Paying the Human Costs of War

1. Paying the HumanCosts of War Christopher Gelpi Peter D. Feaver Jason Reifler Duke University & Triangle Institute for Security Studies

2. Casualty Aversion as aConstraint on American Power Mueller (1973, 1994): support for war drops with log of casualties Developed into conventional wisdom that public will not tolerate casualties Beirut 1983, Gulf War 1991, Somalia 1993 Widespread assumption of “casualty phobia” Kosovo 1999 Caused Saddam to doubt US resolve in March 2003

3. Casualty Aversion:A Contingent Constraint? Casualty phobia myth persisted despite evidence to the contrary Academic consensus on public cost/benefit approach to support for war Key Question: What causes variation in sensitivity to casualties? Jentleson: Policy Objective (PPO) Larson: Domestic Elite Consensus Kull: International Consensus Feaver & Gelpi: Likelihood of Success

4. Approval of Korean War and Battle Deaths Key appears to be perceived success Big drop in support is Aug-Dec 1950 – losing to PRC Slope is positive from Feb-Aug 1951 - US recovers Slope is negative in 1952 - stalemate sets in

5. Approval of Vietnam Warand Battle Deaths Impact of casualties seems to depend on success Pre-Tet slope only significant because of drop Mar-May 1966 Matches increase in those saying war is a “mistake” Post-Tet slope triples majority of population now says war is a “mistake”

6. Presidential Approval andCasualties in Iraq Note that as combat shifts to guerilla insurgency, upward trend in deaths matches downward trend in approval. Multivariate model shows this effect is significant. Note that as combat shifts to guerilla insurgency, upward trend in deaths matches downward trend in approval. Multivariate model shows this effect is significant.

7. Measures for Analysis of Weekly Approval and Deaths in Iraq Presidential Approval - Weekly data Data from The Polling Report Casualties – Log of deaths in Iraq Data from the US Military Minutes of Media coverage of Iraq Data from The Tyndall Report Growth in Dow Jones Industrial Index Dummy variables: Onset of Insurgency Capture of Hussein Release of Kay Report Renewed Iraqi Sovereignty

8. Predicting Presidential Approval With Casualties In Iraq Note that as combat shifts to guerilla insurgency, upward trend in deaths matches downward trend in approval. Multivariate model shows this effect is significant. Note that as combat shifts to guerilla insurgency, upward trend in deaths matches downward trend in approval. Multivariate model shows this effect is significant.

9. Summary: Impact of Iraq War on Presidential Approval Impact of US Casualties: During battlefield combat, approval went up with casualties During insurgency, approval went down with casualties After sovereignty casualties have no effect on approval Turning points: End of May 2003 when “insurgency” became dominant media frame Transfer of sovereignty to new government – an indicator of success? Impact of Media Coverage Rally effect before war & during major combat Coverage of democratic presidential candidates Media frame: battlefield, insurgency, and sovereignty The marginal effects – “approval drops 3 points with every 50 casualties” is a predicted result of our model. It means, holding every other factor (eg. dow jones industrial, media coverage, etc.) else constant at their mean, if you then have 50 more casualties public approval of the President is likely to drop 3 points.The marginal effects – “approval drops 3 points with every 50 casualties” is a predicted result of our model. It means, holding every other factor (eg. dow jones industrial, media coverage, etc.) else constant at their mean, if you then have 50 more casualties public approval of the President is likely to drop 3 points.

10. Comparing Sources of Casualty Tolerance in the Real World Aggregate Data show casualty tolerance varies What drives this variation? Experimental research shows support for all four mechanisms “Success” seems an anecdotal fit, but… Now we need to: Compare the relative importance of these mechanisms Show they influence attitudes in a real conflict

11. A Model of Public Attitudes Toward Casualties In Iraq

12. Four Clusters of AttitudesToward the War in Iraq Vietnam Syndrome: Iraq war wrong, we are likely to lose Bush Base: Iraq war right, we are likely to win Noble Failure: Iraq war right, we are likely to lose Pottery Barn: Iraq war wrong, we are likely to win These two key attitudes can combine to form four distinct patterns. Are argument is that these 4 archetypes interrelate with casualty sensitivity in different ways.These two key attitudes can combine to form four distinct patterns. Are argument is that these 4 archetypes interrelate with casualty sensitivity in different ways.

13. Logit Analysis ofTolerable Casualties In Iraq

14. The Sources of Tolerance for Casualties in Iraq: Interactive Effects

15. The Demographic Sources of Casualty Tolerance in Iraq

16. Reality Check:Our Survey & Election Outcome 2004

17. Logit Analysis of Presidential Vote Choice: November 2004

18. Iraq and Presidential Vote Choice 2004

19. The Demographic Sources of Presidential Vote Choice in 2004

20. What Does It Mean to beSuccessful in Iraq?

21. How Will We KnowWe Are Succeeding In Iraq?

22. Likelihood of “Success” and Whether the War in Iraq was the “Right Thing”

23. A Model of Public Attitudes Toward “Success” and “The Right Thing”

24. Two-Stage Least Squares Analysis Whether US Was Right to Attack Iraq

25. Two-Stage Least Squares Analysis Whether US Will Succeed Iraq

26. Conclusions Aggregate data show public willingness to bear costs of war has varied significantly over time Experimental evidence supports all hypothesized influences on costs and benefits Jentleson, Larson, Kull, Feaver & Gelpi Data on attitudes toward Iraq war suggest that weighting of factors depends on the decision being made

27. “Do the right thing?” or“Just Win Baby?” Expectations of success is trumps for casualty tolerance and support for ongoing mission Prospective judgment about future outcome Pottery Barn twice as likely as Noble Failure to support casualties Rightness/wrongness is trumps for determining vote choice Retrospective judgment about wisdom of a leader’s decision Majority of Noble Failure support Bush but overwhelming majority of Pottery Barn support Kerry

28. The Structure of Public Attitudes Toward Iraq Attitudes toward “Success” and “Right Thing” structured along reasonable dimensions Consistent with hypotheses in literature Attitudes are well organized, but are they immune to new information? Attitudes cause one another, but stronger flow is “success” as a cause of “right thing”

29. Supplemental Slides

30. Sources of Data Historical aggregate data on support for Korea, Vietnam, Somalia Recent aggregate Presidential Approval data during current in Iraq Individual level data on attitudes toward current war in Iraq Series of surveys from October 2004 through October 2004 Flaw in literature: mostly aggregate data

31. Experimental Support for the Impact of Primary Policy Objective Do you support “the United States taking military action to replace the government of Yemen…” If it were threatening the shipping of oil through the Persian Gulf? 47% approve (FPR Mission) If it were engaging in ethnic cleansing and forced slavery? 61% approve (HI mission) If it were providing terrorist bases to Al-Qaeda? 71% approve (WT Mission)

32. Framing Effects and Support for a Hypothetical Invasion of Yemen

33. Experimental Support for theImpact of Domestic and Int’l Consensus Do you support “military action to defend the democratic government of East Timor against an insurrection …”? If Congress, UN, and NATO endorse? 74% approve If Congress opposes? 48% approve If UN and NATO oppose? 41% approve If Congress, UN, and NATO all oppose? 24% approve

34. Elite Consensus and Support for Hypothetical Use of Force in E. Timor

35. Expected Success, Casualties, and Support for Hypothetical Use of Force

36. Casualty Tolerance andConfidence in Success

37. Approval of Vietnam Warand Battle Deaths Impact of casualties seems to depend on success Pre-Tet slope only significant because of drop Mar-May 1966 Matches increase in those saying war is a “mistake” Post-Tet slope triples majority of population now says war is a “mistake”

38. Prais-Winsten Analysis of Battle Deaths and Support for the Vietnam War

39. Approval of Korean War and Battle Deaths Key appears to be perceived success Big drop in support is Aug-Dec 1950 – losing to PRC Slope is positive from Feb-Aug 1951 - US recovers Slope is negative in 1952 - stalemate sets in

40. Capturing Saddamand Perceptions of Success in Iraq MSNBC/WSJ Poll fielded our “success” question Got a “natural experiment” with the capture of Saddam Bush received 8% boost in “very likely” to succeed Casualty tolerance should rise if this perception persists