ACPO Professional Standards Conference 2008

1. ACPO Professional Standards Conference 2008

2. Introduction & Housekeeping John Feavyour Deputy Chief Constable Cambridgeshire Constabulary

3. Health & Safety Announcements

4. Overview of Day 1 & Introduction to Day 2 John Feavyour Deputy Chief Constable Cambridgeshire Constabulary

5. Session Four ‘Vetting – The Ongoing Challenge’

6. ‘Vetting – Risk Management In Action’ Simon Cole Assistant Chief Constable Hampshire Constabulary

7. Implications of Getting It Wrong Home office strikes £8m deal to transport illegal immigrants with man jailed for murder plot  Headline front page story in the Daily Mail Monday 2nd June 2008 Story Details: The department failed to make checks on former police officer Mark Ayres. Although he had been released early, his 13-year-sentence still had two years to run when Government agreed for his handling the deportation of illegal immigrants.  Ayres changed his name after leaving jail. As Mark Andrew Heaver, he was convicted of arranging for two men to stab and beat 33-year-old Michael Donovan to death at his Merseyside home while his wife and children slept upstairs.  Ayres, who joined Thames Valley police from school but left after only 18 months, founded ITA in January 2006. they decided there was no need to look at the background of ITA's bosses, who had no contact with immigrants. They simply ran Criminal Records Bureau checks on the 50 guards.  False claims in Ayers's CV - that he reached the rank of major after serving with the Royal Marines and the Special Boat Service - also went unnoticed.  In 2006, five Nigerian illegal immigrants were found working at the Home Office as cleaners.  Shadow Home Secretary David Davis asked: 'Are they satisfied their vetting procedures pose no risk?'  Headline front page story in the Daily Mail Monday 2nd June 2008 Story Details: The department failed to make checks on former police officer Mark Ayres. Although he had been released early, his 13-year-sentence still had two years to run when Government agreed for his handling the deportation of illegal immigrants. Ayres changed his name after leaving jail. As Mark Andrew Heaver, he was convicted of arranging for two men to stab and beat 33-year-old Michael Donovan to death at his Merseyside home while his wife and children slept upstairs. Ayres, who joined Thames Valley police from school but left after only 18 months, founded ITA in January 2006. they decided there was no need to look at the background of ITA's bosses, who had no contact with immigrants. They simply ran Criminal Records Bureau checks on the 50 guards.  False claims in Ayers's CV - that he reached the rank of major after serving with the Royal Marines and the Special Boat Service - also went unnoticed.  In 2006, five Nigerian illegal immigrants were found working at the Home Office as cleaners.  Shadow Home Secretary David Davis asked: 'Are they satisfied their vetting procedures pose no risk?'

8. National Vetting Strategy Procedures, Protocols & Practices Linking ACPO & National Vetting Infrastructure Commitment to Integrity & Prevention of Corruption Focal Point for Guidance Delivery Plan Now approved by CC West; The Vetting Portfolio will provide a strategic overview concerning all elements of National Security Vetting and Police Vetting including procedures, protocols and practices. This will involve the creation of a links between all ACPO portfolios and National Vetting infrastructures to ensure synergy in ACPO response and approach when developing national policy. The Police Community is committed to the maintenance of the highest levels of honesty and integrity, and to the prevention of; corrupt; dishonest; unethical or unprofessional behaviour. The joint ACPO & ACPOS National Vetting Policy for the Police Community will support that commitment by creating an understanding of the principles of vetting in the police community, thereby establishing uniformity in vetting procedures. The vetting portfolio will act as a focal point for guidance on vetting decisions, and on contractual and legal developments, together with advice on other emerging issues. This will include the development of a delivery plan for Vetting. Governance of the portfolio will be provided by the ACPO Professional Standards Committee within the Workforce Development Business Area.Now approved by CC West; The Vetting Portfolio will provide a strategic overview concerning all elements of National Security Vetting and Police Vetting including procedures, protocols and practices. This will involve the creation of a links between all ACPO portfolios and National Vetting infrastructures to ensure synergy in ACPO response and approach when developing national policy. The Police Community is committed to the maintenance of the highest levels of honesty and integrity, and to the prevention of; corrupt; dishonest; unethical or unprofessional behaviour. The joint ACPO & ACPOS National Vetting Policy for the Police Community will support that commitment by creating an understanding of the principles of vetting in the police community, thereby establishing uniformity in vetting procedures. The vetting portfolio will act as a focal point for guidance on vetting decisions, and on contractual and legal developments, together with advice on other emerging issues. This will include the development of a delivery plan for Vetting. Governance of the portfolio will be provided by the ACPO Professional Standards Committee within the Workforce Development Business Area.

9. Structure of Vetting Portfolio. No click throughs on this slide Structure of Vetting Portfolio. No click throughs on this slide

10. National Vetting Working Group Membership of the group: Regional Vetting Reps Scottish Representation through ACPOS National Police Improvement Agency Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure ACRO – ACPO Criminal Records Office Serious and Organised Crime Agency Cabinet Office Home Office Police Federation / Unison ACPO Personnel

11. Current Levels of vetting - Force Vetting Authentication – Confirms ID and allows access to Confidential and occasional secret Recruitment Vetting – Background checks, Criminal Convictions, financial and Employment References Enhanced Vetting – This will be superseded by 2 new levels. Management Vetting - access to secret and occasional access to top secret Enhanced Management Vetting regular access to Top secret Non Police Personnel Vetting - A means to ensure persons other than police staff have been assessed for reliability and integrity. Serves to reduce risk of loss of sensitive assets. 4 headlines will appear on click AUTHENTICATION- Authentication whilst, not a formal security clearance, underpins all levels of Force and National Security Vetting. Authentication is used to confirm an individual’s identity, nationality, employment eligibility and residency qualification. It allows long term, uncontrolled and frequent access to government protectively marked assets up to CONFIDENTIAL and occasional access up to SECRET. It does not allow access to Police protectively marked assets, or unescorted access to any Police premises. RECRUITMENT VETTING (RV)- There are no national guidelines in respect of police staff recruitment. the vetting criteria for the recruitment of police officers, has been extended to include persons applying for police staff vacancies. RV should include Background checks, Criminal Conviction checks, financial checks and Employment references. (It should be noted that RV checks are shared by both Vetting Units and Recruiting/HR departments). completion of RV allows regular access to CONFIDENTIAL and occasional access to SECRET police and government assets. The 3 year ‘Residency Criteria’ will be expanded upon later. ENHANCED VETTING (EV)- Under the new Policy currently under consultation this will be replaced by 2 new levels Management Vetting and Enhanced Management Vetting The purpose of ‘Management Vetting (MV) and Enhanced Management Vetting’ (EMV) is to provide a means of ensuring that persons serving in ‘designated posts’, which are those with access to sensitive police information, intelligence, financial or operational assets, have been assessed as to their reliability and integrity. The procedure therefore serves to reduce the risks of unauthorised disclosure, or loss of, sensitive police assets. It is recommended that all persons with long term, frequent and uncontrolled access to SECRET, and occasional access to TOP SECRET police assets, should hold MV clearance. Those who require regular and uncontrolled access to TOP SECRET police assets should hold EMV clearance. NPPV- provides a means of ensuring that persons other than police officers, police staff, including PCSO’s and members of the Special Constabulary, having physical or remote access to police information, intelligence, financial or operational assets have been assessed as to their reliability and integrity. The procedure serves to reduce the risks of unauthorised disclosure or loss of sensitive police assets. There are four level of NPPV Level 1, 2, 3 and 4 4 headlines will appear on click AUTHENTICATION- Authentication whilst, not a formal security clearance, underpins all levels of Force and National Security Vetting. Authentication is used to confirm an individual’s identity, nationality, employment eligibility and residency qualification. It allows long term, uncontrolled and frequent access to government protectively marked assets up to CONFIDENTIAL and occasional access up to SECRET. It does not allow access to Police protectively marked assets, or unescorted access to any Police premises. RECRUITMENT VETTING (RV)- There are no national guidelines in respect of police staff recruitment. the vetting criteria for the recruitment of police officers, has been extended to include persons applying for police staff vacancies. RV should include Background checks, Criminal Conviction checks, financial checks and Employment references. (It should be noted that RV checks are shared by both Vetting Units and Recruiting/HR departments). completion of RV allows regular access to CONFIDENTIAL and occasional access to SECRET police and government assets. The 3 year ‘Residency Criteria’ will be expanded upon later. ENHANCED VETTING (EV)- Under the new Policy currently under consultation this will be replaced by 2 new levels Management Vetting and Enhanced Management Vetting The purpose of ‘Management Vetting (MV) and Enhanced Management Vetting’ (EMV) is to provide a means of ensuring that persons serving in ‘designated posts’, which are those with access to sensitive police information, intelligence, financial or operational assets, have been assessed as to their reliability and integrity. The procedure therefore serves to reduce the risks of unauthorised disclosure, or loss of, sensitive police assets. It is recommended that all persons with long term, frequent and uncontrolled access to SECRET, and occasional access to TOP SECRET police assets, should hold MV clearance. Those who require regular and uncontrolled access to TOP SECRET police assets should hold EMV clearance. NPPV- provides a means of ensuring that persons other than police officers, police staff, including PCSO’s and members of the Special Constabulary, having physical or remote access to police information, intelligence, financial or operational assets have been assessed as to their reliability and integrity. The procedure serves to reduce the risks of unauthorised disclosure or loss of sensitive police assets. There are four level of NPPV Level 1, 2, 3 and 4

12. Current Levels of vetting National Security Vetting Counter Terrorist Check (CTC) Security Check (SC) Security Check Enhanced (SC Enhanced) Developed Vetting (DV) 4 headlines will appear on click COUNTER-TERRORIST CHECK (CTC)- Counter Terrorist Checks are carried out to prevent those who may have connections with terrorist organisations, or who may be vulnerable to pressure from such organisations, from gaining access to certain persons, premises and information, that could be exploited to further the aims of a terrorist organisation. CTC clearance, on its own, does not allow access to, knowledge or custody of, protectively marked government or police assets. CTC clearance is required for all police officers, members of the Special Constabulary, Police Staff, including PCSOs and Force Support Officers, and non-police personnel whose work involves proximity to public figures who are assessed to be at particular risk from terrorist attack, or who have access to premises, information or material assessed to be of value to terrorists. The weaknesses of CTC as a blanket check are covered later in the HO 54/2003 slide SECURITY CHECK (SC) - SC clearance is required for those individuals who are to be employed in posts, which involve long-term frequent and uncontrolled access to SECRET government assets, and require occasional access to TOP SECRET government assets and information. This process includes a check with CPNI, examination of finances and a non-step down/standard PNC check SECURITY CHECK ENHANCED (SC (Enhanced) - SC (Enhanced) is identical to the above with additional financial checks and is specific to those individuals who have access to STRAP material. DEVELOPED VETTING (DV) - Developed Vetting (DV) is designed for those individuals who have long-term frequent and uncontrolled access to TOP SECRET government assets and for individuals, while not in such a post who will be in a position to, directly or indirectly, bring about the same degree of damage. This process costs forces £928.25 (source: DVA figures 01/08/07) for a DV, £661 for a standard DV review and £316.08 for each additional interview This level of vetting includes a robust examination of finances, interviews with referees, checks with CPNI and checks of departmental records. It has been identified earlier that much of the work conducted under this vetting level is conducted by Police Vetting Assets. This check is primarily aimed at addressing counter terrorism concerns within the agreed GPMS (Government Protective Marking Scheme). For DV’s, a ‘review’ should be carried out initially at 5 years and thereafter, at a minimum, every 7 years. However, any level of clearance may be reviewed at an earlier stage if adverse information comes to light relating to the subject, or there is a material change in and individual’s personal circumstances. Main Reason for Refusal Convictions 40.1% Residency 11.4% SB - CTC 0.2% Intelligence LIO, MCRAC) 20.5% CRIS 4.6% Candidate Family Members 7.6% Complaints & Discipline System 2.4% Finance Issues 11.3% Other (DVLA, Military, RMS) 1.9% 4 headlines will appear on click COUNTER-TERRORIST CHECK (CTC)- Counter Terrorist Checks are carried out to prevent those who may have connections with terrorist organisations, or who may be vulnerable to pressure from such organisations, from gaining access to certain persons, premises and information, that could be exploited to further the aims of a terrorist organisation. CTC clearance, on its own, does not allow access to, knowledge or custody of, protectively marked government or police assets. CTC clearance is required for all police officers, members of the Special Constabulary, Police Staff, including PCSOs and Force Support Officers, and non-police personnel whose work involves proximity to public figures who are assessed to be at particular risk from terrorist attack, or who have access to premises, information or material assessed to be of value to terrorists. The weaknesses of CTC as a blanket check are covered later in the HO 54/2003 slide SECURITY CHECK (SC) - SC clearance is required for those individuals who are to be employed in posts, which involve long-term frequent and uncontrolled access to SECRET government assets, and require occasional access to TOP SECRET government assets and information. This process includes a check with CPNI, examination of finances and a non-step down/standard PNC check SECURITY CHECK ENHANCED (SC (Enhanced) - SC (Enhanced) is identical to the above with additional financial checks and is specific to those individuals who have access to STRAP material. DEVELOPED VETTING (DV) - Developed Vetting (DV) is designed for those individuals who have long-term frequent and uncontrolled access to TOP SECRET government assets and for individuals, while not in such a post who will be in a position to, directly or indirectly, bring about the same degree of damage. This process costs forces £928.25 (source: DVA figures 01/08/07) for a DV, £661 for a standard DV review and £316.08 for each additional interview This level of vetting includes a robust examination of finances, interviews with referees, checks with CPNI and checks of departmental records. It has been identified earlier that much of the work conducted under this vetting level is conducted by Police Vetting Assets. This check is primarily aimed at addressing counter terrorism concerns within the agreed GPMS (Government Protective Marking Scheme). For DV’s, a ‘review’ should be carried out initially at 5 years and thereafter, at a minimum, every 7 years. However, any level of clearance may be reviewed at an earlier stage if adverse information comes to light relating to the subject, or there is a material change in and individual’s personal circumstances. Main Reason for Refusal Convictions 40.1% Residency 11.4% SB - CTC 0.2% Intelligence LIO, MCRAC) 20.5% CRIS 4.6% Candidate Family Members 7.6% Complaints & Discipline System 2.4% Finance Issues 11.3% Other (DVLA, Military, RMS) 1.9%

13. Synergy between Force and National Security Vetting? Much of the work conducted in some fields of National Security Vetting stems from local checks at a Force level using Police held data Checks of Identity, employment history, nationality, residency qualification and unspent criminal conviction form the baseline of all NSV and Force Vetting. Is there an over reliance on CTC Check? What Does a Negative Check actually mean? Public Perceptions of Security Service Checks 5 headlines will appear on click 1 What is the real difference between NSV and Force Vetting. 2 One would rightly assume that NSV checks will have far more depth and scrutiny level attached, yet these checks are carried out using information largely already held on police databases. 3 Is there an over reliance on CTC – What does it actually tell us, why are so many roles subject to it. This has broad reaching consequences in terms of costs of conducting the checks, the level of resources within the shared service providers, backlogs and the actual peace of mind for an organisation that this ultimately delivers. 4 What does a negative check really mean – does no trace to the security services assume a person is of little or no risk? 5 Public Perceptions of security service checks at a higher level working with data only held by them Versus reality 5 headlines will appear on click 1 What is the real difference between NSV and Force Vetting. 2 One would rightly assume that NSV checks will have far more depth and scrutiny level attached, yet these checks are carried out using information largely already held on police databases. 3 Is there an over reliance on CTC – What does it actually tell us, why are so many roles subject to it. This has broad reaching consequences in terms of costs of conducting the checks, the level of resources within the shared service providers, backlogs and the actual peace of mind for an organisation that this ultimately delivers. 4 What does a negative check really mean – does no trace to the security services assume a person is of little or no risk? 5 Public Perceptions of security service checks at a higher level working with data only held by them Versus reality

14. A New Vetting World Revised National Vetting Policy ACPO Policy and cross portfolio dialogue Cost and resource effective vetting of the extended police family Uniformity in development of memorandum of understanding with partners 4 headlines will appear on click Policy Thanks to the hard work of a number of colleagues within the Force Vetting Officers Advisory Group and the National Vetting Working Group, a complete redraft of the national policy has been produced and consultation is now underway. Thanks to: Alan McCawley (Met) Bob Lane (Warwickshire) Carol Benton (Lancashire) Jonathan Gupta (Staffordshire) Stewart Finlayson (Strathclyde Cross Portfolio issues Vetting portfolio not considered in the many cross portfolio issues, vetting is not considered in terms of cost, resource implications, demand upon Force Vetting staffing levels and aftercare. Key systems and access Extended Family e.g. Community Safety Accreditation, is a CTC check necessary. Risk averse v Risk management MOU CPS, Audit commission, Highways agency. etc 4 headlines will appear on click Policy Thanks to the hard work of a number of colleagues within the Force Vetting Officers Advisory Group and the National Vetting Working Group, a complete redraft of the national policy has been produced and consultation is now underway. Thanks to: Alan McCawley (Met) Bob Lane (Warwickshire) Carol Benton (Lancashire) Jonathan Gupta (Staffordshire) Stewart Finlayson (Strathclyde Cross Portfolio issues Vetting portfolio not considered in the many cross portfolio issues, vetting is not considered in terms of cost, resource implications, demand upon Force Vetting staffing levels and aftercare. Key systems and access Extended Family e.g. Community Safety Accreditation, is a CTC check necessary. Risk averse v Risk management MOU CPS, Audit commission, Highways agency. etc

15. Residency Criteria Current Issues: HR concerns Implications on conditions of employment Ability to have a workforce representative of the community, recruitment and retention of hard to reach groups. Checkable History 5 headlines will appear on click The 3 year ‘Residency Criteria’ remains an area of current debate between the vetting and HR communities. This area of development and future debate has been redefined as the need for a checkable history which satisfies the current vetting policy and recruitment criteria, whilst ensuring the high standards of pre-employment checks are maintained. ACRO are an active participant in this area of future development. IMPLICATIONS ON CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT – Career Breaks, etc. Fairness? 5 headlines will appear on click The 3 year ‘Residency Criteria’ remains an area of current debate between the vetting and HR communities. This area of development and future debate has been redefined as the need for a checkable history which satisfies the current vetting policy and recruitment criteria, whilst ensuring the high standards of pre-employment checks are maintained. ACRO are an active participant in this area of future development. IMPLICATIONS ON CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT – Career Breaks, etc. Fairness?

16. Home Office Circular 54/2003National Recruitment Standards – Eligibility criteria for police recruitment and consistent recruitment practices CTC Check Is it fit for purpose? ACPOS Position Aftercare issues 4 headlines will appear on click HOC 54/2003 gives guidance on eligibility criteria for police recruitment and covers criminal convictions, financial checks, checks on persons who have lived abroad through to whether someone has tattoos or can swim or not. Straight lift from HOC 54/2003; Forces need to carry out recruitment vetting procedures on all applicants to determine an applicant’s suitability to have access to sensitive and classified material and to ensure that counter terrorist checks are made. This guidance applies to all applicants (including UK nationals who have been living abroad) and should be read and sit alongside national security and force vetting policy and procedures and the recent Home Office Circular 6/2003 on nationality. Counter Terrorist Checks are carried out to prevent those who may have connections with terrorist organisations, or who may be vulnerable to pressure from such organisations, from gaining access to certain persons, premises and information, that could be exploited to further the aims of a terrorist organisation. Fit for Purpose ACPOS moving away from blanket CTC check to a risk based approach to role and access level It should be noted that ACPOS have recently decided to move away from this blanket CTC requirement to one which is centred on a role/risk based approach. This ACPOS decision is supported by the Cabinet Office, a decision which the Cabinet Office would like to see replicated for Police Forces in England and Wales. CTC includes a CPNI (Security Service) and PNC check but does not include, as standard, any local force checks such as PSD/Force Intelligence. Aftercare practicality and checking of pre 2003 employees and the management of issues relating to personnel effected. Is 10 years to bigger gap? 4 headlines will appear on click HOC 54/2003 gives guidance on eligibility criteria for police recruitment and covers criminal convictions, financial checks, checks on persons who have lived abroad through to whether someone has tattoos or can swim or not. Straight lift from HOC 54/2003; Forces need to carry out recruitment vetting procedures on all applicants to determine an applicant’s suitability to have access to sensitive and classified material and to ensure that counter terrorist checks are made. This guidance applies to all applicants (including UK nationals who have been living abroad) and should be read and sit alongside national security and force vetting policy and procedures and the recent Home Office Circular 6/2003 on nationality. Counter Terrorist Checks are carried out to prevent those who may have connections with terrorist organisations, or who may be vulnerable to pressure from such organisations, from gaining access to certain persons, premises and information, that could be exploited to further the aims of a terrorist organisation. Fit for Purpose ACPOS moving away from blanket CTC check to a risk based approach to role and access level It should be noted that ACPOS have recently decided to move away from this blanket CTC requirement to one which is centred on a role/risk based approach. This ACPOS decision is supported by the Cabinet Office, a decision which the Cabinet Office would like to see replicated for Police Forces in England and Wales. CTC includes a CPNI (Security Service) and PNC check but does not include, as standard, any local force checks such as PSD/Force Intelligence. Aftercare practicality and checking of pre 2003 employees and the management of issues relating to personnel effected. Is 10 years to bigger gap?

17. THE TIMES Monday, June 2 2008 ISA Story from THE TIMES Monday 2nd June 2008ISA Story from THE TIMES Monday 2nd June 2008

18. Independent Safeguarding Authority The Independent Safeguarding Authority (ISA) Created to help prevent unsuitable people from working with children and vulnerable adults. Regulated Activity Current interpretation of the regulations could indicate that all Police Officers and a large number of police staff members will become the subject of ISA regulation. 2 headlines will Appear on click 1 ACPO recognises that any steps that can be reasonably taken to safeguard the vulnerable in our society should be supported. However, the ISA consultation paper has raised a number of concerns which require clarification and further definition. The financial implications of complying with these obligatory regulations for the Police service nationally cannot be understated. 2 Regulated and controlled activity – clarification required2 headlines will Appear on click 1 ACPO recognises that any steps that can be reasonably taken to safeguard the vulnerable in our society should be supported. However, the ISA consultation paper has raised a number of concerns which require clarification and further definition. The financial implications of complying with these obligatory regulations for the Police service nationally cannot be understated. 2 Regulated and controlled activity – clarification required

19. Independent Safeguarding Authority List 99, POCA and POVA Cost balanced against compliance Cost of this compliance has not yet been stated but under the widest interpretation of the regulations this could cost the police service in excess of £7 million for police officers alone Every Child Matters 3 headlines will Appear on click List 99, POCA & POVA issues within this, costs of registering staff What is List 99? List 99 is a secret register of men and women who are barred from working with children by the Department of Education and Skills (DfES). More than 80 years old, it is maintained by the Children's Safeguards Unit of the department and contains the names, aliases, dates of birth and national insurance numbers of all those forbidden to work with children in schools, social work and voluntary settings. POCA& POVA Protection of Children Act List.  This is a list, managed by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) on behalf of the Department of Health (DH) The Protection of Vulnerable Adults (POVA) scheme was introduced in July 2004. At the heart of the scheme is the POVA list. This is a list, managed by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) on behalf of the Department of Health There is a statutory duty on providers of care to check if an individual is included on the POVA list. Referrals and checks made against the POVA list identify those people who are banned from working in a care position with vulnerable adults. When an employer asks for a criminal records check for a position that involves working with vulnerable adults, then if the above conditions are met then the disclosure process will include a check against the POVA list. In some circumstances, in order to meet the regulations covering minimum staffing levels, an employee may need to start before the results of a check are known Cost v compliance 7 million estimate of cost to regulate police service Every Child Matters puts an obligation on all organisations whose work can contribute to public protection work, including social services, a duty to co-operate and share information and support the creation of a national service framework for children. ISA are currently liaising with the Department for Children, Schools and Families to seek reconciliation between the requirements that they have under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 and the obligations within Every Child Matters. The result of that liaison has huge implications for the Service. ISA – Meeting in London Soon3 headlines will Appear on click List 99, POCA & POVA issues within this, costs of registering staff What is List 99? List 99 is a secret register of men and women who are barred from working with children by the Department of Education and Skills (DfES). More than 80 years old, it is maintained by the Children's Safeguards Unit of the department and contains the names, aliases, dates of birth and national insurance numbers of all those forbidden to work with children in schools, social work and voluntary settings. POCA& POVA Protection of Children Act List.  This is a list, managed by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) on behalf of the Department of Health (DH) The Protection of Vulnerable Adults (POVA) scheme was introduced in July 2004. At the heart of the scheme is the POVA list. This is a list, managed by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) on behalf of the Department of Health There is a statutory duty on providers of care to check if an individual is included on the POVA list. Referrals and checks made against the POVA list identify those people who are banned from working in a care position with vulnerable adults. When an employer asks for a criminal records check for a position that involves working with vulnerable adults, then if the above conditions are met then the disclosure process will include a check against the POVA list. In some circumstances, in order to meet the regulations covering minimum staffing levels, an employee may need to start before the results of a check are known Cost v compliance 7 million estimate of cost to regulate police service Every Child Matters puts an obligation on all organisations whose work can contribute to public protection work, including social services, a duty to co-operate and share information and support the creation of a national service framework for children. ISA are currently liaising with the Department for Children, Schools and Families to seek reconciliation between the requirements that they have under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 and the obligations within Every Child Matters. The result of that liaison has huge implications for the Service. ISA – Meeting in London Soon

20. Raising The Standard Click one displays graphic Click two displays lift texts from Sir Ronnie’s report Raising the Standard is the HMIC thematic inspection on professional standards. Particular emphasis on vulnerability to corruption and information leakage. Vetting a key underpinning principle of the issues. Click one displays graphic Click two displays lift texts from Sir Ronnie’s report Raising the Standard is the HMIC thematic inspection on professional standards. Particular emphasis on vulnerability to corruption and information leakage. Vetting a key underpinning principle of the issues.

21. Raising The Standard The major threats identified in respect of professional standards were information leakage, in particular using intelligence or information for personal gain or passing it on to associates; infiltration of the organisation, which is an increasing threat in the ever-widening ‘police family’ Click one displays graphic Click two displays lift texts from Sir Ronnie’s report Raising the Standard is the HMIC thematic inspection on professional standards. Particular emphasis on vulnerability to corruption and information leakage. Vetting a key underpinning principle of the issues. Click one displays graphic Click two displays lift texts from Sir Ronnie’s report Raising the Standard is the HMIC thematic inspection on professional standards. Particular emphasis on vulnerability to corruption and information leakage. Vetting a key underpinning principle of the issues.

22. Raising The Standard In view of the threats, it is vital that all forces review their operational security arrangements, to ensure integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It is also important that a similarly thorough review is undertaken of the arrangements for staff vetting and identification of potential staff vulnerabilities. These activities represent key measures in preventing and identifying corruption or vulnerability Click one displays graphic Click two displays lift texts from Sir Ronnie’s report Raising the Standard is the HMIC thematic inspection on professional standards. Particular emphasis on vulnerability to corruption and information leakage. Vetting a key underpinning principle of the issues. Click one displays graphic Click two displays lift texts from Sir Ronnie’s report Raising the Standard is the HMIC thematic inspection on professional standards. Particular emphasis on vulnerability to corruption and information leakage. Vetting a key underpinning principle of the issues.

23. Raising The Standard Recommendations and Suggestions This HMIC Review required the creation of vetting units within forces and called for ACPO PSC to review vetting databases. The work of these units will be interlinked with the Vetting Transformation Programme Recommendation 5 Ensure that FVO’s are being consulted during the establishment of local and National threat assessments for their own respective forces Recommendation 11 Chief officers should carry out an analysis of current vetting structures within their force and, where gaps exist, move towards being fully compliant with ACPO’s vetting policy no later than April 2007. Suggestion E In view of the forthcoming force restructuring, before any further police funds are spent purchasing vetting databases that may prove to be incompatible, the ACPO PSC should carry out a review of vetting databases. Any review should take into account the feasibility of a national product. 4 headlines appear on click 4 headlines appear on click

24. The Future Fingerprints & DNA Vetting Transformation –Third shared service provider for police vetting Consultation and ratification of National Vetting Policy National Vetting Officer 4 Headlines will appear on click Fingerprints & DNA Requirement that fingerprints & DNA are taken of all Police Officers and Police Staff prior to attestation/employment. Subject to speculative search prior to placement on elimination database. Implications of Cost involved to the service, finance, resource and logistics VT – Importance of the results of the MPS proposal to the way forward Consultation of the new policy – including HR world re issues of checkable history, fingerprints & DNA of police officers. Business Case for National Vetting Officer. A need for a single point of contact to bring together and drive forward the change process, The Role is crucial for the delivery of Vetting Transformation. 4 Headlines will appear on click Fingerprints & DNA Requirement that fingerprints & DNA are taken of all Police Officers and Police Staff prior to attestation/employment. Subject to speculative search prior to placement on elimination database. Implications of Cost involved to the service, finance, resource and logistics VT – Importance of the results of the MPS proposal to the way forward Consultation of the new policy – including HR world re issues of checkable history, fingerprints & DNA of police officers. Business Case for National Vetting Officer. A need for a single point of contact to bring together and drive forward the change process, The Role is crucial for the delivery of Vetting Transformation.

25. The Future Development of Performance Framework for vetting community Working with ACRO – International Issues Collaboration with relevant ACPO portfolios to deliver unambiguous guidance that provides direction and a clarity of purpose. Ensuring an effective vetting process that is cost effective, resource efficient and proportionate to risk. 3 headlines appear on click Performance Framework An effective framework to be developed, this will be determined by the National VT structure ACRO Checkable history, the use of shared criminal records and intelligence from abroad ACPO Cross portfolio dialogue Vetting should not be an afterthought of other portfolios. Encouraging greater consultation to ensure that appropriate levels of vetting are resource efficient and proportionate to risk. Doesn’t stand alone … link to National Picture 3 headlines appear on click Performance Framework An effective framework to be developed, this will be determined by the National VT structure ACRO Checkable history, the use of shared criminal records and intelligence from abroad ACPO Cross portfolio dialogue Vetting should not be an afterthought of other portfolios. Encouraging greater consultation to ensure that appropriate levels of vetting are resource efficient and proportionate to risk. Doesn’t stand alone … link to National Picture

26. What Can You Do? Engage In Consultation Process Work with and fully engage your vetting units HMIC Professional Standards Template Fully consider Vetting

27. Refreshment Break Scandinavian Ballroom Foyer

28. ‘Vetting Transformation’ Michael Shryane Senior Policy Advisor Cabinet Office, Security Policy Division

29. Overview Roles and responsibilities Cabinet Office priorities Key Challenges for the Police Community Questions

30. Roles and responsibilities Cabinet Office: Intelligence, Security, Resilience Group Security Policy Division Departments (PUSs and Ministers) Departmental Security Officers (DSOs) Wider national security vetting community Home Office: CONTEST Strategy – Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) Security Service: Centre for the Protection of National Insurance (CPNI)

31. Cabinet Office Personnel Security Priorities 1 Recruitment Controls Baseline Personnel Security Standards (BPSS) Rebasing National Security Vetting Proportionate Targeting (added value) Best use of limited national security resources

32. Cabinet Office Personnel Security Priorities 2 Ongoing Personnel Security Management Checks are valuable but a snapshot in time Maintaining currency Vetting Transformation Quicker Smarter Cheaper (more efficient)

33. Challenges for the Police Community Determining National Security Vetting requirements, particularly application of the Counter Terrorist Check (CTC) Joint working in support of the Vetting Transformation Programme Delivering an effective holistic protective security regime (including personnel security measures) that protects police assets and enable partnership working with other organisation and agencies

34. Contact Details Michael Shryane Cabinet Office, Security Policy Division 26 Whitehall London SW1A 2WH 0207 276 5644 michael.shryane@cabinet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk

35. Interactive Exercise

36. ‘Management Vetting and Aftercare’ Bob Varey Chief Superintendent South Yorkshire Police

37. Management Vetting Designed to provide a means of ensuring that persons serving in ‘designated posts’ have been assessed as to their reliability and integrity Designated posts are those with access to sensitive police: Information Intelligence Financial or Operational assets

38. Designated Posts These are the more sensitive posts within the Police Service, such as: Special Branch Officers Intelligence Officers Financial Investigators The posts ‘designated’ for higher clearances will be Force specific

39. What’s Involved? Usual systems checks i.e. PNC, non-conviction databases Professional Standards ‘health check’ Thorough investigation of financial circumstances Line Manager reports Occupational Health reports

40. Why Do It? Requirement of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) Will give an assessment of the individual’s suitability Developed to ‘plug gaps’ in National Security Vetting Requirement for regular access to SECRET Police material Pre-requisite to SC Clearance Requirement for designated posts

41. MV versus SC SC involves a check against the PNC for the subject Subject, partner & parents are checked against National Security databases A Credit Reference Check Does this give reassurance to the Police Service to the required level?

42. MV versus SC SC does not take all police information into consideration Only takes ‘relevant’ PNC convictions into account ‘Relevant’ convictions are those relating to honesty / integrity offences and other matters which may prejudice the National Security i.e. extremism

43. MV versus SC SC does not take non-conviction information into account i.e. custody records, intelligence etc.

44. MV, SC & GPMS SC will give regular, frequent & uncontrolled access to SECRET Government assets SC does not take into consideration areas identified in Police Strategic Threat Assessments MV will give regular, frequent & uncontrolled access to SECRET Police assets Will enable access up to CONFIDENTIAL Government assets

45. Future of MV Revised Vetting Policy introduced new level of vetting Enhanced Management Vetting (EMV) Will be prerequisite to DV clearance Includes all stages of MV with additional checks and most stages of DV Will enable regular, frequent & uncontrolled access to TOP SECRET Police assets

46. Why Have EMV? DV clearances are currently contracted out The Police Service is not provided with any information resulting from DV enquiries DV is a lengthy and costly process EMV should lead to cost savings due to majority of enquiries being completed in house

47. Aftercare Any level of vetting clearance is based on a snap shot in time It assesses an individual’s suitability for vetting clearance at that moment in time, based on all available information Personal circumstances can, and will, be subject of significant change Such changes can affect suitability to maintain vetting clearance

48. What’s Involved Periodic (recommended to be annual) assessment to ascertain if there are any changes Self Declaration Line Manager’s comment Reassessment of clearance

49. Why Do It? Personal circumstances will change over time Gives continued assurance as to suitability to maintain clearance May uncover ancillary issues i.e. misconduct offences the Force is not aware of

50. Managing Failures Were retrospective vetting is conducted and the individual fails, need to consider: Risk to individual Risk to Force Risk to public Decision must be made on a case by case basis, taking all relevant factors into consideration

51. Summary of Morning Session John Feavyour Deputy Chief Constable Cambridgeshire Constabulary

52. Lunch Phileas Fogg Restaurant

53. Session Five ‘Managing People – Local Solutions’

54. ‘Public Trust – Hard to Win, Easy to Lose’ Nick Hardwick Chair Independent Police Complaints Commission

57. What the public gets British Crime Survey (2006/07): 64% very dissatisfied with how their complaint was dealt with

58. How the public want low level complaints resolved….

59. … and what they want the IPCC to do

60. How the IPCC is responding Stock take: “Fix the problem not just the blame”

61. How the IPCC is responding Corruption: Intelligence Unit RIPA Powers IPCC Director Lead IPCC Report Line Intelligence Unit The IPCC has established an Intelligence Unit with all the requisite security features (SENTINEL SECRET network, Brent faxes/phone/video-conferencing facilities, secure safes ad so on). The Intel Unit is establishing liaison points in all PSD Intel Units across E&W, to ensure the proper dissemination of intelligence that comes to the IPCC's attention through investigations. RIPA powers We have full RIPA powers for the prevention and detection of crime, as well as the more recently added power of Article 2(b) investigations following death (irrespective of if the investigation is of a criminal nature). We also have skilled staff across the IPCC from varied backgrounds IPCC Director Lead The IPCC have a Director with lead responsibility for corruption and we are working together with ACCAG to widen the existing protocol between the IPCC and Anti-Corruption Units so that the IPCC can offer a greater degree of support and oversight for what can be resource-intensive and at times politically sensitive work. The protocol will allow our Senior Investigators (and Intel Unit where appropriate (need to check with PG if IU was included next week) to be included in covert referral processes, and will allow us to increase our oversight and independence in key cases. All of our Senior Investigators are highly experienced investigators (and are undertaking a covert corruption skills refresher courser later this year). The IPCC is looking to expand its work in corruption and covert investigations. We will be looking to work closely with forces to assist them in tackling this area of work. We are also exploring the possibility of modes of understanding with other LEAs such as SOCA to provide assistance to future managed covert enquires and in time, we will be looking to be able to run independent covert investigations. IPCC Report Line We have set up a Report Line which is dedicated to police officers an police staff wishing to report concerns of any wrongdoing or malpractice within their place of work. The reasons for the IPCC’s increasing involvement in this area of work are: to provide assistance and support to forces; To fulfil our remit to ensure independence in the system; and To meet the very reasonable public expectation that serious corruption matters will have independent oversight – and in the more serious cases, direction and control. Intelligence Unit The IPCC has established an Intelligence Unit with all the requisite security features (SENTINEL SECRET network, Brent faxes/phone/video-conferencing facilities, secure safes ad so on). The Intel Unit is establishing liaison points in all PSD Intel Units across E&W, to ensure the proper dissemination of intelligence that comes to the IPCC's attention through investigations. RIPA powers We have full RIPA powers for the prevention and detection of crime, as well as the more recently added power of Article 2(b) investigations following death (irrespective of if the investigation is of a criminal nature). We also have skilled staff across the IPCC from varied backgrounds IPCC Director Lead The IPCC have a Director with lead responsibility for corruption and we are working together with ACCAG to widen the existing protocol between the IPCC and Anti-Corruption Units so that the IPCC can offer a greater degree of support and oversight for what can be resource-intensive and at times politically sensitive work. The protocol will allow our Senior Investigators (and Intel Unit where appropriate (need to check with PG if IU was included next week) to be included in covert referral processes, and will allow us to increase our oversight and independence in key cases. All of our Senior Investigators are highly experienced investigators (and are undertaking a covert corruption skills refresher courser later this year). The IPCC is looking to expand its work in corruption and covert investigations. We will be looking to work closely with forces to assist them in tackling this area of work. We are also exploring the possibility of modes of understanding with other LEAs such as SOCA to provide assistance to future managed covert enquires and in time, we will be looking to be able to run independent covert investigations. IPCC Report Line We have set up a Report Line which is dedicated to police officers an police staff wishing to report concerns of any wrongdoing or malpractice within their place of work. The reasons for the IPCC’s increasing involvement in this area of work are: to provide assistance and support to forces; To fulfil our remit to ensure independence in the system; and To meet the very reasonable public expectation that serious corruption matters will have independent oversight – and in the more serious cases, direction and control.

62. Challenges for the future 1. Fix the problem not just the blame 2. Keep it local 3. Make it simple

63. ‘Delivering Outrageous Sanctions’ John Feavyour Deputy Chief Constable Cambridgeshire Constabulary

64. Spectrum of Misconduct

65. Jane Stichbury HMIC

66. The Conference The Frontline Supervision Thematic The HMIC Inspection Timings Collaboration

67. Closing Address Paul West Chief Constable West Mercia Constabulary

68. 3 Key Challenges How are you going to ensure an understanding of the threat to your Force from corruption and resource the required capability and capacity to tackle it? Does your Force have an effective vetting strategy incorporating pre-employment, in-service and “aftercare” arrangements? Is your Force ready to implement the new misconduct arrangements and what ideas can you contribute to the IPCC stock take of the complaints system?

69. ACPO Professional Standards Conference 2008