Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring: Lessons from Experience

1. Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring: Lessons from Experience Markus Goldstein Poverty Reduction Group From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) “Beyond the Numbers: Understanding the Institutions for Monitoring Poverty Reduction Strategies” World Bank

2. Content • Expectations and realities • Organizing monitoring activities • Making use of PRS monitoring • Organizing participation

3. 1. Expectations (and realities) • Objectives of a poverty monitoring system • Supports decision-making • Supports accountability to the public • Promotes evidence-based dialogue • Supports reporting to donors for their own accountability • Functions of the PRS-MS • Poverty monitoring • PRS implementation monitoring • Expenditure tracking • Focus on entire results-chain, linking the various elements

4. 1. Expectations (and realities) PRS-MS mainly has institutional functions: • Coordinating actors (not duplicating) • Developing set of indicators and targets • Building capacity where deficient • Organizing information flows • Compiling data • Linking elements of results-chain • Organizing analysis and evaluation • Generating reports • Disseminating findings • Organizing participation of civil society

5. 1. (Expectations and) realities • Modest achievements: Few have established functioning links between monitoring and decision-making • Common obstacles: • Practical issues with data collection, especially administrative routine data • Difficulties in coordination, duplication, redundancies • “turf battles” • No incentives to participate (and relinquish space) • Formal plans are not translated into actual practice

6. 1. (Expectations and) realities • Common obstacles (cont.): • Shortcomings in PRSs themselves • Lack operational details • Lack of costing • Lack of prioritization • Inadequate indicators and targets • Deficit in evaluation and analysis • Limited budget planning and PEM systems • Weak demand (interest?) from decision-makers • Donor requirements typically not aligned

7. 2. Organizing monitoring activities • Usually, formal plans exist… but not implemented • Problem may be in process of design • Often narrow: some stocktaking, short consultations, design (consultant?)…no stakeholder analysis, no real participation • Details of system not worked out – roles, responsibilities, standards, modalities for cooperation • Limited buy-in from actors • Limited accountability or compliance • Systems are consensual in nature, function only if participants find it useful and legitimate • w/o common purpose, formal obligations don’t work Need more organic design, common commitment

8. 2. Organizing monitoring activities Common building blocks • Steering Committee: political support and oversight • Coordination Unit or Secretariat: convening meetings, managing processes, compiling data, drafting reports • Inter-agency committees and working groups: promote dialogue, inclusive membership, debate results • National Statistics Institute: key data producer, plus normative and technical-assistance role • Line ministries: liaison point (M&E Unit or individual) Key issues are relationships and modalities

9. 2. Organizing monitoring activities Lessons/considerations: • Leadership • Coordination • Liaison with line ministries • Role of national statistical agencies • Involving local governments

10. 2.1. Leadership • Choice of institutional lead is critical • Should be close to center of government/budget process • Range of locations: • Ministry of Finance (Mali, Niger, Uganda)  close to budget • Ministry of Planning (Malawi, Mauritania)  better analysis • Office of the (vice-)President (Tanzania)  greater authority • Leadership more effective if in a single agency, rather than an inter-agency committee • A champion is important but danger that system becomes tied to a personality • In any case, leadership may need to change over time, need for flexibility

11. 2.2. Coordination – the greatest challenge • Typically series of inter-agency committees (13 in Mali) but: • Committee system often over-elaborate • Run out of steam • Incentives work against coordination • Often lack concrete recommendations • Technical secretariats typically suffer from high turnover and limited resources and skills  Avoid burdensome structures, build working relationships  Effective secretariat is key to organize dialogue, work through the issues, assist its members  Process, advocacy, political leadership are critical  Donors can: • Limit parallel demands which create wrong incentives • Support the system by providing incentives

12. 2.3. Liaison with line ministries • Most PRS-MS are “second-tier” systems: rely on routine data from line ministries • Usually a “liaison person” in ministry, but often w/o the authority, time or incentives to play that role effectively • Quality of sectoral data often an issue • Project/donor-specific reporting often take precedence • Promote monitoring within line ministries (for their own management purposes) • Change incentives (+capacity) • Choose liaison persons with higher profile • Requirements from PRS-MS aligned with sectoral information systems • Donors align their reporting requirements

13. 2.4. Role of statistical agencies Often most institutionally advanced element of PRS-MS But issues: 1: PRS-MS arrangements sometimes duplicate existing statistical structures (master plan). Potential rivalry between statistical system and PRS-MS. Limited links between central agency and line ministries  Ensure complementarity with existing systems and plans 2: Role of agency in setting standards, technical assistance, capacity building often not fully played. Often survey and administrative data not compatible.  Funding mechanism to leave space for this role. Donors to move away from supporting activities, towards supporting plans 3: Existing data typically not fully utilized outside the central agency  More dissemination, more training/statistical literacy

14. 2.5. Involving local governments • Communication within a sector often an issue • Incentives differ with degree of decentralization • Limited capacity (and numerous reporting obligations) • No “best practice” examples  Limit indicators to reduce burden (make it easier to comply)  Central quality control mechanisms  Support and capacity-building  Provide feedback to local level  Build on local civil society (?)  Encourage local accountability (dissemination)  Options: • decentralized monitoring (e.g. Uganda, link to grant mechanism) • central monitoring of local governments (when capacity too low)

15. 3. Making use of PRS monitoring In addition to organizing data supply, PRS-MS must build demand • Establish linkages with entry points in decision-making processes: • Budget • MTEF • Planning • Review/update PRS • Parliamentary sessions • Public dialogue • Donor strategies and operations Processes outside the PRS-MS, but should guide activities: • Analysis and evaluation • Outputs and dissemination • Linking PRS monitoring and budget • Role of parliament

16. 3.1. Analysis and evaluation • Analysis key to effective use of data • Area of great deficit • Lack of capacity • Lack of incentives (weak accountability) • Focus on APR production, w/o much analytical content • Often dedicated analytical unit (e.g.Tanzania, Uganda) Work when close to government Work when focused only on analysis Issue of funding and sustainability • Need greater capacity (and incentives) in sectoral agencies • Option: joint work with donors (e.g. PERs)

17. 3.2. Outputs and dissemination • Information must be disseminated to have an impact • Within governments: pushing information back to • central agencies • local and regional governments • service providers • Outside governments: • Parliament • Media and general public • Donors, etc. • Often not accessible • Main focus is often donors • Ensure right format/content for users, including public • Ensure right timing for key moments • Dissemination strategy

18. 3.3. Linking with budget/planning Most likely incentive for evidence-based policy-making • In practice, often weak link • Experience to date: • requirement in rules for budget preparation (usually in countries with MTEF – Uganda, Tanzania) • Challenge function around budget preparation • Ability to “sanction” often limited • Careful: • Results can take time or can be due to exogenous factors • linking funds to ability to monitor or to ability to deliver? • incentives to mis-report? • Incentives to under-commit? • Difficult to operationalize, depends on maturity of MTEF and PEM system • Donors should strengthen the budget process, rather than bypass it (wrong incentives)

19. 3.4. Links with parliament • Relatively low participation in PRS process in most countries • Missed opportunity for oversight function • Low capacity of committees for analysis • Low resources  Capacity building, economic literacy, committees

20. 4. Organizing participation Belongs to both the supply and demand side • A means to strengthen the PRS-MS (producer) • A means to increase accountability (user) Experience varies greatly • Issues of capacity and representativity • Forms of participation • Carrying out monitoring activities (including “action-oriented”) • Participating in PRS-MS structures • Analyzing and providing policy advice • Disseminating information • Typically participation not very formalized

21. Further lessons from experiences • We asked staff in PRS units or national statistics agencies (with responsibility for poverty monitoring): What are the main barriers you see to getting data effectively used in your country

22. Main issues from Sub-Saharan Africa • Political will/leadership (29%) • Capacity building, local & central (19%) • Coordination @ central level (13%) • Coordination between central and local levels (13%) • M&E link to budget (10%) • M&E budget (9%) • Legislation/regulation (4%) • Engagement w/civil society (2%)

23. Issues faced in the Balkans • Lack of capacity within statistics agency (22%) • Coordination between central and local levels (18%) • Coordination at central level (17%) • Political will/leadership (9%) • Inadequate budget (9%) • Missing census/data quality (9%) • Uneducated users (8%) • Overly technical dissemination (3%) • Legislation (3%) • Data access (1%)

24. Conclusions • Do not start from blank slate… build on existing • Won’t happen overnight… gradual improvement • Goal not an ideal system… but a process of change • Context evolves… build flexible arrangements • Focus on relations, incentives and activities • Demand needs to be stimulated… identify entry points • Users differ and need different formats and content • Donors can support or distort… Thank you !