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Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems

Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems. Jens Groth University College London. Round complexity. I nteractive zero-knowledge proof Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. Useful for non-interactive tasks Signatures Encryption …. . Non-interactive proofs. Witness w (x,w)  R L.

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Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems

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  1. Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems Jens Groth University College London FOSAD 2014

  2. Round complexity • Interactive zero-knowledge proof • Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof • Useful for non-interactive tasks • Signatures • Encryption • … 

  3. Non-interactive proofs Witness w (x,w)  RL L language in NP defined by RL OK, xL Statement: xL Proof  Prover Verifier

  4. Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs • Completeness • Can prove a true statement • Soundness • Cannot prove false statement • Zero-knowledge • Proof reveals nothing (except truth of statement)

  5. Zero-knowledge = Simulation Witness w (x,w)  RL  Statement: xL Problem If proofs can be simulated, then anybody can create convincing proofs! Prover Verifier

  6. Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof [BFM88] Common reference string0100…11010 (x,w)RL Statement: xL Proof:  Prover Verifier

  7. Common reference string (CRS) 0110110101000101110100101 • Can be uniform random or specific distribution • Key generation algorithm K for generating CRS • Trusted generation • Trusted party • Secure multi-party computation • Multi-string model with majority of strings honest [GO07]

  8. Simulation trapdoor Zero-knowledge simulation Common reference string0100…11010  S    K (x,w)RL S(,x)   Statement: xL Prover Verifier

  9. Publicly verifiable NIZK proofs • NP language L • Statement xL if there is witness w so that (x,w)RL • An NIZK proof system for RL consists of three probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (K,P,V) • K(1k): Generates common reference string σ • P(σ,x,w): Generates a proof  • V(σ,x,): Outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject)

  10. Public vs. private verification Anybody can check the proof • Publicly verifiable • K generates CRS  • V checks proof given input (,x,) • Privately verifiable • K generates CRS  and private verification key  • V checks proof given input (,x,) Designated verifier with  can check proof

  11. Public vs. private verifiability Public verifiability Private verifiability Sometimes suffices CCA-secure public-key encryption, e.g., Cramer-Shoup encryption Cannot be transferred For designated verifier only Easier to construct • Sometimes required • Signatures • Universally verifiable voting • Reusability • Proof can be copied and sent to somebody else • Prover only needs to run once to create proof  that convinces everybody • Hard to construct

  12. Witness wso (x,w)R Completeness Common reference string σ K(1k) Statement xL V(σ,x,) →Accept/reject P(σ,x,w) →  Perfect completeness: Pr[Accept] = 1

  13. Soundness Common reference string σ K(1k) Statement xL  Adaptive soundness: The adversary first sees CRS and then cheats V(σ,x,) →Accept/reject Perfect soundness:  Adv: Pr[Reject] = 1Statistical soundness:  Adv: Pr[Reject] 1Computational soundness:  poly-time Adv: Pr[Reject]  1

  14. Zero-knowledge K(1k) → σ (x,w)  RL 0/1 P(σ,x,w) →    S1(1k) → σ (x,w)  RL 0/1 S2(σ,,x) →  Perfect ZK: Pr[Adv →1|Real ] = Pr[Adv→1|Simulation]Computational ZK:  poly-time Adv: Pr[Adv →1|Real ]  Pr[Adv→1|Simulation]

  15. Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] • Take an interactive ZK argument where verifier’s messages are random bits (public coin argument) • Let the CRS describe a hash-function H • Replace the verifier’s messages with hash-values from the current transcript • NIZK argument  = (a,z) a a H(x,a) z z

  16. Fiat-Shamir heuristic • Efficient NIZK arguments that work well in practice • Hopefully they are secure • Can argue heuristically that they are computationally sound in the random oracle model [BR93], where we pretend H is a truly random function • But in real life H is a deterministic function and there are instantiations of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [GK03] that yields insecure real-life schemes

  17. Encrypted random bits Statement xL CRS (x,w)RL Epk(0;r1) c1 01...0 c1 Epk(1;r2) c2 11…1 1 ; r2 Epk(0;r3) c3 00…1 c3 K(1k)  (pk,sk) pk Epk(1;r4) c4 10…0 0 ; r4

  18. Statistical sampling Probably remaining pairs of encrypted bits are 00 and 11 • Random bits not useful • Use statistical sampling to gethidden bits with structure • Give proof byrevealing certainstructures related to different parts of statement CRS 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1

  19. NIZK proofs Statement: Here is a ciphertext and a document. The ciphertext contains a digital signature on the document. 1 GB Statistical sampling techniques Groth 2006 1 KB Groth-Ostrovsky-Sahai 2012 (2006) Groth-Sahai 2012 (2008)

  20. Boneh-Goh-Nissim encryption • Pairing-based cryptography • Algebraic geometry and elliptic curves • Double-homomorphic public key encryption • Additively homomorphic • Multiplicatively homomorphic (one-time only)  b a+b a  b a∙b a

  21. Circuit SAT NAND Circuit SAT is NP complete NAND

  22. NIZK proof for circuit SAT Prove Prove Prove Prove NAND NAND Prove Prove

  23. NIZK proof for  w -1 w-1 • Additive homomorphism • Multiplicative homomorphism • Proof  = • Shows , so or  w-1 w∙(w-1) w r  0 w∙(w-1) r

  24. NIZK proof for circuit SAT Prove Prove Prove Prove Proof size 2|W|+|C| ciphertexts NAND NAND Prove Prove

  25. NIZK proofs for Circuit SAT • Security level: 2-k • Trapdoor perm size: kT= poly(k) • Group element size: kG≈ k3 • Circuit size: |C| = poly(k) • Witness size: |w|  |C|

  26. Sublinear non-interactive zero-knowledge • Commitments instead of encryption • Parallel additive homomorphism • Parallel multiplication proofs • Complicated… • Split circuit into many parts and prove in parallel 

  27. NIZK Arguments for Circuit SAT • Bitansky, Canetti, Chiesa and Tromer 2013 • Techniques to make both CRS size and argument size independent of circuit size

  28. Verifiable computation Computation • Client is weak • Want small argument size and low cost of verification • Prover is powerful • Accept higher computation for prover, but must still be low enough for outsourcing to be economically viable Result

  29. Proof carrying data Program 2Outputs Program 1Outputs Program 3Outputs

  30. Pinnochio [PHGR13] Program in C(reduced instruction set) • Argument size • 288 bytes • Verifier time • 12ms(depends on statement) Circuit Quadratic arithmetic program Proof system

  31. Thank you • Questions?

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