The Af-Pak Imbroglio: Implications for the Stakeholders

1. The Af-Pak Imbroglio: Implications for the Stakeholders Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukhari S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

2. Contents • Importance of Afghanistan & Pakistan • Non-State Actors in the Af-Pak Theatre • Insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan • Policies of Pakistan, Afghanistan and US-NATO • Conclusion

14. Non-State Actors • The Two Taliban • Insurgency not monolithic, but united against a “common enemy” • Religion-driven with an ethnic undercurrent, but attempts by Taliban to downplay ethnic identity

20. US COIN Operations • Insurgency on the rise – “un-winnable war”, “headed for failure”; • Operation “Moshtaraq” in Marjah, Helmand (Feb 2010) • Operation “Dragon Strike” in Kandahar (Sept 2010) • Lack of public support to COIN operations – 94% Kandaharis opposed military confrontation with the Taliban – April 2010 (Inter-Press Service) • Failure to deliver a “government-in-a-box”

21. FATA & NWFP 2006 FATA & NWFP 2008

23. Pakistan’s COIN Operations • Pakistan’s COIN Strategy: “Clear, hold, build and transfer” • Three Phases: • To encourage local population out of the area, clear the area and maintain long-term presence; • Rebuild and restore basic amenities/infrastructure • Encourage the IDPs to return back; strengthen local government; raise tribal Lashkars and safeguard the cleared area; • Undertake economic development

24. Cont’d; • Terrorist infrastructure destroyed; training camps, means of finances and recruitment largely affected due to military operations; • Failure to contain conflict within the area of operation – Subsequently Taliban leadership remains evasive; • Internally displaced persons refuse to return back to their native areas for fear of Taliban return and retribution (SECOND PHASE); • Local governments remain weak and largely dependent on Pak Army to run day-to-day affairs; • Economic development still a pipe dream and recent floods tend to take the focus away from FATA to flood affected areas (THIRD PHASE);

25. The Three Stakeholders • Main players – Afghanistan, Pakistan and US-NATO • Other important players: Iran, CARs, Russia, India, S.Arabia and UAE • Centrifugal forces at work; major disagreements between Afghanistan, Pakistan and US-NATO; • Afghanistan government largely failing • Corrupt and unable to provide even a semblance of governance • Losing legitimacy – the presidential and parliamentary elections • Karzai clan-dominated government , with strong commercial interests

26. Cont’d • Major differences over the execution of war with US • Afghanistan emphasizes on CT instead of COIN – pursue the terrorist sanctuaries outside Afghanistan; • Domestic opposition from non-Pushtuns regarding peace overtures to the Taliban; • US-NATO in a Catch-22 situation; • International failure to stabilize Afghanistan • Reconstruction and rebuilding remains nominal on the ground despite spending around $40 billion (IRIN March 2010);

27. Cont’d; • Total Cost of Afghan war from 2001-2010 is $336 billion (CRS-Sept 2010). The cost earmarked for war in 2010-11 is $65 billion • $27 billion spent on raising Afghan National Army (ANA) • Desertion/defection rate in ANA remains at roughly 23 percent and Afghan National Police at 17%; • US and NATO under domestic compulsions to initiate withdrawal of troops • Differences on CT and COIN

28. US exasperation with Pakistan “ambivalence” over sanctuaries on the Af-Pak border; • Pakistan’s descent into political, economic and social turmoil continues; • Taliban-led violence in Pakistan spreading upto Karachi • Differences over approach to the Afghan solution – with whom to talk and whom to boycott?

29. Cont’d: • Attempts to drive a wedge between various insurgents in Afghan theatre; • India as a factor, containment of China through not allowing establishment of railway and road structures