Presentation Transcript

1. Preventive Vigilance

   Dynamic response to ever changing threat perception
2. CASH Security of Post Office cash and valuables. Prevent excess cash retention. Min/Max Bal. Review Security during transmission and line-limits. Pay Day precautions. Physical counting of cash and use of Treasury Module. ECB Memos. Bank Reconciliation. Fake cheque clearance.
3. STAMPS Used-up stamps prevalent in large quantities. Fake stamps keep coming to notice. Bulk Mailers, Religious Institutions easy targets for pushing used-up/fake stamps. Check at acceptance point can only be effective. Proper records of bulk sale/posting necessary in treasury/BMCs.
4. FRANKING Large pilferages noticed by commercial mailers. Both customers and DOP found cheated. Second office of posting to be monitored most carefully. Check at acceptance point most effective. Old machines/die to be destroyed. Site visit / record check necessary.
5. MONEY ORDERS Fake High Value MOs introduced into system. Office copies of list intact, interpolations in second copy common modus operandi. Unsuspecting receiving office pays out. Fake stamps and seals used. HVMO forms sent by fictitious service Regd. articles.
6. CASH CERTIFICATES FRAUDS Encashment of lost/stolen CCs (without proper verification in transfer cases) [Guwahati GPO] Use of lost/stolen CCs by forging No. & Series to avoid Negative List [Kanpur GPO] Double/multiple discharge [Amlapuram HO, Raniganj HO] Discharge of imaginary CCs [Raniganj HO] Inflated amount of discharge shown [Raniganj HO] Non-inclusion of sale in issue journal and non-credit of sale proceeds of genuine CCs [Teliabagh SO, Varanasi] Pledging of lost/stolen/counterfeit CCs [Patna, Chandigarh, Gorakhpur] specially by contractors as security for contracts Encashment of lost/stolen CCs through fraudulent name transfer
7. LAPSES NOTICED IN MAJOR CASH CERTIFICATES CASESPO LEVEL Negative List not consulted Proper verification procedure not followed Payments exceeding Rs. 20000/- made in cash instead of by cheque Local address of the investor is not verified in RBT cases Payments are made without specific pay order of the competent authority Non-maintenance of NC-12 & NC-12 (a) registers and its non-reconciliation with issue journals and money accounted for Non/delayed submission of due returns to the PAO
8. LAPSES NOTICED IN MAJOR CASH CERTIFICATES CASESPO LEVEL Returns to PAO without supporting vouchers – cases of will follow and other remarks Returns to PAO without the signatures of the competent authority – under signature of APM instead of Postmaster Proper upkeep of purchase applications not ensured – kept loose not in guard files and in proper security Poor record maintenance – wanting / missing office copy of issue/discharge journals, stock register, guard files, invoice, indents etc. Acceptance of Agents as witness Non-conducting of internal branch inspection by the Chief / Sr./ Postmasters
9. LAPSES NOTICED IN MAJOR CASH CERTIFICATES CASESPAO LEVEL Non/delayed opening of bags of returns received from HOs Non-scrutiny / matching of supporting documents with due returns Non-pairing of issue/discharge details even of representative samples Non-detection of significant short/excess vouchers with returns Non-detection of even imaginary / inflated discharges (even for periods paired) // double / multiple discharge even during the same month Non-maintenance of S & I register Not keeping watch over the timely receipt of due returns from HOs Upkeep of records – records not available even during the period of preservation Records destroyed after preservation period even without mandatory pairing/checking
10. LAPSES NOTICED IN MAJOR CASH CERTIFICATES CASESADMINISTRATIVE AND INSPECTORIAL LEVEL Major frauds being detected on anonymous complaints – Collapse of regular supervisory / regulatory mechanism Questionnaire during inspections/visits not followed Tenure transfer instructions not followed scrupulously – extension given without examination of performance / previous service records Table transfer norms not implemented in HOs Regular posting of same group of officials in SB/CC related posts (cooling off period not followed) No follow-up on due reports from POs to Divisional offices
11. LAPSES NOTICED IN MAJOR CASH CERTIFICATES CASESADMINISTRATIVE AND INSPECTORIAL LEVEL Light punishments, not commensurate with loss/offence Delay leading to retirement of main/subsidiary offenders No review of such penalties / misplaced sympathy and compassion shown during review Subsidiary and co-offenders not properly identified Delay and hesitation in reporting cases to police No proper follow-up action on findings of departmental investigation Dormant status of DO/RO/CO Checking squads – all satisfactory reports with nil irregularity noticed – number and amount of frauds increasing
12. FEATURES NOTICED IN MAJOR SAVINGS BANK FRAUDS – BY DEPARTMENTAL OFFICIALS Non/delayed-credit of deposits in government account by the counter PA Bogus ATs inserted in the system Issue of duplicate passbook without proper verification Non-maintenance of stock register for passbooks Exchange of passbooks between counters without acquittance Fraudulent use of blank passbooks and post office stamps/seals Access of unauthorized persons to post office records – unauthorized help taken by staff Forged closure / premature closure of accounts by forging signatures of customers
13. FEATURES NOTICED IN MAJOR SAVINGS BANK FRAUDS – BY DEPARTMENTAL OFFICIALS Forged withdrawal from accounts of customers by forging signatures Double / multiple closure of accounts Fraudulent collaboration with Agents leading to cheating of customers investing through agents Routing of counter business through Agent – Fraudulent drawal and sharing of commission – a recent trend – commission is generated even in cases evidently of reinvestment Manipulation of records/ledgers/computer database – inflating balance for fraudulent withdrawal Slackness/arrear of work in SBCO Payments exceeding Rs. 20000/- are made in cash instead of cheque
14. FEATURES NOTICED IN MAJOR SAVINGS BANK FRAUDS – BY AGENTS Creating trust with customers then breaching the same – criminal breach of trust Taking advantage of customers hurry and ignorance of procedures Taking advantage of customers’ interest in part of the commission Non-issue of preliminary receipts to customers Retention of passbooks by the Agents Getting blank / self / without endorsement cheques for investment – fraudulent diversion of the amount in their interest
15. FEATURES NOTICED IN MAJOR SAVINGS BANK FRAUDS – BY AGENTS Managing blank / messenger signed withdrawal slips from customers – leading to premature fraudulent closure Replacement of original papers (mainly account opening form) for opening of accounts with papers in their own handwriting to facilitate issue of duplicate and finally fraudulent closure Access to post office records – allowed to make their own entry in passbooks as per their schedules of deposits – fabricated entry in passbooks misleading depositors Easy availability of blank passbooks to the Agents leading to issue of false passbooks with altered amount to the depositors
16. Types of Frauds in Computerized Offices Stamp prepaid Supervisor password known to operators Inclusion of article & MOs Manipulation of reports Violation of security instructions issued by Directorate
17. COMPUTER SECURITY GUIDELINES Directorate Instructions 46-5/2004-Tech dtd. 21 July 2004 Sharing of Password to be stopped Password to be periodically changed Confidential information to be stored on standalone system only Unauthorized access to Servers/PCs to be stopped
18. During Maintenance Maintenance or rectification of faults in the computer system should be carried out under proper and close supervision in case of maintenance of hardware by an external agency Ensure that no data – file / program is copied and taken by the maintenance engineer. Maintenance of software should be done by the users.
19. Bad hard disk should not be released even after it has been replaced by a new one. Such hard disks may be destroyed by following procedures as applicable to weeding out of classified files. AMC – Repairs – Need to remove all data– wipe out the hard disk , so that deleted information can’t be reversed.
20. Case Study - I Station Kacheguda HO Committed by SBCO supervisor SB LAN Rs. 1,34,317.00 Full amount recovered Breach of password secrecy
21. Case Study - II Anna Road HO System Administrator involved Sanchay Post Changing of BAT through data entry module Detected due to complaints and mismatching of LOT and vouchers.
22. Case Study - III Worli Naka Post Office, Mumbai Sanchaya Post Data Entry Mode used – due to Cheque clearance. Use of APM password Detected due to union complaint
23. RMS OPERATIONS Cases of abstraction/loss of articles Trends in particular sections/sets Rotation of staff, particularly those of doubtful integrity Posting of periodicals in PSO
24. RMS OPERATIONS Loss of CSD Bags, Postage Stamps etc. Careless handling of accountable articles, Non tallying of registered abstracts, fix individual responsibility Punishment for loss/abstraction
25. Suggestions for prevention Training to Officers to conduct Technology inspections. Regular monitoring of password security and sanctity. Technology squad check on lines similar to vigilance squad check. Technology Vigilance to be separated from technology implementation. Data base warehousing at RO/CO. Databases of HPOs/Pos may be obtained once in 2-3 months and may be checked at Tech Cell of RO/CO. Use of analysis services of RDBMS should be done. Need of Technology audit by professionals. Making a Regional cadre for technology officials and system administrators.
26. Monitoring & Investigation Effective monitoring of software usage, observance of password secrecy at Pos, and vigilant inspections of computerized offices will prevent frauds. To investigate computer related frauds, we have to be innovative in our approach to ensure that the real culprit is brought to the book.
27. Thank You