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US Military and Counterinsurgency-- early 1970s --2001. Vietnam syndrome affects whole officer corps (see Conrad Crane's study)Counterinsurgency study shut down in staff colleges and war collegesOpen hostility to the subject among senior officersDespite El Salvador and several small wars? little
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1. Counterinsurgency Doctrine- What’s New and What’s Old Dr. James Corum, All Souls College.
LTC USAR
2. US Military and Counterinsurgency-- early 1970s --2001 Vietnam syndrome affects whole officer corps (see Conrad Crane’s study)
Counterinsurgency study shut down in staff colleges and war colleges
Open hostility to the subject among senior officers
Despite El Salvador and several small wars– little attempt at higher level to learn lessons
Assumption that conflict has been transformed by technology– Emphasis on high tech opns against enemy states
US policy and doctrine for short, decisive wars against conventional states
3. US View of Future War in mid-1990s
4. Iraq War/ Afghanistan. Relearning old lessons– trying to learn new ones Army War College- Steve Biddle AWC- “Afghanistan and the Future of War”
US faith in high tech overdone. Only 50% of al Qaeda positions at Tora Bora and Anaconda found by high-tech recon- See Biddle Study from SSI
Not quite the new way of war advertised in 2001/2002
Importance of training level of local troops- Key to success with high tech US partnership
5. The Motivators for Insurgency 4 Prime motivators– Most insurgencies inspired by one or two of these:
1- Ideology- Desire for new political system to meet needs
2- Nationalism- Desire for independence of another power
3- Ethnic Nationalism- Desire for independence or autonomy of one’s tribe or ethnic group
4- Religion- Desire to make one’s own religion supreme, suppress others
WWII- 1990- Most insurgent movements motivated by ideology and nationalism.
1990-Present- Most insurgent movements motivated by religion and ethnic nationalism. This makes it harder to come to a political settlement or peaceful solution and makes a counterinsurgency strategy more complex
6. Changing Nature of Organization of Insurgencies WWII- 1990. Most insurgencies followed some variation of a Maoist model with a clear political program, central leadership and long term strategy.
1990 to present. Intifada in Israel/Palestine, insurgency in Iraq, conflict in Afghanistan– Insurgents comprised of a loose network of groups– often diverse – often at odds- often without a clear political program. Advantage for insurgents- difficult for govt. forces to take out the leadership or mount any decisive campaign. Disadvantage- groups do not truly coordinate activity or resources.
What we’re dealing with are several insurgent groups and programs. See TX Hammes, The Sling and the Stone (2004)
7. New US Army Counterinsurgency Manual- FM 3.07. Oct 2004 First official US Counterinsurgency doctrine since 1965
New tactical lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan–
Most of the traditional tactics and strategies still valid (Max Manwaring-- Legitimacy is key)
However, new doctrine still looks upon insurgency as a mainly Maoist model– the new models not addressed
Still- big step forward for US to address the subject
8. US Army and USAF (Not Marines) forgot extensive experience in small wars. Photo- US Army in Vigan PI, 1899.
9. US Experience 1899-2001. Philippines 1899-1902, Caribbean and Central America 1914-1934, Post WWII: Greece 1940s, PI 1946-1953, Vietnam 1961-1973, El Salvador 1981-1992
Some sound counterinsurgency doctrine and experience, USMC Small Wars Manual, Adderholt, Lansdale, Manwaring
US small wars expertise at odds with US military culture- esp. post Vietnam
10. Something Old– Importance of simple equipment for 3rd World allies Pentagon preference for expensive and high tech equipment– hard to maintain and operate
Need for agreements with allies/ licensing and manufacturing agreements
Consider producing updated Mi8/Mi 17s with allies
Consider building A-10 as counterinsurgency aircraft with allied nations
CMATT in Iraq pushes for simple solutions with eye to cost/training/ maintenance
11. US-supplied T-28 and advisors in SE Asia circa 1962– cheap and simple Laotian T-28s took out more trucks on Ho Chi Minh Trail than latest US jet fighter bombers– USAF leadership very upset
12. Example of the success of the cheap and simple weapons in counterinsurgency
13. CASA 212-- STOL, simple, cheap, effective-- a good light transport for small air forces-- Very useful in peace ops such as Somalia
14. Cobra Armored Recon Veh.
15. Ratel Light Wheeled APC (U)
16. Some lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq-- High Tech Apache is a great aircraft– but still quite vulnerable to simple weapons Photo: 40mm AA round used against US choppers.
17. Apache blades shredded by 20 and 40mm fire in Iraq– April 2003. Similar problems in Afghanistan in 2001
18. Something Old--Importance of HUMINT Human Intel capability ignored and downgraded post-Vietnam thru Cold War thru 1990s
Belief that high tech would provide “frictionless battlefield”; Clausewitz’s concept of friction “no longer relevant” (Army 4-star mid-1990s)
Emphasis on counting equipment and conventional capability– Not as useful in fighting insurgents
Lack of capable HUMINT one of central problems post 9/11
Not enough done to build up HUMINT capability post 9-11
HUMINT is relatively cheap– but expertise takes time to build– and this goes against Pentagon preference for expensive, high tech hardware solutions– lack of a lobby group for HUMINT
19. Something Old--Relearning Basic HUMINT Lessons Abu Graibh and torture– Big US blunder– pressure for quick solutions, Lack of understanding of basic counterinsurgency Intel techniques at the heart of the problem
Tactical issue-- Torture really doesn’t provide good Intel
Classic interrogation techniques still valid– need to have a corps of highly-trained and language-qualified interrogators
DOD generally misunderstood the potential for insurgency– and failed to have the appropriate Intel resources available.
20. Something New– Importance of modern mass media and media techniques in counterinsurgency Television now a major factor in many nations
US fails to use polling and mass marketing techniques to monitor public opinion and influence opinion. Little effort in Iraq- minimal budget and equipment for the govt. media
Need for locally-run media program with US support
Need to apply civilian skills– mass marketing and education program with TV, radio, and print media
Program will be expensive and require coordination with State Dept. and other agencies
Hearts and minds campaign STILL central to counterinsurgency– need for media campaign combined with traditional civic action program
21. New US Doctrine- Reliance on Local and Militia Forces- Backed by High Tech US Support Search for quick, cheap solutions
Desire to minimize US manpower requirements
Problem- little study of recent experience with militias- problems of Colombia etc. ignored
Difficult to control militias
Low effectiveness of minimally-trained troops
Problem with militia loyalties
Difficult to demobilize militias
22. ICDC BN Plan as of Spring 2004
23. Old Realities– Need for well trained local forces US policy to train the security leadership AFTER the insurgency– Not a sound approach
Need to carefully vet and train the mid and senior defense civilian and military leadership– US and Allied effort still much too small
Concentration on training lower ranks and using contractors– US troops might have been better
Minimal effort to train mid-level and senior leaders– One of the major problems in Iraq planning
Perhaps mediocre Iraqi security performance is due to poor leadership
24. Conclusions “New Way of War” promised in 2001--Not especially successful
Insurgencies STILL last a long time. The Pentagon preference for “rapid, decisive operations” meets reality
Wars are STILL expensive. Don’t look for the “cheap war”
Counterinsurgency is STILL manpower intensive– No way around this
Most of the traditional doctrines still applicable
New Factor-- Need for an extensive, expensive and coordinated media campaign
Counterinsurgency CAN succeed- One can win in Iraq – but appropriate counterinsurgency equipment and training and intelligence doctrines needed