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The Problem of Handover Keying

The Problem of Handover Keying. IETF 66 Montreal. AAA based Keying for Wireless Handovers: Problem Statement draft-nakhjiri-aaa-hokey-ps-03 Madjid Nakhjiri (Huawei USA) Mohan Parthasarathy (Nokia) Julien Bournelle (GET/INT/FT) Hannes Tschofenig (Siemens) R. Marin Lopez (TARI).

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The Problem of Handover Keying

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  1. The Problem of Handover Keying IETF 66 Montreal

  2. AAA based Keying for Wireless Handovers:Problem Statementdraft-nakhjiri-aaa-hokey-ps-03Madjid Nakhjiri (Huawei USA)Mohan Parthasarathy (Nokia)Julien Bournelle (GET/INT/FT)Hannes Tschofenig (Siemens)R. Marin Lopez (TARI)

  3. Slide from IETF 65:Handover in Wireless Access Networks Access link • Access Nodes (BS/AP) providing secure access links • User/device credentials stored at AAA server • Handover: Establish a new secure link with new AN. • Handover performance is a crucial service quality factor • Desired: Minimal interaction with AAA server during handover. MN Access Gateway AAA server Access Node Access Gateway

  4. Slide from IETF 65: EAP Keying for fixed peers EAP server peer Authenticator EAP-XXX Method Authentication Generation of MSK, EMSK, EAP over L2 Generation of MSK, EMSK, EAP over AAA MSK transport EAP complete EAP complete Security Association Protocol (TSKs) Transported MSK Generation of TSKs Generation of TSKs Use TSKs for link security

  5. Slide from IETF 65:Use of EAP keying for handovers Old SA(TSK) MSK1 MN Auth-1/BS1 MSK2 New SA (TSK) Auth2-BS2 EAP/AAA server Auth3-BS3 • Old SA (MN-BS1 TSKs): created using MSK (or PMK) at BS1 • New SA: (MN-BS2 TSKs): Create a new MSK (MSK2) at BS2? • Run EAP again for the new MSK/ SA ?

  6. Slide from IETF 65:Handover keying using EAP: SDO solutions TSK BS1 EAP. AAA server MN PMK MSK AG BS2 Authenticator • Split the authenticator into two functions (e.g. WiMAX) • Authenticator = Access Gateway: (holds MSK, creates per AN keys: PMK) • Authenticator port=Access node (receives PMK, creates TSK through SAP) • Intra-Authenticator Handover? A new PMK for each BS from initial MSK (Port to Port HO)

  7. Slide from IETF 65:Problem: Inter-authenticator Authenticator PMK • Authenticator handover not supported • Requires re-authentication (re-run of EAP) • Can we avoid running a new EAP as part of Authenticator Handover? EAP. AAA server TSK MN MSK ANs

  8. Slides from IETF 65:HOKEY: Create a Key Hierarchy • Use a EAP method generated key to derive a key hierarchy • To support Intra-authenticator as well as Inter-authenticator HO in a way that does not require new EAP runs • To support heterogeneous access technology roaming • Define key derivation/ management at each level • (i.e. at AAA server, at ADC level, at AN level) • If the level within IETF scope: specify • If outside IETF scope: Requirement/ guidance/ parameters specifications (e.g. for channel binding, scoping, caching life time) • Protocols/ Requirements for key request/ transport/ distribution • Reqs for new protocols/ extensions for existing protocols (e.g. AAA) • Security goals • Performance Goal: handover optimization (pre-/ post handover signaling)

  9. Elements according Problem Statement V03 • Intra ADC handover: Key management and key derivation inside same ADC. • Inter ADC handover: Key Management and key derivation through different ADCs but same AAA, without running EAP again. AN1 ADC1 LSAP LSAP-MK1 MN AAA server ADMSK-1 Intra-ADC HO LSAP-MK2 AD1 Inter-ADC HO HRK AN2 ADMSK-2 ADC2 LSAP-MK3 AN3 AD2

  10. Terminology according to PS V03 • Handover Root Key • Used as the root of key hierarchy (previously called XMSK) is held by AAA server now. • Access Domain • A domain whose authentication and key management goes through the same ADC. • Access Domain Controller • Entity responsible for keying needs within an Access Domain. It holds ADMSK (derived from XMSK) to derive new keys. • Access Domain Controller MSK (ADMSK) • A key that is sent to eachAccess Domain Controller • Inter-ADC versus Intra-ADC handovers • Instead of inter- versus intra-authenticator

  11. To specify • HRK (per AAA server) • Separate derivation Spec?: parameters, PRF • ADMSK (per ADC) • Derivation spec part of key hierarcy (PRF, parameters) • Transport spec (protocol/triggers/AAA requirements/ specs) • LSAP_MK (per AN) • Derivation spec part of key hierarchy (hetero access included) • Transport spec (protocol reqs/triggers/specs) • Guidelines on LSK derivation (outside IETF?) • Fast re-authentication (session expiry, ADC HO)

  12. Backup: Why ADC instead of Authenticator • Allows for easier management of heterogeneous roaming/ handovers (e.g. per-domain technology) • Combine key mgmt with mobility mgmt • Handover root key transport/caching behavior • HRK (e.g. MSK) is kept at AAA server, not sent to authenticator • A per ADC master keys (ADMSK) are sent to ADC • Separation of EAP auth. and handover keying signaling • Key mgmt and mobility mgmt can be inside an ADC, independent of entity that acts as pass-thru Auth, • Pass-thru auth either in AN or ADC • More crisp key usage guidelines • Authenticator master key<->Authenticator port master key? • Use ADC master key (ADMSK) and AN master key (LSAP_MK) instead

  13. Tough problems • Terminology, Terminology, terminology • What key to use as handover root key: • MSK or an USRK/AMSK ([I-D.salowey-eap-emsk-deriv] ) • Creates Milestone issues for key hierarchy spec • Positioning of pass-through Auth. wrt ADC and AN • Definition of fast re-authentiaction (resolved!?) • Channel binding • Case 1: when ADC and AN are colocated (EAP keying) • Case 2: when ADC and AN are not colocated (SDO cases)

  14. Handover keying Deliverables (ML May 25) • Handover keying problem statement draft (Informational). • Handover Root Key (HRK) derivation specification (standards Track) • Handover keying key hierarchy draft (Standards Track) • Handover keying protocol requirements draft (Informational/ Standards Track) • Handover keying protocol solution (depending on the scope)

  15. Proposed milestones (ML May 25) • Mar 07 Handover keying PS to IESG • Mar 07 Handover root key specification to IESG • Sep 07 Handover key hierarchy specification to IESG • Dec 07 Handover keying protocol requirements to IESG • Aug 08 Handover Keying protocol solutions to IESG

  16. HOAKEY BoF/HOKEYP Mailing list Report

  17. IETF 65 HOAKEY BoF result • Support for work on handover keying • Issues with multi-application application keying: • Separate application keying from handover keying and Pre-auth • HOAKEY became HOKEYP: • Combine handover keying and Pre-authentication charters • Work towards aggressive interim Chartering and/or another BoF in IETF 66

  18. Progress Since IETF 65 • Produced • HOKEYP charter V00-V03 (April/May) • Handover keying problem statement update to V02 • Pre-authentication problem statement V00 • USRK (AMSK) derivation draft V00/V01 • ML generated 51 emails in April, 93 in May • ML Last call on HOKEYP charter proposal on V03 (May 15-May 25)

  19. MLLC results on HOKEYP charter • MLLC generated 79 emails in 10 days • 11 people approved (13, including ex-BoF chairs) • 6 manufacturers total, 3 operators • 2 persons requesting additions of some remaining EAP WG work into the charter/ clarification of some items • V04 and V05 generated during last call period, including changes in text, deliverables and deadlines • V06 and V07 generated after last call. • 2 solution drafts posted on the ML

  20. Contentious topics • Choice of HRK (MSK versus AMSK/USRK) • TBD by Expert/Design team meeting • USRK/AMSK derivation standardization process? • In HOKEYP, an EAP EXT group? • Definition of fast re-authentication • Method dependent or independent (mostly resolved) • Channel binding solution • For EAP or HOKEY architecture (in HOKEYP or in EAP EXT?) • Milestone dates • Mostly resolved except those relating to HRK choice

  21. Deliverables as of V07 • Handover keying problem statement draft (Informational). • Handover Root Key (HRK) derivation specification (standards Track) • Handover keying key hierarchy draft (Standards Track) • Handover keying protocol requirements draft (Informational/ Standards Track) • Handover keying protocol solution (depending on the scope) • Pre-authentication problem statement draft (Informational) • Pre-authentication protocol requirements draft (Informational) • Possible partial solution for pre-authentication signaling

  22. Proposed Charter milestones • Nov 06 Pre-authentication PS to IESG • Mar 07 Handover keying PS to IESG • Mar 07 Handover root key specification to IESG • Apr 07 Pre-authentication protocol requirement draft to IESG • Sep 07 Handover key hierarchy specification to IESG • Dec 07 Handover keying protocol requirements to IESG • Aug 08 Handover Keying protocol solutions to IESG

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