Lessons from Rail and the Cullen Inquiry: Do we need a Highways Accident Investigation Branch?

1. Do we need a Highways Accident Investigation Branch Lessons from Rail and the Cullen Inquiry Steve Gooding, Director – RAC Foundation Chris Jackson, Head of Transport Sector, Burges Salmon

2. Why we need an HAIB Comparators: UK transport modes and the objectives: of independent accident investigation Lessons from Rail/Cullen/other modes: • Independence • Non-use of witness evidence in criminal process DfT/RAC Foundation investigation project – progress so far Discussion/questions Overview

3. Steve Gooding Director, RAC Foundation November 2018 2017

4. incident monitor investigation implement patterns lessons

5. This is not a ‘block-and-copy’ job

7. Why ? ‘Number Crunching’ by mode (2016 data)

8. To prevent recurrence/improve system safety Ability to: • Get at the facts • Establish immediate and root causes • ‘Call out’ regulatory as well as operational factors • Not penal/fault finding – separate process E.g. Rail scope (2004/49/eu – RSD): Article 19(1) - a serious accident where investigation is mandatory Article 19(2) - an accident or incident, which under slightly different conditions might have led to a serious accident, ie a near miss of a serious accident Investigation Objectives

9. Highways

10. Benefits of an AIB AIB Staff

11. Collision: 5 October 1999: • 31 fatalities • >400 injuries • Public Inquiry(ies): • Cullen/LGRI 1: the collision – immediate causes • Joint Southall/LGRI: Cullen/Ufftrain protection systems etc • Cullen/LGRI 2: industry structure, regulation and legislation • Industry group representations/submissions including ATOC, Railtrack – now NR, ORR, HSE, Unions, Police, families/survivor groups Development Railway Safety Directive in parallel and following. RAIB debate = one of 7 key issues covered Ladbroke Grove/Cullen Public Inquiry

12. Human Error and System Failings: • Location specific • Generic Role of: • Operators (infrastructure and • Regulators • (Legislature) Contrast e.g. Shoreham and Buncefield approaches Technology, societal perception of risk, and future roads Independence and Immediate/Root Cause

13. “ (24) A safety investigation should be kept separate from the judicial inquiry into the same incident and be granted access to evidence and witnesses. It should be carried out by a permanent body that is independent of the actors of the rail sector. The body should function in a way which avoids any conflict of interest and any possible involvement in the causes of the occurrences that are investigated; in particular, its functional independence should not be affected if it is closely linked to the national safety authority or regulator of railways for organisational and legal structure purposes. Its investigations should be carried out under as much openness as possible. For each occurrence the investigation body should establish the relevant investigation group with necessary expertise to find the immediate causes and underlying causes.” Railway Safety Directive 2004/49

14. The safety policy imperative to keep separate from criminal process MOUs between AIBs, regulators and police The different purposes of criminal law, civil law and regulation Need for secondary legislation or equivalent protection E.g Sussex Police v Secretary of state for Transport & Anor (2016): Police application to Court to access AAIB evidence refused by High Court Reason = “chilling effect” of deterring witnesses Compulsion powers/the right against self-incrimination. AIB witness evidence

15. Rail – Different Roles

16. UK Post Cullen rail safety (2005-2015)

17. £480,000 • live crash investigations • independent from the police • boil the sea • focus only on casualties

18. Consult widely • Develop a ‘systems thinking’ framework • Work with police forces and NPCC • Pursue the true cost of crashes • Interrogate and match data sets • Pursue an ‘agile’ approach • Underway • Commissioned • By year end

19. ?

20. Thank you Discussion