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MH-14: Germany Arrested

MH-14: Germany Arrested. WWII: Germany Arrested : Strategic Overview. Germans restored tactical mobility with Blitzkrieg Poland, Norway, France (1939-40) German tactical improvements impressive: Applied WWI Lessons Learned effectively 1918 Weapons technology & tactics refinements

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MH-14: Germany Arrested

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  1. MH-14: Germany Arrested

  2. WWII: Germany Arrested:Strategic Overview • Germans restored tactical mobility with Blitzkrieg • Poland, Norway, France (1939-40) • German tactical improvements impressive: • Applied WWI Lessons Learned effectively • 1918 Weapons technology & tactics refinements • Made & adapted • Developed effective doctrine for mobile warfare: • Integrated: Infantry, artillery, aircraft, & tanks • Effective combined arms tactics • Innovative tactics & clear common doctrine to all: • Speed, exploitation, decentralized C2; • Aggressive independent leadership from the front; • Initiative with full knowledge of commander’s intent

  3. The Problem • Downside was also evident • (But apparently not to Hitler) • Crossbred & mismatched military organization: • 80% of German Army built on WWI equipment • Horse drawn guns, supplies, & baggage • Serious potential supply & logistics problems • German poor logistics systems remained weak link • Striking victories hid ever looming logistics problems • Instead of correcting this problem, what did Germany do?

  4. Limits of German Expansion • Germany tested the limits of its expansion: • Flush w/victory over France, it appeared unbeatable • Everything now seemed possible for the 3rd Reich: • From strictly tactical & operational perspective => • Hitler may have had some bragging rights => • But his hubris was setting him up for a fall- why? • From Political & strategic perspective => • Trouble was just over the horizon • Initial signs should have alerted Hitler & his generals: • (Dunkirk evacuation & Churchill’s firm resolve) • Conclusion to be drawn: ?______ ______ war likely ahead => • and… Germany had better get ready for it - soon

  5. Hitler’s Slow Reaction • Germany should have recognized the signs & their implications: • Should have concluded: time was essential=> • Need to start preparations now: • Exploit industrial resources of West/Central Europe • Address its glaring industrial & logistic shortfalls • Consolidate Germany’s position in Europe • Unfortunately for Germany => Hitler slow to react: • After Battle of Britain failed (w/high costs): => • (Pilots, 1200 A/C, & expended limited industrial assets) • What did Hitler do instead?

  6. ?_____ Front War- again! • Hitler turned German Army East to start a new front! • Operation Barbarossa: • Strategic blunder of the first order - (why?) • (Remember WW1?) • Compounded this mistake by wasted men & material => • Propping up ?_____________and his 3rd rate army: • Italian troops were poorly trained & led worse! • Tend to retreat or surrender after sharp engagement • The only worst mistake that could be made... he made! • What major strategic blunder was even worse than launching Operation?________________? • He declared war on the ?_____ ______following Pearl Harbor

  7. Early Success vs. Long Term Weakness • NTL:German tactics & Operational Art proved superior early on: • But Germany was weak in key areas where it counted – • Particularly unprepared for a prolonged war – why? • German strategy and logistics - seriously flawed • In contrast theses areas were a key US strength vs. • Significant weakness for German Army • Several of Hitler’s & his army’s miscalculations about enemy’s resolve were demonstrated in: • Battle of Britain: • “The Blitz,” Churchill, and the “ Never so few…”

  8. Battle of Britain- lead up • Churchill’s role: • Transform Britain from… ? • To Churchill’s determined & inspiring warrior spirit • Royal Navy’s role: • Command of the ?___________ • British resolve • Demonstrated by destruction ofFrench Fleet under Vichy control Chamberlain’s?__________

  9. Hitler’s response • Hitler’s response to British resolve: • 2 related but separate plans: • Luftwaffe’s Air Offensive to be followed by Sea Lion • Assessment Germany’s invasion plan? • ?_____________________________________________

  10. Initial Target Priorities • Luftwaffe ‘sinitial target priorities: • 1. Establish Air ?________________ • 2. AttackGround support & Britain’s ?_________ industry • 3. Attack RAF in general • 4. Conduct ?___________ bombing (cities), and... • 5. Protect Sea Lion?___________ landings • Goering was convinced Luftwaffe could do it all without need of other service • German Navy thus expected no realistic air support from the Luftwaffe • Worse: treated Channel crossing like a simple river crossing- only a little bigger

  11. German Order of Battle • Luftflotte 2nd & 3rddeploy to Calais in northern France • FMKesselring commands 2600 A/C • Soon assigned more • Comprised main portion of German air striking force • Luftflotte 5to Norway • (300 A/C) • Long range constrains strikes & makes them vulnerable to Fighters due to tactical shortfalls

  12. Tactical Shortfalls • Key tactical weakness of German Operational strategy: • BF109 – very limited range • BF110 - inferior to British Spitfire • As a result any Luftwaffemissions conducted beyond London had be conducted at night – why? • In order to avoid being intercepted by superior ?___________

  13. British Air Defense system • Status of British AirDefense system? • Effective tactical execution of Brit Air Defense • Key role played by Air Marshall ?___________ • Designed, programmed, developed and trainedall components of the system • All hardware & human components integrated effectively into full system • In contrast to his German counterpart- Goering • (noted more for unsupported assertions & bluster)

  14. Operational Strategy & Tactics • German Operational Objective • During Luftwaffe strikes July – Aug 1940 • Objective: RAF industrial Base • Operational strategy & tactics: • Strike RAF Fighter Command & protect Luftwaffe’sbombers • When raids attract fighters => BF109s were to attack them • German Campaign operational priorities: • 1. Fighter command aircraft & bases • 2. Bomber command • 3. Imported (US) logistics stockpiles • 4. British population centers (cities)

  15. “Aldlertag” & The Blitz • On “Eagle Day” Germans attack British Radar sites: • Heavy losses both sides (148 Brits vs. 286 for Germans) • Decide (erroneously) not worth it • Germans shift to strategic bombing (London & other cities) • Impact? • Desired effect on British population? • ?___________________________ • RAF aggressively attacks • Poor German ?____________ contributes to failure • Contributing to successful British outcome: • German Intel failure (British Air Defense Ops) • Gross underestimates of RAF fighters’ capabilities in Northern region • Goering’s poor leadership & tactical errors • British Defense System: effective & flexible • Churchill’s & Dowding’s leadership & British resolve

  16. Strategic Bombing Lessons Learned • Impact on Hitler’sStrategic objectives? • Target priorities: all fall short & in the end failure • Germany lacked adequate A/C strength, capability (range) & capacity • Day light strikes:could not protect bombers from Spitfires • What were the major Lessons Learned of “Blitz”? • Blitz (strategic bombing) Lessons Learned: • Modern economies very ?___________ • Modern economies absorb great punishment & don’t give up • Strategic bombing is ?___________ • Accuracy & sustained operations extremely difficult • Costly: A/C. crews, industrial resources

  17. War in the Med (1941-42) • British Strategic Motivation: • ProtectSuez & Gibraltar=> key toIndia & Far East • Mussolini’s role: (Mare Nostra) • Reclaim past glory of Roman Empire • Force Brits to go around Cape of Good Hope • Instills incentive for Brits to re-open Med (Suez canal access) • Mussolini concerned Hitler may have strategic aims in Med • (Hitler in reality is focused where?) • To the ?___________________! • Italian Army’s role: wrt planning, preparation, leadership • Virtually non existent=> incompetent leadership • Untrained & undisciplined army • Only effective against unarmed 3rd class (mostly defenseless) enemy • Italian Navy versus British Navy • Italian Navy aware of its limitations=> avoids Royal Navy

  18. Mediterranean Theater of Operations

  19. Hitler’s Actions & Mussolini’s Reaction • Hitler’s action to protect Germany’s access to Oil: • Sends “advisors” to Romania to stabilize situation • Reality: panzer division, motorized inf. Div, etc. • Mussolini response to Germany’s deployment: • Nov 1940: launched Offensive into Greece • (Overconfident but insecure opportunist & a bully) • Italian’s Army & Air Force performance? • ?_______________________________ • No preparation or logistic support & poor cmdrs & leadership

  20. Italy vs. Britain in North Africa • Result: Italy’s invasionupset balance of power in Balkans: • Worse for Axis: it opened the door for British & Soviet attacks • Therefore presented obvious potential Brit threatto Romanian Oil=> impact • Delay – Hitler forced to protect southern flankfirst • What soon ensues for Italy & its incompetent Army? • Series of ?_______ ________befall Italian Army & Navy • Taranto:British CV Torpedo A/C attack Italian Fleet • Italian battleship fleet lost half its strength in one night • Sidi dl Barrani: • Gen Wavell’s 7th Amour routed Italian defenders & sent them fleeing West

  21. Germany to the Rescue • Germany to the rescue: • Hitler then sends in “1st string” under command of whom? • Hitler’s motivation & strategic aim? • 1. Motive: Stabilize situation & restore status quo • 2. Prevent ?______’s collapse & secure ?____________ flank • 3. Protect German South Flank during ?____________

  22. Afrika Corps & the “Desert Fox” • Rommel:considered by many to be best armored general of war • (Patton might disagree) • Rommel’s philosophy of war: • Operational & tactical offense • Flexibility & initiative • And… he doesn’t always follow orders • Many times to his benefit (Ultra* intercepts) • Soon chased Brits out of Libya => • Back to their starting point

  23. Enigma & Ultra • British captured U-Boat & its onboard Enigma • Enigma was used to encrypt message traffic from & to higher headquarters • Impact: Brits were able to read enemy’s plans • Bletchley Park’s& the puzzle solvers: • Advantage afforded to Allies by decrypted operational directives • Decrypted product (SIGNINT) was called:Ultra

  24. Germany in the Balkans • Serb officers overthrew Yugoslav gov’t: • Hitler ordered a punitive Operation Punish • Germany’s Balkan Campaign: • 2 separate operations: Yugoslavia & Greece: • 1stLuftwaffe bombed Belgrade & 17K die: • Yugoslavia failed to mobilize • Attempted to defend everything= > nothing • Collapsed in five days • OKH quickly re-deployed for Barbarossa- impact? • Tito’s guerillas continued to fight as ?____________ • A similar situation then ensued in Greece: • XXXX Panzer Corps outflanked Greeks & Allies • Key support provided by Luftwaffe • Greek Army collapsed & Allies retreated to South: • Brits withdrew by sea under heavy fire from Luftwaffe • Germany soon occupied Athens & other cities • Greek resistance then commenced guerilla warfare

  25. Fall of Crete • Crete offered a key strategic position in the Med (Map): • RAF posed athreat to Balkans & Romanian oil for the Germans • Germany finally realized strategic significance of Crete • Decided to act to preclude Brit potential threat to its oil • Plan’s Concept of Operations: • German Airborne Assault: • Gen Student’s 7th ABN division • 7th ABN was tasked to take key operational objectives & hold (Map): • Then await relief by 5th Mountain Division deployed by air & sea: • Transported by JU-52 to secured airhead • Any problem with plan?

  26. Friction • Obstacles complicating German attack: • Bad intelligence on allied situation in Crete • Britintercept & Ultra’s decryption of Enigma forewarns British • Royal Navy able to lay in wait for German transports • Hostile local population • But Friction is an equal opportunity phenomenon… • British problems: • Commander’s focus on attack from the sea: • (few defenders concentrated at airfields) • Defenders on Crete recently retreated from Balkans • Defeated British, Australian, & New Zealand troops (morale) • Luftwaffecontrols air in the MED & is ready to attack Royal Navy

  27. Battle of Crete - Execution • Murphy’s law runs amuck on both sides • 7th Airborne Div. Commander’s glider toll rope snaps • German paratroops land directly on enemy positions & taken under fire • No C3 between ABN troops at Meleme & their support in Greece • Reinforcements await word in Greece • (Student’s HQ) • Time lost by Allies during fragile early phase of airborne assault: • Timely counter-attack would have precluded German foothold • Allies do manage to evade & escape • Results: very high casualties • (Critical moments- Map legend): • German Operational victory at very high costs • Hitler now down on risky airborne ops • But Alliesvery impressed (Normandy)

  28. German Successes: Libya & Egypt (1941-42) • Rommel’s mission was accomplished: • Libya situation restored as directed • Balkan’s now also stabilized & Crete captured: • Royal Navy driven out of Med by Luftwaffe • Long-term Downside: • Greek & Yugoslavian resistance continue to war’s end • Germans unable to exploit their success in Med • Italian liability: • Hitler determined to keep Italy in war- Why? • Protect Germany’s ?____________ flank

  29. Rommel Continues to Prevail • Rommel isleft to fend for himself: • Long, tenuous & vulnerable LOCs across Med • Fought & won against larger British numbers • RAF provides superior combat air support • Ultra alerts allies of tactical ops & re-supply efforts: • (but Rommel often ignored orders=> and confused the Brits) • Rommel able to take prevail over superior numbers • Rommeldefeats a series of British Cmdrspitted against him • British are forced to retreat back to Egypt: • DefeatsGenWavell who is too cautious & inflexible • OutflanksBrits attempt to relieve Tobruk in Operation Battleaxe • Wavellessentially defeated and lose91tanks to Rommel’s12) • FM Auchinleck appointed to replace Wavell • Auchinleck builds up his supply & equipment • While Germans unable to get much thru to Rommel

  30. Operation Crusader (11 Nov’41) • Auchinleck attempted to flank Rommel • But he splits his force & begins his execution too slow • XXXCorps is isolated by Rommel’s anti-tank guns: • Auchinleck also commits his armor in piecemeal fashion • This allows Rommel todefeat XXX Corps in detail • NTL Brit superior #s & Rommel’s lack of supplies=> • Tip balance & force Rommel’s retreat to El Agheila Line

  31. Recurring Theme- Dynamics of LOCs • As Rommelfalls back on LOC - what happens? • Afrika Corps strength versus British strength • Jan’42: Rommel attacks the 1st Armored Div (just arrived ) • Employed superior tactics (leapfrog) w/Panzers & anti-tank 88s • Destroyed 3 greenBritish cavalry Regimentsin detail; • Pushed Brits back to Gazala Line & Rommel occupies Benghazi

  32. British Retreat to El Alamein • By Spring’42: Churchillwas very unhappy => • Pushes his commanders for counter-attack: • Ultra intelligence indicated huge Brit numerical lead • (What doesn’t Ultra tell Churchill on the match-up?) • Gazala Line, 8th Army, & Rommel’s readiness to ?________ ____: • 26 May’42: Despite inferiorOB, Rommelattacks British left flank • Led attack off by a diversion to Brit center - what happened? • Brits retreat 30 miles East of ?_____ Line& soon surrenderTobruk • Rommel continues to press & forces Brits back to El Alamein (Brits will hold)

  33. Superior Tactic & Leadership Defeats Numbers • Rommel wins despite superior Brit numbers & new tanks • Major reasons why Brits lose? • Lack of aggressive ?____________________ • (Auchinleck tentative & too cautious) • No Common Doctrine among disparate allied forces • Inferior Tactics & execution • Rommel forced Brits to retreat back to Egypt: • But his attempt to drive Auchinleckout of Egypt failed • Brits established Defense line at El Alamein& held it • Churchill concluded it was time for a change again: • He would replace FM Auchinleckwith yet another commander • Next time => an inspired choice takes command of 8th Army • Meanwhile => Eastern Front heats up…

  34. Operation Barbarossa • Hitler’s Strategic & ideological aims: • As laid out inMein Kampf • Conquer & enslave Soviet Union –reasons why? • Raw materials & perceived need for ?____________ • Destroy “hated” Bolsheviks & Jews • Enslave “inferior” Slavs • Role of German SS? • ?____________ Hitler’s ideological campaign in wake of German Army • What was Hitler’s strategy & the German plan? • Short campaign w/attack focused near ?____________ • (Germany’s logistics & re-supply considerations) • Why? (Prevent Russia from tradingwhat for what?) • ?____________ for ?____________! (Hint: look at a map of Russia)

  35. Conflicting Operational Objectives • Germans pursued conflicting Operational objectives: • OKH: take Moscow • OKW: secure flanks- (clear Baltic& occupy Ukraine) • Who else favored what operational objective? – and as a result… • Operational Plan- OKHavoided clearly defined objectives • Army Group North (von Leeb)=> aims toclear Baltic states • Army Group Center (von Bock)=> moves to Smolensk • Army Group South (Rundstedt)=> heads to Kiev - then Dnieper • 11th Army => sentto secure Romania & Germany’s oilneeds • Leningrad, Ukraine, & Moscow were all potential objects • Problem w/ no clearly defined operational objectives? • No clear ?____________ – opened to conflicting appraisals: • Each cmdr could follow his own preference (…and they did)

  36. German Army Weaknesses • Generally, German Army well trained, tested & led • NTL => it did have certain serious weaknesses • What were the Army’s major weaknesses?* • German Army in Russia major weaknesses included: • Equipment ?____________ • Logistic & supply ?____________ • Russia’s vast geographic distances=> • Stretched out German Army’s LOCs • Faulty intelligence =>especially on enemy capabilities • Usually grossly underestimated enemy capabilities & intent

  37. Soviet Army Weaknesses • Soviet Army weaknesses: • Too many ineffectual leaders & officer corps • Stalin’s 1937-38 purges eliminated most competent officers • Soviet Army unprepared & out of date • No defense preparations made in defense against a potential invasion • (and all preparations were forbidden by Stalin) • Soviets even continued to provide Germany with raw materials on the very day of invasion

  38. Operation Barbarossa- Execution • 22 June 1941: Germans launch offensive on broad front: • Russian forces surprised, overwhelmed & routed • Resistant pockets surrounded & bypassed (as per tactical doctrine) • Germans press on toward Operational objectives: • Army Group North (von Leeb) clear Baltic states • Army Group Center (von Bock) move to Smolensk • Army Group South (Rundstedt)=> Kiev - then Dnieper • 11th Army => to secure Romania & Germany’s oil needs • All would gain initial tactical & operational objectives

  39. Problems Emerge • But as German advance proceeds, problems emerge: • 1. Logistics strained as LOCs stretched as advance moved fwd • 2. Group Cmdrs become unclear of next priority => • Advance IAW their own tactical considerations • 3. Russians refuse to surrender & instead trade space for time • 4. Then Germans overextend LOCs & reveal stress of logistics shortfalls+ • 5. Intel underestimates of Soviet OOB=> • (USSR still has 5.3 Million man strategic reserve) • Soviets make fierce (but disjointed) counterattacks • Force Germans to halt advance– casualties mount • Equipment & all ammo/supplies consumed daily

  40. Stalin Interferes • Stalin interferes at tactical level– no failure (or initiative): • NKVD shoots slackers (no good deed goes unpunished); • All requests for tactical withdrawal (from cities) denied • Stalinorders: “hold to the last” (and pays the price); • NTL: Germans suffer heavy casualties (440K of 3.78M): • By 1 Sept 1941, Germans short of 200K replacements • Army Group Center halts just outside Moscow: • Debate rages over operational objectives argued again: • OKH:Moscow vs. Hitler:Leningrad & Ukraine: • Accordingly=>Army complies w/limited success • Hitler then concluded that USSR about to collapse: • AG North had almost entirely encircled Leningrad & start siege • AG South had destroyed 4 Soviet Armies in Kiev pocket • So Hitler finally approved the advance on Moscow • (now believed Soviet’s center of gravity)

  41. Battle of Moscow (late Sept 1941) • Operation Typhoon – Army Group Center: • Mission: destroy remainder of Red Army + • Capture Moscow: • Strategic Objective: fall of Soviet Gov. • But Warning signs of trouble for Germans emerge: • Winter rapidly approaching • German Army => • “hand to mouth” supplies consumption evident • No margin for unexpected or additional tasking • Von Bock(Army Group Center) orders attack on Moscow to begin in late Sept • By Dec 4: Germans at Moscow suburbs • But also too exhausted to fight further & now are stalled

  42. Soviet Counter-Attack • Then Zhukovtakes command of Moscow’s defense: • Establishes forward defense: • Builds growing Reserve from vast manpower • Awaits opportunity to attack; • German intelligence analysis of changing situation: (oblivious) • 6 Dec: Zhukov counter-attacks Von Bock as temp. falls -25F: • Plans limited offense against Army to Moscow’s front • Stalin orders general offensive on broad front • German Army appears desperate

  43. Luck Runs Out • Elsewhere other Army Group commanders order withdrawal: • Hitler countermands his generals & fires most of them • Names himself as CINC • Takes over operational command & control: • Orders everyone to hold every inch gained at great costs • Precluded orderly withdrawal (and high casualties result) • Situation rapidly deteriorated for Germans: • NTL Hitler remained firm: hold every inch taken • (And Hitler was probably right to prevent panic=> rout)

  44. Situation Stabilizes • Gradually German’s situation slowly stabilized: • Stalin’s broad offensive was too ambitious to begin with • Offensive soon became overextended: • NTL: saved Moscow & frustrated German Objective • Inflicted huge casualties – Germans Unable to recover • Germans now suspend operations & await spring thaw: • Must invest another year trying to conquer Russia • Germans prepare for upcoming Battles of 1942 • Battle of Stalingrad is next…

  45. Assessment • Germany failed to immediately exploit victory over France: • Instead of exploiting Europe’s industrial potential=> • By immediately preparing for pro-longed war => • Hitler focused Wehrmacht on invading Britain • With no realistic chance of success • Op Sea Lion lacked required doctrine & train for ALCON: • German Navy had no viable Amphibious capability (ships) • Luftwaffe overestimated its capability to support it • Intelligence collection and analysis total failure • Brits w/RAF defended themselves well=> • German air offensive operationally & strategically ineffective • Germans not able to solve emerging problems of Battle of Britain • Gross Intel failure with regard to strategic impact of Air • Lesson that should have already been learned during Spanish Civil War

  46. Assessment- 2 • Italian incompetence created more drain on Ger resources: • Even with Ger assistance limited to mere prop-up Mussolini • Aim: protect German Southern Flank (Barbarossa & Balkans) • German major Political & strategic mistakes of 1941: • 1. Failure to consolidate & mobilize Europe for long haul • 2. Invasion of Russia (open another Front- stretch army) • 3. Declare war on US! (major industrial power added to fight) • In contrast, situation for Allies was very different in 1941: • Only need to hang on & defend until mobilized & industrial resources kick in => • Reverse German success & the current tactical & operational course of war

  47. Assessment- 3 • Germany’s major weakness was Allied key strength: • i.e. (long term strategy & logistics/industrial resources) • Germany fights Operations & tactical battles well=> • but => extremely vulnerable as war’s grows longer in duration: • With time => more strain on its limited resources & logistics • For WWII => ultimate victory would depend more on=> • Nation’s economic and industrial capacityfor long term • (Much like it did inWW1!) • Bottom line: • Germans learned tactical & operational lessons of WWI • But failed to learned strategic & logistical lessons

  48. Back-up Slides

  49. Faulty Intelligence • Major problem: faulty intelligence about comparative aircraft capabilities & Brit defenses: • Spitfire & Hurricanes estimated to be inferior toBF-109 & BF-110 Messerschmitts • German Intel also failed to appreciate effect of Radar & British Ground control system – impact? • Unrealistic operational Intelligence estimates: • Poor German Intelligence analysis: • Only 4 day strikes required defeat Brit fighter command • Only 4 weeks required to destroy rest of RAF & A/C industry

  50. “Aldlertag” - 13 August 1940 • On Eagle Day Germans attack British Radar sites: • Heavy losses both sides (148 vs. 286 for Germans) • Decide (erroneously) not worth it • Goering’s role mostly negative: • Lack of leadership, focus & direction=> • Conducts piecemeal attacks • Tactical errors: tie BF109s to Stukas • (no flexibility afforded to fighter pilots) • British air defense flexibility: • Adjust strategy as required => • Focus on bombers • Still suffer significant attrition – • Desperately need break

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