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INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY. Presidentialism, Parties, and Legislatures. WEEKLY READING. Smith, Democracy , chs. 5-6 Modern Latin America, ch. 6 (Andes). INTRO: CHILEAN ELECTIONS. Round One (12/13/09) Sebasti án Piñera ( Alianza por Chile ) 44.06

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INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

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  1. INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY Presidentialism, Parties, and Legislatures

  2. WEEKLY READING • Smith, Democracy, chs. 5-6 • Modern Latin America, ch. 6 (Andes)

  3. INTRO: CHILEAN ELECTIONS • Round One (12/13/09) • Sebastián Piñera (Alianza por Chile) 44.06 • Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Concertación) 29.60 • Marco Enríquez-Ominami (Independent) 20.14 • Jorge Arrate (Juntos Podemos Más) 6.21 • Round Two (01/17/10) • Piñera (Alianza) 51.61 • Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Concertación) 48.39

  4. BACKGROUND • 1970 election: • Salvador Allende 36.6 • Jorge Alessandri 35.3 • Radomiro Tomic 28.1 • 1964 election: • Eduardo Frei Montalva 56.1 • Salvador Allende 38.9 • Julio Durán 5.0

  5. OUTLINE • Democratic challenges: survival and consolidation • Presidentialism or parliamentarism? • Proposals for reform • The legislative arena • The plight of political parties • Sources of disenchantment

  6. DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGES • Survival and consolidation of democracy • Avoidance of the past (and military coups) • Questions: Would institutional changes help? Did prior crises result from institutional problems? And could they be repaired?

  7. THE “NEW INSTITUTIONALISM” • Individuals seek to maximize gain • Institutions (rules) shape incentives • And can therefore determine behavior • Ergo, institutional design can affect the collective behavior of political actors

  8. PRESIDENTIALISM OR PARLIAMENTARISM? • Presidentialism: • Head of government (president) is directly elected • Fixed term in office • Cannot be removed by legislature (except through impeachment) • Selects cabinet ministers • Head of government is also head of state • Separation of legislative-executive powers

  9. Parliamentarism: • Voters elect MPs • MPs select head of government (PM) • MPs approve cabinet appointments • PM (and cabinet officers) dependent on continuing confidence of parliament • Head of government (PM) is not head of state • Fusion of legislative-executive powers

  10. PRO-PARLIAMENTARY ARGUMENTS • Avoid “temporal rigidity,” so crises of government would not become crises of regime • Avoid polarization from zero-sum game • Avoid paralyzing deadlock • Thus superior durability of parliamentary regimes

  11. PRO-PRESIDENTIALIST ARGUMENTS • Clarity of fixed time horizon • Checks and balances • Democratic election of head of government • Not the cause of immobilism (PR the cause) • Empirical findings result from “selection bias”

  12. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM • Brazil • Argentina • Chile • Why not? • Insistence on election of chief executive • Advent of polling, reduction of uncertainty • Low esteem for congress, parties • Politics of nostalgia

  13. ENGINEERING PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS • Electing presidents: • Plurality vs. MRO [reflections on Chile, 1970-2010] • MRO a “magic bullet” • Reelection or not? • Power domains: • Constitutional or partisan? • Bureaucracy, judiciary, military • Decree authority

  14. THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA • Electoral Systems: • SMDs and two-party politics • PR and multi-party politics • Effects of district magnitude • Closed-list vs. open-list ballots • The problem of term limits • Institutional Performance: • Essentially “reactive” legislatures • Removing presidents?

  15. LEVELS OF POPULAR TRUST(1996-2007) • Church ~ 70% • Armed Forces ~ 50% • Media (TV+print) ~ 40% • Congress ~ 30% • Parties ~ 20%

  16. THE PLIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTIES • Diversity of party systems • Levels of popular confidence

  17. Counting Political Parties: N = 1 / (Σ pi2) Where pi is the proportion of votes earned by the i-th party (or, alternatively, the proportion of seats in the legislature)

  18. THE POLITICS OF DISENCHANTMENT • Weakness of representative institutions + judiciary branch (i.e., rule of law) • Constraints on modern-day democracy • Inadequate policy performance • Tendency toward “delegative” or “illiberal” democracy • Thus 55% would support authoritarian government if it could improve economic situation (2004)

  19. AND THE RISE OF THE LEFT • Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998) • Lula, Brazil (2002) • Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005)… • Reliance on democratic elections • Vote as popular protest • Possibilities of winning • Challenge of governing

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