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Chains of Delegation in Argentina, Brazil , Chile and Mexico

Chains of Delegation in Argentina, Brazil , Chile and Mexico. Alexander Ruiz Euler Poli 235A. Broad analytical framework .- Delegation. Are chains of delegation of political authority functional for voters in Latin America?  Functional: Useful for transmiting preferences bottom/up.

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Chains of Delegation in Argentina, Brazil , Chile and Mexico

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  1. Chains of Delegation in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico Alexander Ruiz Euler Poli 235A

  2. Broadanalyticalframework.- Delegation Are chains of delegation of political authority functional for voters in Latin America?  Functional: Useful for transmiting preferences bottom/up. Presidentialism Parliamentarism Bureaucracy A Bureaucracy B Bureaucracy A Bureaucracy B Executive Legislative Executive I focus on this system, at this level Legislative Voters Voters Chains of delegation are mirrored by a corresponding chain of accountability that runs in the reverse direction (Strøm).

  3. Polarization and gridlock Real (Voters Preferences) Polarization and gridlock Mobilized (Strategic mobilization of voters to advance agenda) Polarization and gridlock are useful to analyze the functionality of chains of delegation because: They allow us to observe two different set of mutually exclusive policy positions. If polarization is present at both voter and legislative level, then the elites mirror the preferences of voters. If polarization is present at only the elite level, it is difficult to see how voters’ preferences are delegated into government if there is gridlock.

  4. Someliterature: Linz - Institutionsmatter. Presidentialism Parliamentarism Bureaucracy A Bureaucracy B Bureaucracy A Bureaucracy B Executive Legislative Executive Legislative Voters Voters • 2 separately elected heads of gov’t • If divided gov’t or multiparty: gridlock (Mainwaring). • Legislative elects executive, and government depends on cooperation.

  5. Someliterature: Hammond and Buttler - Institutionsmatter, but so do preferences Central argument: In both presidentialism and parliamentarism it is important not to overstate the role of institutions. In both regimes, it is preferences which fundamentally determine legislative coalitions and cooperation.

  6. Researchquestion.- Polarization: Convergenceordivergencebetweenmasses and elites? There are 2 possibilities: Elites and masses preferences converge elites HO: + mass polarization implies + elite polarization or masses • These hypotheses DO NOT focus on the reasons behind convergence/divergence: • “True “ preferences of masses • Elite mobilization of masses Elites and masses preferences diverge elites Ha: + mass polarization does not imply + elite polarization or masses

  7. Researchdesign.- General scheme Causal mechanism explored: Polarization at the elite level is caused by polarization at the voter level. • I want to isolate the effect of institutions and preferences over legislative gridlock. • Therefore, I will focus on a longitudinal study in a single country to control for institutional variation. Multiple pretest and multiple posttest single group. People agree/disagree with an issue • For each one of 4 countries: • Argentina • Brazil • Chile • Mexico N O1,2 O1,2 O1,2 O1,2 X1 O1,2 O1,2 O1,2 O1,2 Some threats to internal validity: History threat Regression to the mean N O1,2 O1,2 O1,2 O1,2 X2 O1,2 O1,2 O1,2 O1,2 Legislative voting over 2 issues. Time • O1 is % agree that issue should be solved in form y. • O2 is O1 segmented by Party Identification. • X is legislative voting on issues 1 and 2.

  8. Researchdesign.- Sourcesforempiricalevidence (Mexico) The indicators are constructed as follows: • O1 is % agree that issue should be solved in form y. • Source: Public reports of polling firms (e.g. Consulta Mitofsky, Parametría, BGC y Asociados). • O2 is O1 segmented by Party Identification. • Source: Public reports of polling firms (e.g. Consulta Mitofsky, Parametría, BGC y Asociados). • X1,2 is legislative voting on issues 1 and 2. • Source: Legislative Gazette of Upper or Lower House.

  9. Help! Some problems with my project: Gridlock by definition implies legislative inactivity. Therefore, I cannot observe legislative voting on such an issue. BUT polarization is observable, both at the mass level and in legislative activity. I am unclear on how to link polarization and Linz + Hammond and Butler. Should I focus on polarization, gridlock, or both? Literature?

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