Understanding Insurgencies

1. 1 Understanding Insurgencies Time Required: ~1 hour, depending on discussion Task: Answer the question, �How does understanding an insurgency impact the counterinsurgent mission?� Learning Objectives: � Defeating an insurgency requires understanding (1) how it operates and (2) how this helps it succeed. � Understand the four main insurgent approaches. � Understand the factors underlying insurgent success. � Understand how the counterinsurgent response should take into account insurgent strengths and weaknesses.Time Required: ~1 hour, depending on discussion Task: Answer the question, �How does understanding an insurgency impact the counterinsurgent mission?� Learning Objectives: � Defeating an insurgency requires understanding (1) how it operates and (2) how this helps it succeed. � Understand the four main insurgent approaches. � Understand the factors underlying insurgent success. � Understand how the counterinsurgent response should take into account insurgent strengths and weaknesses.

2. 2 Takeaway: The truth of this statement is self-evident, but WHY does knowing the enemy help us defeat him? ---------- � Generate discussion, meant to tackle the �so what� question � Set up the main objectives of the class: � HOW do insurgencies operate? � WHAT makes them successful? � HOW do we negate insurgent advantages? � Lead up to next slide: insurgent approachesTakeaway: The truth of this statement is self-evident, but WHY does knowing the enemy help us defeat him? ---------- � Generate discussion, meant to tackle the �so what� question � Set up the main objectives of the class: � HOW do insurgencies operate? � WHAT makes them successful? � HOW do we negate insurgent advantages? � Lead up to next slide: insurgent approaches

3. Knowing the Enemy 3

4. Underlying Causes Can be real or perceived Base on actual societal contradictions Based on misinformation Multiple causes Deep-seated, strategic Temporary, local 4 Takeaway: Insurgents generally claim a variety of causes; to be successful, a COIN effort must address legitimate grievances. ---------- � �Insurgent leaders often seek to adopt attractive and persuasive causes to mobilize support.� � Insurgents use multiple causes in order to appeal to as broad a base as possible. � To succeed, COIN efforts must address legitimate grievances. Flickr caption: A U.S. Army Soldier with 4th Platoon, Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division out of Fort Carson, Colo., talks with local residents about whose house was struck by small arms fire by insurgent forces in the area of Dora in southern Baghdad, Iraq, July 23, 2007. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Jonathan Doti) www.army.mil� Takeaway: Insurgents generally claim a variety of causes; to be successful, a COIN effort must address legitimate grievances. ---------- � �Insurgent leaders often seek to adopt attractive and persuasive causes to mobilize support.� � Insurgents use multiple causes in order to appeal to as broad a base as possible. � To succeed, COIN efforts must address legitimate grievances. Flickr caption: A U.S. Army Soldier with 4th Platoon, Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division out of Fort Carson, Colo., talks with local residents about whose house was struck by small arms fire by insurgent forces in the area of Dora in southern Baghdad, Iraq, July 23, 2007. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Jonathan Doti) www.army.mil�

5. 5 Insurgent Approaches Five main approaches Conspiratorial Protracted popular war Military-focused Urban Identity-focused Insurgents may: Change approaches based on circumstances Use different approaches at the same time Takeaway: We talk about approaches, not strategies; these approaches identify consistent trends in insurgent behavior. ---------- � Approaches are distinguished based on the interaction of three actors: insurgents, population, government. � Insurgents can vary their approach by time and place � Insurgents are just as much an element of the environment as counterinsurgents are ---------- Caption from US Army Flickr Photostream: �Sadr militiaman with MP43/44 (to the left, obviously)� [not attributed]Takeaway: We talk about approaches, not strategies; these approaches identify consistent trends in insurgent behavior. ---------- � Approaches are distinguished based on the interaction of three actors: insurgents, population, government. � Insurgents can vary their approach by time and place � Insurgents are just as much an element of the environment as counterinsurgents are ---------- Caption from US Army Flickr Photostream: �Sadr militiaman with MP43/44 (to the left, obviously)� [not attributed]

6. 6 Conspiratorial Approach Takeaway: The objective of a conspiratorial approach is to overthrow the leadership of the government. ---------- � Desired outcomes: � Insurgents: control of all gov�t institutions � Government: institutions remain intact � Population: acquiescence in new insurgent control � Meant to be achieved quickly � Takes over the government from the inside out � US COIN forces are least likely to be able to counter this approach (usually involves secret, high-level forces) � Ex: Communist takeover in Russia (1917)Takeaway: The objective of a conspiratorial approach is to overthrow the leadership of the government. ---------- � Desired outcomes: � Insurgents: control of all gov�t institutions � Government: institutions remain intact � Population: acquiescence in new insurgent control � Meant to be achieved quickly � Takes over the government from the inside out � US COIN forces are least likely to be able to counter this approach (usually involves secret, high-level forces) � Ex: Communist takeover in Russia (1917)

7. 7 Protracted Popular War Takeaway: With this approach, insurgents prolong the conflict while gradually gaining popular support. ---------- � Desired outcomes: � Insurgents: employ Mao�s three phases to wear down government control � Government: slowly becomes weaker � Population: gradually give more and more support to insurgents � Mao�s Theory of Protracted War: � Strategic defensive: gov�t strong, insurgents focus on survival � Strategic stalemate: equal force correlation, guerrilla tactics � Strategic counteroffensive: insurgent strength, conventional ops � Examples: Chinese Communists, North Vietnamese Dau Trahn (see FM 3-24, pp. 1-7 to 1-8)Takeaway: With this approach, insurgents prolong the conflict while gradually gaining popular support. ---------- � Desired outcomes: � Insurgents: employ Mao�s three phases to wear down government control � Government: slowly becomes weaker � Population: gradually give more and more support to insurgents � Mao�s Theory of Protracted War: � Strategic defensive: gov�t strong, insurgents focus on survival � Strategic stalemate: equal force correlation, guerrilla tactics � Strategic counteroffensive: insurgent strength, conventional ops � Examples: Chinese Communists, North Vietnamese Dau Trahn (see FM 3-24, pp. 1-7 to 1-8)

8. 8 Military-focused Approach Takeaway: In this approach, insurgents focus efforts on military attacks on government forces. ---------- � Desired outcomes: � Insurgents: primarily use military force � Government: falls by some means (e.g., revolution or overthrow) � Population: accepts insurgent control � Very little political structure � Often seen in secessionist insurgencies � Ex: Che Guevara, US Civil WarTakeaway: In this approach, insurgents focus efforts on military attacks on government forces. ---------- � Desired outcomes: � Insurgents: primarily use military force � Government: falls by some means (e.g., revolution or overthrow) � Population: accepts insurgent control � Very little political structure � Often seen in secessionist insurgencies � Ex: Che Guevara, US Civil War

9. 9 Urban Approach Takeaway: The urban approach uses terrorist tactics to weaken the government�s legitimacy/ability to rule. ---------- � Desired outcomes: � Insurgents: use terrorism against the population � Government: loses credibility, legitimacy � Population: alienated from the government � �This approach uses terrorist tactics in urban areas to accomplish the following: Sow disorder. Incite sectarian violence. Weaken the government. Intimidate the population. Kill government and opposition leaders. Fix and intimidate police and military forces, limiting their ability to respond to attacks. Create government repression.� � Ex: IRA, Sendero Iluminoso (Shining Path) Takeaway: The urban approach uses terrorist tactics to weaken the government�s legitimacy/ability to rule. ---------- � Desired outcomes: � Insurgents: use terrorism against the population � Government: loses credibility, legitimacy � Population: alienated from the government � �This approach uses terrorist tactics in urban areas to accomplish the following: Sow disorder. Incite sectarian violence. Weaken the government. Intimidate the population. Kill government and opposition leaders. Fix and intimidate police and military forces, limiting their ability to respond to attacks. Create government repression.� � Ex: IRA, Sendero Iluminoso (Shining Path)

10. 10 Identity-focused Approach Takeaway: The identity-focused approach uses terrorist tactics to weaken the government�s legitimacy/ability to rule. ---------- � Desired outcomes: � Insurgents: rely on identity b/c they lack the dual political/military hierarchy of protracted popular war � Government: loses support based on group identities � Population: throws support behind insurgency as communities, identity blocs � Ex: Kosovo Albanians, Muqtada al-SadrTakeaway: The identity-focused approach uses terrorist tactics to weaken the government�s legitimacy/ability to rule. ---------- � Desired outcomes: � Insurgents: rely on identity b/c they lack the dual political/military hierarchy of protracted popular war � Government: loses support based on group identities � Population: throws support behind insurgency as communities, identity blocs � Ex: Kosovo Albanians, Muqtada al-Sadr

11. 11 Dynamics of an Insurgency Leadership Objectives Ideology and narrative Environment and geography External support and sanctuaries Phasing and timing Takeaway: In order to counter insurgent advantages, the counterinsurgent must understand the conditions under which insurgencies succeed. ---------- � Remainder of the class investigates these dynamics � We need to understand what makes insurgencies successful in order to neutralize their advantages and emphasize our advantages.Takeaway: In order to counter insurgent advantages, the counterinsurgent must understand the conditions under which insurgencies succeed. ---------- � Remainder of the class investigates these dynamics � We need to understand what makes insurgencies successful in order to neutralize their advantages and emphasize our advantages.

12. Leadership Leadership provides: Vision Direction Guidance Coordination Organizational coherence 12

13. Leadership: George Washington

14. 14 Common Organizational Structure Takeaway: Insurgencies often constitute a very small proportion of the population, and they tend to have leadership, combat forces, and support elements. ---------- � Often employ cell structure, with small groups, cutouts, and dead drops � Conspiratorial or urban warfare approaches require less complex organizations � Leadership, guerrilla forces, and auxiliaries are akin to command and staff, combat arms, and combat support � Chairman Mao: �The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea� (Mao Tse-Tung, �Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War,� Selected Works, ii (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1954 [1938]), vol. II, pp. 143-45. Takeaway: Insurgencies often constitute a very small proportion of the population, and they tend to have leadership, combat forces, and support elements. ---------- � Often employ cell structure, with small groups, cutouts, and dead drops � Conspiratorial or urban warfare approaches require less complex organizations � Leadership, guerrilla forces, and auxiliaries are akin to command and staff, combat arms, and combat support � Chairman Mao: �The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea� (Mao Tse-Tung, �Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War,� Selected Works, ii (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1954 [1938]), vol. II, pp. 143-45.

15. Objectives Strategic: desired end state Operational: destroy government legitimacy, progressively establish desired end state Tactical: immediate aims of insurgent acts Physical Psychological 15

16. Ideology and Narrative 16

17. 17 Environment and Geography Physical environment Terrain and climate Infrastructure Human environment Demography Socioeconomic conditions Political culture Political system Takeaway: Both the physical and human environments play a role in insurgent success. ---------- � Rougher terrains (e.g., mountains or jungle) often favor insurgencies � Ex: Palestinians vs. Viet Cong � The reliability of existing infrastructure (e.g., communications, transportation, services) also impacts insurgent success. � The human environment sets the parameters for the success of the insurgency�s narrative. � Some insurgent narratives don�t work because of human environmentTakeaway: Both the physical and human environments play a role in insurgent success. ---------- � Rougher terrains (e.g., mountains or jungle) often favor insurgencies � Ex: Palestinians vs. Viet Cong � The reliability of existing infrastructure (e.g., communications, transportation, services) also impacts insurgent success. � The human environment sets the parameters for the success of the insurgency�s narrative. � Some insurgent narratives don�t work because of human environment

18. 18 External Support and Sanctuaries Often crucial to insurgent success Can take many forms: moral, material, political, sanctuary Takeaway: Insurgencies with external support are significantly more likely than the average to be successful. ---------- � Few, if any, insurgencies have been successful with no external support (ex: Malaya). � External support can come in many forms�moral, material, political, sanctuary�with different implications for insurgent success based on the environment, correlation of forces, approach, etc. � Insurgencies with NO external support are 74% MORE likely to lose outright (not accomplish any of their aims) than the average insurgency outcome. � Insurgencies WITH external support are 31% MORE likely to win (be successful) than the average insurgency outcome. � Insurgencies with NO external support are 57% LESS likely to reach a political accommodation with the government than the average insurgency outcome.Takeaway: Insurgencies with external support are significantly more likely than the average to be successful. ---------- � Few, if any, insurgencies have been successful with no external support (ex: Malaya). � External support can come in many forms�moral, material, political, sanctuary�with different implications for insurgent success based on the environment, correlation of forces, approach, etc. � Insurgencies with NO external support are 74% MORE likely to lose outright (not accomplish any of their aims) than the average insurgency outcome. � Insurgencies WITH external support are 31% MORE likely to win (be successful) than the average insurgency outcome. � Insurgencies with NO external support are 57% LESS likely to reach a political accommodation with the government than the average insurgency outcome.

19. Phasing and Timing Strategic Defensive (Phase I) Correlation of forces: favors government Insurgent focus: building support Strategic Stalemate (Phase II) Correlation of forces: approaches equilibrium Insurgent focus: guerrilla activity Strategic Counteroffensive (Phase III) Correlation of forces: favor insurgent Insurgent focus: conventional operations 19

20. Dynamics of an Insurgency Instructor-led PE: RED DAWN. If over 50% of the students have seen Red Dawn, this works. If not, schedule a screening � its worth it! The Movie: Red Dawn was a Hollywood example of what an untrained guerilla band could look like in WWIII, if fought on US soil. Leadership. Who was the Leader in the US guerilla band? Answer: Jed. Ideology. What was the ideology this guerilla band espoused? Pride and resistance to tyranny and unlawful acts against civilian people (non-combatants). This was captured in the spirit of �Wolverines!�, their rallying cry. Also, some other statements revealed the reason they were resisting: �Get off my lawn!� and F*%^ You Commie, As*($^Le)!� . Objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpretation of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective was the restoration of US (not expansion). Operational objectives this guerilla band was NOT LINKED to other guerilla bands or tied to any larger networks; though they would probably welcome the opportunity. Most of their operational objectives, therefore were limited � they were punitive, in nature. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts; they small scale raids and ambushes with they conducted indicate little more than a desire to resist, rather than be subjected to �re-education camps� or killed outright; also, they made contact with internal support network (family and friends) in an effort to spread hope and resistance to the citizens. Environment and Geography. The battle was fought in a small Colorado township, where the guerillas could hide for brief periods in �plain sight.� Also, the guerillas could move and survive (largely untracked) in the surrounding mountains, where the Cuban and Russian heavy armor was unable to travel. Internal Support: The driving force of the �auxiliary� which are non-combatants of a civilian population, sympathetic to the Insurgents� cause. Example such as �Jack� who provided whiskey, information, a radio, his grand daughters (future guerillas) and horses. Another example of internal support was the store owner in the beginning of the movie that outfitted the boys to survive in the mountains. Also, a young store clerk in the movie provided Jed with some information and situational awareness of the education camps (�6 toothbrushes, please�). External Support. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or totally unavailable. There are four types of external support: Moral: the downed US Pilot provided . Political: Not really used in this Red Dawn scenario, due to the isolation of Jed�s guerilla band. Resources: the downed US Pilot provided training and tactical expertise to the guerilla band. Sanctuary: The Rocky mountains provided them shelter and a semi-secure base of training, survival and operations Phasing and Timing. Indicative of Phase I (Latent & Insipient), they sat around a campfire discussing what to do, early in the movie. One of the young men wanted to go home, but Jed refused to permit it. They decided to stay hidden and survive in the mountains until they could understand what was happening around them. They killed a Russian patrol out of necessity to stay hidden. Phase II (Guerilla Warfare): they eventually conducted a series of ambushes against soft targets, easily overwhelming unsuspecting enemy forces. Phase III (War of Movement): towards the end the guerilla and decided to launch a raid which they were generally unable to sustain or support, in order to spark a larger resistance and reduce the grip of the controlling Russian & Cuban forces. Organizational and Operational Patterns. This guerilla band did not develop into a larger organization, but had a simple cell structure (and one leader). Instructor-led PE: RED DAWN. If over 50% of the students have seen Red Dawn, this works. If not, schedule a screening � its worth it! The Movie: Red Dawn was a Hollywood example of what an untrained guerilla band could look like in WWIII, if fought on US soil. Leadership. Who was the Leader in the US guerilla band? Answer: Jed. Ideology. What was the ideology this guerilla band espoused? Pride and resistance to tyranny and unlawful acts against civilian people (non-combatants). This was captured in the spirit of �Wolverines!�, their rallying cry. Also, some other statements revealed the reason they were resisting: �Get off my lawn!� and F*%^ You Commie, As*($^Le)!� . Objectives. Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpretation of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective was the restoration of US (not expansion). Operational objectives this guerilla band was NOT LINKED to other guerilla bands or tied to any larger networks; though they would probably welcome the opportunity. Most of their operational objectives, therefore were limited � they were punitive, in nature. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts; they small scale raids and ambushes with they conducted indicate little more than a desire to resist, rather than be subjected to �re-education camps� or killed outright; also, they made contact with internal support network (family and friends) in an effort to spread hope and resistance to the citizens. Environment and Geography. The battle was fought in a small Colorado township, where the guerillas could hide for brief periods in �plain sight.� Also, the guerillas could move and survive (largely untracked) in the surrounding mountains, where the Cuban and Russian heavy armor was unable to travel. Internal Support: The driving force of the �auxiliary� which are non-combatants of a civilian population, sympathetic to the Insurgents� cause. Example such as �Jack� who provided whiskey, information, a radio, his grand daughters (future guerillas) and horses. Another example of internal support was the store owner in the beginning of the movie that outfitted the boys to survive in the mountains. Also, a young store clerk in the movie provided Jed with some information and situational awareness of the education camps (�6 toothbrushes, please�). External Support. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or totally unavailable. There are four types of external support: Moral: the downed US Pilot provided . Political: Not really used in this Red Dawn scenario, due to the isolation of Jed�s guerilla band. Resources: the downed US Pilot provided training and tactical expertise to the guerilla band. Sanctuary: The Rocky mountains provided them shelter and a semi-secure base of training, survival and operations Phasing and Timing. Indicative of Phase I (Latent & Insipient), they sat around a campfire discussing what to do, early in the movie. One of the young men wanted to go home, but Jed refused to permit it. They decided to stay hidden and survive in the mountains until they could understand what was happening around them. They killed a Russian patrol out of necessity to stay hidden. Phase II (Guerilla Warfare): they eventually conducted a series of ambushes against soft targets, easily overwhelming unsuspecting enemy forces. Phase III (War of Movement): towards the end the guerilla and decided to launch a raid which they were generally unable to sustain or support, in order to spark a larger resistance and reduce the grip of the controlling Russian & Cuban forces. Organizational and Operational Patterns. This guerilla band did not develop into a larger organization, but had a simple cell structure (and one leader).

21. 21 Questions?

22. 22

23. 23 Military problem is how to organize space so than it can be made to yield time Political problem is how to organize time so that it could be make to yield will Military problem is how to organize space so than it can be made to yield time Political problem is how to organize time so that it could be make to yield will

24. 24 Popular Support Different types of support Active Passive Support of intellectuals Not all insurgent approaches require popular support More important in protracted popular war US counterinsurgent approach DOES require popular support Building HN government legitimacy is key Message-driven operations Takeaway: Not all popular support is created equal, and not all insurgencies require popular support to succeed. ---------- � COIN is about getting people off of the fence; most people, most of the time, would prefer to stay out of the fight (passive support: let the insurgency go on around them) � Some insurgent approaches do not require popular support, or require different forms of popular support (e.g., military-focused or urban warfare approach) � HN legitimacy is the pillar of the US approach to COIN; because we don�t want to stay, and because we believe in democracy, we can�t win unless we get enough people on the HN�s side.Takeaway: Not all popular support is created equal, and not all insurgencies require popular support to succeed. ---------- � COIN is about getting people off of the fence; most people, most of the time, would prefer to stay out of the fight (passive support: let the insurgency go on around them) � Some insurgent approaches do not require popular support, or require different forms of popular support (e.g., military-focused or urban warfare approach) � HN legitimacy is the pillar of the US approach to COIN; because we don�t want to stay, and because we believe in democracy, we can�t win unless we get enough people on the HN�s side.

25. 25 Organization and Unity Leadership Leaders important to insurgent viability? Operational structure Reliable logistics Military capability Cohesion Operations security Unity of command Strategic narrative Takeaway: The nature of insurgent organization plays a significant role in whether the insurgency will succeed or fail. ---------- � Leaders� effectiveness can determine the course of an insurgency. (Wwould killing Washington or Arafat at the beginning have crushed those insurgencies, or only delayed them for a while?) � Insurgencies� operational structure plays a direct role in the amount of military force they can bring to bear at the correct time and place. � More cohesive insurgencies have advantages in OpSec, unity of command, and the strategic narrative (e.g., Hizbullah)Takeaway: The nature of insurgent organization plays a significant role in whether the insurgency will succeed or fail. ---------- � Leaders� effectiveness can determine the course of an insurgency. (Wwould killing Washington or Arafat at the beginning have crushed those insurgencies, or only delayed them for a while?) � Insurgencies� operational structure plays a direct role in the amount of military force they can bring to bear at the correct time and place. � More cohesive insurgencies have advantages in OpSec, unity of command, and the strategic narrative (e.g., Hizbullah)

26. 26 Government Response Does the counterinsurgent correctly understand: the insurgent�s approach? what drives insurgent success? insurgent strengths and weaknesses? Takeaway: Crafting the most effective government response involves understanding the insurgent�s approach, what drives insurgent success, and insurgent strengths and weaknesses. --------- � This factor is most important to insurgent success because the government has a wealth of resources that, if appropriately applied, can effectively counter the insurgent�s military/operational effectiveness, message, and the underlying issues of the population. � The government response should be appropriate to the insurgent�s approach (don�t want to build popular support when the military should be countering a military-focused approach). � The most effective government response asks the right questions about the other four elements of insurgent success. � An effective government response appreciates the strengths and weaknesses of an insurgency, attacking strengths and highlighting weaknesses.Takeaway: Crafting the most effective government response involves understanding the insurgent�s approach, what drives insurgent success, and insurgent strengths and weaknesses. --------- � This factor is most important to insurgent success because the government has a wealth of resources that, if appropriately applied, can effectively counter the insurgent�s military/operational effectiveness, message, and the underlying issues of the population. � The government response should be appropriate to the insurgent�s approach (don�t want to build popular support when the military should be countering a military-focused approach). � The most effective government response asks the right questions about the other four elements of insurgent success. � An effective government response appreciates the strengths and weaknesses of an insurgency, attacking strengths and highlighting weaknesses.

27. 27 Insurgent Strengths Intelligence Indigenous characteristics Knowledge Motivation and discipline Limited responsibilities Tactical flexibility Physical condition Takeaway: These strengths are TYPICAL of insurgencies; not all insurgencies will exhibit all of these characteristics all of the time�it�s most important to ask, for your particular situation, what strengths the particular insurgency you�re facing has. ---------- ***Note: All quotes are from FM 90-8 (see below)*** � Intelligence: �The intelligence networks in the infrastructure usually provide continuous and current information on government force dispositions, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities�. Counterguerrilla forces can also overcome [the government�s] intelligence advantage through the comprehensive use of deception, operations security, and communications security.� � Indigenous characteristics: Insurgents �usually have the ability to blend with the local populace.� Population control measures can weaken this advantage. � Knowledge: �The guerrilla's knowledge of the local populace and terrain is a strength.� The creation of and cooperation with local defense forces is an important tool in neutralizing this advantage. � Motivation and discipline: �Usually, the guerrilla is devoted to a cause almost to the point of fanaticism.� In addition, leaders are often highly motivated. Keep in mind, though, that the levels of motivation and discipline may vary greatly from group to group. � Limited responsibilities: �The guerrilla usually does not have the responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligations toward society.� There are things insurgents don�t need to do that you must. � Tactical flexibility: �The guerrilla can utilize a broad range of tactics, from terror and sabotage through conventional warfare.� He is not constrained by the Law of War. � Physical condition: �Guerrillas are usually of an age which places them in their years of greatest physical stamina.� They may also be more accustomed to hardship. ---------- FM 90-8, p. 10-12: 2-11. Guerrilla strengths. a. Intelligence. The intelligence networks in the infrastructure usually provide continuous and current information on government force dispositions, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. The need for secrecy as an element of survival for the insurgent organization makes government penetration and disruption of these intelligence networks difficult. However, their structures are vulnerable to penetration and careful, detailed analysis. Intelligence collecting and analyses must be placed on a robust footing early to build data bases. Pattern analysis and other techniques can rob the guerrilla of this advantage. counterguerrilla forces can also overcome this intelligence advantage through the comprehensive use of deception, operations security, and communications security. b. Indigenous characteristics. (1) Guerrillas usually have the ability to blend with the local populace. In many cases they are part of the local populace. This enhances their capability to operate with secrecy in a given area. (2) The counterguerrilla force must identify the guerrilla and remove him from the civilian populace. This is best accomplished through the effective use of population and resources control. (3) Care must be taken to ensure that civilians are not injured or mistreated as a result of counterguerrilla operations. c. Knowledge. (1) The guerrilla's knowledge of the local populace and terrain is a strength. It gives him the ability to utilize psychological operations effectively. The guerrilla can usually develop a working relationship with the populace because they identify to some degree with his cause. If he cannot persuade them, he has the force to coerce them. The counterguerrilla force must try to overcome this advantage by fostering a strong relationship between the government forces and the populace. The creation of a local civilian defense force by the government and the counterguerrilla force's cooperation with it is one way to do this. (2) By knowing the environment he operates in, the guerilla has a major advantage. This advantage may be overcome by continuous counterguerrilla operations in a given area by a permanently stationed counterguerrilla force and skillful use of native assets. d. Motivation and discipline. The guerrilla leaders are trained and motivated. They reinforce motivation within the guerrilla force through the immediate application of discipline. Usually, the guerrilla is devoted to a cause almost to the point of fanaticism. e. Limited responsibilities. The guerrilla usually does not have the responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligations toward society. This frees all his efforts to conduct operations in support of the insurgency goals. However, the guerrilla force may be tasked to perform certain political services (such as tax collection) by the insurgency shadow government. f. Tactics. The guerrilla can utilize a broad range of tactics, from terror and sabotage through conventional warfare. This enables him to escalate or deescalate antigovernment activity almost at will. g. Physical condition. (1) Guerrillas are usually of an age which places them in their years of greatest physical stamina. One of the major advantages the guerrilla has is his ability to endure hardship. Usually, because of the situation, he has to make do with less. This forces him to adapt and be innovative. (2) The general strengths described are designed to provide a base to analyze the specific guerrilla threat. No two guerrilla forces are identical. These strengths are applied against the specific situation being addressed. Whatever the results of that analysis, the obvious strengths must be reduced or circumvented. ---------- Caption from US Army Flickr Photostream: �Soldiers from 2nd Platoon, Able Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), walk up a steep incline to talk to villagers during Operation Destined Strike in Chowkay Valley, Afghanistan Aug. 22. The villagers told 2nd Platoon that Taliban were rampant in the area.� [photo included here because it demonstrates the difficulty of the terrain in which we must sometimes work, compared to insurgents] Takeaway: These strengths are TYPICAL of insurgencies; not all insurgencies will exhibit all of these characteristics all of the time�it�s most important to ask, for your particular situation, what strengths the particular insurgency you�re facing has. ---------- ***Note: All quotes are from FM 90-8 (see below)*** � Intelligence: �The intelligence networks in the infrastructure usually provide continuous and current information on government force dispositions, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities�. Counterguerrilla forces can also overcome [the government�s] intelligence advantage through the comprehensive use of deception, operations security, and communications security.� � Indigenous characteristics: Insurgents �usually have the ability to blend with the local populace.� Population control measures can weaken this advantage. � Knowledge: �The guerrilla's knowledge of the local populace and terrain is a strength.� The creation of and cooperation with local defense forces is an important tool in neutralizing this advantage. � Motivation and discipline: �Usually, the guerrilla is devoted to a cause almost to the point of fanaticism.� In addition, leaders are often highly motivated. Keep in mind, though, that the levels of motivation and discipline may vary greatly from group to group. � Limited responsibilities: �The guerrilla usually does not have the responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligations toward society.� There are things insurgents don�t need to do that you must. � Tactical flexibility: �The guerrilla can utilize a broad range of tactics, from terror and sabotage through conventional warfare.� He is not constrained by the Law of War. � Physical condition: �Guerrillas are usually of an age which places them in their years of greatest physical stamina.� They may also be more accustomed to hardship. ---------- FM 90-8, p. 10-12: 2-11. Guerrilla strengths. a. Intelligence. The intelligence networks in the infrastructure usually provide continuous and current information on government force dispositions, strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities. The need for secrecy as an element of survival for the insurgent organization makes government penetration and disruption of these intelligence networks difficult. However, their structures are vulnerable to penetration and careful, detailed analysis. Intelligence collecting and analyses must be placed on a robust footing early to build data bases. Pattern analysis and other techniques can rob the guerrilla of this advantage. counterguerrilla forces can also overcome this intelligence advantage through the comprehensive use of deception, operations security, and communications security. b. Indigenous characteristics. (1) Guerrillas usually have the ability to blend with the local populace. In many cases they are part of the local populace. This enhances their capability to operate with secrecy in a given area. (2) The counterguerrilla force must identify the guerrilla and remove him from the civilian populace. This is best accomplished through the effective use of population and resources control. (3) Care must be taken to ensure that civilians are not injured or mistreated as a result of counterguerrilla operations. c. Knowledge. (1) The guerrilla's knowledge of the local populace and terrain is a strength. It gives him the ability to utilize psychological operations effectively. The guerrilla can usually develop a working relationship with the populace because they identify to some degree with his cause. If he cannot persuade them, he has the force to coerce them. The counterguerrilla force must try to overcome this advantage by fostering a strong relationship between the government forces and the populace. The creation of a local civilian defense force by the government and the counterguerrilla force's cooperation with it is one way to do this. (2) By knowing the environment he operates in, the guerilla has a major advantage. This advantage may be overcome by continuous counterguerrilla operations in a given area by a permanently stationed counterguerrilla force and skillful use of native assets. d. Motivation and discipline. The guerrilla leaders are trained and motivated. They reinforce motivation within the guerrilla force through the immediate application of discipline. Usually, the guerrilla is devoted to a cause almost to the point of fanaticism. e. Limited responsibilities. The guerrilla usually does not have the responsibility to maintain normal governmental obligations toward society. This frees all his efforts to conduct operations in support of the insurgency goals. However, the guerrilla force may be tasked to perform certain political services (such as tax collection) by the insurgency shadow government. f. Tactics. The guerrilla can utilize a broad range of tactics, from terror and sabotage through conventional warfare. This enables him to escalate or deescalate antigovernment activity almost at will. g. Physical condition. (1) Guerrillas are usually of an age which places them in their years of greatest physical stamina. One of the major advantages the guerrilla has is his ability to endure hardship. Usually, because of the situation, he has to make do with less. This forces him to adapt and be innovative. (2) The general strengths described are designed to provide a base to analyze the specific guerrilla threat. No two guerrilla forces are identical. These strengths are applied against the specific situation being addressed. Whatever the results of that analysis, the obvious strengths must be reduced or circumvented. ---------- Caption from US Army Flickr Photostream: �Soldiers from 2nd Platoon, Able Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), walk up a steep incline to talk to villagers during Operation Destined Strike in Chowkay Valley, Afghanistan Aug. 22. The villagers told 2nd Platoon that Taliban were rampant in the area.� [photo included here because it demonstrates the difficulty of the terrain in which we must sometimes work, compared to insurgents]

28. 28 Insurgent Weaknesses Limited personnel and resources Individual factors Operational factors Takeaway: These weaknesses are TYPICAL of insurgencies; not all insurgencies will exhibit all of these characteristics all of the time�it�s most important to ask, for your particular situation, what weaknesses the particular insurgency you�re facing has. ---------- ***Note: All quotes are from FM 90-8 (see below)*** � Limited personnel and resources: Insurgents are typically vulnerable to decisive engagements, cutting of supply lines, and combat losses. � Individual factors: Insurgents experience individual stress because of combat, physical hardships, fear of being treated as a criminal, or coercion by other insurgents; this can be exploited using amnesty programs, co-opting into the government, or provision of basic physical needs. � Operational factors: �Operational weaknesses may include security, which requires extensive resources and slows down responsiveness; bases that are difficult to acquire and operate; and the lack of technology or ability to maintain captured high-technology items. The dependence of the guerrilla on popular support is also a weakness�� ---------- FM 90-8, p. 12: 2-12. Guerrilla weaknesses. a. Limited personnel and resources. The guerrilla normally lacks the personnel and the logistics to intentionally become decisively engaged with government forces. Difficulty in recruitment and resupply to replace his combat losses in personnel and materiel may limit his operations. The counterguerrilla force should exploit these weaknesses by interdicting supply routes and facilities, forcing desertion because of hardships; and by inflicting combat losses that are hard to replace. b. Individual factors. Basically, the guerrilla endures a life of physical danger and privation. These stresses can be exploited by counterguerrilla forces. Numerically inferior to the government forces facing him, fear of being treated as a criminal if captured by the government, and fear of violence to himself and his family (imposed by the guerrilla organization to ensure his cooperation) are stress factors in addition to constant combat and a hostile environment that weaken guerrilla resolve. In some societies, good treatment, pardon, protection, food, shelter, and participation in the government may be stronger incentives than the fear of criminal punishment to induce guerrilla desertions. c. Operational factors. Operational weaknesses may include security, which requires extensive resources and slows down responsiveness; bases that are difficult to acquire and operate; and the lack of technology or ability to maintain captured high-technology items. The dependence of the guerrilla on popular support is also a weakness, since if that support wavers or is withdrawn, then the guerrilla will not be able to operate effectively. Another operational weakness may be the lack of sophisticated communications, which could require the guerrilla to spend an excessive amount of time preparing to launch an operation. Takeaway: These weaknesses are TYPICAL of insurgencies; not all insurgencies will exhibit all of these characteristics all of the time�it�s most important to ask, for your particular situation, what weaknesses the particular insurgency you�re facing has. ---------- ***Note: All quotes are from FM 90-8 (see below)*** � Limited personnel and resources: Insurgents are typically vulnerable to decisive engagements, cutting of supply lines, and combat losses. � Individual factors: Insurgents experience individual stress because of combat, physical hardships, fear of being treated as a criminal, or coercion by other insurgents; this can be exploited using amnesty programs, co-opting into the government, or provision of basic physical needs. � Operational factors: �Operational weaknesses may include security, which requires extensive resources and slows down responsiveness; bases that are difficult to acquire and operate; and the lack of technology or ability to maintain captured high-technology items. The dependence of the guerrilla on popular support is also a weakness�� ---------- FM 90-8, p. 12: 2-12. Guerrilla weaknesses. a. Limited personnel and resources. The guerrilla normally lacks the personnel and the logistics to intentionally become decisively engaged with government forces. Difficulty in recruitment and resupply to replace his combat losses in personnel and materiel may limit his operations. The counterguerrilla force should exploit these weaknesses by interdicting supply routes and facilities, forcing desertion because of hardships; and by inflicting combat losses that are hard to replace. b. Individual factors. Basically, the guerrilla endures a life of physical danger and privation. These stresses can be exploited by counterguerrilla forces. Numerically inferior to the government forces facing him, fear of being treated as a criminal if captured by the government, and fear of violence to himself and his family (imposed by the guerrilla organization to ensure his cooperation) are stress factors in addition to constant combat and a hostile environment that weaken guerrilla resolve. In some societies, good treatment, pardon, protection, food, shelter, and participation in the government may be stronger incentives than the fear of criminal punishment to induce guerrilla desertions. c. Operational factors. Operational weaknesses may include security, which requires extensive resources and slows down responsiveness; bases that are difficult to acquire and operate; and the lack of technology or ability to maintain captured high-technology items. The dependence of the guerrilla on popular support is also a weakness, since if that support wavers or is withdrawn, then the guerrilla will not be able to operate effectively. Another operational weakness may be the lack of sophisticated communications, which could require the guerrilla to spend an excessive amount of time preparing to launch an operation.

29. 29 Thinking Like An Insurgent How can understanding an insurgency impact your mission? Takeaway: This is a discussion question to identify the �so what� of the class. ---------- � It may be necessary to discuss the types of missions that relevant personnel will receive. � Emphasize that no one can have all the answers going in; it�s more important to ask the right questions (e.g., How does the environment help the insurgents? What advantages does the insurgency�s organization and unity give it?)Takeaway: This is a discussion question to identify the �so what� of the class. ---------- � It may be necessary to discuss the types of missions that relevant personnel will receive. � Emphasize that no one can have all the answers going in; it�s more important to ask the right questions (e.g., How does the environment help the insurgents? What advantages does the insurgency�s organization and unity give it?)