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FERC Order in Devon Power LLC, et al. ER03-563-00. Robert Ethier Director, Market Monitoring ISO New England Inc. May 2, 2003. Background. NRG had applied for Reliability Must Run (RMR) agreements with the FERC to recover the full cost of service for its Connecticut fleet.
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FERC Order inDevon Power LLC, et al. ER03-563-00 Robert Ethier Director, Market Monitoring ISO New England Inc. May 2, 2003
Background • NRG had applied for Reliability Must Run (RMR) agreements with the FERC to recover the full cost of service for its Connecticut fleet. • ISO-NE had proposed, and the Commission had accepted, a scarcity pricing mechanism called the ‘Proxy CT’ that provided special mitigation rules for generators in chronically congested areas (DCAs). • The intent of the Proxy CT was to control local market power while allowing price signals to incent investment in chronic problem areas. • These areas were identified as CT, SWCT and NEMA/Boston
FERC Action on April 25, 2003 • Denied NRG’s request for RMR arrangements for full cost of service recovery • Allowed guaranteed recovery of only certain maintenance costs required for reliability • New agreements required within 30 days reflecting this ruling
FERC Action (cont’d) • FERC rejected the Proxy CT (combustion turbine) proposal it had previously accepted • ISO to modify Market Rule 1 by June 1 with temporary measure – ‘Peaking Unit Safe Harbor’ offer • Allows fixed cost component in offers of certain units • ISO-NE required to file Locational ICAP plan by March 1 ,2004.
FERC Action (cont’d) • Directed ISO-NE to establish temporary bidding rules: • Permit selected peaking units to raise their offers to reflect fixed and variable costs (PUSH) Peaking Unit Safe Harbor • Peaking unit defined as capacity factor less than 10%, resident in identified DCAs • Allow peaking units to set price • Offers would be allowed to reflect total fixed costs, levelized over 2002 MWh’s of generation
FERC Action (cont’d) FERC Rationale: • RMR contracts suppress market-clearing prices, increase uplift payments, and make it difficult for new generators to profitably enter the market. • In short, extensive use of RMR contracts undermines effective market performance.
FERC Action (cont’d) FERC Rationale: • Our reason for increasing the safe harbor energy bids of these units is to provide a market mechanism for high cost, seldom run units to recover their fixed costs. • When a peaking unit is called, all sellers will be able to receive a high market price and recover fixed costs. This feature will encourage entry by new generators.
Rule Development • ISO-NE intends extensive discussions with stakeholders on rules changes • Regular and special Markets Committee meetings in May to develop rules • ISO-NE to make compliance filing by May 30 • ISO-NE to implement temporary rules changes on June 1 • Rule changes in effect until introduction of Locational ICAP
Locational ICAP • Order directs ISO-NE to develop a mechanism to implement location or deliverability requirements in the ICAP or resource adequacy market • Capacity within chronically constrained areas to be appropriately compensated for reliability • Discussions ongoing with stakeholders • Resource Adequacy Working Group • Markets Committee • ISO-NE intends to file revised ICAP rules no later than March 1, 2004, for implementation no later than June 1, 2004, as required by the Order • Consistent with existing Locational ICAP schedule