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Input Sanitization

Input Sanitization. COEN 225. All Input is Evil. All input is evil: At least potentially Input can be: (A random collection) Files Web forms Cookies Registry entries Database contents Command line arguments. Environmental variables HTTP requests Named pipes E-mail ….

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Input Sanitization

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  1. Input Sanitization COEN 225

  2. All Input is Evil • All input is evil: • At least potentially • Input can be: (A random collection) • Files • Web forms • Cookies • Registry entries • Database contents • Command line arguments • Environmental variables • HTTP requests • Named pipes • E-mail • …

  3. Finding Common Entry Points • Files • Contain data specified by users • Contain data supplied by application • Can be intentionally or unintentionally corrupted • Attacker can also attack file metadata: • Extension • Path • File system attributes • …

  4. Finding Common Entry Points • Sockets • Easy to connect to sockets  need to filter data • Attacker can • Monitor data • Send malformed data to client or to server • Intercept data in the middle of a request and replace it • A.k.a Man in the middle attack

  5. Finding Common Entry Points • HTTP requests • Almost always passes through firewalls • Using webproxy, users have complete control over what is send to the server • Named pipes • See sockets • But programmers might forget how named pipes work and trust input • E.g. SQL Server 2000 vulnerability • See http://www.blakewatts.com/namedpipepaper.html

  6. Finding Common Entry Points • Pluggable Protocol Handler • Example: • http, ftp, https in URL • mailto:tschwarz@scu.edu?subject=WrongPerson • Tell system which application handles data when a hyperlink is clicked • Maliciously crafted link irc://[~900 characters] caused buffer overflow in mIRC protocol handler that allowed arbitrary code execution

  7. Finding Common Entry Points • Programmatic Interfaces • RPC • COM • DCOM • ActiveX • Managed code entry points (Windows) • .NET Remoting

  8. Finding Common Entry Points • SQL • Improperly filtered input strings can lead to execution of powerful SQL commands • Registry • User Interfaces • Win95 machines were used in libraries • Attacker could remove the “Start” button for free entertainment

  9. Finding Common Entry Points • Command line arguments • Attacker provides helpful link with arguments embedded • Example: Cross scripting attacks • Environmental Variables • Can be used by programs to make decisions

  10. Canonicalization • Authentication decision made by one module • Access done by other module

  11. Input Validation • Input – Anything controlled by outsider • user command line input • configuration files that could be manipulated • http requests • packets under consideration by firewall • …

  12. Input Validation • Security Strategies • Black List • List all things that are NOT allowed • List is difficult to create • Adding insecure constructs on a continuous basis means that the previous version was unsafe • Testing is based on known attacks. • List from others might not be trustworthy. • White List • List of things that are allowed • List might be incomplete and disallow good content • Adding exceptions on a continuous basis does not imply security holes in previous versions. • Testing can be based on known attacks. • List from others can be trusted if source can be trusted.

  13. Input Validation • Principle problem • Location of Check  Location of Use • Principle solution • Canonicalization of input • Transform input into a canonical form • Decision is made on input in the same form that program uses

  14. Canonicalization • Two major program errors: • Misunderstanding definition of canonical form • Stopping canonicalization process to early

  15. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters • Meta-information can be attached • Out-Of-Band • In-Band • Often more readable • Often more compact • Has security implications • Potential for overlappingtrust domains: • There exists a logical boundary between data and metadata • Parser need to identify the difference between data and metadata correctly

  16. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters • Example: NULL character for termination of strings

  17. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters • Simplest Vulnerability: • Users can embed metacharacters into input that is not filtered • Instance of second-order injection attack • The attack happens when the metacharacter is evaluated • Example: Password update (next slide)

  18. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters No input sanitization! use CGI; … verify session details … $new_password = $query->param(′password′); open(IFH,″</opt/passwords.txt″) || die (″$!″); open(OFH,″>/opt/passwords.txt.tmp″) || die (″$!″); while(IFH) { ($user, $pass) = split /:/; if ($user ne $session_username) print OFH ″$user:$pass\n″; else print OFH ″$user:$new_password\n″; } … close( IFH ); close( OFH ); User bob inputs: test\njim:npwd OFH becomes: bob:test jim:npwd Bob just added a new user

  19. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters • Discovering attacks like this: • Identify code that deals with metacharacter strings • Identify all delimiter characters that are specially handled and put them into a list • Identify filtering performed on input • Eliminate potentially hazardous delimiter characters from list • Remaining characters on list indicate a vulnerability

  20. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters Bool HandleUploadedFile(char * filename) { unsigned char buf[MAX_PATH], pathname[MAX_PATH]; char * fname = filename, *tmp1, *tmp2; DWORD rc; HANDLE hFile; tmp1 = strrchr(filename,′/′); tmp2 = strrchr(filename,′\\′); if(tmp1||tmp2) fname = (tmp1 > tmp2? tmp1 : tmp2)+1; if(!fname) return FALSE; if(strstr(fname, ″.. ″)) return FALSE; _snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), ″\\\\?\\%TEMP%\\%s″,fname); rc = ExpandEnvironmentStrings(buf, pathname, sizeof(pathname)); if(rc == 0 || rc > sizeof(pathname)) return FALSE; hFile = CreateFile(pathname, …); … read bytes into the file … } 1 Input string is formatted a number of ways before it becomes a file name. Added to a statically sized buffer and prefixed with \\\\?\\%TEMP%\\

  21. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters Bool HandleUploadedFile(char * filename) { unsigned char buf[MAX_PATH], pathname[MAX_PATH]; char * fname = filename, *tmp1, *tmp2; DWORD rc; HANDLE hFile; tmp1 = strrchr(filename,′/′); tmp2 = strrchr(filename,′\\′); if(tmp1||tmp2) fname = (tmp1 > tmp2? tmp1 : tmp2)+1; if(!fname) return FALSE; if(strstr(fname, ″.. ″)) return FALSE; _snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), ″\\\\?\\%TEMP%\\%s″,fname); rc = ExpandEnvironmentStrings(buf, pathname, sizeof(pathname)); if(rc == 0 || rc > sizeof(pathname)) return FALSE; hFile = CreateFile(pathname, …); … read bytes into the file … } 2 Set of delimiter characters that are specially handled: ‘/’ ‘\’ “..” String is passed to Expand EnvironmentStrings( ). Environmental variables are denoted with % characters.

  22. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters Bool HandleUploadedFile(char * filename) { unsigned char buf[MAX_PATH], pathname[MAX_PATH]; char * fname = filename, *tmp1, *tmp2; DWORD rc; HANDLE hFile; tmp1 = strrchr(filename,′/′); tmp2 = strrchr(filename,′\\′); if(tmp1||tmp2) fname = (tmp1 > tmp2? tmp1 : tmp2)+1; if(!fname) return FALSE; if(strstr(fname, ″.. ″)) return FALSE; _snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), ″\\\\?\\%TEMP%\\%s″,fname); rc = ExpandEnvironmentStrings(buf, pathname, sizeof(pathname)); if(rc == 0 || rc > sizeof(pathname)) return FALSE; hFile = CreateFile(pathname, …); … read bytes into the file … } 3 Set of delimiter characters that are specially handled: ‘/’ ‘\’ “..” String is passed to Expand EnvironmentStrings( ). Environmental variables are denoted with % characters.

  23. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters Bool HandleUploadedFile(char * filename) { unsigned char buf[MAX_PATH], pathname[MAX_PATH]; char * fname = filename, *tmp1, *tmp2; DWORD rc; HANDLE hFile; tmp1 = strrchr(filename,′/′); tmp2 = strrchr(filename,′\\′); if(tmp1||tmp2) fname = (tmp1 > tmp2? tmp1 : tmp2)+1; if(!fname) return FALSE; if(strstr(fname, ″.. ″)) return FALSE; _snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), ″\\\\?\\%TEMP%\\%s″,fname); rc = ExpandEnvironmentStrings(buf, pathname, sizeof(pathname)); if(rc == 0 || rc > sizeof(pathname)) return FALSE; hFile = CreateFile(pathname, …); … read bytes into the file … } 4 Filtering: strrchr searches last occurrence for ‘/’ and ‘\’ and increments past it. strstr searches for “..”

  24. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters Bool HandleUploadedFile(char * filename) { unsigned char buf[MAX_PATH], pathname[MAX_PATH]; char * fname = filename, *tmp1, *tmp2; DWORD rc; HANDLE hFile; tmp1 = strrchr(filename,′/′); tmp2 = strrchr(filename,′\\′); if(tmp1||tmp2) fname = (tmp1 > tmp2? tmp1 : tmp2)+1; if(!fname) return FALSE; if(strstr(fname, ″.. ″)) return FALSE; _snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), ″\\\\?\\%TEMP%\\%s″,fname); rc = ExpandEnvironmentStrings(buf, pathname, sizeof(pathname)); if(rc == 0 || rc > sizeof(pathname)) return FALSE; hFile = CreateFile(pathname, …); … read bytes into the file … } 5 However, ‘%’ remains Client can supply a number of environmental variables such as QUERY_STRING In addition, something like ..\..\..\any\pathname\file.txt supplied in QUERY_STRING allows client to write to arbitrary locations in the file system

  25. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters • NULL character injection • NULL characters are necessary to terminate strings when calling C routines from OS and many APIs • Perl and other languages do not use NULL for termination • Example: • Perl application programmer tests that file name ends in “.txt” • Attack inputs sequence “%00” in CGI input • Decoded as NUL character • Can be used to cut-off filename, including extension open(FH, ″>$username.txt″) || die(″$!″); print FH $data; close(FH);

  26. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters: NULL • NUL metacharacter is used to end C-strings, but not Perl, Java, PHP, … • This is a canonicalization issue: • C-based modules canonicalize strings differently than the no-C/no-Unix world • Issues arise when strings cross boundaries between these worlds

  27. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters: NULL • Possible results: • Memory corruption because strlen returns a different value • Truncation of strings  False decisions • Especially for FILE NAMES B O B . T X T \0 B O B \0 . T X T \0

  28. Path Metacharacters • Windows File Names: • C:\\WINDOWS\system32\calc.exe • Optional device • Followed by path • NOT UNIQUE • C:\\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\..\calc.exe • calc.exe • .\calc.exe • ..\calc.exe • \\?\WINDOWS\systems32\calc.exe • File system uses file canonicalization • But the system is less than canonical

  29. Path Metacharacters • Issues: • File squatting (in Windows) • Need to use CreateFile carefully in order to • Not open an existing file that sits in the canonical path of the file name • CreateFile canonicalization • eliminates any directory traversal components before validating whether each path segment exists • C:\nonexistent\path\..\..\blah.txt accesses C:\blah.txt • File-like Objects • CreateFile can open objects that are treated like files but are not files: • \\host\object • type\name • Device Files • Reside in the file hierarchy • But are canonicalized differently • COM!-9, LPT1-9, CON, CONIN$, CONOUT$, PRN, AUX, CLOCK$, NUL • Programmers are often not aware of the rules

  30. Path Metacharacters • CreateFile() (Windows) idiosyncrasies • Strips out trailing spaces in file names • Example attack • Programmer attaches “.txt” to a user-provided name • Attacker provides “helloworld.exe “ with trailing space • The trailing space with following .txt is stripped out • Case Sensitivity • Windows filenames are not case sensitive, UNIX and HFS filenames are • DOS 8.3 • Short file name is created by the file system if the file name is too long. • File can be referred to by the short file name • Use \\?\ before file name to disable DOS filename parsing • Insure that files are normal files by checking for FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, or face access to named pipes, … • Alternative Data Streams are created with an “:” separator

  31. Path Metacharacters • Registry keys • Naming similar to files • Similar issues • Worthy of its own presentation

  32. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters • Shell Metacharacter Injection • Attack vector • User controls input to an argument for execve(), popen(), … • Dangerous shell characters • ; | & < > ` ! - * / ? ( ) . [space] [ ] “\t” ^ ~ \ “\\” quotes “\r” “\n” $

  33. Canonicalization:Dealing with Metacharacters • SQL Injection attack • Attack vector: • User controls part of the SQL query string

  34. CanonicalizationMeta Character Filtering • Three basic options • Detect erroneous input and reject what appears to be an attack • Detect and strip dangerous characters • Detect and encode dangerous characters with a metacharacter escape sequence

  35. CanonicalizationMeta Character Filtering • Eliminating Metacharacters • Whitelisting: Allow only good strings if($input_data =~ /[^A-Za-z0-9_ ]/) { exit; } • Whitelisting: Strip away anything that is not good $input_data =~ s/ /[^A-Za-z0-9]/g • Stripping is vulnerable to mistakes • Blacklisting: Make decisions based on dangerous characters (not recommended)

  36. CanonicalizationMeta Character Filtering • Escaping Metacharacters • Non-destructive: metacharacters are preserved in string • Goal: Receiving module receives a safe string • Attack vectors: • Metacharacter evasion • Encoded metacharacter can be used to avoid other filtering

  37. CanonicalizationMeta Character Filtering • Escaping Metacharacters • Filtering does not detect encoded metacharacters • Example: ..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd • Double Encoding Attacks dXNlcj1wYXNzd2QmaG9tZWRpcj0uLiUyNSUzMiU0Ni4uJTL1JTMyJTQ Base 64 Decoder user=passwd&homedir=..%25%32%46..%25%32%46etc Hexadecimal Decoder pass 1 user=passwd&homedir=..%2F..%2Fetc Hexadecimal Decoder pass 1 user=passwd&homedir=../../etc

  38. CanonicalizationMeta Character Filtering • Character Sets • Example vulnerabilities • Wide characters (unicode) C-style strings are terminated with a 16 NULL, normal character strings with an 8 NULL • Homographic attacks • Different characters look the same • “Microsoft”  “Microsoft” in Unicode • one ‘o’ is cyrillic • String length calculations need to take character set into account (wide characters vs. normal characters)

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