Halfway through Pinker

Halfway through Pinker Seeing the forest despite all those damn trees

Halfway Through Pinker What if Pinker is right? So what? How might these ideas change society?

Humans store knowledge (thoughts) in the brain in a way that is different from linguistic representations. • However, these semantic representations in the brain have an impact on the linguistic realization of these thoughts.

Some of the linguistic phenomena that we observe can be explained by how the mind represents ideas concerning substance, time, space, and causation. • For instance, the mind distinguishes between an agent changing the location of some object versus changing the state of an object. This distinction can be detected in linguistic phenomena such as the rules regarding the alternation of content-locative constructions. Hal loaded the wagon with hay. Hal loaded hay into the wagon. Hal filled the glass with water. *Hal filled water into the glass.

The mind’s representation of substances seems to distinguish between bounded/unbounded and individuals/continuous mass. However, our innate distinction is imperfect. Consider that water (mass) is actually a collection of individual molecules.

The mind’s representation of space is somewhat limited (hence, we have a small finite set of ways of referring to spatial location) and does not correspond to what modern physics tells about space. But our mind’s naïve representation of space is good enough.

The mind’s representation of time is somewhat limited (hence, our language is vague when describing when events occur (past, present and future relative to the speaker and to some other event)) and does not correspond to what modern physics tells about time. But our mind’s naïve representation of time is good enough.

The mind’s representation of causation is a simplified view of cause-and-effect (as we tend to reduce most causes to one (or two) primary causes) and does not correspond to Newtonian, Einsteinian, or quantum physics. But our mind’s naïve representation of causation is good enough.

Good enough for what? • Our mental representations of space, time, and causation are good enough for Homo sapiens to survive and thrive in the environment in which they were adapted to, namely living in small (< 150 people) hunter-gatherer societies.

Our corresponding capacity to communicate those thoughts is sufficient for living in a well-functioning, small, oral, face-to-face society.

But, in the modern world, our naïve physics, for instance, is insufficient to develop more advanced technologies. We have had to create a theory of physics that transcends our minds intuitive notions of substance and causality.

Our innate theory of causation, and in particular, our theory of agents, compels us to think of human agents as primary causes. In other words, we are responsible for our own actions. • This theory of agency, though flawed, works very well to keep small societies functioning well. When someone does something bad, we punish them. Everyone knows everybody in a small society – everyone knows the wrongdoer and everyone sees the consequences of the punishment.

In a large, or ultra-large, society, this theory of agency may not work as well to keep the large society functioning well. • Let’s take a particular example drawn from Pinker: the destruction of the World Trade Center towers.

What was the cause? • Answer: The actions of Osama Bin Laden and his colleagues in Al-Qaeda.

For justice to be done, there must be retribution against Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda

But does the cause stop at (18)? • Couldn’t we ask “what was the cause of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda doing those things?” • If you ask that question, particularly around people directly affected by 9/11, you are likely to get a very emotional, very negative response.

Because, when you start looking at the causes that lie behind a person’s actions, it seems to mitigate that person’s culpability in committing the act. • Jean Valjean steals a loaf of bread. Thief! But, if you knew he was stealing the loaf of bread so that his children won’t starve, that seems to lessen his guilt and our desire to punish him.

So, does the same thing happen when you start looking at the causes for why bin Laden et al committed those acts? • If the answer is yes, that feels disturbing to most of us. It goes against our basic instincts of justice and retribution. • Keep in mind that our intuitive sense of agents, causation, justice and retribution do work well enough for Homo sapiens to thrive and prosper. Holding a person responsible for their action works!

Here’s the problem: That intuitive sense of agents, causation, justice and retribution evolved in small (< 150 people) societies where everyone knows everybody. • It is quite likely that this system of justice (punish the wrongdoer without deeply examining the causes behind the wrongdoer’s actions) does not scale well to an ultra-large society where the vast majority of people do not know each other. • Punishing the wrongdoer may prevent the wrongdoer (and the wrongdoer’s immediate connections) from committing more bad acts, but the punishment may not have the desired impact on those not connected to the wrongdoer.

In other words, in a large, fragmented society, in addition to punishing the wrongdoer, we need to also look at the causes behind the wrongdoer’s act in order to prevent future such acts. • This looking-beyond-the-agent-of-causation does not seem to be innate. In fact, we have a visceral response to suggestions to “look for deeper causes” in situations where we or someone we love are the victim. (Think: 1988 Presidential Debates)

So, Pinker’s point is that some of the innate “stuff of thought” is inherently flawed, despite being incredibly useful in practice. • We need to work out exactly what those “flaws” are so that we become aware of them both in how we make decisions and how we use language. • We have the capacity to transcend those innate flaws.

Halfway through Pinker