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Vietnam Part 2

Vietnam Part 2. Uses of Airpower Background. Vietnam War was primarily a land war Most air power used in conjunction with ground ops North stayed above DMZ, so air superiority over the South was never a concern

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Vietnam Part 2

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  1. Vietnam Part 2

  2. Uses of Airpower Background • Vietnam War was primarily a land war • Most air power used in conjunction with ground ops • North stayed above DMZ, so air superiority over the South was never a concern • In-country operations centered around: interdiction, close air support, airlift, recon, search and rescue, and air refueling

  3. Background • After Gulf of Tonkin, air units built up rapidly • US Air Force occupied 10 major air bases • All were built and defended by the Air Force • Huge logistical effort • Also flew from 6 bases in Thailand • Navy flew from carriers in Gulf of Tonkin • B-52s flew from Guam-- at times even from US

  4. Uses of Air PowerDuring Vietnamization • Train the South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) • Support the South Vietnamese Army • Forestall suspected enemy attacks against withdrawing American units

  5. Uses of Air PowerInterdiction • A major mission during SEA war • Aircraft used: F-4 Phantom, F-100 Super Sabre, F-105 Thunderchief (Thud), AC-130 Gunships • Best known interdiction aircraft was the B-52: a nuclear bomber modified to carry conventional weapons • Arc Light--Name for B-52 interdiction missions F-100 Supersabre

  6. Uses of Air PowerClose Air Support • Missions to support forces of the ground • Aircraft used: A-4 Skyhawk, F-4, F-100, A-37 Dragonfly, A-1 Skyraider and AC-47 Gunships (Puff the Magic Dragon) • Gunships, cargo aircraft armed with rapid-fire machine guns, were very effective • Forward Air Controllers (FACs) were used to locate the enemy and mark targets for faster flying jets A-1 Skyraider A-4 Skyhawk

  7. Uses of Air PowerClose Air Support • B-52 Arc Light aircraft were occasionally used for close air support • B-52 were used extensively in close air support at Khe Sanh • Flew 2,548 sorties and dropped bombs within 300 yards of of U.S. Marine perimeter • B-52 credited with saving Khe Sanh and repelling the Tet and Easter Offensives

  8. Uses of Air Power Tactical Airlift • Vital to successful US operations because of poor security on roads • Aircraft used: UH-1 Hueys, C-7 Caribous, • C-123 Providers, and C-130 Hercules • Missions often flown while under attack • Supplies often air-dropped because of enemy fire and poor landing facilities • A major factor in keeping Khe Sanh alive C-123 Provider C-7 Caribou

  9. Uses of Air PowerReconnaissance • Aircraft used: RF-4C, RB-57 Canberra, and RB-66 Destroyers • Aircraft were equipped with variety of cameras and sensing devices • Missions consisted of locating lucrative targets and assessing battle damage • A valuable part of repelling Tet and protecting Khe Sanh RB 57 Canberra RB 66 Destroyer

  10. Uses of Air PowerSearch and Rescue • An extremely important part of the air support mission throughout Southeast Asia • Buttressed aircrew morale -- fliers knew every effort would be made to save them if shot down • Aircraft used: HH-3 Jolly Green Giants and HH-53 Super Jolly Greens • By’73, USAF had rescued 3,883 Americans

  11. Uses of Air PowerAir to Air Refueling • Indispensable -- extended the range of combat aircraft and enabled many aircraft to return safely • C-130s refueled helicopters, KC-135s refueled fixed wing aircraft • SAC tankers flew 195,000 sorties, unloaded 9 billion pounds of fuel and took part in 814,000 individual refuelings C-130 Refueling KC-135 Tanker

  12. Major Campaigns“Rolling Thunder” • Officially began 2 March 1965 • Objectives • Interdict the flow of supplies from the North • Force the North to stop supporting the Vietcong and quit the war • Raise South Vietnamese morale RF 4 Phantom

  13. Rolling Thunder (con’t) • Strategic bombing and interdiction campaign • Strategic because it was aimed at the North’s will to wage war • Interdiction because the North had few large industries and got most of their material from China and the Soviet Union • Employed mostly tactical aircraft -- F-105s, F-4s and F-111s -- B-52s used in ‘66 in the Southern part of North Vietnam F-111 F-105

  14. Rolling ThunderRestrictions • Johnson administration controlled campaign tightly • Restriction imposed by civilians included: • Hanoi, Haiphong, China border -- off limits • MIG bases and non-firing SAM sites--off limits • Dams, dikes, hydroelectric plants--off limits • White House selected targets, weapons and flying routes -- with little military input

  15. Rolling Thunder • Graduated increases in bombing intensity worked to advantage of North Vietnamese • Gave them time to recover from damage • Allowed them to establish the world’s most intense antiaircraft defense system • Provided them the will to fight on and a sense they could survive • By 1965, it became clear that Rolling Thunder didn’t work

  16. Rolling Thunder • Impacts • South’s morale improved as the North suffered under the bombing • North used frequent halts and restrictions to repair damage and resupply forces in South • Criticism grew at home and internationally • Johnson ended Rolling Thunder prior to 1968 elections • Campaign, America’s longest, was a failure

  17. Major Campaigns “Linebacker I” • Easter Offensive (Mar 72) made it apparent the North was not willing to negotiate • Objectives of Linebacker • Initially a close air support effort to aid retreating South Vietnamese forces • Later, changed to an interdiction campaign against North Vietnam • A systematic campaign with little civilian control -- unlike Rolling Thunder B 52 Stratofortress

  18. Linebacker I (con’t) • Civilian casualties were a consideration but didn’t determine how missions were flown • Haiphong harbor was mined for the first time to restrict in-coming supplies for the North • Strikes were flown over Hanoi and Haiphong -- B-52 strikes on Haiphong began April ‘72 • “Smart bombs’ were used extensively

  19. Linebacker I (con’t) • Linebacker I was the most successful US bombing campaign of the war • Had more impact on the North Vietnam in 9 months than Rolling Thunder did in 4 years • Successful largely because Easter Offensive was a conventional, mechanized attack • Peace Talks resumed in July 1972 • Nixon restricted Linebacker I attacks to below the 20th parallel

  20. Major Campaigns “Linebacker II” • Peace Talks stalled again in Dec 72 • Nixon ordered Linebacker II to run concurrently with Linebacker I • Purpose of Linebacker II was to force the North Vietnamese to negotiate and sign a peace treaty • Ran from 18 Dec to 30 Dec 1972 -- referred to as the “Christmas Campaign”

  21. Linebacker II (con’t) • Very intense and logistically complex • Specific targets in Hanoi and Haiphong • B-52s used for the first time over Hanoi • By the end of Linebacker II, North Vietnam was defenseless • 1,200 SAMs were fired • 80% of the North’s electrical systems and 25% of their POL facilities were destroyed

  22. Linebacker II (con’t) • North Vietnam returned to the bargaining table 30 Dec 72 • All bombing ceased on 15 Jan 73 • Peace treaty was signed on 27 Jan 73 • Linebacker II was a success • Some believe that if Rolling Thunder had been conducted like Linebacker II, the war would have ended in ‘65 -- unlikely http://www.davka.org/what/theleft/peoplespeacetreatyvietnam.html

  23. VIDEO Vietnam

  24. The Vietnam WarLessons Learned • The U.S. can’t win a counterinsurgency war in another country, only that country can • Force and technology are of limited value in a “people’s war” • National leaders must base decisions on realistic assessments before committing troops • “Graduated response” is an ineffective way to employ airpower • Know your enemy and know yourself

  25. More Lessons Learned • Congressional and public support is critical to winning limited war objectives • Congressional and public support for war is hard to get • Modern war is open to public scrutiny and on-scene television coverage • Those who know most about fighting a war should be the ones to conduct it. • We need revolutionary technology, not evolutionary. • We needed precision munitions. We needed to move from many aircraft on one target to one aircraft on many targets.

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