RFID chips and EU e-passports: the end of privacy?

1. Nikita Maria Department of Applied Informatics University of Macedonia - Greece RFID chips and EU e-passports: the end of privacy?

2. Overview • e-Passport Layout • e-Passport Technologies • e-Passport Generations • e-Passport Vulnerabilities • Proposed Measures • Legal Efforts • Conclusions and Proposals 5th International Conference on Information Law

3. e-Passport • The layout 5th International Conference on Information Law

4. e-Passport Technologies • Biometric Data • powerful identifiers • used for authentication and stored on a RFID chip • R.F.I.D. • contactless IC chip • meets all three considerations of usability, data capacity and performance [ICAO Technical Report, 2004] • embedded in the paper passport and communicates wirelessly with the passport reader using an antenna 5th International Conference on Information Law

5. ICAO • The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a specialized agency that issues passport standards as recommendations to the national governments • Introduced the biometrics and the technology of contactless chips (RFID) and the communication protocols • The 3 e-Passport generations.. 5th International Conference on Information Law

6. e-Passport Generations • 1st generation • Passive Authentication Protocol (mandatory) • proves to the reader authenticity of the data • cannot detect cloning • Active Authentication Protocol (optional) • chip authentication • Prevents cloning What about the reader? Is he authentic? Is anyone else “listening” through the communication channel? 5th International Conference on Information Law

7. e-Passport Vulnerabilities • Skimming attacks • occur from distance when an unauthorized reader gains access to the stored data • the attacker communicates directly with the RFID chip (reader authentication needed) 5th International Conference on Information Law

8. e-Passport Vulnerabilities • Eavesdropping • occurs when the attacker intercepts the communication between the RFID chip and the border control reader (secure messaging) 5th International Conference on Information Law

9. e-Passport Generations • 1stgeneration • Basic Access Control (optional) • Reader authentication • Secure messaging The reader optically reads the MRZ and derives an access key The RFID chip also knows this key Cryptographic Session Key derived (Secure messaging) • ACCESS KEY = • Document Number+ • Date of Birth + • Date of Expiry Mutual authentication 5th International Conference on Information Law

10. e-Passport Generations • 2nd generation • Extended Access Control Protocol (optional) • Chip and Terminal authentication • Stronger encryption Its disadvantage is that it depends on BAC! • BAC turned out to be a very successful protocol because of its simplicity • Now is implemented in almost every e-passport • BUT the security that it provides is limited by the design of the protocol - the keys are cryptographically weak 5th International Conference on Information Law

11. e-Passport Generations • 3rd generation • Supplemental Access Control (replace BAC) • implements asymmetric cryptography • data encryption is based on a shared key, unlike BAC which generates the key based on the MRZ • Data is protected both when stored on the chip and when transmitted to the reader • Higher level of protection is succeeded 5th International Conference on Information Law

12. Proposed Measures • Faraday cage • is a metal jacket • prevents any electric or magnetic fields to pass through • A metal surface on an adjacent page Both are vulnerable to eavesdropping when they are expressly presented by their holders! 5th International Conference on Information Law

13. Legal Efforts ICAO • In 1980 issued the first edition of the Doc 9303 as a guideline for issuing machine-readable passports • Introduced the biometrics and the technology of contactless chips (RFID) and the communication protocols • The Doc 9303 evolved through time and separate volumes were published • Doc 9303 part 1 volume 2 (2006) • specifications for electronically enabled passports with biometric identification capability were presented 5th International Conference on Information Law

14. Legal Efforts European Level • E-passports introduced with Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 • standards for security features and biometrics in passports issued by Member States, taking into account the specifications of ICAO • the data subject’s right of verification is recognized • access, rectify, erase • Commission Decision C(2005) 409 • issue passports with a digital facial image stored in the RFID chip by 2006 • fingerprints by 2008 • implement the BAC communication protocol 5th International Conference on Information Law

15. Conclusions • The widespread of privacy concerns used to originate mainly in the fields of law • Now has obviosly expanded into the information technologies • Since biometric data was stored on the RFID chip… Privacy Threats arose • The RFID technology’s infrastructure is responsible for these problems • The EU Commission suggested to enhance RFID with privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) (anonymisation, coding, encryption and authentication) 5th International Conference on Information Law

16. Proposals • Intensive proposed methods to enhance protection of privacy are vital • Fundamental changes are required even to the physical design of the RFID • Or second thoughts should be done about replacing the RFID technology with another that follows data protectionprinciples and applies privacy by design • Cooperation between computer and law scientists is vital for implementing a privacy enhancing technology for e-passports that entails the advantages of the RFID. 5th International Conference on Information Law

17. Thank you for your attention! Any questions? 5th International Conference on Information Law