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Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity. Dr. Britt Cartrite Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict University of Pennsylvania Paper available at: http://www.psych.upenn.edu/sacsec/abir/. Research Questions.

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Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes: Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity

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  1. Modeling Succession Crises in Authoritarian Regimes:Beyond “Slime Mold” Complexity Dr. Britt CartriteSolomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnopolitical ConflictUniversity of Pennsylvania Paper available at: http://www.psych.upenn.edu/sacsec/abir/

  2. Research Questions • Why are authoritarian regimes relatively successful in surviving succession crises (Brownlee 2002)? • Do different types of authoritarian regimes “survive” differently? • When regime breakdown does occur, are there regime-type specific patterns to the breakdown?

  3. Virtualstan’s “Slime Mold” Milieu • Activated identity • Identities in repertoire • Information: local neighborhood + global “bias” • Agent evolution: • Rotation • Substitution • Rotation + Substitution • “Anger”

  4. Virtualstan’s “Slime Mold” Milieu 20 identities in the landscape, including: • State Identity • Loyal Opposition • Regional identities

  5. Types of Authoritarian Regimes • Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (O’Donnell 1973; Collier 1979) • Neopatrimonialism (Eisenstadt 1973; Bill and Springborg 1994; Bratton and van de Walle 1997) • Bureaucratic Feudalism (Baker 1978)

  6. Types of Authoritarian Regimes:Bureaucratic Authoritarianism • Clearly hierarchical • Allegiances of subordinates are to their immediate superiors • Political and social institutions are relatively distinct

  7. Types of Authoritarian Regimes:Neopatrimonialism • “Great Leader” linked to bureaucracy and various social elites at all levels, disrupting local hierarchies • Political and social institutions are relatively indistinct

  8. Types of Authoritarian Regimes:Bureaucratic Feudalism • More coherent institutions than NP, less than BA • Great Leader influences bureaucracy and regional elites, but not their subordinates • Political and social institutions are linked, but not deeply

  9. Operationalizing Authoritarian Regimes:Non-basic Agent classes • Lackeys (lower level bureaucrats) • Bureaucrats (higher level bureaucrats) • Vassals (regional/ethnic subordinate elites) • Lords (regional/ethnic prominent elites) • Great Leader

  10. Agent classes and distributions

  11. Virtualstan Institutions GreatLeader Lord Vassal Lackey Bureaucrat

  12. Bureaucratic Authoritarianism • Great Leader influence = 4 • Bureaucrat: influence = 3; includes GL in decision-making • Lackey: influence = 2; sight radius = 2; includes GL in decision-making • Lord: influence = 3 • Vassal: influence = 2; includes Lord(s) in a radius of 4 in decision-making

  13. Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

  14. Bureaucratic Feudalism • Great Leader influence = 4 • Bureaucrat = n/a • Lackey: influence = 2; sight radius = 1; includes GL in decision-making • Lord: influence = 3 • Vassal: influence = 2; includes Lord(s) in a radius of 4 in decision-making

  15. Bureaucratic Feudalism

  16. Neopatrimonialism • Great Leader influence = 4 • Bureaucrat = n/a • Lackey: influence = 1; sight radius = 1; includes GL in decision-making • Lord: influence = 3; includes GL in decision-making • Vassal: influence = 2; includes Lord(s) in a radius of 4 in decision-making; includes GL in decision-making

  17. Neopatrimonialism

  18. Operationalizing Succession Crises:GL_gone_trigger Effects of GL_gone_trigger = 1 • Cell of Great Leader (28,29) becomes empty at t=33 • Bias ceiling for identity 5 set at -2 for 32<t<58 • Bias for identity 5 set to 0 at t=58 (all models), allowed to vary normally thereafter

  19. Experimental Protocols • 100 pairs of seeds used for each regime type (3) and condition (succession / no succession) for 158 timesteps per run (100x3x2 = 600 runs) • Test of 100 random pairs of one type/condition against 100 seed pairs shows no significant difference • Virtually identical landscapes • Some variation due to variation in non-basic agents • Bias range = 3,-3 • Tests comparing conditions using 2,-2 range show expected decrease • “Scramble” for 0<t<9 (bias volatility = 5000 (50%)), then set to 200 to allow the history to begin “in media res.”

  20. Comparing regime types:Seed pairs #26 at t=33

  21. Comparing succession and non-succession:Neopatrimonialism (seed pairs #26)

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