Global Bystander to Genocide: International Society and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994

1. Global Bystander to Genocide:International Society and the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 Miyu Nishimura Hiroaki Murao Paul Bacon Zemi

2. Republic of Rwanda Rwanda is in the middle of Arican continent. Capital: Kigali Hutsu: 85% Tutsi: 14% Independence: 1962 Main industry: Agriculture (Coffee etc)

3. Historical Background Tutsi and Hutu were not divided ethnically, but Belgium authority politicized the difference, and used it to control Rwanda. • 1959 uprising • The overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy in 1961. • Hutu came to power and Tutsi fled to neighboring countries, such as Uganda. • 1962 Habyarimana came to power in a coup. • His political power base is among the military and the northern Hutu, who have few contacts with Tutsi. • → Hutu extremist seized political and militaristic power. • 1990 Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion • RPF supported by Uganda invaded Rwanda, which was repelled by Rwandan army supported by France, Belgium and Zaire. • Hutu extremist came to believed physical extermination is “final solution”.

4. Chronology

5. UNSCR 872 In order to monitor the implementation of the cease-fire and the movement to transitional government, the SC agreed in UNSCR 872 to establish the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in Oct 1993. The 1458 troops in phase 1 and 2548 in phase 2. The implementation of Arusha accords depended upon compromise of the extremists in Habyarimana’ faction. Arusha Accords is impossible.

6. Dallaire’s warning Dallaire warned Hutu extremist is planing to destroy the Arusha peach process - hate propaganda by radio station - killing Belgian soldiers and Tutsi in Kigali UNAMIR should neutralize the Hutu extremists by disarming, and then it is possible for UNAMIR to conduct the peace keeping mandate. Dallaire asked to seize the weapons, but it was not approved by DPKO. No one wantes to cross Mogadishu-line.

7. UNSCR 909 UNSCR 909 set the schedule to withdraw. The UN would pull out in six weeks unless the transitional government was created, because the US was reluctant to support the UN activities in Rwanda. As a Result UNSCR 909 sent the signal which the UN would not intervene decisively to prevent the genocide.

8. UNSCR 912 Secretary General issued report on UNAMIR to deal with the problems. no mention in the report about Dallaire’s information no request reinforcing to protect human rights His report included three options 1, a massive deployment of troops and change the mandate 2, scaling down UNAMIR to a force size of around 270 3, the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR. Based on the report, the SC unanimously agreed in UNSCR 912, which reduce UNAMIR to 270. No member challenged the interpretation of the cause of killing in the report and challenged the mandate of the Resolution.

9. Term “genocide” In the Report, Secretary General described the situation as “tribal war”. However, describing the situation in Rwanda as genocide had a special meaning. “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” makes it possible for some members of the Security Council to prevent and stop genocide. In fact, Clinton Administration was carefully issued secret directive for its officials not to use genocide to explain Rwandan situation.

10. UNSCR 918 Because of media coverage and many reports from NGO such as MSF, Presidential Statement citing the provisions from Genocide Convention had been issued, so the SC discussed new UNSCR. The SC adopted Resolution 918, which authorized to increase in UNAMIR to 5500 troops with mandate to provide humanitarian assistance. However, the US disagreed to quick deploy. In addition, Western countries were still reluctant to deploy their military, so the alternative was to ask African states to do.

11. UNSCR 925 Secretary General criticized the slow actions. In response to it, the Council adopted the UNSCR 925 to authorize to deploy 5500 troops (UNAMIR II). In the meeting, several countries named Rwanda a genocide. France offered to lead a multinational rescue mission that would serve as an interim measure until UNAMIR ll was fully deployed.

12. Operation Turquoise France publicly stated intervention was to save lives and bring humanitarian aids. France discussed the issue in WEU meeting, but no countries supported. France set up five preconditions UNSC authorization All operation should be limited as humanitarian actions. Troops should remain near the border with Zaire. Troops should not enter into the heart of Rwanda and fight against RPF. Mission should be limited to a maximum two months. The Council adopted UNSCR 929

13. Operation Turquoise France set up “safe humanitarian zone” (SHZ). At that time, RPF was wining and controlling so many parts of Rwanda, so SHZ actually helped Hutu. In fact, RPF would not be allowed to enter the zone while it provided sanctuary for retreating Rwandan government and army. In addition, France changed the schedule for the withdrawal of French troops from 21 August to the end of July, which escalating the refugee crisis.

14. Failures of the International Community

15. Failures of the International Community • Obviously failed to protect Rwandan people from the massacre.  The UN was preoccupied with operations in Bosnia and Somalia. “Not Somalia Again” African states insisted that it was the UN’s moral duty to assist Rwanda in its transition to democracy, but UN did not respond fully.

16. Failures of the International Community • The Security Council did not consider changing the mandate of UNAMIR from peacekeeping to preventative humanitarian intervention.  UN could have done it by determining that the threat of massive human rights violations constituted a ‘threat to peace’ under Article 39 of the UN Charter.

17. Failures of the International Community • Since African states did not have enough power to stop the genocide, responsibility passed to the Western states. BUT the West were reluctant to intervene after the incident of Somalia.  Took too much time discussing about who would take the responsibility, who would shoulder the cost, etc.

18. Failures of the International Community • Non-humanitarian motives behind the French intervention led to means being employed that conflicted with its humanitarian purposes. • The Security Council was afraid to loose its credibility and to damage its reputation.  Did not want to recognize the killing as ‘genocide’

19. What could have been done? • The Security Council should have listened to requests for reinforcement from people such as Dallaire. • Deployment of additional force in the first few weeks of the genocide could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. • Change of mandate and the deployment of an effective fighting force might have led to different outcome.

20. What could have been done? • US’s participation would have been essential.  US forces, under effective command and control, and backed by air power, could have protected Rwandan civilians with little or no risk to US soldiers. • France’s “Operation Turquoise” could have been conducted differently.

21. Evaluation of Wheeler’s Criteria

22. Supreme Humanitarian Emergency? • The Arusha peace process did not go well from the beginning • Response of the extremists was to begin a campaign of killing Tutsis • Dallaire cabled the UNDPKO with the warning that the extremists is planning to kill Belgian soldiers and Tutsi in Kigali at an estimated rate of 1,000 every 20 mins using militia units (credibility confirmed)

23. Last Resort? • Since peaceful negotiations such as Arusha peace agreement did not work and the killings were getting worse, Rwanda needed military intervention • Time frame of 7-21 April was important • Deploying the force any later would have required massive amounts of force because the situation had expanded to the countryside

24. Proportionality? • Too late to deploy force, too much casualties • There weren’t enough forces, equipments, and funds to help the Rwandans

25. Positive Humanitarian Outcome? • NOT AT ALL. The international community failed to prevent the massacre, failed to protect the Rwandan citizens. • Estimated 800,000 people was killed overall  as much as 20% of the country's total population • Over the course of approximately 100 days (from the assassination of Habyarimana on April 6) through mid-July, over 500,000 people were killed, according to the Human Rights Watch estimate

26. Humanitarian Motives? • Most of the international community member did not respond to the killings. • US: President said that the USA had no vital interests in Rwanda and that US military personnel could not be sent to every trouble spot where Americans were offended by human misery. • France: 建前to save lives!! 本音to demonstrate to Africa and the rest of the world that France could still rapidly project military power!!

27. Humanitarian Justification? • UN Resolutions • UNAMIR II • French government justified its intervention as to “save lives of Rwandan people” • But the means used by the French cannot be justified as humanitarian

28. Legality? • UNAMIR acted under UN authorization • However, France went against Resolution 929, which says it should not support ‘interposition’ force between government and the RPF. “Safe Humanitarian Zone”(SHZ)

29. Selectivity? • France made the Safe Humanitarian Zone (SHZ) which did not allow RPF to enter • They actually sheltered Hutu • Most of the states were selective because of prudential concerns

30. Evaluation

31. Aftermath • After the victory of the RPF, the size of UNAMIR was increased to its full strength, remaining in Rwanda until March 8, 1996. • About 2 million people (Hutus, participants in the genocide, etc) with anticipation of Tutsi retaliation, fled from Rwanda to Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and for the most part, Zaire. • Thousands of them died in epidemics of diseases such as cholera at the refugee camps. The US staged the Operation Support Hope airlift from July to September 1994 to stabilize the situation in the camps.

32. Aftermath • Rwandan genocide was the final factor which triggered the First Congo War. • Number of prison population increasing. • Social isolation caused by the problem of war rape • The Special Rapporteur on Rwanda estimated that between 2,000 and 5,000 pregnancies resulted from war rape (between 250,000 and 500,000 Rwandan women and girls had been raped)

33. Rwanda Today  • After its military victory in July 1994, RPF organized a coalition government similar to that established by President Habyarimana in 1994 (The Broad Based Government of National Unity). • Its fundamental law is based on a combination of the constitution, the Arusha accords, and political declarations by the parties. • The first post-war presidential and legislative elections were held on August 25, and on September 29, 2003.

34. Rwanda Today  • Economy is recovering rapidly • Tourism is now the country’s leading foreign exchange earner • Rwanda is one of only two countries in which mountain gorillas can be visited safely and visitors pay high prices for gorilla tracking permits.