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Ageing workforce?. “ Likely to cause ” …. …a difference of opinion? Howard Watson. Stating the obvious?. History. 1994 Railtrack Safety & Standards Directorate 2001 Hatfield accident – RSSB formed RSSB controlled by railway stakeholders Many Railway Group Standards
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“Likely to cause” … …a difference of opinion? Howard Watson
History • 1994 Railtrack Safety & Standards Directorate • 2001 Hatfield accident – RSSB formed • RSSB controlled by railway stakeholders • Many Railway Group Standards • Strategy for standards management • Devolve • Concentrate on “interfaces”
General health requirement • Unchanged • No medical condition “likely to cause…” • Non-prescriptive • Future-proof • Allow evolution of guidance • Problems • Fragmented OH • Risk averse culture
Acceptable risk for the railway? • CAA 1% • DVLA • Group 1 20% • Group 2 2% • RSSB research project T663 • “Managing the risk associated with incapacity in safety critical occupations”
T663 • Consultations • UK data • International and intermodal comparisons • Event tree analysis
Event tree • Onset of unavoidable impairment • Engaged in safety critical task • Engineering controls unable to prevent • Hazardous event • Fatality/weighted injury • Current rate of FWI
Assumptions • Fatality / weighted injury (FWI) • Tolerated = tolerable? • RSSB risk model: 125 types of hazardous event • Not all have human precursor • Probability of FWI estimated • Human Error v medial impairment • 2% due to medical impairment
Results • Driver – 43% • Signaller 16% • Track worker 15% • Crossing keeper 4% • PICOP 0.4% • Acceptable risk to system safety only
Implications for train driving • “F1: FIT NORMAL DUTIES” • 43% annual risk of incapacity? • 68% chance of an event in 2 years • 94% chance of an event within 5 years? • Would a TOC be happy?
Train driver:additional considerations for employer • Safety of the driver - lone worker • Service interruption • Safety of passengers and other staff • Compensation to customers • Reputational damage to TOC • Network disruption • Delay penalties • Reputational damage to Rail
Inquiry begins into train ordeal Train company GNER has launched an inquiry into how hundreds of passengers became stranded for hours in stifling heat due to a power failure. Some travellers broke carriage windows to escape temperatures of over 37C on its 1555 BST Newcastle to London Kings Cross service on Thursday evening.
Acceptable risk to TOC? • Likelihood of event in 5 years • “unlikely” (<50%)? • 5% (CAA)? • In between? • TOC view? • “UK rail” view? • Mutual interest?
Australian Standards New draft 2011 Category 1 SCW 5 yr risk >25% – unfit <5% - fit 5-24% risk assessment (split at 10%) “Fit subject to review” UK DVLA 5 year risks: Group I – 66% Group II – 9%
Suggestion Fails group I – unfit. Meets group II – fit’ In between = risk assessment • OH: risk of relevant impairment; suggested controls • Operator: ?safe system of work • Fit with limitations
Case • Freight Train Driver, 4 months post MI • Well • Inferior infarct • 2 vessels stented • Moderate LV impairment • No ETT • Diabetic type 2 • Probably still smoking
Relevant requirements DVLA II Australia 4/52 post-MI Exercise test Repeat 2 yearly • 6/52 post-MI • Exercise test • Repeat 3 yearly
Consensus? • Fitness category? • Further information? • Drive meantime? • Future management? • Review frequency?