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Exercise Prelude

Exercise Prelude. Paul Youngman. Exercise Prelude. Exercise Prelude took place on the 5 th and 6 th of November with the final report being published by the HSE on their website last month. Overview of results What was within scope for Prelude Observations Key indicators Key responses

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Exercise Prelude

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  1. Exercise Prelude Paul Youngman

  2. Exercise Prelude • Exercise Prelude took place on the 5th and 6th of November with the final report being published by the HSE on their website last month. • Overview of results • What was within scope for Prelude • Observations • Key indicators • Key responses • Areas for further work • Transporter focussed actions • Shipper focussed actions

  3. Exercise Prelude • Scope of Exercise Prelude • Prelude was focused on Network Emergency Management Team actions and downstream load reduction • Testing of Primary and Secondary Transporters and new control rooms • Prelude was run to a script that went through each stage of a Gas Deficit Emergency • No development of strategy or time available for consideration of the “what if’s” • Upstream involvement and actions were limited to communication tests / exchange of forms • Wider interactions with DECC and external communications were also out of scope

  4. Exercise Prelude – General Observations • New processes introduced for Moffat Interconnector worked well • Communications from NEMT to the Distribution Network Control rooms was effective • Communications and processes need aligning to reflect changing industry structure • All transporters reported that the quality of site contact details was poor • Improvement in the number of sites that when contacted would load shed • Improvement by sites in understanding what is required of them • Improvements by Transporters in call handling and the escalation of issues

  5. Firm load shedding - Overall

  6. Firm load shedding - Overall • Improvement compared to exercise Opus in the percentage of SOQ Load Shed • Performance of the top 4 LDZ was 75% of the total SOQ contacted being load shed • Action on all transporters to adopt the best practice of the best performing networks

  7. Firm load shedding – contact details

  8. Firm load shedding – contact details • Contact details incorrect • Consistently high 32.89 %. Every third phone call made was to an incorrect number. • Improvement in action taken where contact is made • Decrease in “could not turn off” and increase in “Successful - can turn off”

  9. Exercise Prelude - Observations • Shippers were frustrated by fax communications • Duplicate faxes being sent by transporter control rooms during the exercise • SC2004 fault resulted in restoration notices being repeatedly sent after the end of the exercise • Some shippers unaware of new control room structure / effect on emergency communications and processes

  10. Exercise Prelude - Actions • Working with Transporters to improve: • Communication with Shippers and Supplementary Transporters detailing the changes to distribution network control rooms • Maintaining a commitment to “Best Practice” and adoption of it. • Establishing a better understanding of isolation and the restoration process

  11. Exercise Prelude - Actions • Working with Shippers to improve: • Provision of emergency contact details • Methods of communication and information provision • Awareness of any process changes • Understanding of the types and scopes of a Network Gas Supply Emergency • Clear understanding of the commercial processes

  12. Summary of Section Q Emergency Contact requirements. In addition to User contact details the User is responsible for providing the following site emergency contacts. (TPD Q 2.3 and 2.4)

  13. Contact Details • Responsibility of Users to update Emergency Contacts in line with the UNC and their contract with consumers • Key Features: • Fax and 24 hour where applicable • Relevant individual at site • Has authority to act in accordance with instructions from Transporter • Alternate contacts where appropriate • Integration with site and organisational plans • Obligation for all to co-operate under GSMR to protect public safety

  14. Report and contact details • The full results of Exercise Prelude are now available from the HSE website • http://www.hse.gov.uk/gas/supply/information.htm • For further information please contact the emergency planning team • gasops.emergencyplanning@uk.ngrid.com • Paul Youngman – Emergency Planning Manager (GNCC) Tel: 01926 654151

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