1 / 15

Beating by hitting Interaction of Group Competition and Punishment in a PG

Beating by hitting Interaction of Group Competition and Punishment in a PG. Eva van den Broek University of Amsterdam Martijn Egas (UvA) Laurens Gomes (UvA) Arno Riedl (UMaastricht). introduction.

benny
Download Presentation

Beating by hitting Interaction of Group Competition and Punishment in a PG

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Beating by hitting Interaction of Group Competition and Punishment in a PG Eva van den Broek University of Amsterdam Martijn Egas (UvA) Laurens Gomes (UvA) Arno Riedl (UMaastricht)

  2. introduction • Costly punishment sustains cooperation (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000) but has detrimental effects (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2004) • Group competition can outweigh the disadvantage of punishing (Boyd et al. 2003, simulations) • A population, when given the choice, migrates to groups implementing punishment (Guererk et al. 2006)

  3. literature is inconclusive: • Bornstein et al. (1996, 2002): (initially) higher contributions under competition • Grosser and Sausgrueber (wp): prosocials contribute less • Gunnthorsdottir, Rapoport (2006): intragroup conflict + intergroup competition reduce free-riding

  4. question Could punishment have evolved due to group competition? Effects of punishment under group competition on Punishing behavior Contributions earnings competition

  5. answer • Finitely repeated public goods game • partner matching • 3x2 competition treatments • Control, Observe, Compete, with or without punishment • Implementation of competition • Linear model: marginal per capita return • Measure at level of payoff, not contribution

  6. design Endowment, 20 MPCR, 0.4 punish effect, 3 indiv. contr. punish cost, 1 Competition factor, 3 Adjusted MPCR for competition treatment: Not α but α + (f/m) (ma – 1).

  7. no group interaction (3 players) group observation (6 players) group competition (6 players) design without punishment Nx (7 groups) Nnn (6 groups) Cnn (8 groups) with punishment Np (6 groups) Npp (8 groups) Cpp (8 groups)

  8. experiment • 30 periods of PG, partner matching • Group size = 3, endowment = 20 • Probability to meet other group p=0.2, randomly pre-defined • MPCR: a=0.4, a’=0.375 • 219 subjects, CREED lab autumn 2006, average earnings € 25 for 90 minutes

  9. Cpp vs Cnn&Npp: contributions Average contribution rounds

  10. Npp vs Cpp: punishment Average punishment points rounds

  11. Cpp vs Npp: earnings euro Cpp Npp

  12. conclusions • Earnings Cpp vs Npp: observation and competition increase contribution levels and downplay punishment • Under competition, less punishment has more effect • Punishment is efficient when combined with competition

  13. conclusions • If comparison is available, a little punishment drives up contribution levels • Boyd et al. could be right: competition can outweigh the detrimental effects of sanctions

  14. thank you

  15. Nx vs Np: contributions

More Related