Cameron’s Conservatives, the Union and Devolution

1. Presentation for WGC/IWA Conference Cohabitation between the Thames and the Taff Cardiff, 9 July 2010 Alan Trench (University of Edinburgh and the Constitution Unit, UCL; Author, ‘Devolution Matters’ blog) Cameron’s Conservatives, the Union and Devolution

2. The Tories and devolution, 1979-2005 • Emergence of devolution in both Scotland and Wales as an alternative to unpopular Tory govt with limited if any mandate in either country • Opposition to Labour’s proposals in 1997 (but Parlia-mentary opposition undermined by both referendum results and Conservative disarray) • Proportional representation enabling Tories to re-enter electoral politics in both NAW and Scottish Parliament • And the Welsh Conservatives could re-invent themselves (in contrast to the Scottish) • Peripherality and electoral irrelevance in Westminster terms giving them room for manoeuvre • But still embraced with ill-grace by party at British level

3. Cameron’s approach • His over-riding goal: the need to ‘decontaminate’ the Conservative brand, to enable it to win power at Westminster • A strategic view of the Union (and much else), rooted in the UK’s place in a wider world rather than some sort of domestic control or uniformity, or ‘score-settling’ • Edinburgh speech, December 2007 • Links to Euroscepticism of modern Conservatism? • What this meant: the ‘respect agenda’ • Intergovt relations • Finance • Referendum on primary powers for Wales and the ‘Broughton declaration’ • BUT: this also meant a variable approach within the party, and limited consistency in applying a not-very-cogently-thought-through position to the different parts of the UK

4. The 2010 election and after • Electoral strategy: the Tories as an electoral presence across the UK • Attempts to win seats in Scotland and Wales • The ‘respect’ agenda toward devolved govts (esp in Scotland) • N Ireland no longer a no-go zone – UCUNF alliance with UUP (problematic on both sides) • Variations in approach – Scotland got generous resources and much engagement. Wales got much less support and attention, though electorally much more significant. • Limited ‘devolution literacy’ in the 2010 Conservative Manifesto(s). • Failure of the ‘UK’ strategy: Tories (and Lib Dems) heavily reliant on English votes to put them in office. Scotland and Wales remain largely peripheral electorally, however important they may be to claims to govern the UK as a whole

5. First steps in office • Limited engagement of party in Scotland or Wales in coalition negotiations – on both Con & Lib Dem sides. • Expectation of Lib Dem expertise esp in & for Scotland – not really justified or delivered • Small-c conservatism: absence of machinery of govt changes – no ‘dept of nations and regions’, despite the personnel problems they face • Might that come at a reshuffle? • Range of commitments in the Programme for Government - and a wide-ranging agenda on constitutional reform more generally

6. Devolution commitments in the Programme for Government • Implement Calman recommendations for Scotland (in both Con & Lib Dem manifestos) • Review use of fossil fuel levy proceeds for Scotland (Lib Dem not Con manifesto) • Commission to consider West Lothian question (Con but not LD manifesto) • Paper examining mechanisms for changing corporation tax rate in Northern Ireland (Con not LD manifesto) • Hold referendum on legislative powers for Wales (in both manifestos) • ‘Process similar to Calman’ for Wales, but nothing directly responding to Holtham (in neither manifesto) • ‘Take forward’ Sustainable Homes LCO (in neither manifesto) • Plus reduction in size of UK Parliament (with knock-on effects for size of NAW) (Con not LD manifesto)

7. Possible territorial strategies for a Conservative/coalition UK Government In principle, 4 general strategies are open to the Conservatives for managing the territorial politics of the UK: • An all-UK electoral strategy, emphasising the presence of the Conservatives in each electoral arena and relying on party linkages and interest to ensure policy co-ordination (pretty much what Labour did in 1999-2007). • An ‘interparliamentary’ strategy, emphasising the role of elected legislatures and links between them, at expense of governments. Marginalises SNP, but risks creating practical gridlock (because most business is between govts).

8. Possible territorial strategies cont’d • A ‘disengagement’ strategy: distinguish as clearly as possible between devolved and non-devolved matters, allow a high degree of autonomy for devolved ones, and minimise spill-overs • An ‘intergovernmental’ strategy: emphasise role of governments dealing with each other, and use their pragmatism to secure agreement Beyond this lies another big issue • Should the UK Govt try to put all the devolved territories in, as much as possible, the same position, and treat them in the same way – or should it treat each of them individually in an ad hoc, bilateral way? • And if it does the latter, what is ‘Britishness’? Symbolic rhetoric or what?

9. Possible territorial strategies cont’d • The Conservatives’ ‘all-UK’ strategy clearly failed: no gains in Scotland, dismal performance in N Ireland, far fewer gains than expected in Wales (and not much of a showing in northern England either). That also undermines the interparliamentary strategy. • ... So what’s left is some combination of the disengagement and intergovernmental strategies • ‘Ad hoc-ery’ was the hallmark of the Labour govt, and appears to be that of the Coalition too (consistent with traditional Conservative thinking). • The main difference is that the new govt don’t regard the SNP as an immediate electoral threat, even if they are a larger constitutional one.

10. Progress so far I: The cuts agenda • The Emergency Budget avoided the bear-trap of hitting devolved functions & budgets especially hard. In fact, by sheltering health spending and prioritising education, it protects devolved budgets from the worst of the cuts that Whitehall depts will suffer • Not to say that the process will be pleasant, but it could be much worse. • Social security spending is clearly a major target. That will have implications esp. in Scotland, where that is the main tangible function of the UK Govt – which in turn will affect attitudes toward UK level and ‘Britishness’ (especially given financial debates which increasingly focus on fiscal autonomy or ‘responsibility’)

11. Progress so far II: the ‘respect agenda’ • Constitutional problems with Westminster politicians taking questions etc in devolved legislatures • Referendum on primary powers: an unsavoury blame game, perhaps because the (then-shadow) Sec of State didn’t engage with the practicalities • Timing of referendum on AV (and suggestion that Scottish elections could be postponed to let it go ahead on 6 May!) • Use of intergovt mechanisms (JMCs) thorough-going and effective • Finance: the promise of a ‘Welsh Calman’ ignores more pressing issues, the fact that Calman looked at both constitutional and financial issues (which Holtham and AWC have considered in Wales), and • But Scotland has had gains (notably the fossil fuel levy), while Wales hasn’t

12. In conclusion ... • The new government starts with several problems, not least the economy and the failure of their first-choice territorial strategy • They are clearly much sensitive to Scottish concerns than Welsh ones. • That’s reflected in problems over the timing of a referendum on Part 4 of GWA 2006, the silence about size of NAW, and over finance (contrast with the fiscal powers debate or fossil fuel levy) • A big issue remains unresolved and unclear: how much do the Conservatives see the Union as a sequence of ad hoc, bilateral bargains, and how much do they think there should be linking thread of UK-wide norms or standards? • In any case, making their strategy work is going to call for sustained ministerial effort and engagement, and will involve displeasing backbench MPs. Still unclear whether they will deliver.

13. Read more on the ‘Devolution Matters’ blog http://devolutionmatters.wordpress.com/