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Efficient Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Arguments for Set Operations. Prastudy Fauzi , Helger Lipmaa, Bingsheng Zhang University of Tartu, University of Tartu, University of Athens, . Motivation: Secure Computation. Add NIZK proof. pk. E(x1),…,E( xn ). Ok if (x1,…, xn ) S.
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Efficient Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Argumentsfor Set Operations PrastudyFauzi, Helger Lipmaa, Bingsheng Zhang University of Tartu, University of Tartu, University of Athens,
Motivation: Secure Computation Add NIZK proof pk E(x1),…,E(xn) Ok if (x1,…,xn)S E(f(x1,…,xn))
Motivation: Secure Computation (2) Add NIZK proof pk E(S) Ok if ST E(f(S)) E(T) E(g(T))
Proofs for Set Operations • Encrypted inputs satisfy certain set relations => security against malicious adversaries • Or even multiset relations • …
Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs pk E(x1),…,E(xn) Proof of Correctness Proof can be constructed without knowing inputs Contradiction? Complete Sound Zero-Knowledge
Common Reference String Model td E(x1),…,E(xn) pk,sk crs Proof of Correctness
Our results • NIZK proof for one particular multiset operation • (PMSET) • Applications to other (multi)set operations • Non-interactive • No random oracle • Efficient
Cryptographic Building Block: Pairings • Bilinear operation • e(f1+f2,f3) = e(f1,f3) + e(f2,f3) • e(f1,f2+f3) = e(f1,f2) + e(f1,f3) • With Hardness Assumptions • Given e(f1,f2), it is hard to compute f1 • … • Much wow
Commitments We use a concrete succinct commitment scheme from 2013
Multiset Commitment Too costly!
Multiset Commitment • S => • polynomial that has S as null-set • Including multiplicities • => • is secret key
Main Idea iff • Commitments are randomized • Proof = a crib E that compensates for randomness • Enables to perform verification on commitments
Additional Obstacles • Soundness: • We use knowledge assumptions • Guarantee that proverknows committed values • Common in succinct NIZK construction • [Gentry Wichs 2011]: also necessary • Zero Knowledge: • Simulator needs to create proof for given commitments • Not created by simulator • We let prover to create new random commitments for all sets • Add a NIZK proof of correctness • Simulator creates fake commitments • Uses trapdoor to simulate
Applications • Mostly use very simple set arithmetic • Is-a-Sub(multi)set: • iff exists C such that • Is-a-Set: • MultisetA is a set if for universal set U • In many applications, U is small • Set-Intersection-And-Union: • and iff , ,and A, B, and D are sets • See paper for more…