U.S. Runway Safety Briefing

1. U.S. Runway Safety Briefing ICAO NAM/CAR/SAMRunway Safety/Runway Incursion Conference John Pallante, ARI-2 October 2002

2. Global Airspace Characteristics Growing demand for air travel and system capacity Millions of operations a year Hundreds of thousands of pilots and aircraft Thousands of air traffic controllers Thousands of airports Pressure to reduce delays and to enhance safety

3. Runway Safety Realities • Systemic, Rare, Potentially Catastrophic Events • Human Factors – Inevitable and Constant • Commercial and GA Incursions – Proportionate to Operations • Airport Design, Procedures, and Local Factors are Significant • Solution includes Cultural Change, Joint and Individual Ownership

4. Operational Errors Pilot Deviations Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations A pilot deviation (PD) is an action of a pilot that violates any Federal Aviation Regulation. For example, a pilot fails to obey air traffic control instructions to not cross an active runway when following the authorized route to an airport gate. An operational error (OE) is an action of an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) that results in: A vehicle or pedestrian deviation (VPD) includes pedestrians, vehicles or other objects interfering with aircraft operations by entering or moving on the runway movement area without authorization from air traffic control. • Less than the required minimum separation between two or more aircraft, or between an aircraft and obstacles (obstacles include, vehicles, equipment, personnel on runways) • An aircraft landing or departing on a runway closed to aircraft Types of Runway Incursions • A runway incursion is any occurrence on an airport runway involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, landing, or intending to land. • The FAA investigates runway incursions and attributes the occurrence to one or more of the following error types.

5. 66.21 68.67 67.68 65.47 est. 64.85 Tower Operations (millions) YTD 09/30/02 Runway Incursions (All Categories) DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE

6. Distribution by Type of Runway Incursions FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02) FY 1998-2001 DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE

7. Available Evasive or Speed of Proximity of Available Evasive or Speed of Proximity of Environmental Environmental Reaction Corrective Aircraft and/or Aircraft and/or Reaction Corrective Aircraft and/or Aircraft and/or Conditions Conditions Time Action Vehicle Vehicle Time Action Vehicle Vehicle Category A An incursion that Collision resulted in a runway collision Runway Incursion Severity Categories Operational Dimensions Affecting Runway Incursion Severity Increasing Severity Increasing Severity Category D Category C Category B Category D Category C Category B Category A Separation decreases and participants take extreme action to narrowly avoid a collision, or the event results in a collision Little or no chance of collision but meets the definition of a runway incursion Separation decreases but there is ample time and distance to avoid a collision Separation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision Little or no Separation Separation Separation chance of decreases but decreases and decreases and collision but there is ample there is a participants take meets the time and significant extreme action definition of a distance to avoid potential for to narrowly runway incursion a collision collision avoid a collision

8. 53 = FY02 Perf Limit 66.21 68.67 67.68 65.47 est. 64.85 YTD 09/30/02 Tower Operations (millions) Category A&B Runway Incursions DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE

9. Severity Distribution of Runway Incursions FY 1998-2001 FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02) Category A includes 2 collisions / 0 fatalities (VNY & LAL). Category A includes 2 collisions / 4 fatalities (FLL & SRQ- 4 fatal). DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE

10. Location of Collisions at Towered Airports (1990 – 2001) 66% or 2/3 of runway 2001 A Events 2000 A Events 2001 B Events Traffic Flow 2000 B Events Category A and B Runway Incursions (CY 2000 and 2001)

11. Runway Collisions Met. Conditions (1990 - 2001) DAY VMC DAY IMC 2 1 0 5 NIGHT IMC NIGHT VMC

12. TOTAL OPERATIONS 4 Year Total = 268 Million Annual Average = 67 Million TOTAL INCURSIONS Total Incursions = 1460 Average No. of Incursions = 5 per airport over 4 years INCURSION RATE Average Rate = 0.55 incursions per 100,000 operations Frequency and Rate of Runway Incursions (CY 1998 - 2001)

13. Airport complexity influences the number and rate of runway incursions (FY 1998 - 2001) LAX STL IAD 34 Incursions 30 Incursions 3 Incursions

14. Severity Distribution at the 32 Benchmark Airports (CY 1998 – 2001) • The Benchmark Airports accounted for • 18% of all operations (approx. 61 Million out of 332 Million) at towered airports over the 4 year period • 26% (383) of all the runway incursions in the 4 year period studied • The Benchmark Airports accounted for • 38% (38/87) A events, • 36% (59/163) B events, • 35% (178/509) C events, • 16% (113/694) D events

15. What the FAA is Doing • Current Situation • Runway Safety Goals Outcome: Zero fatalities from runway incursions

16. Primary Performance Factors of Runway Incursions (1997-2001) • Pilot Deviations • Enters or crosses a runway after acknowledging hold short instructions • Takes off without a clearance after acknowledging position and hold instructions • Operational Errors • Loss of arrival/departure separation on same or intersecting runways • Runway crossing separation errors • Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations • Crosses a runway without communication or authorization • Enters a runway after acknowledging hold short instructions

17. Runway Safety Blueprint 8 Goals – 39 Objectives • Education and Training – Safety Seminars • Surface Safety Awareness – Mass Mailings • Procedures – Modeling and Simulation – Advisory Circulars • Data Collection – Surface Incidents – ASRS

18. Runway Safety Blueprint (cont’d) 8 Goals – 39 Objectives • Communications – Phraseology Workgroup • Situational Awareness – Paint Study • Local Solutions – Special Emphasis Program • Technology – Flashing PAPI – Runway Status Lights (AMASS, ASDE-X) – Moving Map – LED Lights

19. Technologies • ARI sponsoring technologies with industry-wide potential • AMASS • 18 Commissioned • 6 Operational Suitability Demo • 13 Remaining • LED lighting • Enhances hold position markings at runway/taxiway intersection • Omaha system activation July 2002

20. Summary • Runway Safety is a multi-dimensional issue that requires a multi-dimensional approach. • People make mistakes – even the most intelligent, well-trained, conscientious, well-intentioned people make mistakes. • Education, training and procedures are important solutions, but they are always susceptible to human error. To be successful, a balanced approach also requires improvements in airport design and technology, and a determination to take ownership of the issue of runway incursions.

21. Backup Slides

22. Approach • Analyze the incident data to determine areas of greatest risks • What are the types and relative frequencies of different types of error? • Identify mitigation strategies for managing human error • Procedures • Technologies

23. Where do we go wrong? • Controllers • Forget (about a closed runway, a clearance that they issued, an aircraft waiting to takeoff or cleared to land) • Get distracted • Fail to coordinate (teamwork) • Don’t catch all readback errors • Act human

24. Where do we go wrong? • Pilots • Fail to “hold short” as instructed (and cross or line up on the runway) • Takeoff without a clearance • Get lost (with and without poor visibility) • Misunderstand the clearance • Act human

25. Resulting in: • Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft taking off or landing • Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft landing • Controllers forgetting about aircraft holding in position and clearing an aircraft to land on the same runway • Other scenarios

26. What Controllers Can Do • Optimize teamwork • Recognize limitations of human memory and attention • Don’t clear an aircraft into “position and hold” if you plan on it being there for more than a minute • Never “assume” – keep up your scan and check that the runway is clear • Good communication techniques

27. What Pilots Can Do • DON’T “mind your own business” – do whatever you can to increase your awareness of the airport operation • LISTEN UP • LOOK OUT • Airport diagram “out and in use” • Is there a runway between you and the gate? • Is there an aircraft on final?

28. What Pilots Can Do (cont’d) • Both pilots should listen for clearances to land, taxi, and take-off • When in doubt, about your position or your clearance - ASK • SOPs and Recommended Practices • Landing lights go on when take-off clearance is received (signal that aircraft is rolling) • Call ATC if you expected an imminent take-off and have been lined up and waiting for more than 90 seconds

29. Technologies

30. BAA Activities • Background • Issued Surface Technology Broad Agency Announcement (BAA): Exploring new and emerging, lower cost technology solutions • Demonstrate technical feasibility of proposed technology • Proceed to technology/solution development phase based on operational transition potential • Status • Six demonstration contracts awarded in 2001(summary on next slide) • Laser light technology contract awarded in July 2002 • System demo - November 2002

31. BAA Activities (cont’d)

32. Other Projects (cont’d) • Hold Line Enhancement with LED lights • Three phases testing at Omaha • LED stand alone • LED with motion sensors • Special scenarios - TBD • Operational Assessment complete • Jan 2003

33. Other Projects (cont’d) • VHF audio alert with motion sensors for non-controlled airports • Two months data collection at Millard Airport completed in May 2002 • Detection rate and false alert rate need enhancement

34. Other Projects (cont’d) • Flashing Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) • Notifies pilots on approach that it is unsafe to land due to an aircraft or vehicle occupying the Take-off Hold position or other critical position on the runway • System control logic driven by loops detection in Long Beach • Article 7 Brief • August 12, 2002 • Field Demo • September 10-12, 2002

35. Technologies Deployment • Short Term • Utilize existing Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (SMGCS) and install FAA approved light fixtures such as Runway Guard Lights and Stop Bar Lights at those hot spots and high traffic intersections to increase the awareness of pilots and vehicle operators • North Vegas • Long Beach • Phase in automatic control such as loops and motion sensor, and evaluate their effectiveness

36. Technologies Deployment (cont’d) • Mid Term • Evaluate, certify and install R&D equipment and system to improve runway safety • Addressable Sign – TYS • LED/Hold Line Enhancement – OMA • 75 MHz Ground Marker – Tech Center • Long Term • Provide low cost surveillance system for smaller airports • Implement and promote the utilization of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and ground vehicle tracking • Integrate existing and future certified warning equipment/devices with safety logic to provide visual and aural alerts to users including air traffic controllers, pilots and vehicle operators