Addressing Africa's Conflicts and Insurgencies for Peace: Analysis and Resolution

2. Analysis of conflicts and insurgencies in Africa, and the processes of conflict resolution aimed at addressing them Mr VasuGounden, ACCORD 19 August 2015 Presentation to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation

3. OVERVIEW OF PRESENTATION • Overview of security threats throughout Africa • Challenges of insurgencies in Africa • Trends in conflict resolution practices to address insurgencies • Analysis of South Africa’s peacemaking efforts in Burundi, Lesotho and South Sudan

4. SECURITY THREATS ACROSS THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

5. STRUCTURAL THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITYInequality, Poverty, Unemployment • Many countries across the world are built on unstable and unsustainable foundations: • rising social and economic inequality • high unemployment • persistent levels of relative poverty • In the long term, countries must strive to ensure that all citizens develop the necessary skills, are supported with meaningful opportunities, and ensured a basic level of capital to improve their lives • The short term, however, presents significant instabilities and threats to peace,security and development

6. STRUCTURAL THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITYGovernance Deficits • Shift from single party states into multi-party democracies, rise of coalition politics and heightened competition for political power (e.g. 3rd Term Debates) • Challenges for political parties: Shift from liberation movements to governing parties  hegemonic political parties or fragmented, identity-driven parties in coalition systems • Poor quality of governance and administrative institutions: • Inefficient policy implementation and service delivery • Small and low tax bases • Exclusive political processes and narrow policy outcomes

7. MANIFESTATIONS OFEMERGING SECURITY THREATS

8. ILLICIT FINANCIAL OUTFLOWS • Diverse, Complex, and globalised forms of illicit trade • Estimated cost of organised crime: ~ $870 billion/year • Illicit Financial Outflows (50% of value of all illicit trade in Africa) • Tax evasion, money laundering, mispricing schemes • Total illicit financial outflows from Africa ~ $1 trillion (1970-2010) • Losses of more than $50 billion / year (Report of the High Level Panel on Illicit Outflows from Africa) • Transnational Organised Crime • Narcotics, human trafficking, small arms and light weapons, maritime piracy • Wildlife and Forest Crimes • Illegal exploitation, trade, poaching of plants and animals (e.g. timber, ivory)

9. PUBLIC PROTESTS AND HEIGHTENED CIVIC ENGAGEMENT • Changing nature of governance and civic engagement • Rise of “individual governance” • increasing pressure on the State to adapt and modrenise • Greater expectations for service delivery and efficient policy implementation • Increase in protest globally: from 2006 (59) to 2013 (112) • Why? Mismanagement of the economic crisis; high fuel and food prices; austerity; demands for ending poverty and structural inequalities; calls for improved governance and ending corruption • 49% of all food-related riots btw 2006 and 2013 were in sub-saharan Africa • Burkina Faso, Burundi, DR Congo: popular protests over critical governance and constitutional debates

10. OVERFLOW OF REFUGEE AND IDP POPULATIONS • Driven by continued prevalence of conflict, inadequate long-term migration plans, lack of sufficient funding • Threatens human security, affected persons vulnerable to violence and marginalization • Great pressures on affected countries and those countries hosting refugees • More than 144,000 individuals have left Burundi since April: • 66,000 to Tanzania; 56,000 to Rwanda; 11,500 to DRC; 9,000 to Uganda • Mediterranean migration crisis: in 2015, 182,000 asylum seekers have crossed the sea from the African continent, with estimated 2,000 fatalities

11. INSURGENCIES AND RESPONSES ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

12. OVERVIEW OF INSURGENCIES • Political, radicalised ideologies, asymmetrical approach to combat • Amorphous and opaque organisations: some highly complex and intricate, others with less coherence and strategic alignment • Whom do they represent? What are their interests? • Grievances rooted in historical inequalities, diverse manifestations and motivations for violence • Regional and global links vis-à-vis ideologies, funding and resources

13. UNDERLYING FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO INSURGENCIES IN AFRICA • “Poverty, illiteracy, high rates of unemployment • Poor working conditions and insufficient training and capacities of law enforcement • Government institutional weaknesses, poor control of borders, low and insufficient administrative coverage of large territorial expanses • Proliferation of transnational organised crime, illicit trade, and human trafficking • Transformation of insurgent motivations beyond traditional zones of warfare (e.g. transnational motivations, asymmetric warfare)” Source: Report of the AU Commission Chairperson on Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa (2014), P.2

14. GLOBAL TRENDS IN INSURGENCIES Source: Global Terrorism Index (2014), P:13

15. GLOBAL TRENDS IN INSURGENCIES Source: Global Terrorism Index (2014), P:15

16. INSURGENT HOTSPOTS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT Source: AON Risk Solutions (2015), P.13

17. URGENT ZONES VULNERABLE TO INSURGENCIES LIBYA NIGERIA / LAKE CHAD BASIN AREA SOMALIA / KENYA MALI / SAHEL BELT

18. INSURGENCIES THROUGHT AFRICALibya • Disintegration of state apparatus, loss of effective control over territories and militias following regime change of Libyan Leader Qaddaffi in September 2011 • Decentralised and localised security forces and armed militias, formed along narrow identity markers, now compete with one another for power, influence and resources (e.g. oil, tax revenue from population), largely unaccountable to political structures • Deadlocked political negotiations between rival institutions (House of Representatives and General National Congress) detract from State’s administrative capacities and the effective implementation of any security sector reforms • Consequent decline in human security has contributed to further radicalisation of Libyan youth and provided a fertile breeding ground for foreign terrorist groups to establish foothold on the continent • Libya as a direct conduit for the spread of of weapons (both small arms and military grade weapons), illicit narcotics and trafficking of humans throughout North Africa and the African Sahel • Instability in Libya accelerating security challenges in neighbouring countries (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt, Sahel region) as well as in Mediterranean countries (e.g. Greece and Italy) due to unrestricted movement of weapons, persons and flow of refugees

19. CONTROL AND INFLUENCE IN LIBYAMarch 2015 Source: Internal Displacement (2015)

20. INSURGENCIES THROUGHT AFRICANigeria / Lake Chad Basin Area • Emergence of Boko Haram finds roots in ethnic/religious/developmental marginalisation of northern communities of Nigeria, tracing back to early 1800s • Boko Haram, in its earliest incarnations, emerged in 2002 as an internally-focused movement against perceived Western influence over Nigerian government and society, specifically in terms of social and political issues; early forms of Boko Haram comprised both moderate and radicalised wings • Following failed diplomatic negotiations with former President Obsanajo in 2009 and heavy-handed security response against Boko Haram sects, movement turned radical and began undertaking conventional terrorist activities, namely through human rights violations against civilians and through destruction of state property • Severe underdevelopment and unemployment in Nigeria’s northern states, widespread corruption throughout military and Executive Administration of former President Jonathan (including accusations that some officials actively collaborated with factions of Boko Haram), contributed to Boko Haram’s enhanced capacities to mobilise young Nigerians and grow in military strength • Duration of insurgency has led to massive outflows of refugees into neighbouring countries and placed great strain on administrative and security capacities of Lake Chad Basin region. Current President Buhari has committed to defeating Boko Haram (in collaboration with Chad, Niger) under AU and UN-mandated Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) • Boko Haram’s public pledge to ISIL more indicator of ideological overlap, mobilisation strategy, and quest to secure greater resources than explicit commitment to internationalise its conflict

21. INSURGENCIES THROUGHT AFRICANigeria/Lake Chad Basin Area Source: Nigeria Security Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations (2015)

22. INSURGENCIES THROUGHT AFRICASomalia / Kenya • Al Shabaab emanates from radicalised remnants of Islamic Courts Union, which controlled south-central Somalia from 2000 until invasion of Mogadishu by Ethiopian-led forces in January 2007 • Al-Shabaab initially focused on eliminating all external influence and interference from Somalia (including the Transitional Federal Government from 2007-2012); Al-Shabaab’s ideologies rooted in fundamentalist view of political Islam • Al-Shabaab largely adhered to Islamic fundamentalism and committed human rights abuses against Somali population, however was supported to some extent by the Somali population - members of Al Shabaab provided basic services, such as water provisions and basic security, to those under its control; however this support largely evaporated following Al-Shabaab’s decision to prevent the delivery of food aid during the famine in 2011 • AMISOM peacekeeping force, together with the Somali National Army, have actively combatted Al-Shabaab both in Mogadishu and throughout southern Somalia to some degrees of success. However Al-Shabaab’s employ of asymmetric warfare heightens the complexities of permanently defeating its forces. In recent months suicide bombings and assassination attempts have increased in Mogadishu despite progress in liberating other regions of Somalia • Kenya’s decision in 2011 to actively confront Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia has accelerated the conflict in northern Kenya. Al-Shabaab has capitalised on structural, economic and socio-cultural disparities in northern Kenya to mobilise and radicalise Kenyan nationals of Somali descent to launch attacks inside of Kenya. • Despite Al-Shabaab’s public allegiance to ISIL, there is no indication that Al-Shabaab would internationalise its own activities beyond Somalia/Kenya. Somalia presents more of a concern to international peace and security as it is a channel for the free movement of illicit goods, weapons, and human trafficking.

23. AMISOM SITUATION UPDATESJanuary 2014 vs October 2014 Source: AMISOM (2014)

24. INSURGENCIES THROUGHT AFRICAMali / Sahel Belt • Current dynamics in Mali rooted in decades- long contestations by Tuareg communities for greater autonomy and development focus (2012 coup d’etat was fourth Tuareg rebellion since 1960). Massive influx of arms from Libya between 2011-2012 contributed to more aggressive posturing by Tuareg communities and has been considered amongst the sparks of the uprising. • Between 2012-2015, the Malian government and a number of the armed groups in northern Mali have strived to negotiate an all inclusive peace agreement that addressed the northern communities’ long-standing grievances • Agreement was signed on 15 May 2015 with a number of groups based in northern Mali • Criterion for inclusion in the peace talks was that they did not renounce the territorial integrity of Mali and did not commit any acts of terrorism • International forces have been in Mali since late 2012, starting with France (Operation Sérval), AFISMA (AU-mandated Peace Support Operation) and MINUSMA (UN-mandated Peacekeeping Force). MINUSMA’s mandate enables the mission to use “all means necessary” to ensure the restoration of state authority and the protection of civilians • Insurgent groups operating in Mali and the Sahel belt include: Ansar al-Dine, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Arica (Mujao). • Groups are increasing involved in violent attacks that target civilians, local authorities, UN peacekeepers and humanitarian organisations, active throughout the Sahel region and are linked with continental and global routes for transnational organised crime

25. SECURITY DYNAMICS IN MALI AND THE SAHEL REGIONMarch 2015 Source: Clingendael Institute (2015)

26. POTENTIAL AND EMERGING INSURGENT THREATS ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT • Central African Republic/Uganda • Egypt • Sudan • Western Sahara

27. RESEARCH ON ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF INSURGENCIES No definitive or undisputed conclusions from broad base of literature assessing economic impacts of insurgencies, but some important considerations do emerge: • Higher industrial economic growth (as opposed to agricultural growth) is associated with lower levels of international and domestic terrorist violence, but also correlated with higher levels of suicide attacks (SW Choi, 2015) • Terrorism impacts economies through: national income losses and growth reduction, dampened foreign investment, impacts on international trade, Smaller developing economies are more economically vulnerable to terrorism than those that are richer and diversified (IMF, 2015) • International terrorism affects bilateral and multilateral trade on medium and long term horizons (over 18 months after an attack) but not in the immediate aftermath (Egger and Gassbner, 2013) • Developed countries can curtail terrorism at home by limiting unskilled labour quotas and increasing skilled labour quotas; however restrictions on unskilled labour can also increase domestic terrorism inside of the host developing country (Bandyopadhyay and Sandler, 2014)

28. GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES Source: AON Risk Solutions (2015), P.8

29. HOW THE AFRICAN UNION DEFINES TERRORISM 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism • Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or groups of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is intended to: • Intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or • Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or • Create general insurrection in a State • Any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organising, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to abvoe

30. SOUTH AFRICAN NORMATIVE AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO ISSUES OF INSURGENCIES • 1998 Prohibition of Mercenary Activities & Regulation of Certain Activities in Countries of Armed Conflict Bill (amended 2006) • Intended to regulate mercenary activities of South Africans in armed conflict, as well as regulation of issues that might foster armed conflict, such as financing mercenaries and selling of arms (nationally or internationally) • 2004 Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and related Activities Act 33 • Intended to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities, to legislate criminal penalties for offenses connected with terrorist activities, to give effect to international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities, and to provide for measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities

31. CONTINENTAL NORMATIVE AND LEGAL RESPONSES TO INSURGENCIES • 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism • 2002 AU Plan of Action for the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism • 2004 Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism • African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (CAERT) and the AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation • African Anti-Terrorism Model Law • African Mechanism for Police Cooperation - AFRIPOL • AU Peace and Security Council Sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism (Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa) • SADC, in cooperation with CAERT and the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre is in the process of developing a Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategy for Southern Africa

32. PROCESSES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RESPOND TO INSURGENCIES ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT • Military-based responses • Dialogue-based responses

33. CONTINENTAL MILITARY INITIATIVES TO RESPOND TO INSURGENCIES • Nationally-driven responses • Tunisia: ‘State of Emergency’ legislation throughout the country • Egypt: ‘State of Emergency’ legislation in the North Sinai • Kenya: targeting of Kenyans of Somali descent in Northern Kenya as means of disrupting Al-Shabaab’s networks • Continental peacekeeping forces with ‘enforcement’ based mandates • AMISOM: Somalia • MINUSMA: Mali • African Capacities for the Immediate Responses to Crises (ACIRC) - currently deployed in the DRC with South African troops • Multi-National Joint Task Force (Chad, Niger, Nigeria) combatting Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region • International contributions to military responses • French military operations in Central African Republic and Mali • United States counterterrorism activities through proliferation of drone activities, military support bases and special task force activities

34. Dialogue-Based Responses to Insurgencies on the African Continent • How to engage in dialogue with radicalised non-state actors • Diametrically–opposed world views and ideologies • Incompatible demands • Asymmetrical warfare • To whom in radicalised non-state actors does one speak? • Are there moderate branches with the willingness to dialogue? • Do they have a mandate to represent the organisations? • Do they have influence over the insurgent wings of their movements? And if they reach agreements, to what extent can they keep their adhere and enforce their commitments?

35. ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO DATE • Comprehensive national and continental legal frameworks to restrict broad range of ‘terrorist activities’. However challenge is ensuring that all countries ratify, domesticate, and implement these frameworks • Lack of coordination and coherence between national initiatives and continental frameworks. Slow development of regional frameworks to combat insurgent • Need for greater intelligence sharing and collaborative efforts, especially through Continental Early Warning Systems and National and Regional focal points to the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (CAERT) • Positive example of the 2013 Nouakchott Process on the Enhancement of Security Cooperation and the Operationalization of APSA in the Sahelo-Saharan region • SADC only now undertaking efforts to develop a regional strategy

36. ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO DATE • Domestic legal responses to date are important steps forward but also possess negative externalities (e.g. immigration policies and remittance legislation in South Africa) • Complexities inherent in issues in preventing and ending insurgencies • Deep seated grievances in local communities, originating from long-term imbalances in economic development and political inclusion, are at the root of forces that lead to radical mobilisation • Overemphasis on promoting military-driven counterterrorism responses versus building local police capacities (who are frontline of day-to-day engagements) and promoting trust between communities and military structures • Traditional military responses are often aimed at promoting immediate and short-term changes without addressing the underlying forces • Forces of globalisation (free movement of ideas and information, people, goods, capital) challenge efficacy of state-centric responses to insurgent activities • Need for balance of comprehensive solutions: • multi-faceted security capacities to mitigate immediate threats; • improved policing efforts to build stronger trust and relations with all communities and promote more positive security environment; • long-term systematic efforts by government and private sector to promote equitable development and reduce unemployment rates that underlie shifts towards radicalisation

37. HOW INSURGENCIES THREATEN SOUTH AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT • Increase in refugee populations from across the continent lead to increase migration (both legal and illegal) into South Africa, placing greater strain on South Africa’s institutions and infrastructure • South Africa’s strong links with economies outside the continent, position as a continental transit hub, and policing and border management challenges contribute to the rise of organised criminal activities throughout the continent relying on South Africa (e.g. human trafficking and narcotics trade) • Greater investment in security-based responses diverts limited financial resources from other development priorities • Heightened potential for ‘lone wolf attacks’ promotes increasing militarization of police, which could indirectly contribute to heightened tensions between police and local communities

38. HOW INSURGENCIES THREATEN SOUTH AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT (continued) • Bilateral trade unlikely to be impacted in immediate future, but over long-term horizons insurgencies may weaken the economic fundamentals of important South African trade partners (e.g. Nigeria, Kenya). Tripartite Free-Trade Agreement (COMESA, EAC, SADC) as a long-term measure to ensure free trade. • Continued incidents of terrorism throughout the continent contributes to dominant negative narratives about the continent, and may dissuade inflows of foreign direct investment and tourism into South Africa • Illicit profits secured from transnational organised crime enable armed non-state actors to sustain their activities in conflict environments (e.g. Central African Republic) and therefore promote insecurity throughout the continent

39. PART 2: ASSESSING SOUTH AFRICA’S ON-GOING PEACEMAKING EFFORTS BURUNDI, LESOTHO, SOUTH SUDAN

40. CURRENT CONFLICT DYNAMICSBurundi • Debate over 3rd term for current President Pierre Nkurunziza • Reading of Constitution and 2000 Arusha Agreement • April-May 2015: 40+ days of civil protests in Bujumbura (civil society, religious movements, individuals) protesting against 3rd term • May 2015: failed coup attempt by select army generals • 2015 Election Results • Parliamentary Elections (26 June) – CNDD-FDD wins 77 of 100 seats • Presidential Elections (21 July) President Nkurunziza wins 69,4% of 2,65 million votes (73% of registered voters participated in elections) • International election observers did not describe polls as ‘free or fair’; AU did not send election-observer mission • Increasing environment of political insecurity threatening stability (recent political assassinations) • Opposition leader A. Rwasa was appointed as Deputy Speaker of Parliament, considered to be an act of political reconciliation

41. CURRENT PEACEMAKING INITIATIVESBurundi • Joint UN-AU sponsored dialogue • Incompatible objectives by the parties • Opposition sought withdrawal of Nkurunziza candidature • CNDD-FDD government sought endorsement of poll schedule without protests • Considered unsuccessful with no agreement and withdrawal of facilitator • East African Community-led mediation • Regional Initiative history of engagement in Burundi • Regional peace and security with Burundi • Direct economic and social impact • Appointed H.E. Museveni as facilitator, who has delegated to Defence Minister C. Kiyonga

42. SOUTH AFRICAN PEACEMAKING EFFORTSBurundi • Deployed a fact finding defence delegation headed by a former SA contingency commander to AU Mission in Burundi • Participated in discussion on Burundi by the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region • Deployed the Minister in the Presidency as Special Envoy • Sent a State Security Agency delegation led by the Deputy Minister of State Security • Participated in the East African Community summit on Burundi led by the Deputy President • Deployed an inter-departmental elections monitoring team seconded to the South African Embassy in Burundi

43. CURRENT CONFLICT DYNAMICSSouth Sudan • Continued accusations of human rights violations on all sides of the conflict • South Sudan FY 2015 budget: $3.76 billion; budget shortfall of $2.4 billion • $720 million/yr in oil export revenue; $480 million/yr in tax revenue (Sudan Tribune, 2015) • 1.5 million IDPs in South Sudan, 559,000 South Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries • Circulation and discussion of AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan report to disputing parties

44. CURRENT PEACEMAKING INITIATIVESSouth Sudan • 21 January 2015: Arusha Agreement on the Reunification of the SPLM • Agreement shepherded by CCM, with support of DP Ramaphosa • Process undertaken outside of IGAD Frameworks, but identified as a targeted strategy to address a root cause • March 2015: Breakdown of IGAD-led Peace Process • Last face-to-face meeting of the principals within the peace process structures on 03 March, unable to resolve most urgent outstanding issues (3rd Phase, 8th Session) • April 2015: decision to implement ‘IGAD-Plus Process’ • IGAD Mediation Team (led by Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan) • AU ad-hoc Mediation Support Team (Algeria, Chad, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa) • United Nations and European Union (Observer Role) • Troika Countries (Norway, United Kingdom, United States) (Observer Role) • China (Observer Role)

45. CURRENT PEACEMAKING INITIATIVESSouth Sudan • 01 June 2015: Delegation of SPLM G-10 return to South Sudan for first time since detainment • Returned under the auspices of the Arusha Agreement • Shepherded by DP Ramaphosa and CCM President Kinana (as guarantors of Arusha Agreement) • SPLM-IO has not participated in the recent events in support of the Arusha Agreement • August 2015: Resumption of IGAD-Plus Mediation Process: • Outstanding Negotiation Issues: leadership structure in Executive Branch; Distribution of political power between SPLM and SPLM-IO in Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei States (oil-producing region), demilitarisation of Juba under international supervision • Increasing number of defections within SPLM-IO structures at leadership and grassroots levels • Threats that if an agreement is not reached by 17 August that sanctions and trade/arms embargos will be placed upon key stakeholders on both sides of the negotiations

46. SOUTH AFRICAN PEACEMAKING EFFORTSSouth Sudan • DP Ramaphosa appointed as President Zuma’s Special Envoy to South Sudan (February 2014) • Shuttle Diplomacy between Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Juba, and Arusha • Historic ties between ANC and SPLM (tracing back to the 1980s) • South Africa as Chair of AU Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development committee on Sudan and South Sudan • South Africa as represented on AU ad-hoc committee within ‘IGAD-Plus’ Mechanism • DP Ramaphosa as co-guarantor of the Jan 2015 Arusha Agreement for the reconciliation of the SPLM, spearheaded 01 June initiative to shepherd SPLM-G10 back to Juba

47. CURRENT CONFLICT DYNAMICSLesotho • Constitutional crisis in 2014 requiring urgent intervention of SADC • Deployment of South African police to guard installations and key political figures and promote security sector reform • Maseru Facilitation Declaration and Security Accord: • Advancing elections to early 2015 • February 2015 General Elections: • No outright winner of elections: All Basotho Congress (ABC) with 40 constituencies (215,000 votes); Democratic Congress (DC) with 37 constituents (218,000 votes); • Pakalitha Mosisili of DC forms coalition government and becomes Prime Minister • Environment of increasing political insecurity • Several members of the ABC, former government officials have fled to South Africa • June 2015: assassination of Lt General Maaparankoe Mohao, a suspended former LDF commander (and a respected ex-commander of the SADC standby force)

48. SOUTH AFRICAN PEACEMAKING INITIATIVESLesotho • SADC Troika Organ for Politics, Defence and Security as lead stakeholder for implementing regional peacemaking response • South Africa as chair of SADC Troika • DP Ramaphosa as SADC Facilitator for Lesotho • July 2015: Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State of the SADC Double Troika, hosted by President Zuma in Pretoria • SADC Ministerial Organ Troika Fact-finding Mission led by Minister of DefenseNosiviweMapisaNgqakula into deteriorating political and security environment • Double Troika is made up of the Republics of Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Malawi and the Kingdom of Lesotho • SADC Troika established Commission of Inquiry into death of Lt Gen Mohao and created an “oversight committee” to provide early warning and facilitate a new intervention is needed • SADC to receive update and recommendations at SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, 15-16 August 2015

49. ANALYSIS OF SOUTH AFRICA’S PEACEMAKING EFFORTS • Willingness to engage flexibly through different points of entry and to consolidate African-led initiatives • i.e. bi-lateral relations, regional economic communities, party-to-party relations • Desire for South Africa to undertake collaborative approach to peace-making efforts and to position itself as an impartial stakeholder • Clear interest of ensuring stability and promoting the peaceful resolution of disputes, as envisioned through the consolidation of the country’s African Agenda • Challenges of enforcement in mediation efforts: how to incentivize without coercing (carrots vs. sticks), which stakeholder within a peacemaking process should be responsible for ensuring compliance • Longer term challenges: continued political instability in countries where South Africa has devoted significant diplomatic and financial resources over the past two decades – structural underpinnings of conflicts suggest that sustained engagements will be required for at least the next two decades

50. CONCLUSIONS