Giuliano Bonoli

1. The politics of postindustrial welfare statesExplaining cross-national variation in the adaptation to new social risks Giuliano Bonoli

2. The late 2000s: a new « consensus » for the welfare state • The 2000s have seen the emergence of a new « consensus » on social policy • It puts emphasis on “social investment” • Defended by international organisations, and, within countries, different political forces • Countries have moved in this direction, but at a different speed and with different results

3. Uneven progress towards the new welfare state • Nordic welfare states have been considerably more successful in adapting the social investment model • Continental European welfare states are lagging behind • Puzzle: why, in spite of the strong consensus on the social investment model, is progress uneven?

4. Old Pensions Survivors benefits Short term unemployment benefits Sickness benefits Invalidity benefits New Active labour market policies In work benefits Child care services Family benefits Parental leave Examples of old and new social policies

5. It is justified to distinguish between two sorts of social policies, because: • They constitute responses to different social transformations (industrialisation/ postindustrialisation) • They have different objectives (decommodification/ labour market participation) • They target different groups • Why not?

6. How do we explain divergence? • Politics: Social vs. Christian democracy Vs. Liberals • The relative timing of postindustrialisation, ageing and welfare state maturation • Left power with economic openness • The influence of women

7. Spending on old and new polices as a % of GDP, averages 1997-2001 Source: OECD SOCX 2004

8. The timing of key postindustrial developments in 18 OECD countries Source: Based on OECD Statistical compendium

9. Relationship between the average benchmark year and spending on new social risk polices, 1997-2001 Source: Based on OECD Statistical compendium

10. Alternative explanations 1: the strength of the left Source: OECD SOCX and Armingeon et al. CPDS

11. Alternative explanation 2: the strength of the Christian democrats Source: OECD SOCX and Armingeon et al. CPDS

12. Alternative explanation 3: Catholicism Source: OECD SOCX and www.adherents.com

13. Competing explanations: correlation matrix Source: see previous slides

14. Alternative explanation: catching upIncrease in spending on the new polices in the 1990s and spending in 1987-1991

15. Unpacking the timing hypothesis: a crowding out effect • It is not time per se that matters, but the different configurations of variables that one finds at different points in time • This can be conceptualised as a crowding out effect • We can expect spending on old policies at time t to impact on spending on new policies at time t+ 1 • We need to control for total social expenditure

16. Pooled time series analysis of spending on childcare and ALMPs • ALMPs: spending data 1981-2003 * 21 OECD countries, time t • Childcare: spending data 1996-2003 * 23 OECD countries, time t • IV: strength of the Left, Christian democracy, trade openness, proportion of women in parliament, spending on old age (+ controls), at time t-1

17. Prais-Winsten Regression of spending on ALMPs, 1981-2003. Source: G. Bonoli, The Political Economy of Activation, Lausanne, IDHEAP, Working paper No. 1/2008, available on www.idheap.ch/ps

18. Prais-Winsten Regression of spending on family services, 1998-2003.

19. Conclusions ? • We clearly need a multicausal explanation to account for the divergence • Timing matters, through an institution-induced crowding out effect • Politics also matters. But we need a more complex understanding of politics. • Left parties are not identical across countries • Need to focus on new cleavages (gender, age)