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How the parties bargain: the nature and reach of Good Faith Bargaining (GFB). GFB obligations in s. 228 Centrepiece of bargaining framework Bargaining orders (s. 229) & other mechanisms Important role for FWC in oversight & enforcement of GFB.
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How the parties bargain: the nature and reach of Good Faith Bargaining (GFB) • GFB obligations in s. 228 • Centrepiece of bargaining framework • Bargaining orders (s. 229) & other mechanisms • Important role for FWC in oversight & enforcement of GFB
Assessing the impact of the GFB obligations • Useful in facilitating bargaining • ‘I suppose the good faith bargaining provisions sort of provided an initial push for the company to get along and actually come to the bargaining table …’ • ‘Shadow effect’, i.e. lodgment of application (or threat) sufficient to alter other party’s bargaining conduct • One employer’s view: • GFB is ‘a tool, [but really] it’s … what people work around.’
Assessing the impact of the GFB obligations (2) • Union concerns about the limits of GFB: • ‘At the end of the day the good faith bargaining provisions can be used to bring people to the table, can make them put certain information on the table, but … they don’t seem to assist in any way in terms of actually getting to some sort of outcome.’ • ‘we really believed we would get a couple of [bargaining] orders that we were seeking … [but] if the bar has to be so incredibly high, then what’s the point?’ • Particular concerns re 3rd parties not at the bargaining table; & employer “direct dealing” & “surface bargaining” tactics/conduct
Facilitating bargaining by assisting parties to resolve disputes • Dispute resolution by FWC under s. 240 • Conciliation/mediation – arbitration only if all parties agree • The most utilised of the Part 2-4 mechanisms (60.2% of all applications)
Assessing the impact of FWC dispute resolution in bargaining • Mostly used by “repeat players: unions & large, unionised employers • Motivations for using s.240: • 1. to finalise agreement or overcome impasse • ‘… we had reached a point where we weren’t making any progress in the negotiations, and we were really… seeking to have somebody with, I suppose with some authority and some… knowledge, assist with the process…’
Assessing the impact of FWC dispute resolution in bargaining (2) • Motivations for using s.240: • 2. to defuse hostilities • ‘we made [the] application … because we were going through all this, threats and intimidation. But also the meetings were just not at all constructive… so we wanted to get into a forum where we had an independent person sitting there because that tends to make people at least make reasonable … responses. And so we got into that and we went right through the claims. That was the first really civil meeting…’ • 3. as an “exit strategy” & way of “saving face” • ‘There may be times when we say to the employer… there’s an issue where we actually … agree with the employer, but the membership aren’t that keen on it and so, we’re going to take it to [FWC] and take along a posse of members and see if we can get a Commissioner to tell them that it’s not that bad after all and they can accept the offer…’
Assessing the impact of FWC dispute resolution in bargaining (3) • Motivations for using s.240: • 4. to demonstrate all efforts are being made • 5. escalate the dispute • 6. no other option!
Assessing the impact of FWC dispute resolution in bargaining (4) • Effectiveness of FWC’s role under s. 240: • depends on willingness of parties to get involved • difficult where high level of hostility • preference for “interventionist” conciliators • limits of conciliation – arbitration needed where employer determined to resist • lack of awareness among less experienced negotiators
Promoting bargaining among historically excluded workers: the Low Paid Bargaining (LPB) Stream • Highly innovative set of provisions (Part 2-4, Division 9) • Only 3 applications in 3-year period • Aged Care Case – authorisation granted, but excluded employees on existing agreements • ANF GP clinics – authorisation rejected, “logistical difficulties” • Union concerns that LPB won’t deliver improved wages/conditions for employees (not enough compulsion on e’ers; no industrial action) • Some unions have used alternative strategies, e.g. Equal Remuneration Case
Key findings & conclusions • 1. The extent of FWC’s influence is greater than the case data suggests – the “shadow effect” • 2. FWC’s role & influence in bargaining is largely restricted to unionised workplaces • 3. Part 2-4 has different effects for “new”, as opposed to “mature”, bargainers
Key findings & conclusions (2) • 4. FWC’s role is facilitative, not determinative • 5. Parties value the FWC’s role highly • 6. A need for greater awareness of the FWC’s dispute resolution services – especially among new bargainers, & individual bargaining reps