Leon Hermans

1. Identifying long-term monitoring needsCoastline management in the Netherlands1st EEEN Forum, Leuven, 9–10 February 2012 Leon Hermans Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands

2. Outline of presentation • Long-term monitoring and environmental evaluation • A framework that is fit for multi-actor complexity • Applying the framework in retrospect: coastline management in the Netherlands 1985 – 2010 • Conclusions

3. Long-term monitoring and environmental evaluation • Necessary for ‘evidence-based’ learning • Long-term horizon • Uncertainties, including in underlying science • Competing interests • “Data rich but information poor” syndrome? • Can one predict policy issues ten years ahead? Economist, 2011

4. Researching long-term monitoring • Aim: Support design of long-term monitoring programs fit for policy-oriented learning in multi-actor context • Conceptual design of approach: actors and policy-oriented learning • Historical test of design: What happened without support? Two cases, one in the Netherlands, one in South-Africa.

5. Designing an approach for monitoring • Network context of policy-making: interdependent actors as drivers • Outcomes of policy-processes as result of interactions among actors • Learning to be done by these actors • Actors central in identification learning agenda policy processes

6. Capturing the essence of actor interactions: Game theory For each game: • Decisions • Rules and procedures • Players For each player: • Goals – preferences, mandates, responsibilities, interests (what they want to achieve) • Means – resources, interventions, connections (what they can do) • Perceptions – assumptions about the game and the system (what they think)

7. Games and Learning over Time: Rounds and Levels

8. Coastline management in the Netherlands, 1984 - 2011 Three rounds included in analysis: • 1990: Policy decision: Coastline preservation • 1990 – 2000s: Annual programming sand nourishments • Current: Long-term strategy for coastline (Sand motor?) Pictures: Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, Deltaprogramma

9. Game 1, 1980sCoastal erosion & Finalizing Delta Works

10. Game 1PlayersandCoalitions Engineers ‘Rijkswaterstaat’ Scientists: Delft Hydraulics , Universities, … Minister Public Works & Water Management Cabinet / Finance Minister National Parliament Union of Water boards Coastalprovinces Coastalmunicipalities Nature organisations Residentscoastalareas Ownersbeachpavillions Other coastal businesses Public at large (citizens) Coastal Experts Budgetholders Societal stakeholders

11. Solution space (opened up by storm event)

12. Game 2, 1990sAnnual programme sand distribution – Technical and administrative procedures

13. Game 2 Coalitions and their interests • {Rijkswaterstaat, Waterboards}: Safety National Coast: • Coastlinepreservation, longertimespan • {Municipalities, Waterboards}: Regionaltailoring: • Sometimeslittle bit ‘extra’, forregionaleconomy (beachwidth) andsafety (small dunes), shortertimespans • {Nature,Waterboards}: Nature / no disturbance • No disturbanceduneareas, fornature but alsotomaintainsafetyof water defensestructures, longesttimespan • Different coalitions with (sometimes) different interests in amount and frequency of sand nourishments at specific locations

14. Game 2: Sand nourishment programming Coastline preservation Nature Regional development • Safety interest accepted by all • No extra budget for additional interests of players • Game has no shared solution space

15. Games and Assumptions

16. Monitoring assumptions Game 1

17. Monitoring assumptions Game 2

18. Monitoring in coastline management • Since (pre-) 1990: Safety indicators • 2009: Agreement on research nature effects sand nourishments • 2009: Two reports with cases on sand nourishments and recreation

19. Emerging picture: partial monitoring • Only part of assumptions were monitored • ‘Just happened’ • Experts, analysts and budget Rijkswaterstaat all ‘safety’ oriented • Consequences: • We ‘know’ sand nourishments ‘work’ for safety • We do not ‘know’ their effects on nature and recreation • Is this bad? Should it have been differently? Who is responsible?

20. Conclusions from this case • Looking at policy processes as ‘games’ with players who make assumptions helps uncover monitoring needs • May suggest a broader focus for monitoring, covering needs for multiple actors • But: who is responsible for ‘more’ monitoring?

21. Conclusions on methodology • Long-term framework IAD + rounds • Enabled organizing data • Game theory • Useful for suggesting concepts for analysis of actor interactions • Added value of full game theory models for identification of monitoring agendas is limited • Assumption-based planning / assumption surfacing • Critical for translation from games to monitoring needs • Important to identify assumptions for multiple actors – game theory helpful but other approaches for actor analysis also possible

22. Thank you for your attention! Leon Hermans L.M.Hermans@tudelft.nl A more detailed working paper can be downloaded from: http://www.nextgenerationinfrastructures.eu/index.php?pageID=19&itemID=580908