The Perils of Watershed Planning

1. The Perils of Watershed Planning - In 1972, an interagency task force was formed to consider multiple resource use in community watersheds In 1980, it produced the “Blue Book” – Guidelines for Watershed Management of Crown lands used as Community Water Supplies In 1984, it produced “Appendix H” to the Blue Book – Policy and Procedures for Community Watershed Planning MoF and MoE were given responsibility for jointly preparing Integrated Watershed Management Plans (IWMPs). - And the fun began...

3. Some Additional Context • In 1986, MoF had just taken the groundbreaking step of putting District Planners into the District offices. Previously, planning staff were in Region or Victoria. • MoE participation in IWMPs was limited by staff availability (mostly Ken Gorsline). • Each year, a priority list of watersheds requiring IWMPs was drawn up with over 50 candidates in the Nelson Region • Watersheds where development was anticipated were priorities for IWMPs. • Local initiatives included Sitkum Creek, Duck Creek, Arrow Creek, Nelson city watersheds, and the first – Springer Creek – in the Slocan Valley

4. So What Happened Next? • Well, this was smack in the middle of the “War in the Woods”, which pretty much sums up where things were at with forestry/environment issues in BC. • Some watershed groups formed with the intent to stop or severely limit logging and mining in watersheds, rather than to provide input which guided such developments. • Misinformation and rhetoric were generated by all parties. MoF and industry staff were unable to counter this without looking complicit in the alleged conspiracy. • In all of this, moderate voices (within all parties) were drowned out or actively suppressed. Cooperative groups such as the Blewett Watershed Committee were accused of “collaboration” and pressured to go hard-line

6. The Burning Issues • Slocan Valley Watershed Alliance was at the forefront of the watershed planning debate. In October of 1988, negotiations between MoE, MoF and the SVWA had broken down, with five main outstanding issues • These issues sounded quite reasonable to outside observers, but some made no technical sense and others were outside of agency jurisdiction. • On February 24, 1989, at the request of the SVWA, the BC Ombudsman’s office investigated and confirmed that MoF and MoE were acting appropriately.

7. So What Were The Issues? • 1. A clearly defined risk analysis procedure which includes a log/no log decision mechanism and which will be applied uniformly in all watersheds.

8. So What Were They? • 1. A clearly defined risk analysis procedure which includes a log/no log decision mechanism and which will be applied uniformly in all watersheds.Seems reasonable, right? Except that risk analysis (hazard X consequence) is supposed to vary depending on circumstances, does not usually include a “yes/no” outcome (rather, it evaluates implications of various options for consideration by a designated decision maker), and therefore could not meet the request.

9. Standards • 2. Clearly defined, comprehensive standards for development activities which ensure protection of water quality, quantity, and timing of flow in the short and the long term

10. Standards • 2. Clearly defined, comprehensive standards for development activities which ensure protection of water quality, quantity, and timing of flow in the short and the long termThis was a tough one for a number of reasons, not least of which was the relative lack of consistent standards in BC, but also the fact (again) that standards need to be tailored to the specific situation in order to be workable. The Forest Practices Code was a great step forward in 1995, due to its formalization of watershed assessment procedures which encouraged operational flexibility based on field work.

11. Bogeymen • 3. Provide alternatives to clearcutting, slash burning, and pesticide use in watersheds

12. Bogeymen • 3. Provide alternatives to clearcutting, slash burning, and pesticide use in watershedsGeared, one would have to think, to build on the emotional rhetoric which was rampant at the time. We could commit to looking for alternatives, and we often did so, but the implication of this statement was clearly that the above practices should not occur in watersheds. Few reputable hydrologists would make such blanket statements; it had been clear for decades that road systems and other forms of soil disturbance had much greater impacts on water than the actual removal of trees. Impacts of wildfire were also acknowledged, but it wasn’t until the fire season of 2003 that this reality really sank home.

13. Processsssssss • 4. The need for a clear process and procedures for carrying out the objectives of the IWMP, including how decisions are made, how the IWMP is amended, and how the IWMP is improved. Clear definition of the rights, roles, and responsibilities of water users in an IWMP process, and in particular in the context of technical committees.

14. Processsssssss • 4. The need for a clear process and procedures for carrying out the objectives of the IWMP, including how decisions are made, how the IWMP is amended, and how the IWMP is improved. Clear definition of the rights, roles, and responsibilities of water users in an IWMP process, and in particular in the context of technical committees.Where to begin on this one? The Terms of Reference for IWMP technical committees (which included agency, industry and water licensee reps) were pretty clear, but water users didn’t like them for a number of reasons (ie. they felt they were entitled to more rights than the Water Act actually gave them). Getting into excessive detail on process is a time-proven way to delay decisions; you end up playing “what if?” games till the cows come home rather than spending that time sorting out real issues and questions. • This issue was, in fact, closely tied to the larger “local control/decision-making” socio-political movement, which has a long and colourful history in the West Kootenays. In short, many participants were more interested in effecting political change than they were in protecting water supplies.

15. The Big One • 5. Establishment of adequate liability protection for damage from development activities in the short and the long term

16. The Big One • 5. Establishment of adequate liability protection for damage from development activities in the short and the long termHere it is. After all the rhetoric, politics and half-truths are set aside, this is the basic concern of pretty much all water users: If something goes wrong and I lose my water, will government or industry cover the costs?Not an unreasonable concern at all. Up to this point, government could make no blanket assurances. We had fixed damages in the past, but all we could say was that if something happened we’d investigate and do what we could. It sounded lame, even to us. So, as is appropriate in a planning framework, we identified this issue to Victoria something like eight times over a five year period.The message repeatedly came back: government was not going to accept unconditional liability for its actions. When you think about it, it would probably not be a good idea. But we kept plugging away.

17. Breakthrough • In 1990, the MoF was enthusiastically pushing the IRM bandwagon and generating policies in support of that. Timing is everything, but sometimes just a subtle word change can make a difference. Someone – I’m not sure who – picked up on the fact that the word “liability” was sinking us each time. Instead of a gov’t commitment to “liability”, we suggested “responsibility”, and it went through like grass through a goose. • In 1990, MoF issued its policy on “Repairing Damage to Water Supplies and Delivery Systems”, which applied to both community and domestic watersheds.

18. Responsibility, not Liability • Water Users were responsible for holding valid water licenses, having systems which could handle normal variations in quantity/quality, and dealing with natural events (though PEP could be approached for the latter). • Forest Licensees were responsible for correcting damages caused by their actions • The Forest Service was responsible for damages caused by logging and roadbuilding if the licensee had followed all the rules and/or had left the watershed. • Investigation and determination of cause were the responsibility of MoE and MoF, with water user and industry participation

19. Cape Horn Slide • In 1988, Brian Chow produced a detailed report on 8 or so “flat over steep” development-related landslides in Arrow. • In 1990, a major slide occurred in Arrow District which damaged property in the Memphis Creek/Cape Horn area. • An interagency group (Mike Curran, Dwain Boyer, David Toews and Brian Chow) investigated and determined that diversions and concentration of drainage from logging roads and trails triggered the slide • Property owners initiated legal action. The Forest Service settled out of court. • This was a pivotal event, because the government specialists demonstrated that they could be trusted to provide an objective evaluation.

20. IWMP Technical Committee Handbook • Produced by Arrow District and MoE Water Management Branch as background information for participating water users (“extension”). • This, along with measured responses in local media, was part of an attempt to counter misinformation. • Many staff in MoF and MoE contributed. • If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then it was well received. The SVWA promptly generated their own version, and MoF Public Affairs followed suit with one of theirs – a glossy publication called “All Things Considered”. Both spun in different directions.

21. Trial By Flood • In 1996, the Referendum Slide on 49 Creek (a domestic watershed in Blewett) blew out seven water systems which served something like 80 individual water licences. • MoE and MoF specialists determined the cause to be flat over steep water contribution from a cutblock to a road constructed pre-Code by Crestbrook Forest Industries • The current operator, Kalesnikoff, responded immediately by providing a crew to assist with repairs • Kootenay Lake District accepted responsibility for funding repairs, since the incident was clearly logging and road related, and Kalesnikoff was clearly not to blame. • Funding sources were found, and approximately $21,000. was spent repairing water systems. In less than a week, the creek had cleared and systems had been repaired or replaced.

24. Trial By Flood • In 1996, the Referendum Slide on 49 Creek (a domestic watershed in Blewett) blew out seven water systems with a debris torrent all the way to the lake. • MoE and MoF specialists determined the cause to be flat over steep water contribution from a cutblock to a road constructed pre-Code by Crestbrook Forest Industries • The current operator, Kalesnikoff, responded immediately by providing a crew to assist with repairs • Kootenay Lake District accepted responsibility for funding repairs, since the incident was clearly logging and road related, and Kalesnikoff was clearly not to blame. • Funding sources were found, and approximately $21,000. was spent repairing water systems. In less than a week, the creek had cleared and systems had been repaired or replaced.

25. The Aftermath • You might think that such an event would confirm the worst fears of water users and put an end to watershed logging. Amazingly, the opposite occurred. • We were seen as having kept our word, and, equally importantly, established a solid precedent for using the new policy. It would be hard for gov’t to pull it back now. • The contingency policy was reiterated in the 1996 Community Watershed Guidebook. In 1997, it was incorporated into the KBLUP Implementation Strategy in a more detailed version which covers both domestic and community watersheds. • We have used it about six times, usually for relatively minor costs such as cleaning out settling tanks. • Over the years, we have updated the District version and circulated it widely to water users and others. Our approach has been commended on several occasions by the Forest Practices Board.

26. Other Watershed Issues • Human contamination (or cattle)(IHA considers all surface water sources as susceptible to contamination and in need of treatment) • Long term water quality monitoring(Not too helpful in sorting out whether any changes are natural or man-made – see FPB Eagle Creek investigation) • Equivalent Clearcut Area(often seen as an alteration limit rather than a more general indicator or red flag – also see FPB Eagle Creek investigation; the Board agreed with us)

27. Implications of Wildfire and Beetle • Following the 2003 wildfire season, a number of fire-related landslides occurred – Okanagan Mtn and Kuskanook, among others – due to formation of water repellent soils and increased water yield • During the 2003 wildfire season, road construction, harvesting and fireguard construction occurred in the City of Nelson watershed (Five Mile Creek) with the blessing of Nelson City Council. This despite a City of Nelson policy from the IWMP days which opposed logging or roadbuilding in their watersheds. • Increased beetle activity in the West Arm from 2003-2007 led to increased harvesting in watersheds, considerable public unrest, and two FPB complaints (Laird and Eagle Creeks.

29. An End to the Do-Nothing option • During the “War in the Woods”, a great deal of misinformation was bandied about, and it took time for people to recognize it as such. • One example was the claim that gov’t and industry were fear-mongering when they warned of the implications of wildfire. Unbelievable as it may sound, it was repeatedly stated that large intense wildfires were unlikely to occur here. • In 2003, when the communities of Nelson and Harrop were developing evacuation plans due to the Kutetl wildfire, two lightning strikes happened near Argenta during a strong south wind. Only one IA crew was available. It was sent to the strike south of Argenta and put it out. The other strike, to the north, became the Hamill fire, which spread to 600 hectares in under two hours. • After 2003, people who had downplayed the risk of wildfire lost a great deal of credibility. Doing nothing is no longer seen as a viable way to protect one’s watershed.

30. Room for Debate... But... • It is generally a mistake for planners to debate land use decisions, such as resource development in watersheds. Those decisions are made by gov’t, and you are best to stay out of political discussions on work time. However, it is entirely appropriate to quietly provide accepted facts and principles. • Roads and other forms of soil disturbance are the major source of impact in watersheds, and therefore careful planning and construction in appropriate conditions is fundamental. • In the event of a major wildfire, roads provide options for control measures. If roads are needed, they will very likely be constructed quickly and in less than optimal circumstances. • Most water users now understand this, but often still press for restrictions on motorized access in newly roaded areas. There can be very good reasons for restrictions on access (ie. grizzly bear management, introduction of invasive plants, etc), and the time to do so is before use begins. Unfortunately, the issue of access management is presently not being addressed by government. • The District Manager can only restrict access for purposes of critical environmental protection, avoiding road damage, or protecting public safety. Just being a licensed watershed is not enough.

31. Sitkum Fire 2007 and Salvage • See the “Sitkum Rationale” document for an in-depth analysis and rationale of the District Manager’s decision to allow salvage harvest after the 2007 wildfire. • Whether this was the right decision or not can be debated, but it does illustrate that even the “do nothing” option carries risks. • It is also a good example of planning and information management being used as an effective form of decision support for management • This was also a complaint to the Forest Practices Board, during which the DM suggested that they should set up a satellite office in our building since they seemed to spend so much time here. • Finally, it was our latest use of the “Repair of Damages” policy. We purchased $400. worth of washed sand for the Sitkum Improvement District’s infiltration gallery, in recognition of the increased sedimentation which accompanied the road construction and salvage harvest.

33. What to expect • Water users will call in with alleged impacts on their water. Prompt investigation is warranted, by MFR and licensee. MoE and IHA may have to be involved also. Most impacts are minor and short-lived. • A qualified hydrologist or engineer may be required to establish cause and prescribe mitigative measures. MoE or MFR staff are preferred, but a consultant who is familiar with the drainage would be excellent. • If the impact is significant, and is logging or road related, then licensee or MFR are responsible for corrective action. • The basic principle is to bring the water delivery system back to its previous condition. If improvements are made, water users would cover the incremental costs. • In the past, we have covered water users’ time ($15./hr), equipment hire, bottled water, replacement piping, and even laundry bills. Each situation has to be negotiated separately. • To maintain credibility, mitigative measures often need to be undertaken prior to getting funding approval from above. So, it’s important to keep this policy on the radar screen of higher-ups.

34. Water Licence Query • http://a100.gov.bc.ca/pub/wtrwhse/water_licences.input • Tricky thing here is to know what water District/precinct you’re in. • Also, there are many streams with the same name, so look at the results carefully. • We obtained hardcopy maps of POD’s and streams which are helpful, if somewhat fragmented. Not yet available digitally, but checking on this.

35. Alternate Water Sources • Water licensees are advised to identify potential alternate water sources in advance of forest operations. • In practice, this often does not occur. However, water users generally know of possible sources. • Major impacts are generally short-lived (less than a week) and the main issue is water for consumptive use in the interim. • The usual solution is to make necessary repairs, wait for the stream to stabilize, and provide bottled water for consumptive use purposes. Local water suppliers can adjust quickly to increased demand.

36. Equivalent Clearcut Area (ECA) • We planners pressed the hydrologists to give us some guidance on reasonable harvest levels, primarily for timber supply analysis purposes. • Some people came to view these strategic “ECA recommendations” (20-30%) as operational “ECA limits”. Even we noble planners fell into this trap in our early years, using the concept of distributing harvest by elevation and aspect, as in the Lasca Creek CRMP. • ECA can be a relevant consideration, especially at high levels in flood-prone situations (such as Hawkins Creek), but needs to be put in context by a qualified professional, specific to the watershed in question. • Potential impacts of roads, natural disturbances and other factors need to be considered as well.

39. See Peter Jordan and Doug Nicol 2002. “Causes of Gentle-over Steep Landslides in Arrow and Kootenay Lake Forest Districts” An excellent summary, with pictures, of 7 different landslides. Found in: Technical Report 003 (2002). Terrain Stability and Forest Management in the Interior of British Columbia: Workshop Proceedings May 23–25, 2001, Nelson, British Columbia, Canada Too large to post (147 MB), but is available in downloadable form at

40. http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfd/pubs/Docs/Tr/Tr003.htm