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The Climate Treaties: UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. UNFCCC. UNFCCC. Most important aspects Objective = overall goal for the treaty Divides parties into different categories Establishes moderate commitments Applies to 6 greenhouse gases
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UNFCCC • Most important aspects • Objective = overall goal for the treaty • Divides parties into different categories • Establishes moderate commitments • Applies to 6 greenhouse gases • Requires parties to meet every year to assess whether the existing commitments will meet the objective
Art. 2 - Objectives Stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner
Art. 4 - Commitments • All Parties, Annex I Parties, Annex II Parties • All = developed, developing, economies in transition • Annex I = developed • Annex II = developed - economies in transition
All Parties: Inventory Develop programmes Cooperate in tech transfer Manage sinks and reservoirs Subject to “common but Differentiated responsibilities” Annex I: “take the lead” Develop national programs And take actions to mitigate Annex II: Fund emissions inventory Transfer technology Fund adaptation
UNFCCC • Structural importance • Developed countries must take the lead to reduce emissions • Developing countries do not have strong obligations to reduce emissions – but should inventory and report • Parties will meet to determine if they need to do more
The Politics = Same as Before • Developed countries • EU • U.S. • Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, etc. • Former Soviet Union • Developing countries • Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) • OPEC • Brazil, Indonesia, other major forested areas • China • India • Least Developed Countries
The Politics = Same as Before • Increased differences: • Developing countries argue: developed countries promised to “take the lead” – until they do this, no new commitments for developing countries • Berlin Mandate: affirms no new commitments for developing countries • U.S. argues: • if developing countries (i.e., China) do not have commitments, then United States should not sign or ratify any treaty
Kyoto Protocol Key Elements • QELROs = targets and timetables • collectively, 5.2 percent reduction below 1990 levels during 5 year reporting period, 2008-2012 • Individually – calculated in AAUs • flexibility mechanisms • emissions trading - AAUs • Joint implementation - ERUs • EU bubble - AAUs • CDM - CERs
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables • Art 3(1) - Annex I Parties • individually or jointly • CO2Eq emissions of GHGs in Annex A • “basket of gases” • do not exceed assigned amounts • QELROs in Annex B • overall goal = at least 5 percent below 1990 levels in commitment period 2008-2012
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables • Art 3(1) - Annex I Parties • CO2Eq emissions of GHGs in Annex A • “basket of gases” = CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables • Art 3(1) - Annex I Parties • do not exceed assigned amounts = QELROs in Annex B
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables • Art 3(1) - Annex I Parties • do not exceed assigned amounts = QELROs in Annex B • Australia 108 Austria 92 Belgium 92 Bulgaria* 92 • Canada 94Croatia* 95Czech Republic* 92 Denmark 92 • Estonia* 92 European Community 92 Finland 92 France 92 • Germany 92 Greece 92 Hungary* 94 Iceland 110 • Ireland 92 Italy 92 Japan 94 Latvia* 92 • Liechtenstein 92Lithuania* 92 Luxembourg 92 Monaco 92 • Netherlands 92 New Zealand 100Norway 101 Poland* 94 • Portugal 92 Romania* 92 Russian Federation*100 Slovakia* 92 • Slovenia* 92 Spain 92 Sweden 92 Switzerland 92 • Ukraine* 100 United Kingdom 92 United States of America 93 • * Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables • Art. 3(7) - Annex I Parties • 1st commitment period - 2008-2012 • assigned amount • percentage reduction times baseline times 5 • = Annex B percentage of 1990 baseline emissions of GHGs • alternate baseline for human-made GHGs (see Art. 3(8)) • alternative baseline for Economies in Transition (EITs) • example • Japan baseline emissions in 1990 = 100 • What is its assigned amount?
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables • example • Japan baseline emissions in 1990 = 100 MtCO2eq • What is its assigned amount? • 100Mt * .94 (percentage reduction) * 5 (commitment period) = 470 MtCO2eq
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables • example • Japan’s assigned amount = 470 MtCO2eq • What does this mean? • Japan may emit, on average, 92 Mt/year, but can have varying emissions levels during that 5-year period • It just needs to achieve the overall goal
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables • Baselines • 1990 baseline in most cases • alternate baseline for human-made GHGs • alternative baseline for Economies in Transition (EITs)
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables • Why have different baselines? • 1990 baseline • alternate baseline for human-made GHGs • Montreal Protocol phase out – wanted to give time for companies to use alternative products and create new ones • alternative baseline for Economies in Transition (EITs) • “hot air”
Kyoto Protocol: Targets and Timetables • What is “hot air”? • Economies in transition = large emissions in early/mid 1980s • Soviet Union collapsed, so did their economies, so did their emissions • But countries want to allow EITs to pretend their emissions were higher – why?
Hot Air and Assigned Amounts • If use 1989 as baseline: • Emissions = 100 MtCO2eq • QELRO = 100% • Assigned Amount = 100 MtCO2eq * 100% * 5 = 500 MtCO2eq • If use 1990 as a baseline: • Emissions = 70 MtCO2eq • QELRO = 100% • Assigned Amount = 70 MtCO2eq * 100% * 5 = 350 MtCO2eq
Kyoto Protocol: Flexibility Mechanisms Emissions Trading Joint Fulfillment Joint Implementation Clean Development Mechanism
Kyoto Protocol: Flexibility Mechanisms • Joint Fulfillment - Art. 4 • “EU Bubble” • Annex I parties may jointly fulfill commitments • enter into agreement • total combined aggregate GHGs cannot exceed total assigned amounts • revised emissions allocations must be set out in the agreement • if revise regional economic integration organization, does not change commitments • if Parties fail to meet combined level of emissions reductions, each Party is responsible for its emissions in the agreement
Joint Fulfillment - Art. 4 • “EU Bubble” • Annex I parties may jointly fulfill commitments • enter into agreement • total combined aggregate GHGs cannot exceed total assigned amounts • revised emissions allocations must be set out in the agreement • if revise regional economic integration organization, does not change commitments • if Parties fail to meet combined level of emissions reductions, each Party is responsible for its emissions in the agreement • See page 66
Joint Fulfillment - Art. 4 “EU Bubble” – every EU country agreed under Annex B to reduce emissions by 8% (or to emit .92 of baseline)
Emissions Trading • Simplest form • Regulators set an overall cap on allowable emissions from covered sources • Regulators allocate emissions credits/allowances to covered sources – each credit = amount of pollution (e.g., 1 credit = 1 ton CO2eq) • Sources may: • Emit same amount of pollution as they have credits • Emit more pollution, so buy credits • Emit less pollution, and sell credits
Emissions Trading Emissions cap: year 1-5 = 12, year 6-10 = 9, year 11-15 = 6, year 16-20 = 3
Emission Trading Emissions cap: year 1-5 = 12; emissions trading allows facilities to buy/sell credits, but cap stays the same
Emissions Trading • Arguments in Favor?
Emissions Trading • Arguments in Favor? • Cost-effective • Flexible • Administratively easier (money v. expertise to set emissions limits) • Spurs Innovation • Absolute cap on emissions
Emissions Trading • Arguments in Favor? Some responses. • Cost-effective • For some facilities, but not all. • Flexible • Subject to gaming • Administratively easier • Not always • Spurs Innovation • Not always
Emissions Trading • Arguments in Favor? Some responses (cont.) • Absolute cap on emissions • Overallocation problem • What if the cap doesn’t achieve environmental goals? • Caps may not be more effective than command-and-control • But they are more directive than taxes