280 likes | 447 Views
Introduction to Network Mathematics (3) - Simple Games and applications. Yuedong Xu 16/05/2012. Outline. Overview Prison’s Dilemma Curnot Duopoly Selfish Routing Summary. Overview. What is “game theory”? A scientific way to depict the rational behaviors in interactive situations
E N D
Introduction to Network Mathematics (3)- Simple Games and applications YuedongXu 16/05/2012
Outline • Overview • Prison’s Dilemma • Curnot Duopoly • Selfish Routing • Summary
Overview • What is “game theory”? • A scientific way to depict the rational behaviors in interactive situations • Examples: playing poker, chess; setting price; announcing wars; and numerous commercial strategies • Why is “game theory” important? • Facilitates strategic thinking!
Overview • Olympic Badminton Match 2012 • Four pair of players expelled because they “throw” the matches • Why are players trying to lose the match in the round-robin stage?
Overview • Chinese VS Korean • If Chinese team wins, it may encounter another Chinese team earlier in the elimination tournament. (not optimal for China) Best strategy for Chinese team: LOSE • If Korean team wins luckily, it may meet with another Chinese team that is usually stronger than itself in the elimination tournament. Best strategy for Korean team: LOSE
Overview • Korean VS Indonesian • Conditioned on the result: China Lose • If Korean team wins, meet with another Korean team early in the elimination tournament. (not optimal for Korea) Best strategy for Korean team: LOSE • If Indonesian wins, meet with a strong Chinese team in the elimination tournament. Best strategy for Indonesian team: LOSE
Overview • What is “outcome”? • Ugly matches that both players and watchers are unhappy • By studying this case, we know how to design a good “rule” so as to avoid “throwing” matches
Outline • Overview • Prison’s Dilemma • Curnot Duopoly • Selfish Routing • Summary
Prison’s Dilemma • Two suspects are caught and put in different rooms (no communication). They are offered the following deal: • If both of you confess, you will both get 5 years in prison (-5 payoff) • If one of you confesses whereas the other does not confess, you will get 0 (0 payoff) and 10 (-10 payoff) years in prison respectively. • If neither of you confess, you both will get 2 years in prison (-2 payoff)
Prison’s Dilemma Prisoner 2 Prisoner 1
Prison’s Dilemma Prisoner 2 Prisoner 1
Prison’s Dilemma • Game • Players (e.g. prisoner 1&2) • Strategy (e.g. confess or defect) • Payoff (e.g. years spent in the prison) • Nash Equilibrium (NE) • In equilibrium, neither player can unilaterally change his/her strategy to improve his/her payoff, given the strategies of other players.
Prison’s Dilemma • Some common concerns • Existence/uniqueness of NE • Convergence to NE • Playing games sequentially or repeatedly • More advanced games • Playing game with partial information • Evolutionary behavior • Algorithmic aspects • and more ……
Prison’s Dilemma – Two NEs Prisoner 2 Prisoner 1
Prison’s Dilemma – No NE Rock-Paper-Scissors game: If there exists a NE, then it is simple to play!
Outline • Overview • Prison’s Dilemma • Curnot Duopoly • Selfish Routing • Summary
Curnot Duopoly Basic setting: • Two firms: A & B are profit seekers • Strategy: quantity that they produce • Market price p: p = 100 - (qA+ qB) • Question: optimal quantity for A&B
Curnot Duopoly • A’s profit: • Strategy: quantity that they produce • Market price p: p = 100 - (qA+ qB) • Question: optimal quantity for A&B
Curnot Duopoly • A’s profit: πA(qA,qB) = qAp = qA(100-qA-qB) • B’s profit: πB(qA,qB) = qBp= qB(100-qA-qB) • How to find the NE?
Curnot Duopoly • A’s best strategy: dπA(qA,qB) —————— = 100 - 2qA – qB= 0 dqA • B’s best strategy: dπB(qA,qB) —————— = 100 - 2qB – qA= 0 dqB • Combined together: qA* = qB* = 100/3
Curnot Duopoly • Take-home messages: • If the strategy is continuous, e.g. production quantity or price, you can find the best response for each player, and then find the fixed point(s) for these best response equations.
Outline • Overview • Prison’s Dilemma • Curnot Duopoly • Selfish Routing • Summary
Selfish Routing • Braess’s Paradox x 1 x 1 s t s 0 t x x 1 1 Traffic of 1 unit/sec needs to be routed from s to t Want to minimize average delay Braess 1968, in study of road traffic
Selfish Routing • Before and after x 1 x 1 .5 .5 1 0 s t s 0 1 t .5 .5 0 1 x x 1 1 Think of green flow – it has no incentive to deviate Adding a 0 cost link made average delay worse!!!
Selfish Routing • Braess’s paradox illustrates non-optimality of selfish routing • Think of the flow consisting of tiny “packets” • Each chooses the lowest latency route • This would reach an equilibrium (pointed out by Wardrop) – Wardrop equilibrium • = Nash equilibrium
Summary • Present the concept of game and Nash Equilibrium • Present a discrete and a continuous examples • Illustrate the selfish routing