Presentation Transcript

1. Seminar 4“The House of Commons”

   Comps Prep
2. (TOA,Q1) 1. Describe your personal theory of war that you developed in TOA Present your definition of war Define other important terms specific to your theory Perhaps describe the history and path of your thought in developing your theory Diagram and describe your theory. What’s your theory’s form, function, and logic (as Clausewitz uses with regard to war and Gharajedaghimodels with his systems analysis)? Discuss theory definitions (can do this first), criteria, or other aspects of theory (Reynolds, Kuhn, or other) and “validate” your theory 2. How has it changed since TOA, and why? Articulate changes from initial take on it and how specific aspects of the course have enhanced or altered your theory. Is there relevance or connection to your monograph? Or relevance to the campaign you’ll brief? (or just use some historical example(s) to test your theory. 3. Also, discuss what usefulness this project served for you while a student in SAMS and how you think it will continue to prove useful to you as a SAMS graduate. Discuss how you can use your theory while deployed to Afghanistan or assignment elsewhere. Discuss the utility of understanding of how to build a theory or recognize one in daily work. Can also scheme to work other theory questions from the sheet into your answer as to eliminate the need for panel to ask other questions (although this could open up the avenue for further questions in detail on those areas). Wrap-Up, Answer this: Why is my theory (or having done this project) important when I’m a planner and operational artist?
3. Craig’s crack at question #1. 1. Describe your personal theory of war that you developed in TOA At the root of war, I believe there is natural conflict between the belief systems and worldviews between and within differing entities (national, sub-national, or supra-national collective groups who associate for any reason; they include organizations, nation-states, cultural and civilization identities, and political establishments). My definition of war is this… my theory is this, seen in this diagram… Describe non-violent war and violent war, giving examples of each. FORM, FUNCTION, LOGIC: The form of my theory gets at the root of war—the intangible place that war and conflict come from. The structure is of an open system. The function of my theory is that it accounts for war on a global scale based on historical example and provides a tool in comprehending potential aggressors and their purposes and underlying agendas. It provides the impetus to strengthen relationships among allies based on common values , and alerts policy makers of the strategic implications for engaging in non-violent war with other entities in the proper time and space to prevent violent conflict from occurring. The logic of my theory is shown in causal relationship. When people choose to believe certain tenets of a worldview, they inherently clash with certain tenets of other worldviews. Certain tenets, seen by the categories in the roots, cannot coexist. They are fundamentally at odds. When people and groups 2. How has it changed since TOA, and why? I’ve begun to refine it, define more terms, and conduct more research into this topic. As the course progressed, I realized I was in way over my head with this approach, especially after completing the design block of instruction. I gained deeper insight regarding exploring the meta-cognition and analysis of entities, as described by Henrotin. Regardless, progressing through SAMS has made me realize that I can easily spend several years in exploring, adding, and researching the elements of this theory, and it could easily become a book. I’ve been able to put a name on several aspects of my theory, such as the form, function, and logic, based on course material from Clausewitz and Gharajedaghi. 3. usefulness this project served for you while a student in SAMS and how you think it will continue to prove useful to you as a SAMS graduate. My theory has served as a learning tool first and foremost in understanding theory, and how we develop theories and identify them in operational approaches of other units or developing my own post-graduation [give example of some products 3ID was producing during the MRX I attended]. Class readings helped further my understanding of my theory and how war itself results and how it manifests out of the natural conflict between roots of worldviews—for example, Kalyvas, and the Logic of Civil War helped me understand the relationships involved in the American Civil War and why violence escalates [continue in further detail about the book]. I can also apply this theory to my understanding of Afghanistan as I prepare to deploy there. In light of Brinton’s Anatomy of Revolution, which helps to flush out manifestations of Revolution, primarily based on economic and class warfare, and other differing beliefs in various worldview roots, I see how war has manifested itself throughout Afghanistan’s history[continue in this tangent] Also, can discuss economics, as a root of worldviews, and relate to Commanding Heights, the opposing theories (Hayek & Keynes, as well as Marxism/Leninism) and discuss historical example of economics as a source of conflict and how it manifested in war.
4. Question 2 (TOA) John Lewis Gaddis, in The Landscape of History, discusses the concepts of continuity and contingency. How does he define these terms and what usefulness do they have for historians, academics in other fields, and military practitioners? Consider readings from one of the SAMS courses that reflects the presence of continuities and contingencies (whether or not the author explicitly refers to them as such) and discuss how your understanding of those terms helped you as you read and interpret the text. For example, place a historical campaign or war you read about in context by using the concepts of continuity and contingency as Gaddis described them.
5. Question 2. (TOA) John Lewis Gaddis, in The Landscape of History, discusses the concepts of continuity and contingency. How does he define these terms and what usefulness do they have for historians, academics in other fields, and military practitioners? Consider readings from one of the SAMS courses that reflects the presence of continuities and contingencies (whether or not the author explicitly refers to them as such) and discuss how your understanding of those terms helped you as you read and interpret the text. For example, place a historical campaign or war you read about in context by using the concepts of continuity and contingency as Gaddis described them. Big Ideas Contingencies (Pg. 30) Phenomena that do not form patterns. Individual actions/choice (ex. Lee Harvey Oswald). May have sensitivity to initial conditions (chaos theory). Intersection of two or more continuities (new combination = unpredictability). They don’t fall within the realm of repeated and therefore familiar experience: we generally learn about them only after they’ve happened (Black Swan). Continuities (Pg. 30) Patterns that extend across time. Not laws or theories. Continuities are phenomena that recur with sufficient regularity to make themselves apparent. They help generalize about human experience (ex. empires expand until overreach, birth rates decline as society becomes more wealthy, democracies don’t fight each other). We can expect long lasting trends to continue (or not change quickly). Supporting Ideas (Pg. 22) Historians have the capacity for selectivity (choice of what is important), simultaneity (describe multiple things happening at the same time), and the shifting of scale (zoom in and out on the level of analysis, ex. Coastline of Britain[Pg. 27] or fractals [Pg. 81]). Links to Other Works Kuhn(The Structure of Scientific Revolutions) Rough comparison of continuity to Paradigm/normal science and contingency to anomaly/paradigm shift. Linn(The Echo of Battle) Example of continuity is the resiliency of three martial traditions: Guardians, Heroes, and Managers. However, what tradition is ascendant at any given time is a contingency, as is the character and choices of influential individuals. Examples AQI/Suni Awakening Continuity(historical pattern) Radical ideologies, like empires, expand until they overreach and then subside or moderate ex. Communism. The contingency was the individual decisions of Sunni Sheiks in Anbar to turn against AQI. 1973 Arab-Israeli WarThe macro continuity is that successful militaries tend toward complacency/overreach. The specific continuity was that Israeli had an intelligence/air power dominance that they expected to extend into the future. The contingency was the Arab’s ability to adapt and deceive. Implications Scaling Sometimes zooming out and taking a macro perspective makes patterns more discernible. Zooming in (micro) tends to highlight contingencies. The challenge for planners is to identify the macro/patterns and identify/manipulate the micro/contingencies within that context. TimeIn the future contingencies/continuity coexist. The present solidifies those relationships and they become fixed in the past. This has implications for understanding current environment/problem frame, the desired system, and how to get there. Prediction Continuities provide general story/narrative arcs. They do not provide specific predictions for individual actors, only the possibility to think through indicators of change. Contingencies cannot be predicted based on past trends (Black Swan). Planning Have to be sensitive to continuity – especially in understanding the environment and constructing a narrative logic. The existing patterns form a basis for planning/action. However, careful attention to assumptions will define the requirement for branch planning to deal with contingencies.
6. Question 3. Choose one of the applicatory readings from TOA (Mintzberg, Brinton, Kalyvas, or Herbst), and argue whether the author developed a theory or not, and regardless, how the reading illustrated the utility of theory to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem or develop a strategy or plan to deal with it. Reynolds says that theories have three desirable characteristics: abstractness, inter-subjective (shared agreement with a body of experts), and empirical relevance (predictive or explanation). They are general, timeless, applicable across time and space. The 3 P’s to theories: Powerful, parsimonious (short), and Predictive. Based on Reynolds’s definition, does the selected author’s work constitute a theory? May also be useful to define theory in terms of Kuhn. One approach is to discuss to pros and cons of using Reynolds’s definition of theory in social science. He clearly wrote his book for the hard sciences where theories predict future phenomena. Social science theories tend to be more descriptive and less predictive. See the three blocks for summarizations of Kalyvas, Herbst, and Brinton. See following slides.
7. Q 3: Choose one of the applicatory readings from TOA and argue whether the author developed a theory or not, and regardless, how the reading illustrated the utility of theory to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem or develop a strategy or plan to deal with it. Kalyvas – The Logic of Violence in Civil War Civil war: armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the onset of the hostilities Violence: deliberate infliction of harm on people (he specifically focuses on non-combatants during civil war) He rejects the extant literature on the subject b/c it suffers from a # of pathologies: Madness and “bloodless convention”: violence is seen as irrational or the outcome of narrowly instrumental goals Partisan bias: taking sides (revolutionary romanticism, intellectual distance, etc) Political bias: conflation of civil wars with regular politics Urban bias: studies often done by urban intellectuals and information is ‘costly’ (access to countryside is hard if not impossible); privileges top-down perspectives over bottom-up perspectives, assumes unchanging identities, choices, etc. Selection bias: data distorted during collection/interpretation, overaggregation and acontextualization (info concerning the 5W’s of the violence is usually missing) Theory: Irregular war fundamentally alters the nature of sovereignty through the breakdown of the state’s monopoly of violence by way of territorially based armed challenge. The simplest way to conceptualize the division of sovereignty in civil war is to distinguish between zones of incumbent control, zones of insurgent control, and zones in which control is contested. This places a premium on the effective use of violence as a key instrument for establishing and maintaining control – and thus for generating collaboration and deterring defection; in turn, effective violence requires discrimination. Control spawns collaboration - the higher the level of control by a political actor in an area, the higher the level of civilian collaboration w/this political actor. However, the absence of alternatives often produces collaboration irrespective of the level of popular satisfaction or lack thereof, which may be then wrongly interpreted as a reflection of legitimacy” (p. 93). MIL resources generally trump the pop’s prewar political and social preferences in spawning control Indiscriminate violence is, first, “a way to come to grips with the identification problem”—that is, the problem of determining allegiances in the civil war environment—and thus is likely to occur “where and when resources and information are low” (p. 147); and, second, a means of “shap[ing] civilian behavior indirectly through association” (p. 150). Thus, indiscriminate violence is not likely to occur where actors possess great levels of information and/or control, and Kalyvas hypothesizes that the negative repercussions of such violence will lead actors to move away from it as the conflict progresses. Zones of control: Kalyvas divides areas undergoing civil war into five zones of control: (1) total incumbent control, (2) dominant incumbent control, (3) contested control, (4) dominant insurgent control, and (5) total insurgent control. Given the linkage between control and violence, his theory predicts violence perpetrated by the group in power to be unlikely in zones 1 and 5, respectively. Actors are more likely to employ indiscriminate violence against zones of enemy control (zones 1 and 2 for insurgents and zones 4 and 5 for incumbents). In areas of fragmented control, selective violence is employed primarily by the dominant political actor: incumbents in zone 2 and insurgents in zone 4. Finally, this theory surprisingly predicts that the balance of control between insurgents and incumbents in zone 3 areas is likely to produce no selective violence by either side, which “suggests a complete contrast between symmetric and asymmetric war when it comes to violence. In the ideal type of conventional war, all violence takes place on the front line; in the ideal type of irregular war, the functional equivalent of the front line turns out to be peaceful for civilians” (p. 204). Abstract: yes; Inter-subjective: draws on historical and social science research; Empirical relevance: analyses conflict from Thucydides to OIF Utility to the practitioner: MIL resources spawn control but requirements for the establishment and preservation of control over an entire territory (country) are staggering Force of arms alone will not prevail – incumbents need to persuade hostile pop to their side by offering political liberalization, econ development, and civic action Indiscriminate violence occurs in zones where the other side (incumbent or insurgent) has control; does not occur in zones of contested control Inferring preferences from observed behavior is exceedingly difficult b/c preferences are open to manipulation and falsification, actual behavior (passive or supporting behavior) is difficult to observe in civil war environments. Launching an insurgency and eventually winning only requires “the commitment of a significant part of the pop” – burden greater on the incumbent Commitment (to one side or the other) may result from varying combinations of persuasion and coercion
8. Q 3: Choose one of the applicatory readings from TOA and argue whether the author developed a theory or not, and regardless, how the reading illustrated the utility of theory to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem or develop a strategy or plan to deal with it. Herbst – States and Power in Africa Thesis (not theory): The fundamental problem facing state builders in Africa - be they pre-colonial kings, colonial governors, or presidents in the independent era – has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people. (page 11) Pre-Colonial Era Cost calculations directed leaders to formally control only a political core that might be a small percentage of the territory over which they had at least some claim because the cost of extending formal authority in Africa was very high. This cost structure came about for several reasons: Control of territory was often not contested because it was often easier to escape from rulers than to fight them Warfare tended to concentrate on seizing booty as it was hard to hold onto territory Central governments were not concerned about what outlying areas did as long as tribute was paid and no security threats emerged to challenge the center Pre-colonial African states therefore had precisely the opposite physiology of many in Europe. Power assets were concentrated in the center, as opposed to the European model which placed assets in the hinterland to protect against outsiders and invasion. Colonial Era The colonial powers had little ambition to rule the hinterlands of Africa; therefore, they did not extend and establish the infrastructure and administrative systems needed to modernize the more rural portions of the continent. Given the European failure to extend power and infrastructure, such as roads, it is hardly a surprise that migration, the traditional African response to political distress, continued throughout the colonial period. Africans subverted the state for many years by simply leaving. European colonialism in Africa could be arrayed across a vast spectrum from the Portuguese with the most direct system of rule to the famous system of indirect rule used by the British. Boundaries were, in many ways, the most consequential part of the colonial state. The establishment of the territorial grid respected by other powers allowed European rulers to be free of competition from other Imperial states and enabled them to establish internal administrative structures and pace that was convenient, given the resources they were willing to deploy. Post-Independence Due to the demography, ethnography, and topography of Africa, African leaders decided to retain their colonial boundaries. The new leaders had no interest in organizing boundaries around actual territorial control, and they were also unwilling to resort to war as a way of redrawing the boundaries. War causes states to become more efficient in revenue collection by forcing leaders to dramatically improve their administrative capabilities. Because African governments chose not to settle disputes through war, they have failed to create the bureaucracy necessary to generate an effective tax base (particularly in the hinterlands). Politics between countries is well ordered while domestic politics does not evidence many signs of stability Abstract: yes; Inter-subjective: draws on historical and social science research; Empirical relevance: surveys hundreds of years of history It’s your call whether he is a theorist or not. I’d submit that he is a historian and his research used process tracing to explain the origin/evolution of the African response to power projection over harsh geography during 3 x distinct periods in African history. Utility to the practitioner: The European experience does not provide a template for state making in other regions of the world. Many other regions of the world share the African experience of having significant outlying territories that are difficult for the state to control because of relatively low population densities and difficult physical geographies Because African governments do not tax their people, they have felt no need to make concessions to their populations. Therefore, foreign aid and natural resources are essentially a windfall for those in power creating massive corruption Migration is a historical norm in the region, particularly during conflict, famine, etc. The central difficulty of nation-building in much of Africa results from the lack of any shared historical mythology and memory on which state elites can set about building the nation– no concept of a national identity.
9. Q 3: Choose one of the applicatory readings from TOA and argue whether the author developed a theory or not, and regardless, how the reading illustrated the utility of theory to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem or develop a strategy or plan to deal with it. Title: The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning by Henry Mintzberg Thesis: There are ways to couple the skills and inclinations of the planners with the authority and flexibility of managers to assure strategy making is informed, integrative, and responsive to environmental change . Additionally Strategy and Planning are different and Strategy and Strategy formation are different. Planning: (a process) a formalized procedure to produce articulated results in the form of an integrated system of decisions. Rest on analysis-provides data for strategy formation. Planning operationalizes strategy Strategy formation: an output of an ongoing dialogue between managers, leaders and operators with many feedback looks seeking to capitalize on rapid adaptation to changing environment. Requires synthesis Strategy-(a function) an art-a plan, pattern, position or perspective regarding intentions. Four types: Intended/Deliberate-plans for the future Unrealized-concepts developed but not realized Emergent-a realized strategy that was not indentified ahead of time Umbrella (realized)-a combination of intended and emergent strategy Mintzberg recommends the use of both Performance Control and Action Planning methods to address all elements of both planning and strategy Performance Control (Detailed-inductive-reality)-Budget and Objectives Top Down development/Constraints Focus is control not strategy development Action Planning (Conceptual-deductive-best case)-Strategy and Programs Often Ad hoc/May be bottom up Focus is decision making and action/generates LOO/LOEs Combined these elements bridges the great divide of planning (reflect integrated planning)-reflects umbrella strategy-represents analysis and synthesis but takes a concerted effort-Military only true agency capable of integrated planning Is this a Theory: No Abstract: No-focuses on “current” issues with planning/strategy, really only presents a list of issues and a list of possible remedies-no theory presented; Inter-subjective: Yes (weak)-defines terms but there are still many other acceptable definitions in use; Empirical relevance: No-only presents a list of issues and solutions-does not provide case studies or anything more then observations. As a Planner-Mintzberg discusses the challenges in bridging the great divide-provides proposals for fostering performance control and action planning methods-or design and MDMP- Watch out for people who are wedded to the plan or only see the plan as a closed system-must have the ability to adept/plan needs to support reality Synthesis comes when analysis interacts with reality Don’t fall in love with the plan-you could miss emergent factors
10. Q 3: Choose one of the applicatory readings from TOA and argue whether the author developed a theory or not, and regardless, how the reading illustrated the utility of theory to the practitioner seeking to understand a particular problem or develop a strategy or plan to deal with it. Title:Pure Strategy by Everett Carl Dolman Thesis: Meaningful exploration of the tenets of war and strategy requires more than rigorous mathematical analysis and complete rationality of purpose. It requires revelation, insight, steadfast commitment, and faith, for strategy is not a pure science. Strategy: It is an idea, a product of the imagination. It is about the future, and above all it is about change. It is anticipation of the probable and preparation for the possible. It is alchemy; a method of transmutation from idea into action. Strategy formation: Strategy is not about winning. The pure strategist understands that war is but one aspect of social and political competition, an ongoing interaction that has no finality. Strategic Thinking- concern with aggregate interactions and conditions. Tactical Thinking-concerned with individual action and decisions. Grand Strategy (pg 26)-process by which all the means available to the state are considered in pusuit of a continuing political influence. Military Strategy-formulates a coordinated war plan, developing policy and instructions that conform to the overall and specific political directives. Operations-command the medium in which his or her fores are to operate. When command is not achievable, then endeavor to contest the medium, so as not to give unencumbered use of it to the enemy. Is this a Theory: No Abstract: (Yes) While use of the term strategy and his demonstration of how it functions and influences military operations are in deep abstract, they are neither novel or explanatory. Inter-subjective: (Yes) There is strong inter-subjectivity in this book, though he focuses on land and air. By illustrating the relationship between strategy, tactics, and operations, Dolman articulated the differences in thinking which can be applied to any organizations .Empirical relevance: (No) Outside of quotes form other scholars and authors, Dolman used very little empirical data to support his thesis. In his defense, he never set out to develop a theory on war or strategy, but to answer two questions: Can there be an operational theory of war? If so, what is the utility of culling from a broader theory of war a unique and meaningful operational one? He wanted to show that the principles of strategy and war are remarkably robust in the coming ages or space and information as well as the new sciences of chaos and complexity are used to drive home the notion that strategy is about change and adaptation. Usefulness to a Planner-Dolman describes in detail the various ways of thinking at various levels. This allows the planner to understand the purview and priorities at their respective level. In other words, when to widen or focus the lens through which they plan.
11. 4. (TOA) Critically evaluate whether current Army and Joint doctrine rest on a foundation of systems theory, and more specifically Network Centric Warfare theory. Define terms with precision and support your assertions with evidence from both doctrinal and non-doctrinal material presented in the various courses you took during AMSP, to include your participation in the Exercise program. (Senge, 69-73) Systems thinking - a discipline for seeing the "structures" that underlie complex situations, with its greatest use in dynamically complex situations - Key to the system is not the loop v. the linear, but the inputs/delays that occur during the system's cycle. Systems thinking is holistic and about seeing relationships rather than cause and effect chains. It is looking at processes not snapshots. (Bousquet, 140-144) Systems analysis falls under the "cybernetic" warfare, with computers featuring prominently. With more machines involved in the war, there is a greater predictability to actions, thus making creating a system with fewer points for unexpected input/delay. The concept of self-regulation with feedback in an open system first appeared in the 1940s and looked for patterns within systems. Understand the patterns = understand the system. (Osinga, 70) The word "system" was coined to denote both living organisms and social systems and from that moment on a system had come to mean an integrated whole whose essential properties arise from the relationships between its parts, and systems thinking, the understanding of a phenomenon within the context of a larger view. (Boyd) emphasized both the need for analysis (breaking down the system to its parts) and synthesis (identifying how the parts worked together) because neither alone will give a complete perspective on the system. (Gharajedaghi) points to four attributes to systems thinking: holistic thinking, chaos and non-linear feedback, self-organization, and iteration and interactive design (learning). Although holistic, systems thinking is not always better since the trap of understanding the system is dangerous. U.S. military doctrine uses two opposed but complementary types of thinking: reductionist and systems thinking. Reductionist thinking breaks down concepts into component parts to better understanding them. Reductionist thinking simplifies complex problems with a finite and logical structure. It is extremely useful to understand simple or clearly defined problems, but is limited in application because of its reliance upon cause and effect relationships. Army: ADP 3-0 and FM 5-0 use reductionist and systems thinking. Multiple lists of foundations, tenets, functions, processes, and principles illustrate reductionist thinking within the doctrine. ADP 3-0’s foundations and tenets, operations structure, and warfighting functions break ULO into component parts for better understanding. The central idea of ULO is linear: gain the initiative to maintain a position of advantage in order to create conditions for conflict resolution. The strategic context in ADP 3-0 and the nature of operation in FM 5-0 uses a systems approach as army operations contribute to a greater JIIM actions. Doctrine acknowledges the evolving nature of the operational environment and threat, but the approach to understanding uses fixed categories such as PMESII-PT and METT-TC. However, the operations process (plan, prepare, execute) and commanders activities (UVDDLA) are decidedly a non-linear system, which incorporates feedback and adjusts outputs even though the process used to produce the outputs (plans and orders) can be reductionist/linear (MDMP) or systematic (ADM). Joint: JP 3-0 and JP 5-0 describe the environment as complex and uncertain creating a backdrop of systems thinking but provide a series of reductionist templates to plan and execute operations. The joint manuals derive plans and orders from national strategies and orders using Operational Design and JOPP. This process is linear and assumes cause and effect (FDO’s for example). The recent change to joint doctrine reduced the discussion of assessment and maintained the principles of war and joint functions to construct plans, a decidedly reductionist approach. Only within JIPOE does systematic thinking truly occur but even here it is tempered with linear thought.
12. 5. Compare and Contrast Jomini and Clausewitz. Consider their backgrounds, intellectual and cultural influences on their theoretical efforts, the similarities and differences in purpose and content of their published work, and their relevance to present-day military doctrine and theory. Then offer a more general description of your method of looking for a theory in an academic work or in doctrine or journal articles, and how that method helps you assess whether an underlying theory serves as a foundation for the ideas you are reading, and how this helps you assess the usefulness and relevance of the work. CARL-theory-framework to study war and its complexity/nonlinearity Theory of war: Absolute v Real War the act of force to compel the enemy to do your will Battle is the means Paradoxical Trinity: Violence, Hatred, Enmity Chance/Probability/Fog-Friction Emphasis on Policy and Strategy Govt, Military, people Military Genius/Coup d’oeil Reflective/descriptive Utilized History appropriately-understood context-identified change/continuity Nature v character of war Systems approach-nonlinear-war is complex German/Prussian influence Scharnhorst (Aufklares-military ed/professionalism)/Romanticism/Kant/Hegel-dialetic reasoning Son of Prussian Officer-wrote to support Prussian political and military Reform Significant military training/education Abstract Concentrate military force against COG Strategic Perspective Human Dimension Defense/Battle centric Objective Knowledge/proves theory through Scientific Knowledge War is art and science Jomini-guidebook of doctrine-sought to simplify war Strategy-art of making war on a map Strategy=maneuver Tactics=fighting Immutable principles/Reductionist Apply military power against mass of the enemy, maneuver to encounter, mass at decisive point-at the proper time and with the proper force Enlightenment Born into a middle class Swiss family/French Enlightenment Wrote during and after the Napoleonic Wars Influenced by Bulow’s work Prescriptive/Explanatory Agrees with the impact of friction and the Genius of the CDR Did not believe battle was the only way to decide war More Science/More Tactical Formulaic/Linear-checklists-procedural Failed to recognize adaptability of enemy Simplicity=more popular by professionals initially Utilized History to his advantage Offense/Interior Lines Scientific Knowledge-founder of military science Lines of operations/Decisive Point Read each other’s works Involved/Influenced by Napoleonic Wars Different Intent: Sell Books v Develop Theory Interest in Frederick the Great’s campaigns War or military conflict=perpetual behavior by societies Reynolds: Abstract, Intersubjective, Empirical Relevance=CARL yes a theory/Jomini not a theory SAMS/Powell Doctrine/MSN CMD-ClauswitzianDOTMLPF/Doctrine/Reductionist ideals(predictability/certainty)-Jominian(OP ART Straddle both)

13. Question 6:

    Explain the main stages in the development of operational art from the 18th to the 21st century. Identify the major theories, doctrines, technological advances, and other contributors to this evolution.
14. #6 18th Century 19th Century 20th Century Mechanical Era Thermo Era Chaopletic Era Cybernetics Era Themes Romanticism Limited Objectives Conscripts/Mercenaries Fighting Season Lack of operational reach Political and Military leader the same Fortress fighting Direct fire short range fires capability Franco-Prussia (Prussia Wins – Frederick the Great) American Revolution Theorist Thucydides – Fear, Honor, Interest Fredrick the Great Theory of Warfare Single decisive battle decides the outcome of war Themes Industrial revolution continues (full bore) Air power, mechanization Trench warfare Maneuver Warfare Commanders begin to have staffs (Prussian Command and General Staff College=Professionalization) Interwar Period German Focus blitzkrieg Soviet Focus Deep Battle American Focus Deployment and Sustainment (Early 1900’s) AirLand battle Combined Arms Maneuver Total War to Limited War Atomic and Nuclear developments Proxy Wars (Cold War Era) Campaigns WWI/II Korea Vietnam Arab/Israeli War Desert Storm OIF/OEF Theorist Naveh – difference in Soviet and American Op Art (Soviet Emphasized Maneuver; US emphasized Firepower, true op art however needs both) Boyd Dolman – Position of Advantage Theory “American Way of War” technological advantage will win the day Theory of Warfare Still seek decisive battle but the advent of campaigning is changing that theory. Themes Enlightenment Beginnings of Industrial Revolution Uncle Carl and Jomini cut their teeth Napoleonic warfare interior lines of communication become important General staff focused on sustainment massing of artillery assets Corps/DIV organizations distributed movement but still decisive battle Campaigning Campaigns Scott and Mexico Grant overland Campaign Franco-Prussia (Nap vs Moltke/Bismarck) Theorist Clause and Jom Mahan and Corbett (Sea Power) Douhet and Mitchell (Air Power) Theory of Warfare Still seek decisive battle but the advent of campaigning is changing that theory. Key: Bousquet, Antoine, The Scientific Way of Warfare TOA 13 and 14
15. Question 7 Simultaneity and Depth: (IDF, 1973) Simultaneity refers to the “concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.” (JP 5-0) The concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the enemy throughout the area of operations, creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy commanders and resources and contributing to the enemy’s defeat.” The Egyptians and Syrians had seized the initiative at the outset of hostilities on 6 Oct 73. The IDF were then able to repel, counterattack, and seize the initiative against the Syrians on the Golan front, thus forcing Assad to plea to Sadat for help. Sadat ordered a Sinai offensive that the Israelis were able to defend, counterattack, and seize the initiative against the Egyptians too. (Gawrych, 1973 Arab-Israeli War, pp. 55-56) Tempo: (IDF, 1973) Tempo and proper timing allow the friendly commander to “dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and inhibit the enemy.” The Israeli air force diverted north from the Sinai to meet the crisis on the Golan front where Israeli armor was outnumbered six to one. It halted the Syrian advance and allowed the IDF to reinforce with a second division on 7 Oct and a third division on 8 Oct. The IDF also reinforced the Sinai with armor, TOW missiles, and air force to repel the 13 Oct Egyptian offensive. (Citino, 176-179) Center of Gravity: Desert Storm) “A COG can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act.” (JP 5-0) The Iraqi COG was adjudged to be the Republican Guard, three heavy and five motorized divisions equipped to be the highest Iraqi standards. (Brown, “Maturation of Op Art, ” p. 462)
16. Question 8 1-9. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of full spectrum operations. It is commander-led and blends the art of command and the science of control to integrate the warfighting functions to accomplish the mission. 2-6. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess throughout operations. The focus of their efforts varies during different operations process activities. (See figure 2-2 on page 2-3.) For example, during planning commanders focus more on understanding, visualizing, and describing while directing, leading, and assessing. During execution, commanders often focus more on directing, leading, and assessing while improving their understanding and modifying their visualization. Example Westmoreland vs. Abrams Westmoreland failed to understand his enemy, visualize the operational environment and operational concept, and did not create effective measure of success due to those shortcomings (IE Body count-attrition approach) Abrams was better able to describe his understanding of the operational environment and utilize better measure of effectiveness to direct tactical actions on the ground that were linked to the strategic end state.
17. Question 9: Challenges and differences in Command at the operational and tactical levels Challenges Tactical: Winning current fight Constrained Time-line Troop to task tension Resource Constraint Operational: Operating within the strategic flux of information, objectives, and changing time lines. Anticipate 2nd and 3rd order effects from tactical actions and managing their risks Vast and ambiguous implied task Developing campaign plans Managing Risk
18. Question 9: Challenges and differences in Command at the operational and tactical levels Differences: levels of war have no finite limits or boundaries. These levels are characterized by the different responsibilities and actions performed at each echelon of military headquarters. The headquarters at each level of war have different perspectives, requirements, and constraints associated with them and different horizons for planning, preparation, and execution. vs. Tactical thinking is concerned with individual actions and decisions. (Dolman pg 5)Tactical commanders focus primarily on employing combined arms within an area of operations. Tactical planning takes into account the numerous boundaries that restrict action. From the tactical perspective, war is bounded by real and artificial restrictions of time and space.
19. 13. (EOA) Discuss the cognitive tension between strategy, operations, and tactics. Provide at least one example from the course. Tension (Merriam-Webster) 3 a : inner striving, unrest, or imbalance often with physiological indication of emotion b : a state of latent hostility or opposition between individuals or groups c : a balance maintained in an artistic work between opposing forces or elements Thus, "Cognitive Tension" is the creative opposition between ideas, concepts or beliefs. Naveh Dolman, Pure Strategy The art and science of employing the elements of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national and/or multinational goals. (FM 1-92) Generation Decision ParadigmShifting For the goal of strategy is not to culminate events, to establish finality in the discourse between states, but to influence states' discourse in such a way that it will go forward on favorable terms. (6) Strategy The use of the engagement for the purposes of the war. (Clausewitz) "Operational Art" is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space and purpose. (ADP 3.0) Tactics has its place, on the field of competition or battle space, and there it is supreme. Strategy, too, has realm of its own, at the point where military force and policy converge. Here the strategist must link the logic of tactics and war with the intent of policy. That link will be identified later as operational art. (14) Synthesis Inquiry Framing Operations "Operational Art" organizes the separate tactical activities into the operation proceeding from the criterion of the operation as a whole. (Svechin) Architect of Soviet Victory, Harrison, p34 The employment of units in combat... The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy in order to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. (FM 1-02) Analysis Action Adaptation To the tactical and operational planner, wars are indeed won or lost, and the difference is clear. Success is measurable; failure is obvious. (5) Tactics Tactics teaches the use of the armed forces in the engagement. (Clausewitz)
20. 14. Moltke has stated that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. Agree or disagree and provide examples Agree-however, impact can be mitigated if the plan is flexible, the intent is clear, and assessment methods/criteria, branches and sequels are components of the initial overall plan. Planning v Predicting War requires interaction of two human components-each with their own will/context/perspective Plans must be flexible and adaptive-enemy is adaptive, plan is a reductionist concept Plans cannot cover every contingency; if done correctly-planning mitigates risk through identification, reflect ion on OE, understanding of self, enemy and problem CARL-enemy gets a vote/fog and friction/Chance and probability Boyd-OODA Loop-assessment and reframing Doctrine-Mission Command-mission and intent and endstate Planning is iterative Pitfalls in planning: forecasting, planning in too much detail, prescriptive Integration of red team Planning based on incomplete knowledge and assumptions War is a system Examples-1973 Arab Israeli War, Vietnam, Napoleon’s approach, Eastern Front, Maginot Line, duration/intensity of WWI
21. OPART Strachan (– OPART in 80s was strat in 1914; clouds the issue because it implies that OPART can take the place of strategy since wars are single campaigns ADP 3-0 (p.9) – Pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose FM 3-0 c1 (p.7-2) places OPART between tactics and strategy and links them via OPARTs arrangement of campaigns and major operations containing multiple arranged tactical actions to the strategic ends; OPART is specifically described as employing tactical actions to achieve the strategic end state; the campaigns and operations are designed to establish the conditions that define the end state (p.7-3) Linkage Strategy, as determined by the NCA (for national level) and COCOM (theater level) drives what the operational planner/artist plans for; they look to arrange tactical actions in time, space, and purpose to achieve strategic ends ICW whatever other instruments of national power are available or being used in the planner’s AO Factors to be considered can be derived from Gray (1st seven), classroom discussion (last 2, included as necessary), and others the planner or commander deem relevant for the AO in question: Political Socio-cultural Economic Technological Military-Strategic Geographical Historical Theory (economic and IR) Religion (although part of socio-cultural, may warrant separate consideration Ideological Enemy/Threat Individuals Strategy Liddell Hart (Strategy) – mil strat is close to Moltke “adaptation of means..to attain objective in view” (334); BHL close to Moltke and agrees w/ JFC Fuller in describing strat as art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill policy (335); “dislocation is aim of strategy” (339) = ADP 3-0’s position of relative advantage Gray (War, Peace, and Intl Relations) – Thucydides’ “Fear, honor, and interest” as causes for war still valid (2); seven ideas to examine when looking at strat context: Political; Socio-cultural; Economic; Technological; Military-Strategic; Geographical; Historical (9-12) Yergin/Stanislaw (Commanding Heights) – Keynesian (control of markets 37-38) vs. Hayek (free market 124-25) are important to consider when planning Strachan (Lost Art of Strategy, 35-36) – Jomini “art of making war upon a map”;
22. 15. (SCOA) What is the relationship between strategy & operational art? What factors should be considered in examining the strategic context for operational art? Operational Art: the pursuit of strategic objectives (in whole or in part) through arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, & purpose [ADP 3-0] How CDRs balance risk & opportunity to maintain relative advantage while linking tactical actions to reach a strategic objective Requires understanding the OE, strategic objectives & force capabilities. Military-Strategic / Military Political Grand Strategy (Nat’l Objective – Liddell Hart) Economic Socio-Cultural / Social Technological / Information - Infrastructure Geographic / Physical Environment Historical / Time Strategic Context Factors (Gray) / PMESII-PT (ADP 3-0) ENDS: Policy articulated thru DIME MEANS: DIME-Specific Strategy (e.g., “Military Strategy” or Liddell Hart’s military aim: way forces directed to meet / achieve political purpose) Political: What politics do leaders profess? (Drezner) -- what artifacts / values / assumptions exist (Schein via Hatch) Political / Military-Strategic: Intended/deliberate/ realized/emergent strategy (Mintzberg) Historical: Nation’s Foreign Policy Traditions (McDougall: Old/New Testament) Economic: Who controls the Commanding Heights? (Yergin & Stanislaw) Socio-Cultural: Discourse & Reality of War (or anything else) (Lynn) WAYS: Prioritized Resources that weight the DIME
23. Q 16 (SCOA). What is deterrence? What is the military’s role in deterrence? [primarily from lesson SCOA 6 Foreign Policy Traditions II ,& SCOA 7 Cold War Plans.] References: FM 1-02; Lawrence Freedman’s Deterrence(2004); Bernard Brodie’s “Anatomy of Deterrence”(1959); Colin Gray’s War, Peace and International Relations (2007); Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle(2006); Henry Hendrix’s Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy(2004) (from SCOA 3); FM 1-02: Deterrence is the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (Freedman 26-27) 2 COMPETING STRATEGIES: 1.Pre-Emption 2.Prevention 2 Methods of Deterrence: Historical Examples of each: Gray 218. Strategic Deterrence--The Cold War served as the environmental frame for America’s nuclear strategy where the US searched for the most effective deterrence against the Soviets by using nuclear threats. Placing NATO troops in Germany served as a deterrence. Gulf War Op DESERT SHIELD—deter Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia. Hendrix 168-9. Roosevelt’s naval diplomacy, using the Great White Fleet, (naval power--greatest guarantor of peace) provides an example of internalized deterrence; (from class notes and p 169)—potentially deterred Japan for about 20 years from continuing expansion and seizing Philippines sooner . Military’s Role:(from notes) Maintain training and posture for expeditionary operations; maintain ability to make good on the threat of force. Maintain presence globally. See JP 5-0: Military role to deter and compel adversaries; III-39 to 43 (PHASE 1, Deter), and Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) (appx E) Other Synthesis: Clausewitz says war is an act to compel enemy to do our will (75). Bonus Material to think/talk about --With regard to Nuclear Policy, Strategy, in context of Cold War: Freedman 11. In dealing with the Soviet Communist threat, DOCTRINE of CONTAINMENT was implemented in the late 1940s under the assumption that the Communist model would expand into Europe. So, the only way to keep it from expanding was to threaten the use of force. DETERRENCE is the METHOD used in containment (also referenced by Brodie p173) Gray 213, The US threatened to use nuclear forces, and its sole function was to deter. Thus in the case of nuclear strategy, military officials could not responsibly settle for a strategic context that guaranteed mutual suicide, with regard to the deterrent concept that backed up the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) policy. Further, this policy was not true strategy because it would not provide any position of advantage, and the military needed to develop alternative measures to achieve strategic advantage. (nuclear strategy is probably a contradiction in terms). Gray 217. It wasn’t until the 1960s that both the US and Soviets concluded that nuclear weapons could not be used to threaten for the purpose of gain, but strictly for defense, which reveals, militarily, why doctrine moved to “active defense”-1970s, (then to airland battle--80s )(Krause, Historical Perspectives of Op Art, pgs 13-15) Freedman: Both of these controlling strategies are more relevant than deterrence for contemporary environment (can rarely deter non-state actors) 2. Controlling 1. Coercive Have a capable & credible force Historical Example of Coercive Strategies: - 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. warned the Soviets to stop constructing missile sites in Cuba (compellence) and NOT to pass ships carrying more missiles through the American blockade (deterrence). The Soviets warned of consequences if the threats were implemented. Thus, it was a process of coercion and counter-coercion with deterrence and compellenceused on both sides. (Freedman, p. 110) Compellence (Do this or else I’ll use force against you Deterrence (Do NOT do this or else I’ll use force against you if you do. Strategic Deterrence—taking steps to persuade opponent that a particular act against my interests would be unwise and unwelcome. --set boundaries for actions and determine associated risks. 2. Internalized Deterrence—actions that are not being deliberately applied as a strategy.
24. #17 Walter McDougal Promised Land, Crusader State Page 2-3 The Good – Despite occasional funks and lapses, US has struggled to acquit itself abroad in a more high minded fashion than the imperial monarchies of the 19th century or the dictatorship of the 20th The Bad – Sense of exploiting our military dominance to plunder or bully other nations The Ugly – History of foreign policy ought not to be discussed in moral terms at all, because every responsible government conducts its affair according to balance of power and coup d'état McDougall's compelling thesis is that there is a fundamental dichotomy in US Foreign Policy, with two competing doctrines each influenced by four different themes. There is the Promised Land (or Old Testament) impulse, which is based on four key traditions:  Exceptionalism (Focus on liberties at home): (p. 18) “special” because of geography and so called religious freedom (Americans were a chosen people delivered from bondage to a Promised Land, and you can’t get more exceptional than that) Unilateralism (as opposed to isolationism): (p. 40) self-evident course for the US was to avoid permanent, entangling alliances and to remain neutral in Europe's wars except when our liberty – the first hallowed tradition – was at risk. The American System (Monroe Doctrine): (p. 39) not enough to steer clear of European wars and ambitions but US must also make sure that European powers did come over to the “Western Hemisphere” Expansionism (Manifest Destiny): (p. 77) US was to remain free and independent the first tradition then it must pursue a unilateral foreign policy expansionism was the logical corollary of the first three US Foreign policy traditions. This was the prevailing approach to foreign policy—designed to protect America's liberty and independence from the outside world—until 1898 and the Spanish American War, at which point a New Testament (Crusader State) gained ascendancy, likewise guided by four traditions: Progressive Imperialism: (p. 103) necessary to retain the US defensive posture (western hemisphere) and establish global reach (navy refueling stations) to project power around the world. Liberal Internationalism (Wilsonianism): (p. 132) four main ideas: (1) no more territorial gains achieved by conquest; (2) equality of rights for small nations; (3) government control of arms manufacture; (4) association of nations wherein all shall guarantee the territorial integrity of each. Containment: (p. 157) effort to contain the communist ideology (in this case Soviet Union specifically) from spreading threatening the American system Global Meliorism (reforming other nation’s internal problems): (p. 173) simply the socio-economic and politico-cultural expression of an American mission to make the world a better place. Conclusions: “The United States went off the rails, in terms of its honored traditions, when it went to war with Spain in the first place (118).” “Our first four foreign policy traditions—the Old Testament of American diplomacy—reflected that balance of reason and faith (203).” ANSWER: Based on McDougall’s Promised Land, Crusader State, one could argue that any strategic or operational planning must be able to support any of the eight foreign policy traditions that McDougall identifies. McDougall asserts that all eight of these traditions to some extent, exist in our current form of government and within the hearts of policy makers and may not change as America’s leadership changes. John Lewis Gaddis Surprise, Security, and the American Experience Main Idea: (p. 13) Historians James Chace and Caleb Carr persisted ever since DC was burned do3wn by Brits that the United States safety comes from enlarging rather than from contracting its sphere of responsibilities. (US does not circle the wagons like the Buffalo Bills, we expand the circle to ensure US security) Page 37: When confronted with unexpected dangers, we tend to expand rather than contract our sphere of responsibilities. Running and hiding has rarely been our habit. Only three great surprises in American History Burning of DC Exemplified in continental hegemony, ideological example, and commercial opportunity Pearl Harbor Expanded sphere of influence that amounted to informal empire on a global scale 9/11 Secure American liberty and security throughout the world by promoting democracy The key to American influence in the world has always been the hope for a better life that we still, more credibly than anyone else, have to offer
25. 18. Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy (Hendrix) contained several examples of where TR used military force to induce rivals and those we were in cooperation with to act IAW U.S. wishes Great White Fleet (p.160-62) made voyage around the world in 1908 stopping in several locations (AUS, NZ, Philippines, Japan, China, and informal stops in the Mediterranean, including providing HA following earthquake in Sicily); led to important agreements with Japan regarding Philippines and to formation of AUS-NZ-US partnership prior to WWII and following (Overwhelming force) Venezuela (p.25-53) in 1902-03 had potential for UK and GE landings because of debt issues; TR mobilized 54 ship fleet to Caribbean to conduct exercises with ADM Dewey as commander (from position as CNO IOT emphasize importance of mission to UK and GE); UK friendly with US, so decided not to interfere; GE took more persuasion including large scale LFX by US Navy and TR pressuring GE diplomats for Kaiser Wilhelm to believe US was serious in its invocation of the Monroe Doctrine to keep from further colonization of Americas; TR understood the effect a large naval force could have on European countries far from their bases of supply (Scalable response) Panama (p.54-81) in late 1903 was another example; US having difficulty with Colombia (who owned Panama at the time) or changing requirements for Isthmus Canal; US prepared to back Panamanian revolution to break away from Colombia by sending ships and Marines under USMC Commandant (ala Venezuela by using powerful figure in rarely used role to emphasize importance of mission to US); the naval/marine forces were to deter Colombia from invading Panama after their declaration of independence from Colombia. Threat was adequate to encourage Colombia to accept peace terms with Panama; TR planned invasion of Colombian port, if necessary, to force them to w/d from Panama; TR actually changed his mind several times about whether or not to put Marines ashore because of the diplomatic implications (Limits of Naval Power) Morocco (p.82-103) in 1904 had problems with an outlaw kidnapping American ex-pats; TR re-directed Battleship Squadron on summer cruise of Med to Morocco ITO influence Moroccan govt to acquiesce to outlaw’s demands; famous "Perdaciris alive or Raisulidead“ telegram left out that State Dept (ultimately TR) had to authorize force, indicating TR’s understanding of the limits of military power Scott’s invasion of Mexico in A Gallant Little Army (Johnson) – GEN Winfield Scott created plan that invaded Mexico to take Mexico City and force the Mexican govt to peace talks and treaty to allow US to express Manifest Destiny in taking NM, AZ, and CA to allow US to spread from Atlantic to Pacific; Scott used operational pauses to encourage Mexico’s cooperation and because he did not desire to destroy the entire Mexican military, but to leave them as a viable government continuing after the treaty was reached
26. Question 19: How Economic Theory can Influence Military Operations (SCOA) Colin S Gray - War, Peace and IR ( pg11) Strategic history an economic story. An economic context to record of war, peace and order. The economic context a potential show stopper. Defence preparation and actual warfare are exercises in economic choice. Fall of Germany and Soviet Union prove that an economic shortfall is fatal. Global Meliorism is the socio-economic and politico-cultural expression of an American mission of make the world a better place, a policy that directly influenced the conduct of military operations References : Commanding HeightsYergin & Stanislaw Promised Land McDougall
27. Economy: Capitalist (realism; Smith) or liberal (global trade) Anatol Rapoport’s non-Clausewitzian War Philosophies (editor and wrote the intro to the 1968 Penguin Classic “On War” There is a final war. Eschatological (final war) Philosophies of War Cataclysmic (world destruction) Philosophies of War Prevent all war. Divine Eschatological (religious final battle) Natural Eschatological (planet extinction; human extinction) Global Cataclysmic War Theory Human (messianic) Eschatological (people here now) Ethno-centric Cataclysmic War Theory Economy: Islamic (ideological) Economy: Capitalist Liberal Economy: Marxist Socialist Economy: Marxist Socialist Rapoport claims the Soviets switched to this during the Cold War- the chief difference is: War is NOT a tool. The outside world wants to destroy the unique ethnic identity of the select people. Protective measures such as the Berlin Wall are not for keeping people in, but keeping outsiders out. The world will end in a final show-down. Example: MAD in the Cold War fueled this logic; Soviets sought to preserve their state versus Capitalist westerners. Rapoport calls this a system-theoretical approach. The principles are: War is NOT a tool. ALL war is bad. Global government is the answer to ending conflict. International systems will aid in preventing global cataclysmic war. The nuclear age advanced this logic. Example: The United Nations pursues international systems and a form of weak global governance with the general position that all war is bad…NATO is not an example of this; NATO is an alliance under Clausewitzian logic. Religious movements that feature an “Armageddon plot” or the return of a savior with the destruction of all non-believers follow this logic. A final war will, God Willing, end human conflict; this is pre-determined (linear causality), and the chosen people will reign supreme. Example: Iran launching WMD at Israel to trigger emergence of 12th Imam. Extreme environmentalism movements; anti-human movements (by humans, oddly). Non-human events such as planet destruction, asteroid event, or disease epidemic that ends human (or all) life. Example: the dinosaurs did not wage “war” but their existence was terminated this way. Humans waging limited war while an asteroid hurtles towards us makes a similar example…. A group of people already on the planet that will bring about the final battle- the Nazis, early Soviet Party, and other extreme non-religious groups followed this logic. The Proletarian Revolution where workers of the world unit. American Manifest Destiny during the Great Plains Indian Wars has components of this logic also. Example: Soviet Party of the early 20th century followed this logic, according to Rapoport.
28. #20 Since the War of 1812, American foreign policy tradition centers on guaranteeing its security. America’s conduct of small wars was military action deemed necessary to ensure its security in the form of preemption and expansionism. In Surprise, Security, and the American Experience, John Gaddis asserts that unlike its Asian and Europe counterparts, America’s maintains a foreign policy based off the Monroe Doctrine that expands its hegemony outwards, not inwards, following a traumatic security experience from a foreign threat. The following are examples: Westward expansion/Frontier wars. This was un-colonized territory. From the U.S. perspective, if the U.S. didn’t seize control, then European colonial powers would first. As a result, the Indian wars occurred in the West. The Spanish-American War resulted in U.S. re-asserting its hegemony in the Western hemisphere against European powers, and also resulted in U.S. gaining control of previously held Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. U.S. counterinsurgency operations (another small war) in the Philippines that followed was the U.S. retaining control of its “sphere of security” since it now had control of those colonies and Hawaii as a U.S. territory. After World War I (Wilson), U.S. policy transitioned towards global Meliorism a.k.a. Wilsonianism. The U.S. experience in Vietnam was another small war where military force was deployed to buy time for the civil programs to build South Vietnam into a viable non-Communist state. Operation Iraqi and Enduring Freedom, Gaddis, argues, were small wars consistent with historical American policy traditions and it wouldn’t have mattered if it was Gore or Bush as President; after 9/11, the U.S. would have invaded Afghanistan and eventually Iraq as part of its tradition of expanding outward to guarantee its security. References: Surprise, Security, and the American Experience by John Gaddis Promised Land, Crusader State by Walter A. McDougall (Chapter 8) Alternative Examples: Henry Hendrix Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy: The US Navy and the Birth of the American Century Chapter 2: Overwhelming force and the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-1903 Chapter 3: Scalable Response in Defense of the Panamanian Revolution Chapter 4: Morocco and the Limits of Naval Power
29. Question 21: Use theory, history, and doctrine to explain the relationship between detail and conceptual planning Answer/Arguement: The relationship between conceptual and detailed planning is mutual: Conceptual planning without a detailed component results in a “daydream on acetate” and equally, a detailed plan without a conceptual component results in a “road to nowhere” because they are not tied to the overarching purpose. History: Operation overlord is an historical example of the mutual relationship between conceptual and detail planning. Over nine months, the staff conducted half a dozen distinct iterations of cyclic planning refinement, moving from a general concept to a specific planning directive, while simultaneously generating movement tables, detailed topographic and oceanographic surveys, and refined statements of operational requirements. The efforts of the staff transcended any previous definition of planning. In its final form, Operation Overlord was a military undertaking of a “magnitude undreamt of before,” eventually involving over 130,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines from seven different countries.
30. Question 21… Doctrine(FM 5-0 Ch 2): Conceptual planning is determining the operation’s end-state, establishing objectives, and sequencing the operation in broad terms through the understanding of the environment and the problem. It answers the question what to do and why. Detailed planning translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan—the specifics of execution, such as, scheduling, coordination, synchronizing and directing of the force. It answers the question how. Theory: Bar-yam: relationships to parts give rise to be like the behaviors of the system and how the system interacts and forms relationships with its environment (WEAK)
31. Q 22. Using theory, history, and doctrine explain the relationship between design and mission command. BLUF: Design is the underpinning of battle command, especially in the complex environment of modern operations. Personal Examples. The tie between design and MSN CMD is in the transition from conceptual planning to detailed planning. The Army Design Methodology (ADM) as described in doctrine supports battle command, which according to FM 3-0 is the “art and science of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing forces to impose the commander’s will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy. Battle command applies leadership to translate decisions into actions—by synchronizing forces and warfighting functions in time, space, and purpose—to accomplish missions.” (FM 3-0, 5-2). Design underpins the exercise of battle command, guiding the iterative and often cyclic application of understanding, visualizing, and describing. As these iterations occur, the design concept—the tangible link to detailed planning—is forged (FM 5-0, 3-1). Thus, design enhances the “understand” and “visualize” components of battle command, and provides the links to the “describe” and “direct” elements of battle command. The continual assessment, a fundamental part of battle command, is also served by problem re-framing in the ADM. Theory. Situational understanding is fundamental to effective command and control. Complexity theory, open systems theory, chaos theory, emergence History. Slim in Burma; Lawrence in the Hejaz; BG Aviv Kochavi during the attack on Nablus in April 2002. All recognized aspects of complexity and adaptation, recognizing the environment, enemy, and intervention as systems and sought an understanding of the nature of the system they wished to transform. After a combination of reflection, critical and creative thinking, and creation of a shared understanding, each visualized and described novel and effective approaches to transforming the system to a favorable state. Doctrine. Per FM 5-0, Ch 3, design supports battle command. Commanders are the central figure because they maintain decision and direction authority. “Commanders are not continuously engaged in the design method; rather, they participate enough to inform and guide design through its course.” (3-1) Design provides an approach for leading adaptive work from which a complex, ill-defined situation can be made sense of and acted upon effectively. Argument: Design goes hand-in-hand with battle command. Design has always been a critical facet of battle command, even before it was called ‘design’, defined, studied, pondered, and written on. Commanders perform design in their minds as they seek to understand the situation and the problem, and as they visualize and describe the situation, problem, and possible solution to their staffs and soldiers. As battle command is a cycle, so too is design—demanding continuous observation, assessment, adjustment, adaptation, and, upon occasion, reframing. While application of design once varied greatly from commander to commander and organization to organization (and still does to some extent) by deliberately (though not restrictively) tying design to the battle command process, the commander helps engender shared understanding throughout his organization, adaptability and agility in the face of the complex operating environment or complex enemy systems, and more likelihood of success as a learning organization. In short, design is the method that enables battle command Sources for Theory: G-Man w/ the 2 order machine Bar-Yam: systems thinking and emergence (Design and BTL CMD Linkage) Checkland: Rich Picture and Soft Systems Methodology Schoen: Reflection in Action (feedback) and Teacher-Mentor Mary Jo Hatch: Organization Structures
32. 23. FM 6-22 Army Leadership discusses informal leadership. Define the concept and give an example of a situation that required you to use informal leadership during practicum or exercise. How does information, effective communication and influence play a role in informal leadership? Informal Leadership: A type of leadership that is not based on command or other designation of formal authority. Informal leadership occurs as an individual exerts influence others for the good of the organization (FM 6-22: 3-15) Often a result of experience May req initiative by the individual to assume the role of an informal leader Army considers leadership to be formal-legitimate or informal-influential Army is a team of teams- May lead outside chain of command (in a JIATF/HN) or lead by example Information Informal Leaders may have access to additional knowledge but must have a clear understanding of the commander’s mission and access to the same information as the CDR/Staff (Mission CMD) March-knowledge is power/Team members must understand one another’s inconsistencies-members influence one another Kotter-keep the boss informed/understand perspectives-context of situatin and individual Communication Must create a common vision/apply cultural sensitivities/establish trust Mission Command enables leaders to support the requirements of subordinates and peers to execute informal leadership and still accomplish the mission March-teams req coordination and communication/discuss and understand personal inconsistencies . Kotter-good communication/good relationships enable leaders to overcome resistence Influence-compliance/commitment-provide purpose, motivation and understanding Kotter-IPC skills/judgement must be applied by informal leaders/understand self, subordinates and seniors/must get things done through others without control (capacity to develop sufficient sources of power to make up for the gap inherent in the position-avoid parochialism, infighting, power struggles)/understand why people resist informal leadership and the decisions-context Senge-leaders must learn, grow and change and assist others to do so/reflection and collaboration are critical March-direct conflict do not reduce it/social norms and judgment shape decision making/be ware of ambiguity Historical Examples: TE Lawrence-utilized informal leadership within both the British Chain of Command and the Arab sphere of influence. Ike had to hold together and balance the coalition during WWII and Abrams worked with DoS reps to implement CORDs-and to work with the SVn. Isserson although more jr in the Soviet System fostered deep battle/op shock doctrine.
33. 24. (DOA) Explain the difference between complex and complicated systems. Using theory, a historical campaign(s), and personal experience give examples of both, and explain the implications for how to ensure relevant action when performing simple, complicated, and complex tasks. Dorner: The Logic of Failure. Human planning and decision making processes can go awry if we do not pay enough attention to possible side effects and long-term repercussions; if we apply corrective measures too aggressively or timidly; or if we ignore premises we should have considered. Comprehensive Systems Approach allows commanders to make decisions with full understanding of nuances and interlocking elements of a complex system and not make decisions on an ad hoc basis (pg 5) Schön: iteration includes reflection while acting. To make use of this gained reflective ideation, Schön recommends what he calls reciprocal reflection, which also requires numerous iterations for effect. He adds a third component to the iterative process – trust. Educating the Reflective Practitioner, 87-8; 101; 163. “Making Things Work” by Yaneer Bar-Yam: this book provides a description of concepts as they have been developed in the scientific study of complex systems, but here they are directed at solving complex problems of our world. This book attempts to discuss complex systems concepts in order to provide new insights about how to approach solving deeply rooted complex problems. 50 Complex adaptive systems are special cases of complex systems. They are complex in that they are diverse and made up of multiple interconnected elements (and so a part of network science) and adaptive in that they have the capacity to change and learnfrom experience. "complex systems" is a new approach to science, which studies how relationships between parts give rise to be like the behaviors of the system and how the system interacts and forms relationships with its environment. 24 Historical Campaigns: “Complex adaptive systems modeling shows that the global nature of the present Islamist jihad, and hence its dangerous character, derives from the links in the system – energy pathways that allow disparate groups to function in an aggregated fashion across intercontinental distances – rather than the elements themselves.” Kilcullen, D. J. 2005. "Countering Global Insurgency". Journal of Strategic Studies. 28, no. 4: 597-618. (pg 75 of SAMS Student Text v 2.0) “As Grant approaches the Chattanooga area, he reflects, acts, reflects some more, gains new information and intelligence, acts some more. His approach is that of iteration.” Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs (New York, NY: Literary Classics, 1990), 403-421. (SAMS Student Text v 2.0,108) Implications for relevant action for simple, complicated and complex tasks: Simple problem: Completing my six year-old’s math homework. Intricate problem: Completing a tough crossword puzzle. There is only 1x right solution. Complicated problem: Normandy Amphibious Assault on D-day. Complex Problem: Accomplishing vague strategic goals that change under limited conditions (no troops on ground) with NATO and the Arab League in Libya while waging 2+ other wars. Complex: iteration reflection flexibility assessments open systems unknown unknowns exteriority adaptive actors innovation holistic approaches dynamic explanation over description reduction does not explain mechanistic resistant Simple: Closed systems Known knowns clear actors linear causality reduction friendly mechanistic friendly principles/procedures reverse engineerable predictable Complicated: Closed systems Known unknowns many actors often linear description rich reduction friendly interiority mechanistic prone (COGs) Intricate: one solution many steps time consuming precise reverse engineerable mechanistic 100% predictable
34. 25. (DOA) Discuss the function and utility of narrative in design as well as its relationship to discourse. Focus on defining what narrative and discourse are, what comprises them, how you ‘do’ them, how they function, and how they inform design. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “narrative” as follows: “That part of a deed or document which narrates the relevant or essential facts.” A “narration” is “The action of relating or recounting, or the fact of being recounted; an instance of this.” Finally, “narrate” means “To relate, recount, give an account of.” The etymology of this word is also significant: “L. narrat-, narrare, prob for gnarrare, related to gnarus knowing, and thus ult. to know.” Anarrative recounts relevant circumstances using plot and logic to make, and project into the future, decisions about how relevant circumstances should or should not connect. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “discourse” as follows: “Onward course; The act of the understanding by which it passes from premises to consequences; reasoning, rationality, reason; Communication of thought by speech.” Alternatively, “discourse” means “To run or travel over a space, region, etc.; To pass from premises to conclusions…” Possessing a conception of the cognitive process that results in strategy, one achieves at least three useful insights. First, it is possible to determine if a rival is operating in accordance with a strategy or simply executing tactical actions on the basis of expediency. This claim is based on the assumption that strategy has a distinct form that enables specific types of change; activity within a different form will not achieve these types of change and is thus not truly “strategy.” Second, an anatomy of strategy offers a way to make broad evaluations of a competitor’s truthfulness. If an actor’s stated concerns are not addressed by his actions, then it is reasonable to assume he is not honest about or alternatively, unaware of, his actual strategy. Such a “truth test” sounds straightforward, but is in fact impossible without understanding the linkage between thought, word and deed; narrative provides this linkage. Third, one can evaluate strategy for potential efficacy. By studying the narratives of strategic discourse, one can evaluate the logic of projected decisions and circumstances. Logical inconsistency significantly lowers the probability that a strategic actor will achieve and sustain a desired position of advantage. Makers and consumers of strategy exist within an ocean of circumstances that benefit or hinder their community's ability to survive on its own terms. Strategy confronts this reality by explaining why some circumstances are relevant to a given concern, and then how those circumstances enable a reconfiguration of the larger context to improve conditions within the community. The reconfiguration of circumstance is achieved by using one part of a larger system to influence another part of the same system. Therefore, circumstances without narrative are “like uncarved wood. Merged, undifferentiated… Like muddy water.” Confronted with bounded but largely undifferentiated circumstances, the strategist must still create a narrative to explain why the circumstances he contemplates are bounded in one way and not another. It is thus apparent that strategy cannot exist independently of narrative.
35. Q 26. Define adaptive work and describe how one leads this type of effort. (See D322 from 20 Oct 10, Leadership Without Easy Answers by Ronald A. Heifetz. References below.) Adaptive work is defined as an adaptive challenge when a gap exists between values and circumstances and that gap cannot be closed by application of current technology, know-how, or routine behavior. “Adaptive work consists of the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face. Adaptive work requires a change in values, beliefs, or behavior. The exposure and orchestration of conflict – internal contradictions – within individuals and constituencies provide the leverage for mobilizing people to learn new ways.” P. 22  The example studied for class was the 1983 case between the Environmental Protection Agency and the American Smelting and Refining Company copper plant near Tacoma, WA (p. 88). The processing of copper ore involved the use of arsenic, which had been determined to cause cancer. William Ruckleshaus was the head of the EPA who was responsible for protecting the public health. His involvement required that he: Identified an adaptive challenge; Regulated level of distress; Focused attention on relevant issues Devised strategy that shifted responsibility for the problem to the primary stakeholders Other terms introduced include: Adaptive vs. Technical Work (pp. 73-76) Routine – technical work Non-routine – technical to adaptive work Non-routine/requiring learning – adaptive work  4Heifetz’ thesis is that leadership is organized around two key distinctions: technical versus adaptive problem solving and leadership versus authority. P. 8 Leadership is a social contract mobilizing people to tackle tough problems. P. 15  Iteration and adaptive work:  How does one lead it? Look at Senge (Arrows) and COL Grigsby Nexus (team building) Checkland: SSM to lead it. Schoen: History: Wedemeyer and T.E. Lawrence “Leadership w/o Easy Answers” by Heifetzdefines adaptive work as “the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face. Adaptive work requires a change in values, beliefs, or behavior = culture. The exposure and orchestration of conflict – internal contradictions – within individuals and constituencies provide the leverage for mobilizing people to learn new ways.” (p.22) “Leadership will consist not of answers or assured visions but of taking action to clarify values. It asks questions like: That are we missing here? Are there values of competing groups that we suppress rather than apply to out understanding o he problem at hand? Are the shared values that might enable is to engage competing views? Ongoing adaptive capacity requires a rich and evolving mix of values to inform a society’s process of reality testing. It requires leadership to fire and contain the forces of invention and change and to extract the next step.” (p.35)
36. Q 26. Define adaptive work and describe how one leads this type of effort. References: Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers, 22,69,75,101, 87-88. Art of Design Student Text, 16, 40, 113, 114 Heifetz defines adaptive work as “the learning required to address conflicts in the values people hold, or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the reality they face. Adaptive work requires a change in values, beliefs, or behavior. The exposure and orchestration of conflict – internal contradictions – within individuals and constituencies provide the leverage for mobilizing people to learn new ways.” (p.22) “Leadership will consist not of answers or assured visions but of taking action to clarify values. It asks questions like: That are we missing here? Are there values of competing groups that we suppress rather than apply to out understanding o he problem at hand? Are the shared values that might enable is to engage competing views? Ongoing adaptive capacity requires a rich and evolving mix of values to inform a society’s process of reality testing. It requires leadership to fire and contain the forces of invention and change and to extract the next step.” (p.35) Strategic Principles of leadership: 1. Identify the adaptive challenge. Diagnose the situation in light of the values at stake, and unbundle the issues that come with it. 2. Keep the level of distress within a tolerable range for doing adaptive work. 3. Focus attention on ripening issues and not on stress-reducing distractions. 4. Give the work back to the people, but at a rate they can stand. 5. Protect voices of leadership without authority. (p.128)
37. Question 27: How do you build organizational learning to facilitate integrated planning? Using theory, history and doctrine, describe how this might contribute to the organization’s ability to reframe during execution.
38. The Fifth Discipline Peter Senge Ideas of systems thinking, particularly equilibrium, patterns, and team learning through discourse. Fighting complex systems with complex solutions is the antithesis of Systems thinking. understand the underlying dynamic complexity and address it with a simple mean. Look for interrelationships rather than linear cause-effect chains. See the process rather than a snapshot. From the systems perspective, human actors are part of the feedback process. Reinforcing and Balancing Feedback & Delays.
39. Design Visualization of OE ( Form, Function, Logic & ecology) W/O reductionism unveil the ill structured problem SLIM & Burma Campaign : Reframing in Execution Current system Desired system DESIGN
40. Q 28 DOA Paper
41. Q 29 Trends in warfare in the next 5-10 years Can link to question to 32
42. Q.30 (FOA). What is the utility of Scenario Planning for anticipating future conflicts? What did you learn about operational art in using this process? Detriments of Scenario Planning: Planners can easily misuse this tool. This is not a crystal ball. It generates options for planning- it does not make predictions. Can become a source of Anchoring Bias; could prevent planners from seeing indicators of differing situations than anticipated. Black Swans are not anticipated. Scenario planning probably only captures white and grey swans (known-unknowns), especially if conducted prior to executing design for an environment. PROBLEM: Tetlock“Tarot on K St” -Most forecasters fail to outperform the proverbial dart-throwing monkey. From Marx: when history throws a curve, the intellectuals fall off the train. (in a non-linear, open system world, great demand exists for forecasting future events so preparations can be made, but is difficult to do). “History rarely overtly repeats itself, but it often rhymes.” Utility of Scenario Planning (Developed by Peter Schwartz): Use scenario planning as a tool to structure and analyze potential situations in the future for which military forces could be used (5-10 yrs) We see the most utility in that it generates discourse with Senior Leaders; reveals indicators for events that require preparation and action. Merges well with Design’s conceptual planning…works as a potential intermediate step between conceptual and detailed planning (this way scenario planning is based off of a much more understood environment). Can be used to reinforce the existing planning progress—both to develop branch plans within an existing OPLAN when we are already committed to a COA, or provides the impetus, based on current indicators, to get increased resourcing (such as increased funding) to execute plan/branch plan Generates options that reflect logic, not just wild speculation about the future; but also avoids the mentality of dealing only with “known-knowns” of the future. Scenario Planning process could be used in the context of an OODA LOOP (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act). What did I learn about operational art in using this process? Seeing that scenario planning cannot predict all events that could occur in the future, military forces must maintain the flexibility to address the wide range of events that may arise. On the same token, operational art must maintain the creative flexibility and iterative process that allows planners the freedom to best conceptualize and develop operations to handle a wide spectrum of operations. In light of scenario planning and the entire SAMS course, I see that our views and definition of OP ART need to continue to evolve based on environmental context, just as it has since the 1700s. Understanding scenario planning allows us to know we must not become bound to a system of conducting war just because it works today. **Every era probably thought they had the optimal solution with regard to “op art” or their view on “strategic-tactical” matters. Thus, just as scenario development helps us generate options for the future, so too must we continue to refine the way we view and implement what we call operational art today. OP Art Evolution over Time Environmental Progress: internal/external happenings—social, political, technology, military systems, doctrine, competitors, enemies 1700s FUTURE
43. EXAMPLE: Legitimate Economy Prosperity High Corruption Low Corruption High Violence Low Violence This model features an improving Mexican legal economy with a declining illicit economy; positive feed-back loops funnel greater security resources against a diminishing rival criminal enterprise. Best possible future scenario. This model features an improving Mexican legitimate economy with a booming illicit commodity- violence will increase as Mexico buys more security capabilities while drug cartels can also purchase more lethal hardware and mercenaries/influence. Illicit Economy Prosperity Illicit Economy Entropy This model features a booming illicit commodity with a declining legal economy. With limited resources for security costs, Mexico will lose legitimacy and face state failure without outside intervention. Cartel growth and robust black markets will hasten this collapse. This model features a declining legal and illegal economy in Mexico. With less legal enterprise options and no rival illicit economy, Mexico will slide into a collapsed state condition where extreme poverty occurs. Violence will be moderate due to limited illicit options. High Corruption High Corruption Legitimate Economy Entropy Moderate Violence High Violence
44. 32. What trends will influence the future operating environment? How will these trends affect operations in the next 5-10 years JOE-Trends may suggest possibilities and potential directions, but they are unreliable for understanding the future because they interact with and are influenced by other factors. Trend analysis is the most fragile element of forecasting Trends are non-linear and are part of a larger system JP 1-02 operational environment — A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander Global Trends 2025: Global Multipolar system, shift in relative wealth and economic power, energy crisis, climate change, resource shortfalls, regional instability, emergence of China/India/Russia, increased terrorism and weapons proliferation JOE-Nature vs Character of war globalization, pandemics, economic shifts, energy crisis, climate change, resource shortages, cyber, space JOC-irregular warfare/irregular threats continue to evolve-target non state actors and leverage IA, long term involvement vs decisive victory, target threat as well as governance, RoL, Eco development-security cooperation ACC-Future threat-conventional/unconventional and will target our vulnerabilities-comms, surveillance, precision fires, mobility, armor; will target will of Am. People, US Forces will be limited by air and sealift capabilities and budget/ concerned with demographic shifts, climate change, pandemics and HADR, food and water shortages, shifting eco patterns, cyber and space conflict AOC: types of enemies: existing military powers with advanced technology, terrorist groups, insurgents, militias, cartels, IR forces, increased antiaccess capabilities by state and nonstate actors, enemy use of complex/urban terrain, increased use of technology by nonstate actors, adaptation to counter our strengths, WMD Biddle-Military Power-Force Structure v Technology-Policy and Strategy must evolve, RMA v evolution, budgetary constraints, Joint Campaign Assessment must evolve to embrace current/future tech, LETHALITY & ADAPTABILITY Group discussion-arc of instability, robotics, regional instability, is conventional war becoming extinct, CAM and WAS War shaped by DIME-T and IR/ECO Theories-the cultural /strategic context Trends help identify areas of concern, areas to be monitored, areas or issues that may require a response-impacts Strategy, R&D, DOTMLPF, defines the capabilities required by the armed forces
45. (EX) 33. FM 3-0 described lethal actions as critical to accomplishing offensive and defensive missions while stability and civil support operations emphasized nonlethal, constructive actions. ADP 3-0 departs from this philosophy, stating that “lethality is the foundation for effective offensive, defensive, and stability operations,” and that “lethality is a persistent requirement for Army organizations, even in conditions where only the implicit threat of violence is sufficient to accomplish the mission through non-lethal engagements and activities.” What are the implications of this philosophical shift in planning and preparing forces for operations? See figure 3-3 in FM 3-0; FSO are always combinations of offensive, defensive and stability operations. What changes is the preponderance of one type of operation within the context of a specific OE. Based on this understanding, ADP 3-0 does not reflect a change in thinking so much as an explicit recognition that military forces cannot sever their connection to force and violence: lethality is always at least implicit. The only implication is thus that violence or the threat of violence must always be considered in the planning of operations. This is the case for two reasons: Violence or it's threat are key enablers within a mission set. Non-lethal capability is not sufficient reason for military employment. If non-lethal capabilities are truly sufficient, a nation can contract such assets. It is the need for security that prompts use of the military instrument. Violence or it's threat may hinder the accomplishment of national objectives. If lethality is always part and parcel of a military force, planners must be aware of how this essential nature changes the environment. Often, steps must be taken to reduce the perception of lethality in order to accomplish tasks. This can only be the case if lethality is inseparable from military forces.
46. Question 36 (EX) Both JP 5-0 and FM 5-0 identify a thorough mission analysis as crucial to planning. Explain the primary purpose of mission analysis and describe how JOPP differs from MDMP during the mission analysis phase. What are the command and control implications of these differences? Would a brief to your division commander using MDMP be different than a brief to the SECDEF or CJCS using JOPP?
47. Question 36. (EX) Both JP 5-0 and FM 5-0 identify a thorough mission analysis as crucial to planning. Explain the primary purpose of mission analysis and describe how JOPP differs from MDMP during the mission analysis phase. What are the command and control implications of these differences? Would a brief to your division commander using MDMP be different than a brief to the SECDEF or CJCS using JOPP? Purpose FM 5-0 The commander and staff conduct mission analysis to better understand the situation and problem, and identify what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done, and most importantly why – the purpose of the operation. (Pg. B-6) JP 5-0 Mission analysis helps the Joint Force Commander (JFC) understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process. (Pg. IV-4) Differences in Mission Analysis Command and Control Implications The big difference is that JOPP must account for a much broader scope and purpose than MDMP – it incorporates civilian strategic guidance, a greater number of stakeholders (JIIM), force planning (RFFs), strategic deployment, and a distinct approval process (APEX IPRs, see below). Some of the discrete differences in mission analysis are: 1) JOPP includes a step to “Develop Mission Success Criteria” this can be linked either to the overall mission or phase/major operation within a campaign (transitions/assessments). 2)Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) vs Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), procedurally JIPOE is done separately and is an input to JOPP MA / IPB is done within MDMP MA. Additionally, the relative purpose, focus, and level of detail also differ. JIPOE is broader, purposefully systemic/holistic, includes strategic & operational COGs, and looks to determine enemy military COAs. MDMP seeks the detail necessary to counter enemy CONOPS. 3) INTEL, In JOPP the J2 staff estimate produced in MA addresses the ability to produce Annex B and the entire integrated INTEL operation/support plan. In MDMP, where assets are already known, MA develops an ISR plan and synchronization tools. The most significant implication for command and control between the two processes stems from the fact that in JOPP the planning JFHQ may not have allocated forces or established command authorities. 1) In a JIMM (Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational) environment developing command relationships is a much more complicated (& possible complex) undertaking. There are more stakeholders (ex. USMC who want MAGTF OPCON to MARFOR vice a Land Component Command, non-DoD agencies, and coalition/allied partners). Some negotiation may be required. 2) A Combatant Command has the option to create subordinate Joint Task Forces, an option not available to service commands using MDMP. 3) Typically in HQs using MDMP units are allocated from a higher HQ with established command relationships/authorities (ex. OPCON, TACON, Supporting/Supported). 4) For Control, interoperability is more complicated in a JIIM environment. Would a brief to your division commander using MDMP be different than a brief to the SecDef/CJCS using JOPP? Of course. SecDef is like the honey badger – he doesn’t care about your happy weather & light data, or your interpretation of specified & implied tasks. Aslo, SecDef typically doesn’t have the time to check your homework and review 157 slides. More importantly, the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) uses the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) to accomplish joint planning. APEX uses a series of formalized In-progress Reviews (IPRs) to structure dialogue between Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) and higher headquarters. They are part of the plan review and approval process. The IPRs are A (Strategic Guidance), C (Concept Development), F (Plan Approval), and R (Plan Assessment). IPRs can be iterative (ex. Multiple IPR As to develop the strategic guidance). Additionally, the CJCS/Joint Staff will specify the level of planning detail for the plan under consideration. A Level 1 plan is a commander’s estimate, a Level 2 plan is a Base Plan (BPLAN – CONOPS, without annexes or TPFDD), a Level 3 Plan is Concept Plan (CONPLAN – BPLAN+ plan summary + Annexes A,B,C,D,J,K,S,V,Z / may also include TPFDD/Annex E for a Level 3-T Plan), a Level 4 Plan is an OPLAN (a complete and detailed Joint plan with annexes and TPFDD). Briefings to SecDef/CJCS will be influenced by the IPR schedule, level of planning detail required, and time available. All of these factors will cause significant variation from a typical MDMP brief. 48