Briefing Flow

1. Deconflicting Electronic Warfare in Joint OperationsCol Art Huber, USAFCOL Gary Carlberg, USACol Prince Gilliard, USAFCAPT David Marquet, USNJCWS Class 06-04

2. Briefing Flow • Background • The Nature of the Problem • How We Do It Today • Some Ideas to Address the Challenge • Summary

3. Background • Briefing developed from paper co-authored to satisfy Joint Professional Military Education Phase II requirements • Joint Forces Staff College Faculty Advisors: • COL Tom Snukis, USA; Mr. Karl Erickson • Assignment was to research and write a paper covering a topic that is of current issue to the joint community • Research methodology: open literature survey, interviews and e-mail correspondence with subject matter experts • Shortened version of paper submitted to Joint Forces Quarterly in hopes of publication Disclaimer: The views presented herein do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the US Government, the DoD, or any of its agencies. Release: The paper on which this briefing is based was cleared by the Commandant of the Joint Forces Staff College on 12 Oct 06.

4. Introduction [I]t has become clear that in any future fighting, a significant electronic battle will also be taking place. Curtis E. LeMay, General, USAF (Ret), 1946 • Like air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum has become a contested domain to attain the “high ground” for control of this medium • Like combat involving kinetic weapons, EW is no less immune to the problem of fratricide • More and more systems are vying for their place in an increasingly crowded frequency spectrum • Constant pressure to transfer military bands to the public domain • Low tolerance for interference • Rush to field emitters without frequency certification We must better manage and deconflict the EM spectrum if EW is to remain a weapon of choice for our warfighters.

5. The “Cocktail of EM Confusion” • Fratricide has been a problem since the dawn of EW • EW fratricide has occurred even in operations involving the most modern equipment and well-trained, professional crews • The problem extends to comm, sensors, data links, UAVs, etc. • Two events from recent history serve to illustrate: On one occasion I was on orbit conducting jamming operations, and we knew an EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft was in the area putting out Psyops broadcasts to Iraqi troops. But we didn’t know the frequencies or the times when it was operating. A linguist misidentified a broadcast, we targeted it and we ended up jamming it. We discovered the mistake only after we landed. Chris Bakke, EC-130H Compass Call crewmember in Operation Desert Storm Imagine trying to win an overseas air war where target intelligence can be gathered only part of the day, where aerial refueling is hampered by inability to fly in close formation under prevailing weather conditions, and where many newly developed radio systems for air, sea, and land forces don’t work the way they did back in the U.S. Sound unlikely? It isn’t - these constraints limited the U.S. forces’ ability to operate to maximum efficiency during the Kosovo campaign. Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Frequency Spectrum Issues, Nov 00

6. The “Cocktail of EM Confusion” • Experiences in Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom show the problem has only gotten worse: This is the first time that you and I have seen electronic fratricide reach the point that it has. … When you take a look at data links and the number of jammers in place and all the radios we have out there, [deconflicting] becomes a very difficult problem. … We have a long way to go … I need to … determine when and where I’m going to jam and how I’m going to affect the electronic medium.” Lt Gen Walter Buchanan, former chief 9th AF and CENTCOM Air Forces, Nov 05 The ground guys are throwing out energy, the airborne guys are throwing out energy, and the … bad guys are throwing out energy. So it’s a little hard to prevent guys from stepping all over each other. … [I]t’s a big problem when [the] same frequency you’re jamming on is the frequency someone else is datalinking on and someone else is trying to communicate on. Col Rick Rankine, HQ AF/A5RE, Sep 06 So what’s a warfighter to do?

7. Perimeter Detection Perimeter Detection Battlefield Sensor Battlefield Sensor Ship Ship - - Shore Shore - - Ship Ship Security Sensor Security Sensor UGV UGV Intruder Intruder MEDEVAC MEDEVAC Link 11 Link 11 UAV/UGV UAV/UGV Navigation Aids Navigation Aids UAV UAV Detection Radar Detection Radar Over Over - - the the - - Horizon Horizon Position Location Position Location UAV UAV Beacons, Beacons, Radar Radar ATC ATC Range Data Range Data EOD EOD MSRT MSRT UAV UAV Tactical HF Tactical HF Tactical FM/SINCGARS Tactical FM/SINCGARS JTRS Clusters Implementation JTRS Clusters Implementation 100 100 10 10 20 20 30 30 40 40 50 50 60 60 70 70 80 80 90 90 100 kHz kHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz UAV/Range Search Radar, Control, Weapons ATC, REMBASS, Flight Deck Flight Termination Sonobuoy , Scoring, Radar, Tactical PCS Battlefield Soldier Intercom Systems, Target Intrusion Target Security Sensors Wireless Comm , MW Landing Emergency Control Detection Tracking UGV D/L, Battlegroup Locator, VIICS RF Tags Sonobuoy MEDEVAC Cellular Rescue UAV MSE/HAVEQUICK JTIDS UHF, AM Tac VHF Tactical UHF ( Ter /SAT) Radar TACAN EPLRS Tactical MW Range Instrumentation JTRS Clusters Implementation 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MHz MSE, Tactical WB, Acquisition/ Target Control, Surveillance, Fire Control/Tracking DSCS Precision Munitions, Surveillance/ Range Video Relay Fire Control Radar Radar, UAV, UGV UAV ATC Radar, Telemetry MW Sensor MW, EHF Radio, Terrain Data Link MW Landing UGV, Missile DL, Telemetry INMARSAT IRIDIUM MILSTAR, Sensor BCIS Radar GPS TACAN Surveillance/Search/ GBS Tropo Range GBS MILSTAR L2, L4/L3, L1 FC Radar CDL, TCDL, Control Intrusion Trgt Control UAV IFF, Scoring SCDL, WB DLs Detection Scoring Search, Fire Control Radar GPS L5 Challenge Athena JTRS Clusters Implementation 1 2 3 4 5 6 21 30 40 GHz GHz GHz GHz GHz GHz GHz GHz GHz DoD Spectrum Dependence 100 MHz Range Instrumentation Surveillance/ UAV ATC Radar, Telemetry Data Link UGV, Missile DL, Telemetry MILSTAR, Sensor Surveillance/Search/ GBS GBS FC Radar CDL, TCDL, Trgt Control UAV IFF, Scoring SCDL, WB DLs Search, Fire Control Radar GPS L5 Challenge Athena JTRS Clusters Implementation

8. DoD Spectrum Dependence

9. Observations on the Spectrum • The US is unique among nations in that it lacks a national spectrum policy • In comparison to other countries, U.S. interests are not pursued in a coherent and harmonious manner • U.S. frequency allocations within the RF spectrum are not necessarily mirrored around the globe • Results in problems like refusal to allow some U.S. systems to operate within foreign national borders • E.g., German restrictions on the Enhanced Position Location and Reporting System (EPLRS) • Frequently, in the rush to field new systems, insufficient attention is put on securing frequency certifications Frequency management is important because it sets the bounds for the freedom one has to operate within an EW environment

10. The Nature of Today’s Challenge • How today is different: • Threat and countermeasure ubiquity • Proliferation of spectrum users/systems • Battlespace dynamics • Highly non-linear, rapid in tempo, chaotic • Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) • Have garnered a massive US effort to develop Counter IED (C-IED) systems • $3B allocated in FY06 … $378M spent on C-IED jammers since 2003 • Radio Frequency IEDs (RFIED) variant are numerous and varied • Arming/detonation mechanisms include remote control toys, electronic keychains, garage door openers, radios, walkie-talkies, cell phones, satellite phones, and long range cordless phones

11. RFIEDs Have Added a New Dimension to the Fratricide Problem • Use of IED jammers has resulted in kinetic and non-kinetic forms of fratricide: • Premature or inadvertent detonation killing or injuring insurgents but also civilians and friendly EOD personnel • Interference with other friendly (primarily comm) systems • Problem has been compounded by coalition context • E.g., Israel’s Elisra-built EJAB (Electronic Jammer Against Bombs) system used by Polish forces Elisra EJAB Polish Troop Vehicle

12. The Dilemmas in EW Deconfliction The Warlock is a jamming device used to hunt up and down radio frequencies searching for signals that could detonate a bomb. The Army has worked heroically with the makers to upgrade the short range and limited capability of the Warlock. But in the field, competing technologies kept getting in the way. The Army uses a radio (called SINCGARS) that also hops around frequencies. The radio frequently interfered with the Warlock jammer. Unable to communicate, troops began turning off their jammers – thereby exposing themselves to IEDs. Newsweek, Mar 06 HMMWV equipped with C-IED Jammer Warlock Green / Red Warlock “S” SINCGARS

13. EW Deconfliction “By the Book” • “Bible” is Joint Pub 3-51, Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare • Joint Freq Mgt Office (JRMO) under COCOM J-6 • Establishes policy and procedures • Develops and distributes spectrum-use plans • Exercises frequency allotment and assignment authority • Coordinates spectrum use with international/host nation authorities • Prepares and updates the JRFL • Joint Restricted Frequency List (JRFL) is first line of defense • A time- and geographically-oriented listing of functions, nets, and frequencies that must not be jammed or interfered with by friendly forces • COCOM J-3 ultimate authority for frequency deconfliction

14. EW Deconfliction “By the Book” • EW part of Information Operations (IO) so EW Officer (EWO) typically assigned to IO cell • Responsible for planning, synchronizing, coordinating, deconflicting EW • Supervises EW planning and preparation of EW appendices in operations plans • Monitors EW execution in on-going operations and exercises • EW a form of “fires” so EWO also works with Fire Support Coordinator and Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) • Tools available to the EWO include: • Databases (providing friendly and enemy EW related data) • Planning process aids • Graphics analysis tools (e.g., visualization models for electromagnetic propagation)

15. EW Deconfliction “By the Book” • The EW Coordination Center (EWCC) • An ad hoc staff coordination element often formed to facilitate the EW coordination function • Managed by the J-3 EWO and includes other EWOs • If the Task Force involves a coalition, participants include EW officers from supporting allied and/or coalition forces • Identifies conflicts between the JRFL and friendly electronic attack operations and requests changes • Joint Spectrum Center (JSC) • Serves as DoD center of excellence for electromagnetic spectrum management matters • Supports COCOMs, Military Departments, and Defense agencies • Manages Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution program The EWCC and JSC have become absolutely critical to the EWO to get the deconfliction job accomplished

16. The Process in Action When exercised properly, the process can work well: One of the first tasks … given … was denying enemy C2 … [while] at the same time … limit[ing] collateral damage. …The electronic warfare assets could have jammed the GPS [Global Positioning System] signals. Fortunately, [the Director of Space Forces] recognized the potential for EW fratricide. He worked with the EW coordination cell, mission planners of all services and implemented an EW energy management scheme to preclude the GPS interference. … The bottom line was a successful attack … to bring in fire on sniper positions and navigate through the city of Fallujah. General Lance Lord, former Commander, Air Force Space Command, describing an instance of successful EW deconfliction in OIF

17. Freeing Up the Jam Our “suggestions for improvement:” • Develop better mechanisms to formulate and pursue national spectrum policy • Adopt a resource perspective for the frequency spectrum and apply the joint strategic planning process to its management • Adhere with greater discipline to doctrine and be creative within its confines as regards existing joint frequency management processes • Insert relevant technological improvements • Hold acquisition efforts accountable to secure allocation approval for desired operating frequencies and to best practices for characterizing new systems through testing

18. Develop a National Spectrum Policy A national spectrum policy would: • Better balance U.S. security and safety requirements with new commercial uses of the frequency spectrum • Work to ensure military spectrum needs are protected and interests advanced to meet burgeoning req’ts to achieve “information dominance” • Account for both domestic and international environments as well as government and commercial considerations • Build new mechanisms to promote unity of effort between the: • State Dept (lead for international spectrum allocation negotiations) • Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (charged with federal government allocations) • FCC (administers non-federal government and civil/commercial uses) • Orchestrate a single, consistent voice at international forums (e.g., the International Telecommunications Union and World Radiocommunication Conference) which govern international spectrum allocations

19. Apply Joint Strategic Planning to Spectrum Management • Warfighters have a process to prepare for and conduct military operations known as Joint Strategic Planning • Process provides: • Authoritative direction • Assignment of missions, tasks, forces and resources • Assumptions and objectives • Operational limitations including rules on the use of force and rules of engagement (ROE) • Policies and concepts to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans • Frequency Spectrum is NOT currently treated as a resource within this framework • Instead, spectrum is treated like a logistics “commodity” • Results in JSC having a role like DLA • Needs greater priority and visibility

20. Apply Joint Strategic Planning to Spectrum Management • If frequency spectrum was treated like other strategic resources in the joint planning process, then it would: • Assign spectrum to the COCOMs for use during peacetime in the “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum issued by the Secretary of Defense • Apportion spectrum to the COCOMs through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan issued by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, for use in developing operational plans • Allocate spectrum to the COCOMs for use in actual operations • Benefits that would then accrue might include: • Proactive ID of potential and actual theater spectrum conflicts • Pre-conflict reservation of spectrum blocks and system reprogramming • Detailed planning for spectrum order of battle (in time and space) • Institution of a frequency tasking order (FTO) to enable enhanced situational awareness and tracking of spectrum use • Better ID of shortfalls for translation into acquisition requirements

21. Discipline and Creativity within Doctrine • A survey of recent history uncovers lapses in application of doctrinal precepts for EW deconfliction • Coordination between freq mgt entities has been overlooked • JRFLs have been violated • EW environment analyses were incorrect having used obsolete data • Standup and continuous manning of EWCCs on combatant commander and task force staffs were neglected • Those assigned EW duties lacked training and/or expertise • Poorly planned personnel rotations have degenerated handoffs and increased spin-up times Disciplined adherence to doctrine and best practices will improve EW deconfliction mission accomplishment

22. Discipline and Creativity within Doctrine Doctrine provides plenty of leeway for new ideas on how to best execute the deconfliction process • Example 1: CENTCOM’s new EW Concept of Operations • Delegates EW Coordination Authority to the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (1st time placed in a single commander) • Creates Combined Theater EW Coordination Cell (CTEWCC) • Charged to integrate and satisfy req’ts for pre-planned operations • Develops and synchronizes plans to employ EW assets • Explicitly charged with mitigating EW fratricide • Example 2: Joint Fires Board employed by Combined Joint Task Force 76 (Afghanistan) • Charged with ensuring unity of effort and synchronizing fires • Coordinated efforts of task force staff/cells using ATO as baseline • Increased knowledge of EW • Provided forum for discussion of deconfliction issues

23. Technology Can Help Too • Improvements in environment & spectrum mgt tools • Current primary tool is JSC’s SPECTRUM XXI • Limited network integration • Can’t facilitate frequency assignments for time slots < 24 hours • Proposed replacement is GEMSIS • Global Electromagnetic Spectrum Information System • Will integrate spectrum mgt on the Global Information Grid (GIG) • Will enable “spectrum on demand,” real-time deconfliction in time and space • Improvements in system capabilities • Expanded transmit/receive bands • Expanded hardware and software (re)programmability • Digitally modulated waveforms • Channel sharing via multiplexing and frequency “sniffing” • Precision (cleaner signals and electronically steerable arrays) But never forget advanced technologies must be accompanied by complimentary TTPs and training!

24. If You Want It Bad … • The record shows a number of developmental and upgrade programs have failed to secure certification for their operating frequencies • This problem is quite prevalent with systems procured in an “urgent and compelling” manner • Testing that would uncover frequency issues is often short-circuited or has failed to provide warnings and caveats to system operators At least 89 telecommunications systems were deployed within the European, Pacific, and Southwest Asian theaters without proper frequency certification and host-nation approval. 1998 DoD IG Audit Report For the longest time we couldn’t get the names of the [C-IED] systems, let alone what frequency they were operating on. We need someone … to work out these frequency conflicts before the equipment comes into country. CDR Kevin Robinson, officer assigned to Task Force Paladin in OEF Disciplined adherence to acquisition process rules and the frequency certification process will help avoid spectrum conflicts

25. The Need to Be Resolute • EW has made incredible strides since Gen LeMay made his prophetic remarks to become indispensable to modern combat • The benefits of new technologies have come with a price … growing reliance on spectrum-dependent systems • We have recognized the complexities inherent in our current situation and have created mechanisms and processes to cope • However, …We often fail to do what we know must be done to succeed! If we are to slay the demon of EW fratricide – i.e., stop being our own electronic enemy – we must not only understand the trends and develop appropriate responses, but be ruthless in our follow-through

26. Parting Admonition:EW Deconfliction is Critical! Proper coordination of systems like this… IED Countermeasure Equipment (ICE) Scopes of Radars Jammed by other Radars Helps prevent this! HMMWV Destroyed by IED