Emery Roe, RESIN, July 2009

1. Emery Roe, RESIN, July 2009 Chokepoints, ICIS, & the Bay-Delta conceptual Model linking them: Some Proposed Definitions & PROCEDURES

2. Proposed Sub-Process in RESIN Initiative: RESIN Procedural Process

3. Definitions focus on spatial & functional interactions --Spatial Definition *adjacent placement of individual CISs, greatly faciliated by being behind levees (enforced ICISs) *though do not be deceived, e.g., GIS mapping shows Greater Sherman Island chokepoint—a real advance in resilience (i.e., knowing the next step ahead when bouncing back or absorbing a shock requires managers at least to know what the chokepoint is that they are returning to)! RESIN & Chokepoints

4. Definitions focus on spatial & functional interactions --Spatial Definition (continued) *Note resilience is tied in with the spatial definition of a chokepoint: When an infrastructure within the chokepoint fails, resilience means it can bounce back (or absorb the shock) while planning the next step ahead before tripping other infrastructure failure within the chokepoint or the CIS/ICIS failure beyond. RESIN & Chokepoints

5. --Functional definitions are more difficult to operationalize for several reasons: *Technological (including network) interactions * Organizational (including political) interactions --Focusing on these interactions takes you to other ICISs than just levee-specific ones. RESIN & Chokepoints (continued)

6. Types of (increasing) functional interactions that define a chokepoint [CP]: --Level I Criterion (“Level 1 Chokepoint”): C[Fcp] includes CIS and ICIS failure beyond chokepoint (e.g., Sherman Island goes leading to transmission line failure elsewhere or ports in Sacr. and Stock. flood leading to massive transportation problems and shutdowns in the region; note combination of org/tech factors causing different levels of “common mode failure”) RESIN & Chokepoints (continued)

7. --Level II Criterion (“Level II Chokepoints”): C[Fcp] are potentially so large it is not possible to predict or compute them, organizationally (e.g., in economic/legal terms) or technologically. --Level III Criterion (“Level III Chokepoints”): C[Fcp] are so utterly large as to constitute a “game-changing event,” e.g., the disappearance of Sherman Island or the indefinite shutdown of the ports would break the Bay-Delta zero-sum game among stakeholders. RESIN & Chokepoints (continued)

8. The relationship between resilience and sustainability within each level of chokepoints: --Resilience centers on P[F]: The goal is to reduce P[F] for an infrastructure within an chokepoint, thereby reducing P[F] for the chokepoint, e.g, by improving recovery time of the infrastructure in question) --Sustainability centers on C[F]: The goal is to ensure that C[F] of any chokepoint, should it still fail, does not increase the P[F] of another spatially or functionally related chokepoint, e.g. by managing the Cross Delta Channel or Project pumps so as to accommodate the unpredictable effects of levee flooding. RESIN & Chokepoints (continued)

9. Again, where is P[F] in all this? --By reducing P[F] for any single infrastructure in a chokepoint, e.g., by making it more resilient, we reduce the overall P[Fcp] --At best, reducing the P[Fcp] of one chokepoint should reduce the P[Fcp] of the other chokepoints related to it, though even here, if one fails, its C[F] will still have be managed sustainably (i.e., so it does not increase P[F] elsewhere in the ICIS). RESIN & Chokepoints (continued)

10. General Points: --Defining a chokepoint is geared to identifying their CIS and ICIS components; --Defining a chokepoint is geared to identifying resilience with respect to P[F] and sustainability with respect to C[F]; and --In defining them this way, we make explicit the positive side of chokepoints (not just their negative common mode failure features): Namely, managers can and do focus their attention on them precisely because they are chokepoints. Indeed a resilient and sustainable solution might be to add more chokepoints if they can be managed better than others. RESIN & Chokepoints (continued)

11. Interconnected Critical Infrastructure Systems (ICISs) on the own without reference to chokepoints --Can we define an ICIS in other ways than focusing on chokepoints within a region? --Yes, at the infrastructure level, where our conceptual model will identify primary relationships between and among specific infrastructures including but not limited to interactions we are defining as chokepoints. RESIN & ICIS

12. But are there other ways to define an ICIS relevant to our RESIN engineering goals? --Yes, and we should give some attention to these if only because they have engineering implications. One example is: Delta as buffer. --Start with Bob Twiss notion of Delta as place, ecosystem and crossroads. Each has implications for the infrastructures within in and thus for engineers. But once you look at the region as region, you needn’t stop there in terms of its role as an ICIS. RESIN & ICIS (Continued)

13. Example I. The Green Heart of Western Netherlands RESIN & ICIS (Continued)

14. Example II. The Florida Everglades RESIN & ICIS (Continued)

15. Example III. The Bay Delta as the same kind of buffer? What are management & policy implications for engineers? RESIN & ICIS (Continued)

16. First Pass: RESIN & BAy-Delta Conceptual Model

17. Second Pass (after URS discussion): 1. Includes roads & deepwater shipping channels 2. Core to all ICIS models? 3. Based on expert opinion and reports RESIN & BAy-Delta Conceptual Model (continued)

18. Proposed Revision Process: Note now that Stakeholder Analysis can feed into other ICIS model spedification. RESIN & BAy-Delta Conceptual Model (continued)