recover from a website defacement attack. • Verify that the system will automatically recover if the service is made unavailable. • Resiliency • Verify that if the vulnerabilities were executed they would not seriously impact the overall system • SCIT does not fix app/OS vulnerabilities; does not protect against the integrity, and confidentiality of the user’s session and sensitive data; these properties are the same as that of the application. • Current SCIT implementations do not change the application code.

  35. Quick Review + Road Map SCIT: Why? How? Scope. Independent Validation. Performance. DOD Network. Specific Server: SCIT – DNS. Scalability. Plans. Demo

  36. Performance & Functionality Stress Tests • Workload: number of user sessions/minute (50,100,125) • User session: • Series of request and response from server • Select item from drop down list and add it to persistent storage • OpenSTA is used to generate workload • 3 runs per case. • Duration of run = 3 * Exposure time for the run • each VM is tested at least once • Workload consists of N requests every 10 secs. • Exposure times of 2,3 and 4 minutes, No Rotation • Stand alone web server for Non-SCIT test. 8/30/2014 36

  37. Performance Test Results • SCIT Server Environment • Entry Level DELL System • Dual processor – 4 cores each • Memory: 4 GB • Slackware OS • Apache, Tomcat, Shopping Cart (Java) 8/30/2014 37

  38. SCIT and DoD Networks • Sustaining Networks • SCIT provides additional layer of defense. • Tactical Networks • SCIT provides continuity of operations, automatic recovery. 8/30/2014 38

  39. Standards and Compliance Requirements • DODI 8500.2 • Enclave and Computing Environment Integrity • ECID-1 Host Based IDS • Host-based intrusion detection systems are deployed for major applications and for network management assets, such as routers, switches, and domain name servers (DNS). • Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard • Consumer Data Protection Requirement • Compensating Control 8/30/2014 39

  40. Potential Target Audience • Web site/ Ecommerce • Commercial Data Centers • Government Critical Infrastructure sites • (e.g. Emergency preparedness) • Database server protection • DNS servers • SSO servers • Cloud Computing Services 8/30/2014 40

  41. DNS & DNSSEC & SCIT-DNS • DNS is an essential part of Internet. • Used where names are used – web, email, web services, etc • DNS was designed for trusted environment. • DNSSEC adds end-to-end security to DNS. • OMB has mandated DNSSEC. • “.. represents an infinitesimal presence .” (http://dns.measurement-factory.com/surveys/200910.html) • Particularly challenging in some environments, like tactical. • SCIT – DNS • DNSSEC is the preferred solution. • SCIT-DNS provides near DNSSEC trust with DNS convenience • Focus of Army SBIR 8/30/2014 41

  42. SCIT – DNS 8/30/2014 42

  43. Scalability Issues Can SCIT be incorporated in Enterprise environments? Many servers Many applications Can SCIT work in a multiple apps per server environment? Can SCIT VMs be distributed across the server farm? Can SCIT effectively exploit multi-core architectures? Version 1 Objectives System Admin Function Many apps and servers Monitoring of the system state Diagnostics Deployment of VMs App related VMs are assigned to the servers Distribute after testing at a staging server System captures VM map to facilitate deployment Distributing the sever load Prelim simulation model Resource Allocation model SCIT in Server Farms 8/30/2014 43

  44. Pristine Image VM Controller VM Dispatcher VM Cloned Pristine Image VM 01 Cloned Pristine Image VM 01 Cloned Pristine Image VM 01 Cloned Pristine Image VM 01 Cloned Pristine Image VM 01 Manual Tuning SCIT Configuration & Construction Staging Server Pristine Image VM 8/30/2014 44

  45. Current Status • Validated the scalability of SCIT: Developed SCIT Infrastructure System (SIS) • Monitor server farm from a single point • Diagnostics from a single location • Automate the staging, testing and deployment of SCIT apps • Pristine images, clones, dispatcher, controller • Specified the key management requirements • Configuration • Simulation of SCITized multiple application server farm • Independent validation at Lockheed units • Testing at Gaithersburg, Omaha, Rockville • Capture new use cases: upload and download of files taking 3 to 4 minutes: Share Point • Independent validation at Northrop Grumman Triad Labs - Colorado • Moving target defense • SCIT DNS • SCIT SSO – SAML compatibility • Community of interest: pubs, invited presentations and workshops • Parallel Effort: Development, Quantitative, Simulation 8/30/2014 45

  46. Way Ahead • Further Validation and Certification • Seeking Pilot project opportunities • Examine long duration applications • Up to 5 minute uploads • SCIT improvements • Dispatcher is static; can this be rotated; what about apps distributed across server boxes • Dynamism enables diversity in deployment: OS, App, Memory Image • Multi-level rotations: apps, OS, hardware • SCIT reconnaissance • SCIT in cloud computing, Virtualized Desk Top Infrastructure • Multiple apps per server • Adaptive SCIT; Memory image based IDS; Hardware Enabled SCIT 8/30/2014 46

  47. IP Protection and Recognition 8/30/2014 Issued Patents: • "Self-Cleaning System“, US 7549167. Issued 6/16/2009. Inventors: Yih Huang and Arun Sood • "SCIT-DNS: Critical Infrastructure Protection through Secure DNS Server Dynamic Updates", US 7680955. Issued 03/16/2010. Inventors: David Arsenault, Yih Huang and Arun Sood. • “Single Use Server System", US 7725531. Issued May 25, 2010 Inventors: David Arsenault, Yih Huang and Arun Sood. Pending Patents • "Data Alteration Prevention System", Utility Patent Application No.: 11/419,832, 5/23/2006, Docket No.: GMU-05-037U. Inventors: David Arsenault, Yih Huang, and Arun Sood. • Two additional patents applied in 2010. Research Support: • Army (TATRC), NIST/CIPP, SUN, CTRF/Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin Awards: • Winner Security Technologies for Tomorrow – GSC and CNI-Expo competition 2 June 2010. • 2nd place GSC Cyber Security Challenge 13 Novermber2009. GSC=Global Security Challenge, associated with London Business School. SBIR: • Army – SCIT DNS with focus on tactical environment. 47

  48. Benefits of SCIT SCIT removes malware every minute without detection “.. 85 percent of the 285 million records breached in the year were harvested by custom-created malware.” Verizon. SCIT reduces data ex-filtration Data ex-filtration is slow gradual process to avoid IDS detection & SCIT interrupts the flow every minute SCIT does not rely on signatures and is threat independent IPS / IDS depend on signature matching and focus on known threats. SCIT relies on exposure time control. SCIT automatically recovers from defacement or software deletion attacks: mission resilient SCIT reduces intrusion response (alerts) management cost SCIT provides an additional dimension to separate false alarms. 8/30/2014 48

  49. SCIT: Additional Capability • Apply hot patches • Operating Systems • Applications • Potential for fast recovery from bad patches • Technology that converts a static system (“sitting duck”) into dynamic system • Different types of diversity: admin cost – security trade off • Explicit use of time in secure system design

  50. SCIT Publications + Contact Info • SCIT technical publications • Links to media reports • Links to demo videos http://cs.gmu.edu/~asood/scit http://www.scitlabs.com Questions? ArunSood {asood@scitlabs.com, asood@gmu.edu} +1703.347.4494 8/30/2014 50

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