Social-Psychological

1. Social-Psychological Banuazizi

2. Two approaches • social-structural factors • cultural values, beliefs, orientations • Modernization theory united the two elements • Soc processes marked by modern attitudes • empathy, personal efficacy, rationality, flexibility

3. Interest in soc psych (and religion) • Iran revolution • persistence of "primordial" groups” • achievement of Confucian economies

4. 3 roots • Psych-analytic theory and "modal personality" idea • Mainstream behaviourism • attitudes clue to social action • concerns in failed development

5. Soc-psych CAUSAL theory • McClelland's "achieving society” • Soc-psych intervening variable • Nat identity > personal insecurity > pol development "failure" (PYE) • Mod pressures > lack of empathy > pol dev insts failure (LERNER)

6. Soc-Psych dependent variable • Lack of studies despite behaviourism claim that environment shapes action • Inkeles & Smith argued • Dispositions arise from ‘modern' experiences. These in turn mediate continuing success of modernization

7. Inkeles • [294] Exposure to large scale modernizing institutions lead to “syndrome of psych modernity” • Individuals prone to this influence beyond childhood • underlying dimensions transcend ethnic, cultural and national differences.

8. Inkeles and Overall modernity scale • 159 items tested in 6 countries • 1. Openness • 2. Independence from trad auth • 3. Belief in efficacy of science • 4. Ambition • 5. Punctuality/planning • 6. Interest in civic affairs • 7. Interest in international news

9. Modernity? • Factor analysis found all bearing on a single point: • Could be "modernity” • Could be that definitions are tautological • ten background factors accounted for variance in OM scores

10. OM Score factors • Top three were • Formal education • Exposure to media • Occupational experience • Is modernity a state of mind or behaviour congruent with demands of modern society?

11. Inductive reason • Induce from these three propositions: • Exposure to modern insts creates modernity • Individuals can "modernize" after puberty • Ethnicity, nationalism, culture transcended • In other words: modernity can be manipulated and thus lead to pol dev

12. Problem • traditional Socio Economic Status variables could explain all but 1% of the variance in behaviour studied by Inkeles • we still need an explanation at the national level for differences in overall political development • religion?

13. Further research • Need to do “cross-national” and longitudinal studies • Still stuck with difficulty of confirming influence of a mediating factor

14. Tradition-Modernity • Original assumption was that traditions were temporary impediments • Modernity derived from theory • Tradition derived from residual negative attributes • See Talcott Parson’s pattern variables

15. Parsons

16. Tradition • Conservative • Impetus for change from outside • [typically the west] • Resilience and meaning of trad got more attention in 1970s • But psychology slower to change • Inkeles talking about passivity etc.

17. Corrective reaction • Traditional ideologies (expressed in ethnic or religious movements) seen as more of a challenge to incumbent regimes than secular ideology • Tradition demands activity too • Islamic codes of personal conduct • fundamentalist regimes • Islamicizing public policies [Taliban?]

18. Resurgence of Islam • Extremist anachronisms? • Appeal to disoriented losers?! • But too much diversity under the “fundamentalist” umbrella • Iran a puzzle for modernization theory • large army and security forces toppled • growth rates too high? • Reactionary backlash?

19. Iranian politics • Fuelled by • uneven growth • urban-rural tensions • labour aristocracy • perceived dependence on US • Shah’s contempt for Islamic culture • autocratic/repressive rule

20. Iranian politics • Anti-Shah forces • Shiite ulama • involved in opposition movements • tied to bazaari community • financial & pol independence from the state • control of network of mosques -- allowed criticism • But others rode the theocratic coattails

21. Islamic factions • Radical • young intelligentsia • Militant • ulama, petty-b, dispossessed • Liberal • “contest” appealed to non-violent middle class • Traditionalist • protest from old middle class strata

22. Analysis • Islam adapted by group interests • Leadership • Ideological mobilization tool

23. Conclusions • Economic structural change not necessarily linked to secularism in • political insts • attitudes & values • Islam appeal linked to dislocations & inequalities • Traditional actors are powerful not passive • cf ultra right in Israel • Catholic Church in Poland

24. Conclusions • Absolutist politics after Iranian revolution • explained in terms of desire for power • not necessarily an aspect of Islam • Dialogue between tradition and modernity silenced in Iran, this time by tradition!